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Abstract 
 
In the mid-1990s, the World Bank promoted a major reform of the pension systems in 
developing and transition economies; namely, the introduction of mandatory defined 
contribution pension schemes. Yet this was not accompanied by thorough analysis of the 
potentially speculative valuation side effects of influential institutional investors being 
introduced into underdeveloped financial markets. 
In this Dissertation we developed a theoretical Overlapping Generations Model 
(OLG) with rational asset bubbles and influential institutional Defined Contribution (DC) 
pension funds. We report empirical evidence, based on data from the Croatian financial 
market, which confirms predictions of our theoretical model: namely, that when the financial 
market becomes dynamically inefficient, introduction of influential DC pension funds 
significantly increases the incidence and the intensity of the bubbly asset episodes. The 
empirical evidence also confirms that the shock of return to dynamic efficiency on the 
financial market, caused by the Global Financial Crisis, resulted in a sudden and swift 
collapse of the bubbly Croatian equity market. 
We begin the Dissertation with a retrospect of the Efficient Market Hypothesis and 
the empirical evidence on asset price misevaluation episodes. The Efficient Market 
Hypothesis was contested with respect to its “joint hypothesis problem” contained in the 
distinction between the information efficiency of financial markets and the efficiency of 
financial market asset valuation. Major empirical evidence questioning asset valuation 
efficiency led to the development of four major theories of asset bubbles, which we treat in 
detail.  We focus on the Rational Asset Bubbles theory as the most compelling and we use it 
in our own theoretical modelling. Building on a model developed by Jean Tirole (1985), we 
develop an original OLG Rational Asset Bubbles model with mandatory DC Pension funds as 
influential institutional investors. We inspect the dynamics of the modelled financial market 
using Phase Diagrams to derive the hypothesis that the introduction of a mandatory DC 
pension fund in a dynamically inefficient financial market leads to a higher state of the 
rational asset bubble. We also hypothesise that a sudden change in the dynamic efficiency of 
the financial market could lead to a swift crash of the rational asset bubble in such a market 
environment. 
To test these hypotheses, we first develop novel approaches to identifying and 
measuring observable counterparts to each of the variables specified by the theoretical model. 
Next, we gather unique raw data from the Croatian financial market and extract time-series 
variables measuring: the relative value of the Croatian equity bubble; the dynamic efficiency 
of the Croatian financial market; and two different sets of DC pension fund investment data 
(one at annual and the other at monthly frequency), which arise from the introduction of DC 
pension funds on the Croatian financial market. Using this dataset, we estimate two empirical 
Vector Error Correction Models. In the first model we use the first set of two investment 
variables arising from the introduction of the DC pension funds: the direct equity investments 
in Croatian equities; and the indirect investments through the Croatian and SEE equity 
focused open-end mutual funds. While the empirical evidence showed that the direct equity 
investments behaved as productive investments, the indirect equity investments were 
identified as a bubbly (speculative) asset used by the Croatian DC pension funds. The model 
showed that the introduction of the DC pension fund led to a higher bubbly steady state of the 
equity market. This was confirmed by the second, simpler, VEC model, which was specified 
with only the indirect investment variable identified as bubbly in the first model. Specifying a 
model with only the indirect bubbly investment enabled higher frequency observations to 
better capture the speculative impact of DC pension funds.  
In sum, we demonstrate the importance of the interaction between the introduction of 
DC pension funds and the dynamic efficiency of the financial market for the incidence and 
intensity of asset bubbles. In doing so, we draw to the attention of policy makers in countries 
introducing mandatory DC pension funds some hitherto unacknowledged consequences of 
this reform, once vigorously promoted by the World Bank.  
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Introduction 
 
In this dissertation we develop and present an Overlapping Generation Model with 
rational asset bubbles, which introduces Defined Contribution (DC) pension funds as 
influential institutional investors into the canonical model developed by Tirole (1985). We 
show through theoretical simulations derived from our model that the introduction of 
influential institutional investors, such as DC pension funds, onto the underdeveloped 
financial markets of the SEE transition economies created a fertile environment for rational 
asset bubbles. In our corresponding empirical analysis, we use data from the Croatian 
financial market, and its equity market in particular, because of the relative importance of this 
market in the SEE region and because of the availability of the data. Based on data from the 
Croatian financial market, we estimate two Vector Error Correction Models and find 
evidence supporting our theoretical hypothesis that the introduction of influential institutional 
investors onto an underdeveloped financial market could create a speculative market 
environment and increase the speculative market pricing equilibrium to the levels associated 
with asset bubbles.  
The general motivation of this dissertation comes from the pension reforms in the 
SEE financial markets and the speculative equity market episodes on their small equity 
markets following the pension reforms. Global pension reforms in the last decade of the 20
th
 
and the first decade of the 21
st
 century were marked by the highly influential research 
Averting the Old Age Crisis sponsored by the World Bank (World Bank, 1994). With this 
research, the World Bank promoted mandatory fully funded pension funds, the so called 
“second pension pillar”, as the basis of pension reforms suitable for developing and transition 
countries. Those mandatory fully funded pension funds were designed as country wide 
saving/investment schemes, predominantly taking the legal form of DC pension fund 
institutions. These collect part of each employee‟s gross salary on a mandatory basis and 
invest this amount on the financial market to provide pensions in the future. Such reform was 
meant to help those countries overcome the issue of population aging and the inadequacy of 
their current “pay-as-you-go”, the “first pillar” of their pension insurance systems. This 
World Bank initiative, followed by a set of active advising programs, resulted in 23 countries 
undertaking the reforms and accepting the so called “second pillar” of the pension insurance 
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represented by the mandatory fully-funded privately managed pension funds (later in the text 
DC pension funds). The reforms started among Latin American countries
1
 where, after being 
pioneered in Chile in 1981, 12 more Latin American countries undertook the same path. The 
second wave followed among the Eastern European transition countries
2
 where 10 countries 
undertook the reforms in a period of 10 years or so (1998-2008) (Lago, 2014). Romania was 
the last country on the list, which converted to the system in 2008. The main consequence of 
the reforms was the establishment of influential Defined Contribution (DC) pension fund 
institutional investors rapidly growing by their assets under management and soon becoming 
dominant institutions on the underdeveloped financial markets of the reforming countries. 
Besides the main focus on the issue of aging population, inadequacy of the current 
pension system and the suggested reform process, with detailed prescriptions on the forms of 
application and transition to the mandatory fully-funded saving schemes, there was very little 
analysis and information in the World Bank research about the potential negative impacts or 
challenges of such reform on the underdeveloped financial markets of those countries. 
Mostly, this was because before 1994, when this research project was published, only Chile 
had a (relatively short) track record of experience with the introduction of privately managed 
mandatory DC pension funds. The World Bank (WB) assumed in its research that the impact 
of the introduction of mandatory fully-funded DC pension funds on the financial markets of 
the developing and transition countries would be predominantly positive, stimulating 
financial innovation and market deepening. Such an assumption was based on the experience 
of US financial markets, where occupational pension schemes started dominating the 
financial market already in the 1980s and early 1990s (Allen, 2001).  
In the United States, pension funds and life insurance companies became the main 
forces behind financial innovations after the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, which imposed minimum funding requirements and 
sharply increased the demand for hedging instruments. New instruments have 
been tailored to the needs of pension funds (such as zero coupon bonds, 
collateralized mortgage obligations, mortgage-backed securities, indexed futures 
                                                 
1
 Latin America: Chile 1981, Peru 1993, Argentina and Colombia 1994, Uruguay 1996, Bolivia and Mexico 
1997, El Salvador 1998, Nicaragua 2000, Costa Rica and Ecuador 2001, Dominican Republic 2003 and Panama 
2008. 
2
 Eastern Europe: Hungary 1998, Poland 1999, Latvia 2001, Bulgaria, Croatia and Estonia 2002, Lithuania 
2004, Slovakia 2005, Macedonia 2006 and Romania 2008. 
18 | P a g e  
 
and options, and guaranteed income contracts). These financial instruments have 
transformed illiquid loans into highly liquid and tradable securities and enabled 
new forms of risk sharing, facilitating both business investment and housing 
finance. UK pension funds make active use of financial instruments in their 
international investment strategies, increasing liquidity and lowering transaction 
costs. So, one reason for encouraging private funded pension plans in middle 
income developing and transitional countries is they might become an instrument 
of financial innovation and capital market deepening. 
       (World Bank, 1994, p. 177) 
However, even in developed financial markets such as the US market, those 
welcomed innovative financial instruments produced to satisfy the investment requirements 
of the growing occupational pension industry, stressed as positive in the WB research in the 
1990s, were later criticized as being highly speculative and responsible for the real-estate 
bubble which triggered the Global Financial Crisis with its collapse in 2006/2007. 
The potential issue of the over-accumulation of productive investments caused by the 
strong shift in the savings attitude of the developing and transition economies, as a corollary 
of the introduction of mandatory fully-funded pension schemes, was ignored as a possible 
problem for the financial markets of those developing and transition countries. The potential 
negative effects were disqualified without a thorough analysis but simply with the argument 
that reasonably high rates of productive capital returns existed in those economies (World 
Bank, 1994, p. 208; Vittas & Michelitsch, 1995, p. 24). 
 This lack of a critical attention toward the potential negative impact on financial 
market dynamics when influential institutional investors – pension funds – are introduced 
onto a small and underdeveloped financial market, in the World Bank (1994) research on the 
suggested reforms, resulted eventually in negative performance and an expensive reverse 
trend in the reforming process of the pension systems in many of those developing and 
transition economies after the Global Financial Crisis. Hungary fully reversed the reforms by 
nationalizing the “second pillar” DC pension funds, while many other countries such as 
Argentina and Bolivia in Latin America, and Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania 
in Eastern Europe applied transitional measures reversing the reforms, mainly by reducing 
the mandatory contributions to the fully-funded pension funds (Heinz, 2012). One of the 
main reasons was the significant financial loss and the disappointing returns achieved by 
pension fund investments (Rofman, 2011). The inadequate analysis of potentially negative 
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effects of the introduction of fully-funded DC pension funds on the financial markets of the 
transition and developing economies, producing fertile ground for development of 
speculative investment episodes, was one of the main reasons for the failure of the reforms 
and for the costly reversing actions. The main challenge of this dissertation is to add to the 
understanding of the consequences of introducing influential institutional investors onto the 
underdeveloped financial markets of the developing and transition economies, in particular 
with respect to the probability of the incidence and the level of bubbly (speculative) market 
outcomes.   
 In order to understand the occurrence and the character of asset bubbles, in Chapter 1 
of the dissertation we present a detailed introduction to the theoretical treatment of market 
speculation and asset bubbles. We begin our discussion with the still dominating financial 
markets paradigm of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis (ECMH) and we introduce 
some of its main issues such as the “joint hypothesis problem”. A number of empirical 
studies testing the ECMH show that although financial markets generally provide confirming 
evidence of information efficiency, they often imply asset pricing mechanisms that 
significantly differ from the fundamental values of the underlying assets (Shiller, 2000). 
Those two elements, the information and pricing efficiency of the financial market 
mechanism are hard to separate and test individually, which describes the joint hypothesis 
problem. However, the impressive amount of empirical evidence focused on departures of 
financial asset prices from their fundamental values initiated new theoretical ideas describing 
the market pricing mechanisms, aside from the principles of the ECMH or the beliefs of 
market “fundamentalists”. In the first chapter we make a complete account of the four major 
theories of asset bubbles, which present an alternative understanding on the operation of 
financial market pricing mechanisms. Those schools of asset bubbles or asset bubble theories 
are the Rational Asset Bubble Theory, Asymmetric Information Theory, the Agency Problem 
Theory and the Irrational Investors Theory. We find the most compelling to be the Rational 
Asset Bubbles theory, which with its Overlapping Generations modelling (OLG) structure 
was introduced in the canonical work of Jean Tirole in 1985. This presents the most complete 
platform for modelling financial markets with bubbly assets, connecting the macro dynamics 
with the micro specifics defined in the model (Tirole, 1985).   
Next, we continue with Chapter 2, where we present our original extension to Tirole‟s 
Rational Asset Bubbles OLG model, augmenting it by introducing mandatory institutional 
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DC pension funds as influential market participants. Our specific theoretical modelling, built 
on the platform of Tirole‟s Rational Asset Bubbles model, allows us to analyse the dynamics 
of the speculative asset pricing mechanisms under certain conditions: namely, the 
introduction and the impact of the DC pension funds; the dynamic (in) efficiency of the 
financial market; and the impact of significant shifts in inter-temporal consumer preferences 
caused by events such as the Global Financial Crisis. Phase diagram simulations arising from 
our theoretical model are used to simulate certain scenarios and inform our main hypothesis 
about the effects of the introduction of DC pension funds. We hypothesise that the 
introduction of the DC pension funds is expected to increase the incidence and the intensity 
of rational asset bubbles, especially in dynamically inefficient financial market environments. 
We also hypothesise that strong shifts in the dynamic efficiency of the financial market, 
caused by either sudden fear among consumers/investors triggered by such events as the 
Global Financial Crisis or by the termination of the DC pension scheme, could produce swift 
increase of market volatility and a collapse of the bubbly assets.  
We continue by developing an empirical strategy for testing our hypotheses in 
Chapter 3. There we first determine the most important variables that have to be measured, 
and we identify unique measuring methodologies used to extract the corresponding data from 
the Croatian financial market. Our main endogenous variables are the relative value of the 
Croatian equity bubble, the dynamic efficiency of the Croatian financial market and two 
separate sets of DC pension fund investment variables differentiated by the method of 
derivation and their genuine frequency. Within the DC pension fund investment variables, 
besides the direct equity market investments, we introduce investments in the Croatian open-
end investment funds. These funds are financial intermediates that invest on the Croatian and 
SEE equity markets based on a pre-specified investment policy. The Croatian Open-end 
investment funds focused on Croatian and SEE equity markets boomed with their assets 
under management during the period of the Croatian equity bubble and were intensively used 
as an investment asset by the DC pension funds. Their extension of the principle-agent 
problem and information asymmetry makes them a suitable candidate for the “bubbly asset” 
in the context of the Croatian financial market. The open-end investment funds were the 
actual financial market innovation, in the spirit of the World Bank, which genuinely 
developed in order to satisfy the need of the DC pension funds for a bubbly asset in the 
bubbly financial market environment. In this chapter we also estimate the relative value of 
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the asset bubble on the US market, as an exogenous variable to control for the effect of global 
financial markets. Finally, we construct set of dummy variables representing the introduction 
of certain legal acts affecting the operation and the investments of the Croatian DC pension 
funds. We make a complete descriptive analysis of our dataset in order to address some 
important issues such as stationarity and co-integration among non-stationary variables. We 
further use this data set in Chapters 4 and 5, where we estimate two empirical time-series 
models to test our main hypotheses. 
In the first empirical model presented in Chapter 4, we estimate a Vector Error 
Correction Model (VECM) with lag order of four and with two long-term co-integrating 
relationships. This model is estimated with a set of two investment variables of the DC 
pension funds describing their introduction to the Croatian financial market: direct DC 
pension fund investments in Croatian equity; and indirect DC pension fund investments in 
Croatian equity through the Croatian and SEE equity focused open-end mutual funds. The 
data for both variables is directly extracted from the audited balance sheets of the four 
Croatian DC pension funds and interpolated from their yearly frequency to monthly 
frequency using the cubic fitting function. This first estimated empirical model has several 
drawbacks. First, it consumes a high number of degrees of freedom due to the high optimal 
lag in the model compared to the length of the data set. Second, its two DC pension fund 
investment variables are interpolated from their genuine yearly to a monthly frequency, 
which causes them to be highly cross correlated with each other. And, finally, the coefficients 
of the VECM show weak results when testing their stability. We also introduce a structural 
break within the co-integrating vectors, signifying the effect of the Global Financial Crisis, 
which suggests that the GFC had a dominant effect on the collapse of the equity bubble and 
on the change of the dynamic efficiency of the Croatian financial market. Our first theoretical 
model, confirms that the introduction of the DC pension funds, measured by the pension fund 
investments variables, have a positive effect on the relative value of the Croatian equity 
bubble. One of the unique benefits from the first empirical model with two investment 
variables is that it identifies the bubbly asset as the indirect DC pension fund investments via 
the Croatian and SEE equity focused open-end mutual funds, while the direct equity 
investments are identified as productive investments. This distinction is confirmed by the 
contrasting impacts of each investment variable on the dynamic efficiency of the Croatian 
financial market.   
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In order to overcome the problems identified with our first empirical model estimated 
and presented in Chapter 4, we estimate the second empirical model presented in Chapter 5, 
in which we introduce DC pension funds by a single investment variable. This is a smaller 
VECM with a lag order of zero and with two co-integrating vectors, and in which the 
investment variable of the DC pension fund is represented by an index of the assets under 
management of the Croatian and SEE equity focused open-end mutual funds weighted by 
their participation in the DC pension fund portfolios. The genuine monthly frequency of this 
index variable brings the benefit of much richer information about the DC pension fund 
speculative investments but at the cost of shorter period of availability. Using this variable we 
estimate a much simpler VEC Model, losing many fewer degrees of freedom. This second 
model is free from residual cross-correlation among the equations of the VECM, which was 
an issue with the empirical model presented in Chapter 4. The coefficient stability tests show 
also much more robust results for this second empirical model. However, when we test our 
hypothesis using our model in Chapter 5, we find similar results to the ones supported by our 
first empirical model. 
Finally, we use our two empirical models to draw conclusions about the long-term 
and short-term interactions of our variables governing our modelled financial market 
dynamics and to test our theoretical hypotheses about the impact of the introduction of DC 
pension funds on the incidence of bubbly assets on domestic financial markets. We find 
evidence confirming the positive effect of the introduction of DC pension funds on the level 
of speculative asset bubbles in the financial market. We also find that the dynamic 
inefficiency of the financial market, representing a misbalance between investment 
opportunities and savings/investment demand, creates a fertile environment for the 
occurrence and for the growth of the rational asset bubbles on the local financial market. 
Namely, an environment with strong savings demand and low investment opportunities 
characterized by low interest rates, called a dynamically inefficient market environment, is 
the necessary condition for the occurrence of rational asset bubbles. The opposite, a 
dynamically efficient financial market environment, represents an environment in which 
rational bubbles collapse. In this structural environment of the financial markets, and 
especially in the case of the dynamically inefficient financial market, the introduction of 
influential DC pension funds, which soon gain significant market importance, stimulate the 
incidence and levels of asset bubbles. Such asset bubbles, increased to a higher level due to 
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the introduction of the DC pension funds, come under high pressure in times of sudden return 
of dynamic efficiency of the market caused by some event triggering market distress. Such 
times are common in periods similar to the global financial crisis, which caused a structural 
shift to the financial market steady states and set the speculative asset valuation dynamics 
towards collapse.  
Finally, we draw the attention of current and future policymakers to the importance of 
dynamic efficiency on the financial market and to the influence of institutional investors on 
the creation of speculative market episodes. Policies stimulating dynamic efficiency must 
follow the growth of the market dominance of DC pension funds. Otherwise the market 
environment can become a fertile platform for ultimately harmful speculative market 
episodes. We believe that this research opens up a new set of issues that should be further 
analysed in order to improve not only the process of pension reforms in the developing and 
transition countries, but also the process of pension fund influence on the global financial 
market. 
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Part I: Theoretical Modeling 
Chapter 1: Theory of Capital Market Asset Bubbles 
 
Introduction 
 
 Analysing the main factors explaining the occurrence of asset bubbles on small and 
illiquid equity markets, such as are characteristic for the South East European (SEE) equity 
markets, presuppose a wide understanding of the theory of finance, focused on the efficiency 
of capital markets and equilibrium asset pricing models. This knowledge sets the critical basis 
for understanding the potential reasons for asset price miss-valuation and for the occurrence 
of asset bubbles in different market environments. For this reason, we begin this dissertation 
focused on the effect of the pension reform and introduction of Defined Contribution pension 
funds in the Croatian financial market on the formation of equity asset bubbles, by reviewing 
the main theoretical foundations on asset pricing theory, market efficiency and the theory of 
asset bubbles.  
We begin by giving summary ideas on the mainstream theory on market efficiency 
and equilibrium asset pricing models, where the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis 
(ECHM) dominates the present mainstream theory of finance. We try to evaluate some 
weaknesses and fundamental questions of ECMH, such as the joint hypothesis problem, 
which will lead us to the current disagreement among the most influential economists in the 
field, about the issues of market efficiency and asset price miss-valuation. This disagreement, 
prominent especially during the last two decades, and playing out against the background of 
many observed market miss-valuations of financial assets, led to the development of a new 
set of theories focusing on the arguments and models explaining the occurrence of asset 
bubbles.  
The main idea of this theoretical chapter is to provide the platform for theoretical and 
then empirical investigation: in particular, theoretical tools, such as the Overlapping 
Generations Model, presenting a general equilibrium framework; and the main micro–
structural features important for explaining asset bubbles. This is a condition sine qua non for 
specifying an empirical model capable of explaining the occurrence of asset bubbles in 
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illiquid financial markets, such as the one present in the Republic of Croatia, affected by the 
introduction of influential institutional investors, namely the defined contribution pension 
funds. 
This theoretical chapter will be structured in the following order. Subchapter 1.1 
which follows, will focus on explaining the historical development of the main ideas leading 
to the establishment of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis(ECMH), with exposition of 
its main strengths and weaknesses, and especially focused on the distinction between the 
informational efficiency hypothesis of the capital markets and the hypothesis on efficiency of 
the equilibrium asset pricing. This distinction is known as the joint hypothesis problem.  
Then follows subchapter 1.2 focused on the theories of asset bubbles, defined as a 
persistent pricing disparity over an assets fundamental value and inspired by the vast 
empirical evidence showing the persistence of capital asset market miss-valuations. Here, we 
will begin with the dominating general equilibrium model, the Overlapping Generations 
Model, which will be explained in detail since it represents the main macro modelling tool for 
theoretically modelling and analysing asset bubbles in different theoretical contexts with 
different micro structures. Then, further, this subchapter will be divided into four parts, each 
one covering one of the four major schools on asset bubbles focused on a specific micro 
structural feature of the market economy which leads to the occurrence of asset bubbles.  
Finally, the conclusions will synthesize all the major ideas relevant for the incidence 
of asset bubbles on the Croatian financial market. This will help to specify an original model 
of asset bubbles, by means of which we will analyse the effect of introducing institutional 
investors.  
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1.1. Evolution of the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis and 
Equilibrium Capital Markets Pricing Models 
 
The origin of ideas about efficient capital markets, as summarized in the work of 
LeRoy (LeRoy, 1989), begins in the early 1930s. The Random walk theory of price dynamics 
was the focus of the pioneering economists analysing stock price dynamics such as Holbrook 
Working (Working, 1934). Another rising group of authors, known as 
“fundamentalists”,(Williams, 1938) and (Graham & Dodd, 1934), claimed that the best 
investment strategy is investment decision-making based on the value of the investment 
assets defined by their discounted values of future expected cash-flows (DCF). This claim 
about valuation based on the intrinsic value of assets, from the very beginning of its 
theoretical treatment within asset pricing theory, was confronted with increasing empirical 
evidence showing that there was not much pay-off from investment decisions based on 
fundamentalist prescriptions. This was an observation made by several academics (Cowles, 
1933), who analysed the results of fundamentalist recommendations given by 45 professional 
agencies at that time, finding that their advice was on average useless. This opposition to the 
claims of “fundamentalists” even from the early stage of the foundation of asset pricing 
theory was becoming a widely accepted opinion among the market practitioners as well.  The 
theoretical alternative for explaining stock market prices and the process by which they are 
set on the market, was to observe the market price dynamics as a pure “random walk”, which 
made the rational investment strategy similar to that of a pure gambler. There was obviously 
a need for a new set of better founded ideas bringing together the observed stochastic stock 
price dynamics and the ideas of the fundamentalists for explaining how market prices are set. 
New radical ideas came from the work of Samuelson who introduced the “martingales 
stochastic distribution”, which has weaker constraints compared to the “random walk” 
distribution (Samuelson, 1965). The difference between the two is that a “random walk” is a 
sum of random numbers in our case representing the absolute change of the value between 
two periods, where each consecutive number is an independently and identically distributed 
(i.i.d.) random number or change. The formal statement of the random walks is the following: 
        (1.1) tt
XXXS  ..10
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where is an i.i.d random variable with “i” indexes represent periods from 1 to t  
            
On the other side, a “martingale sequence” is a sequence of numbers, where the 
expected value of the martingale variable reflects the information about all its previous period 
values. A completely natural consequence of this statement is that if prices represent a 
martingale process, then the expected value of the current period price will equal the value of 
the last observed price end so on. The formal definition of the martingale price dynamics 
could be described in the following way: 
       (1.2)   
This in turn, for the purpose of its use in the theory of finance, all historical and actual 
information about the asset whose price dynamics is analysed and established by the market 
are included in the definition of the actual expected price. One important difference of 
martingales compared with the random walk, is based on the weaker predictability constraints 
of the martingales coming from the fact that the higher moments of the martingale variable 
could behave with inter-temporal correlation, while such a property is not present in the 
random walk stochastic variable where higher moments cannot be predicted, which means 
that no variance clustering could be observed. This also means that the expected variance of 
the price described by a martingale process is not necessarily equal to the last observed price 
variance or to its historical mean, which is a case with the random walk distribution variance. 
That implies that in the case of the random walk, variance or the second and every other 
higher moment could not be modelled using historical prices. On the other side, price 
variance and every higher moment could be modelled based on historical price values in the 
case of martingales.  This is crucially important for application explaining stock price 
dynamics, because it implies that with martingales, trading agents could predict future 
variance clustering or could predict changes in asset price variation using the historical price 
variation.  
This leads to a strong conclusion about the character of agents in efficient capital 
markets as defined in the work of Samuelson (Samuelson, 1965). Predictability of price 
variance with historical prices implies that this variation of asset price, or of the higher 
moments, does not enter traders‟ decision functions. Otherwise, if it is assumed that markets 
iX
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are efficient, traders will make the predictability of variation disappear by applying the 
prediction model to make arbitrage profit on variation based trading strategies. This makes 
one significant characteristic of martingales as applied by Samuelson, something that 
according to the interpretation of LeRoy, Samuelson might not have been unaware of 
(LeRoy, 1989). The implication is that agents in Samuelson‟s martingale model are defined 
as being risk neutral. This means that agents are indifferent about the risk defined as a higher 
moment of stock price dynamics, which could be arguably discussed as confronting some of 
the already established portfolio theoretical conclusions in portfolio theory(Markowitz, 
1952), the classical CAPM model as well as the later observed “equity premium puzzle” 
(Mehra & Prescott, 1985). This also implied that the non-arbitrage condition, required at the 
equilibrium of efficient markets, will lead all financial assets to have the same expected rate 
of return in equilibrium, which equals the expected risk free rate of return. Finally, besides 
the drawbacks, Samuelson - describing the price dynamics of financial assets as a “fair game” 
martingale process -made a connection to the fundamental valuation of assets based on 
discounting the value of expected future cash flows where all available information is 
included in the estimation process. The stochastic feature of price dynamics was explained as 
a result of the uncertainty connected to the future cash flows. Later this approach was the 
basis for major criticism of martingales by empirical studies that applied volatility tests of 
asset prices in comparison with the volatility of dividends (Shiller R. , 1979; 1981; LeRoy & 
Porter, 1981). 
Theoretical interest in the efficiency of capital markets in the late 1960s, culminated 
in the formal adumbration of the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis (ECMH) by Fama 
who defined efficient capital market equilibrium prices as ones which “fully reflect” all 
available information about the underlying financial asset(Fama, 1970). This definition of the 
efficient capital market, building on the work previously done by Samuelson, can be found 
even in today‟s finance textbooks mainly due to its simplicity in explaining the concept of 
market efficiency. Fama claims, similar to Samuelson, that if prices “fully reflect” all 
available information about the underlying asset, then price dynamics must represent 
martingale stochastic dynamics, which means that the actual prices are the best estimate of 
the next period prices(Fama, 1970).   
Fama goes even one step further, claiming that financial asset price dynamics 
represent a semi-martingale stochastic process (Fama, 1970). A semi martingale, compared to 
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a pure martingale, contains one additional condition; namely, that the expected value of the 
current price is greater than or equal to its last price. This implies that there is a possible “non 
negative drift” in the stochastic process of price dynamics, which he used in his claim that 
such a case within martingales makes the “buy-and-hold” investment strategy dominate any 
other trading strategy based on all available information. The formal definition of the semi-
martingale distribution with a non-negative drift is defined by the following inequality 
(Fama, 1970): 
       (1.3) 
In this respect, Fama‟s previous work (Fama, 1965a; 1965b) found that asset prices on 
such efficient capital markets tend to represent the intrinsic fundamental value of the 
financial asset, a crucial belief that he weakened in his later work in response to an increasing 
weight of counter-arguments coming from the empirical research of other authors. He pointed 
out that if the financial markets are efficient, information derived from technical analysis 
prescriptions, such as “the Dow Theory”, based on finding patterns in the historical dynamics 
of asset prices, has no added value for the investment strategy of traders. Fama made 
extensive empirical research (Fama, 1965a), showing asset prices, although randomly 
distributed around their expected value, follow Mandelbrot‟s “fat tail”3 infinite variance 
stable Paretian distribution with a specific coefficient a<2 (Figure 1.1.). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 A “fat tail” probability distribution is one which accumulates probability at extreme events in its tails. In this 
group belongs the T-student distribution which is leptokurtic especially at <10 degrees of freedom, and is often 
used by the industry simulating this “fat tail” character of asset price distribution. 
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Figure 1.1.: Heuristic presentation of the difference between the tails of normal 
and fat tail distributions 
 
      P(x) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           
            0        X 
Source: Authors own interpretation of the difference between the right-hand tail of the Gaussian Normal 
distribution (broken line) and of fat tailed distributions (illustrated by the solid line) 
 
Other authors also confirm this type of asset price distribution, also pointing to the 
importance of previous work by the French mathematician Louis Bachelier, who with his 
doctoral dissertation on the Theory of Speculation was claimed to be the first to model the 
stochastic process now called Brownian motion (Bachelier, 1900). 
Fama initially realized that not all markets are completely efficient and that information 
efficiency plays a crucial role in determining the extent of market efficiency. Accordingly, 
when defining market efficiency, based on the empirical evidence about the levels of 
inclusion of information in the price of assets, he established three levels of capital market 
efficiency in his efficient capital market hypothesis (Fama, 1970):  
1)  “weak form” where the actual asset prices reflect all information of the previous 
historic price series;  
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2)  “semi-strong form” where, besides the information on historical prices, actual 
prices reflect all publicly known fundamental information of significance to the 
underlying asset; and  
3)  “strong form”, where all information about the underlying asset is reflected in the 
actual market price of an asset, including insider information. 
Even today, this is the most used distinction of different levels of capital market efficiency, 
based on the three different levels of fundamental information reflection in the prices. Yet, 
Fama soon changed his definition of efficient capital markets to one describing them such 
that they (Fama, 1976): 
A) do not neglect any information relevant to the determination of security prices; and 
B) Investors‟ have rational expectations. 
Introduction of the rational expectations investors was the biggest novelty in his newer 
definition, which received a better reception (LeRoy, 1989).  
The assumption of rational expectation means that agents use all 
their available information to make those inferences about future events that are 
justified by objective correlations between the information variables and the 
future events, and only those inferences. 
(LeRoy, 1989) 
 This could simplify to the conclusion that, with rational expectations assumed, agents 
are theoretically modelled in a way that they optimize knowing the structure of the market 
and the parameters of the model describing the market, which makes them rational, but also 
that they know the model and parameters describing the underlying asset of the investment, 
which makes them endowed with rational expectations. This definition certainly does not 
exclude the possibility of rational departures from the “objectively” defined fundamental 
value of assets, which will later come to be known as rational asset bubbles. 
This new definition in Fama's textbook of 1976 could be the first sign that he realized the 
“joint-hypothesis” problem within the empirical test of efficient capital market based on 
martingales theory, which will be treated in more detail further on, especially in his own 
summary critique of the Efficient Market Hypothesis made in 1991. 
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In his later review of his seminal paper on the ECMH, Fama summarizes that there 
remains a significant amount of empirical evidence showing that stock prices follow 
martingale dynamics in the short run, but mounting evidence against it for longer period price 
dynamics (Fama, 1991). He also stressed that there is little evidence that based on historical 
price information one could develop a profitable arbitrage short-run strategy when calculating 
in the trading costs. On the other side, Fama also admits that in the long run, in contrast, there 
is significant empirical evidence that price dynamics can be predicted based on historical 
price dynamics (Fama, 1991).  
Testing the empirical connection of the fundamentalists‟ ideas with the market asset 
prices, the empirical research showed that the variance of asset prices is higher that the 
variance of dividends, which was defined as an upper bound for price variance if the prices 
change according to the martingale model and based on asset intrinsic value (Shiller R. , 
1981; LeRoy & Porter, 1981). This is part of the strong evidence against market efficiency 
described as setting asset prices equal to their fundamental value. Other evidence is the 
empirical work finding the existence of mean reversion of prices in their long-run dynamics. 
Many authors observed the mean reversion character of stock price dynamics in the longer 
run. Shiller, based on this evidence formed a model of “fads” for describing the dynamics of 
asset prices. According to Shiller, low forecastability of future values of cash flows and, 
overall, of the fundamental value of assets, creates a large discrepancy between the market 
price of assets and their fundamental value (Shiller R. , 1981). He suggests that martingale 
models be combined with the mean-reversion models describing asset price equilibrium into 
models with “fads”, so that the theoretical model corresponds better with the actual empirical 
observations. Those models should have near-zero short-run asset price inter-temporal 
correlations according to the assumptions in the ECMH literature, but also negative or mean-
reverting autocorrelations for longer-run asset returns and they should permit breaches of the 
variance bounds of dividend variation by price variation as observed in his empirical 
tests(Campbell & Shiller, 1988).  
Back to his starting work on ECMH, Fama presented empirical evidence in support of the 
“weak” and “semi-strong” forms of the ECMH, but found little evidence in support of the 
“strong” form of ECMH (Fama, 1970).  In his own review twenty years after he published the 
ECMH, Fama realized that there is an important difference between the hypothesis of market 
efficiency as described by the martingale asset prices process, and the hypothesis of efficient 
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equilibrium asset pricing model used by the market (Fama, 1991).  This difference is 
recognized as a joint hypothesis problem. Capital markets may be efficient in the sense that 
they instantly rationally incorporate all available information in the prices depending on the 
market micro-structure, but this does not necessarily exclude the persistence of asymmetric 
information and other factors which may impact the efficient equilibrium asset pricing model 
dominating the market. This leads to an increasingly accepted opinion that empirical tests of 
efficient market reaction on new information, which were widely used to provide evidence 
for the claims of markets efficiency, do not necessarily also provide evidence that markets 
equilibrate prices at their objective intrinsic value such as the DCF value described in the 
work of the market “fundamentalists”. This represents a departure of Fama from his own 
work (Fama, 1965a), where he claimed that asset prices on efficient markets, defined as ones 
reflecting all available information, are equal to the intrinsic value of the underlying assets. 
This departure gained importance especially because, even though there is significant 
evidence that markets react instantly to new information, which means they incorporate new 
information in the price of assets, there exists significant evidence that conventional 
equilibrium asset pricing models are regularly inconsistent with the observed asset prices 
through time. This evidence also corresponds to the claims of economists such as Grossman 
and Stiglitz, who made one of the best critiques of ECMH (Grossman & Stiglitz, 1980), as 
recognized by Fama himself (Fama, 1991), and who theoretically proved in a simple model 
of a market economy that markets inevitably function in an asymmetric information context. 
An implication of their conclusion is that, although markets efficiently react to new 
information, because of the persistent asymmetry of information they still could exhibit large 
price disparities from some formally or objectively set criterion for intrinsic asset valuation 
such as the one of fundamentalist prescriptions. LeRoy shows many examples of empirical 
price regularities which cumulate evidence against such efficient equilibrium pricing models 
(LeRoy, 1989). The “Monday effect”, the “Weekend effect” and the “January effect” are just 
three of the many, empirically observed regularities. 
The joint hypothesis problem slowly drew the focus of academic research away from 
empirical tests of the informational efficiency of capital markets, based on testing martingale 
price dynamics, toward the suitability of different equilibrium market asset pricing models. 
One of the most influential models was the CAPM (Capital Asset Pricing Model) (Sharpe, 
1964; Linter, 1965; Black F. , 1972), widely used by practitioners but strongly criticized for 
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its inconsistency. Due to its observed inconsistency with the empirical observations (Fama, 
1991), showing the significance of other factors such as the size of the company, or the value 
of some company specific valuation coefficient in their expected return estimation model 
such as E/P or B/M
4
, CAPM was subject to further improvements. Merton introduced the 
idea that the consumer/investor when making investment decisions tries to actually smooth 
their future consumption by investing in market instruments which provide the inter-temporal 
bridge for their budget constraint (Merton, 1973).  He augmented the CAPM into the Inter-
temporal Capital Asset Pricing Model. He claimed that efficient market investment decisions 
incorporate a third portfolio or asset besides the efficient market portfolio, which serves 
investors or consumers to hedge risks of events affecting the other two portfolios (such as 
short-run treasuries and an efficient market portfolio) used by the classical CAPM. He finds 
that long-term government bonds might be playing this third instrument role. He recognized 
the problem of the CAPM model in ignoring inter-temporal investment decision 
characteristics, and the fact that investors care not only for the static expected returns but also 
for the future set of expected investment returns. The group of augmented models, forming 
the Inter-temporal Capital Asset Pricing Models (ICAPM) class of models, recognized the 
importance of the Inter-temporal Marginal Rate of Substitution (IMRS) when explaining the 
variance of stock prices. Other authors, such as Holmström and Tirole, extended the research 
on the CAPM by including the ideas on hedging the liquidity risks by companies with their 
Liquidity Capital Asset Pricing Model. They showed that companies try to hedge liquidity 
risks by holding liquid assets, which affects the equilibrium pricing model such as the 
classical CAPM (Holmström & Tirole, 2001).   
So in general, this increasing focus on the equilibrium capital asset pricing models 
created augmented versions of CAPM trying to find better theoretical explanations by 
introducing additional factors affecting equilibrium asset prices where the most interesting 
work was done on the consumption based factors which, as will see later on, play a 
significant role in the general equilibrium rational asset pricing models with asset bubbles as 
defined in the OLG framework (Tirole, 1985).  
Models such as CAPM, multi-factor asset pricing models or consumer betas models 
also proved inconsistent and unreliable through time. In their paper, presenting a critique of 
                                                 
4
 E/P – Corporate Earnings to equity Price; B/P – Corporate Book value to equity Price coefficients 
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equilibrium asset pricing models, Fama and French, find that the Sharpe-Linter-Blacks‟ 
classical CAPM model shows significantly inaccurate power in predicting asset price returns 
(Fama & French, 2004). They find that “Jensen‟s alpha”, which according to CAPM has to be 
equal to 0, is in practice significantly different than 0 even for diversified portfolios. They 
propose further improvements of CAPM by controlling some state variables such as earnings, 
labour income, spending as in Merton‟s Inter-temporal CAPM, and so on. They also find that 
the estimation accuracy of the CAPM model is significantly weak and that choosing the 
market benchmark for the asset return estimates may create a significant bias. 
Most of the recent empirical testing for the different forms or levels of the ECMH is 
based on inspecting the inter-temporal correlation of the current period price dynamics with 
the price dynamics from the previous period and the reaction of the price to news about some 
fundamentally important information for the underlying asset. One of the elegant empirical 
tests applied is the test for the profitability of some market strategy based on historical price 
data. But simple immediate response of asset prices to some new information, or the non-
profitability tests of historical price based trading strategies, does not imply that the market 
equilibrium asset prices correspond to the discounted cash flow (DCF), which is one of the 
most commonly used criteria for establishing the fundamental value of an asset. It does not 
also imply that the price reaction to new information is adequate, over or under optimistic in 
terms of the intrinsic value of the asset. It does not even exclude asset bubbles such as the 
ones modelled by Tirole‟s “myopic” investors (Tirole, 1982) where prices also have 
martingale stochastic properties.  
Twenty years after his seminal paper on ECMH, Fama states that there are numerous 
empirical findings of other authors showing that expected returns have significant mean 
reverting cyclical patterns over the long term, which make possible significant departures of 
prices from the intrinsic value of assets (Fama, 1991). This is strong evidence against the 
pure “fundamentalist” equilibrium asset pricing models and in favour of the possibility of 
asset bubbles defined as a significant departure of market prices from the fundamental value 
of their underlying assets. Authors searching for answers in another direction, such as 
focusing on asset bubbles theoretical research, e.g. Tirole, show that although bubbles cannot 
exist in fully dynamic models with rational expectations and a finite number of trades(Tirole, 
1982), they can only exist in models with infinite trades such as OLG models(Tirole, 
1985)and in “myopic” or “biased” expectation equilibrium models where asset price 
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dynamics consist of some fundamental price and a bubbly element with martingale 
properties. 
 As a result, the evolution of ideas about the efficiency of capital markets came to the 
joint hypothesis problem. In turn, this pointed the way to growth of asset bubbles theory as an 
alternative to the equilibrium asset pricing theory based on the intrinsic value of assets as 
defined by the early fundamentalists. This introductory text on the theory of efficient capital 
markets led us through the evolution of the set of ideas and the main problems confronting 
the present academic thinking on asset pricing theories. One of the greatest of these is the 
empirically observed disparity between the market asset prices and their intrinsic values, 
which simply proves that “fundamentalist” asset pricing models such as Gordon‟s pricing 
model (Gordon, 1959) derive from invalid assumptions for the equilibrium asset pricing 
models on markets at different stages of efficiency. This thesis belongs to the set of research 
efforts trying to contribute to the equilibrium asset pricing models where asset bubbles 
defined as departures from asset intrinsic values are accepted as an inherent market outcome. 
In the following sections, theoretical schools on equilibrium pricing models with asset 
bubbles are reviewed in order to arrive at the point where the introduction of influential 
institutional investors onto the financial market can be modelled and the consequences for the 
pricing of bubbly asset investigated. 
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1.2. Theoretical foundations of speculative asset bubbles 
 
Speculative Asset Bubbles are not a new market phenomenon arising as an outcome 
of asset miss-valuation on financial markets. Their occurrence is known from the early stages 
of capitalism and on different kinds of markets. The only difference to today's notion and 
importance of asset bubbles compared to their earlier occurrences arises due to the process of 
globalisation. Globalisation increased the importance of financial markets to the global 
economy and amplified the extent and implications of episodes of massive asset bubbles and 
crashes. Such evidence is seen through the last episode of the housing bubble rise and burst in 
the US in the first decade of the 21
st
 century, leading to a collapse of the major financial 
markets and to a prolonged economic downturn in the global economy. 
This chapter reviews theoretical developments explaining the phenomenon of 
financial market asset bubbles. The main goal of this chapter is to identify and explain the 
mechanisms creating asset bubbles, which will later on be used to inform empirical analysis 
of the impact of institutional investors on their occurrence. Theoretical reflection on market 
miss-valuation such as the occurrence of asset bubbles focuses not exclusively on the creation 
and evolution of asset bubbles, but also on their rationality, connection to market micro 
structure and their dynamic properties within the financial market. 
In terms of the initial theoretical ideas and awareness, asset bubbles and their 
incidence was stressed as an important market phenomenon even in the important 
contributions of Keynes, who claimed that asset bubbles are an inherent characteristic of 
capital markets (Keynes, 1936). Keynes stressed most of the deterministic factors and 
mechanisms inducing the creation of asset bubbles. He also distinguished between the assets 
fundamental value and their market price. Keynes defined the fundamental value by the 
present value of the discounted future cash flows similar to Gordon‟s later established and 
popularised intrinsic model of stock valuation (Gordon, 1959), recognizing the importance of 
expectations or the probability of future events causing different cash flow outcomes. Keynes 
recognized the psychological profile of an “animal spirit” present among market participants, 
which drives prices away from fair value and stressed some important behavioural 
characteristics of investors. Although Keynes did not present a rounded theory of asset 
bubbles, he surely pointed to the essential ideas such as moral hazard and risk-shifting issues 
among investors, which informed developments in later years of theories of asset bubbles. 
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Asset bubbles draw significant attention of prominent economists because of their 
wide occurrence and impact. In this respect there is an amazing amount of literature trying to 
explain the occurrences of speculative asset pricing. Reinhart and Rogoff present a well-
structured overview of the earlier episodes of speculative asset bubble occurrence (Reinhart 
& Rogoff, 2009), joined by many authors such as Paul Krugman who is one of the latest 
authors trying to raise the importance of understanding the occurrence and implications of 
financial market asset bubbles (Krugman, 2008).  
Aside from the insightful ideas on asset bubbles set out by Keynes, and subsequent 
informal literature on speculative asset bubbles, there was a wide theoretical interest in 
explaining the occurrence and functioning of asset bubbles with higher rigour, which 
especially developed with the rise of the empirical evidence against the ECMH in the 1970s 
and 1980s. A general division of the main ideas, or schools of thought on the issue of asset 
bubbles was suggested by Allen and Rogoff, and we will keep this main structure on the main 
theoretical ideas throughout our work. These are the main schools in asset bubbles theory 
(Allen & Rogoff, 2010): 
 Rational asset bubbles school 
 Agency problem school 
 Asymmetric information school 
 Irrational investors school 
In the following part of this theoretical chapter, we will focus on the characteristics of 
these four theoretical branches representing specific approaches to explaining and analysing 
asset bubbles.  Every school tries to stress some important feature of the micro structure of 
the financial market, leading to the occurrence of miss-valuations and consequently the 
possibility of speculative asset bubbles. It is important to stress that most of the theories apply 
a specific micro-structural feature to some general equilibrium model where those specific 
micro structural elements lead to specific static and dynamic conclusions. The prevailing 
macroeconomic general equilibrium framework used by the authors from those four 
branches, is Samuelson‟s Overlapping Generations Model framework (OLG) (Samuelson, 
1958), which is a very important tool for the theoretical modelling used in asset bubbles 
theory. Consequently, we devote significant attention to explaining and examining the OLG 
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framework, first used by the Rational Asset bubbles school, which we later use to develop 
our own theoretical contribution.  As we advance through the understanding of the OLG 
model, its enrichment with micro-founded insights will lead to more realistic outcomes and 
then, with the introduction of intermediary financial institutions embedded with an agency 
problem, to our own model in the following chapter. As most of the authors do, it is very 
important to be aware of the limitations of the theoretical modelling and to make a balance 
between the complication of the micro-structural features and the insightfulness of the model. 
Most of the good models are sufficiently simple to bring the most important conclusion to the 
forefront.  
 The main goal of the theoretical approach presented here will be to discuss the rationality 
and the factors leading to the occurrence of asset bubbles, especially among small non-liquid 
open financial markets. One such environmental characteristic impacting asset bubbles is the 
introduction of a mandatory defined contribution pension fund, with specific investment 
rules, investment incentives and other important qualities as an institutional investor. We first 
consider the Rational Asset Bubbles School, where the OLG framework will be explained. 
 
 
1.2.1. Overlapping Generations Model and Rational Asset Bubbles 
School 
 
The Overlapping Generations Model (OLG) was first introduced as a theoretical 
framework by Paul Samuelson, with claims present among economists that the actual author 
of the model was the French Nobel winning economist Allais Maurice. The OLG model 
represents a General Equilibrium multiple agent generations model. Samuelson's effort in his 
famous paper introducing the simple OLG model could be interpreted as a successful reaction 
to the critics of the Keynesian school concerning its weak connection of general equilibrium 
models to micro economic foundations. Samuelson succeeded in presenting a very simple, 
albeit well-rounded theoretical framework deriving its specific macro dynamics by allowing 
different micro-structural characteristics of the economy (Samuelson, 1958). In this way he 
made it possible to logically explain that there exists only a “special case” of the micro-
specific environment in which the outcome of the market economy brings the general 
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equilibrium to the socially optimal one. This “special case” was described as the “classical 
economy” outcome.  
Samuelson, through the OLG framework, showed that there is a dominating set of 
common micro-structures for the market economy, where market mechanisms are inefficient 
in bringing the economy to the socially optimal outcome. Due to its simplicity and its ability 
to capture different important phenomenon, the OLG model was later on increasingly used 
and extended by many prominent economists. The OLG model serves to explain most of the 
principal economic phenomena, including financial market inefficiencies, and to help identify 
solutions, especially in modern monetary economics, by its dynamic macro system based on 
the complete use of neoclassical micro foundations allowing for different assumptions 
concerning the rationality of agents and the use of rational expectations. 
The OLG model has one very important characteristic as opposed to the infinite living 
agent model (ILA) (Ramsey, 1928).It introduces an infinite existing economy but consisting 
of finite living agents instead of infinite living agents. This slightly complicates the inter-
temporal consumer‟s decision, but brings the savings problem and the long term perspective 
much closer to reality (Truman, 2007).  
Although Samuelson originally set out a three-stage overlapping generation model with 
each individual agent living in three stages during their finite life, later in his paper he 
focused on a two-stage model without losing any generality (Samuelson, 1958). The main 
reason comes from it being more simple but sufficiently insightful and robust in explaining a 
series of economic and market phenomena. Economists, who followed his work, mainly 
accepted the general framework of the two-stage overlapping generation model. We will also 
focus on the two-stage OLG model in our later modelling. 
The OLG model is based on an economy consisting of a finite number of homogenous 
agents, called households or the population, who live finite lives in two stages.  In the first 
stage of its life, the agent is characterized as “young”; and in the second as “old”. Hence, in 
the overall infinitely lasting economy, there are two generations that constantly overlap their 
existence through the dimension of time. This means that persons who were young in the 
previous period (t-1) are old at the present period t, and they overlap or simultaneously 
coexist with persons who are young in the present period. Then, in the following period (t+1), 
the young born in period (t-1) no longer exist, they disappear (or simply die), and the young 
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generation from period (t) become old and overlap with a new born generation of young. In 
this way the system continues to exist forever. This gives one important characteristic of 
constant preference heterogeneity within the market economy at any time of its evolution. 
At the first of the indefinitely many discrete periods (t=0), called the initial or “the big 
bang” period, there are a number of Initial old agents. The initial old agents are numbered by 
N0 and the first generation of young which is brought to existence by the initial old in the first 
period are numbered by N1.  Samuelson introduces population growth denoted by the rate n, 
which connects the number of young in the next period (t=2) with the young in the previous 
period (t=1) by the population growth first order difference equation Nt=(1+n)*Nt-1. This is 
the simplest way of modelling population growth in the OLG structure, and it could be 
defined by a more complicated dynamic equation depending on the needs of the analysis.  
Population growth plays a significant role in the OLG economy, since it determines 
its growth and dynamics which, when introducing production, as within the model of 
Diamond, creates a more realistic model of the economy (Diamond, 1965). Another crucially 
important feature that OLG introduces, are overlapping economic agents aware of their finite 
lives and different wealth, productivity and consumption characteristics at each period. 
Looking at the infinity of the system it is an asymmetric system and this asymmetry arises 
because of “the big bang moment” and the fact that the system then lasts forever. This 
characteristic affects the welfare outcomes when finding the optimality solutions or the social 
planer‟s solution of the model. 
Here is how the development of the system can be explained graphically (Table1.2.1). 
Here we stick to Samuelson‟s model determined with a constant growth of the population, 
equal to n+1 which in models with production determines the growth of the economy. 
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Table1.2.1: Population Evolution in the 2-Generation OLG model 
t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5... 
N0 (initial old) 
N1(young) 
 
N1(old) 
   
 N2(young) N2(old)   
  N3(young) N3(old)  
   N4(young) N4(old) 
N5(young) … 
Source: Authors interpretation of the Samuelson (1958) OLG framework inspired by the lecture notes 
from Professor Paula Verme - Hernandez at Texas A&M University, US 
 
Further, the OLG model is also based on the neoclassical micro economic foundations 
set by the consumer preference theory, but provides more realistic longer term solutions of 
the general economy and inter-temporal decisions compared to the models based on infinitely 
lived representative agents (Ramsey, 1928).  
In the OLG model there is only one type of good which is not transferable between 
the two periods, which can be consumed in any period and which brings certain utility to the 
consumer following the consumer‟s homogenous utility function: 
)C;U(C 1+2t1t
         (1.4) 
Here, C1,t represents the consumption of the agent in the period (t) when young (1), and C2,t+1 
represents consumption of the agent in the period (t+1) when agents are old (2). Every 
rational agent, considering its budget constraint will try to maximize its overall life time 
utility function depending on its two period consumption decision. This process defines each 
agent‟s inter-temporal consumer preferences. 
There is a very important characteristic of the economy arising from the inter-
temporal consumer preferences of homogenous consumers constituting the economy. In 
general, there could be consumers who derive higher utility from their consumption of the 
good when young, who are called “impatient” consumers; and, on the other side, the implicit 
utility function can describe another type of homogenous consumers in the model who derive 
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more utility from consuming when old, who are called “patient” consumers. Logically, 
considering their consumption preferences, those agents who are characterized as “impatient” 
consumers have a higher liquidity preferences budget wise, to be able to achieve their 
optimizing temporal consumption structure. On the other side of the spectrum, more “patient” 
consumers will be more exposed to long-term investments and will structure their budget 
toward more illiquid assets.  In the extreme, there are agents deriving utility from 
consumption only when young (“extremely impatient”) and those who derive it only from 
consumption only when old (“extremely patient”). The OLG model can use only one type of 
homogenous consumer preferences, but the type used determines a very important 
characteristic of the economy. This distinction between “patient” and “impatient” consumers 
could further be modelled as being stochastic, which can explain the stochastic properties of 
financial markets where on extreme occasions markets become dominated by liquidity 
demanding “scared” agents or long-term investment demanding “optimistic” agents and not 
the mere intrinsic characteristics of the investment assets. This stochasticity of agents‟ 
marginal rate of substitution (MRS) could further play a significant role in explaining the 
volatility of financial markets. 
Going further into the micro structure of the OLG model, agents make rational 
decisions about their inter-temporal consumption structure and other use of available wealth 
throughout their lives. Samuelson gave only a certain one dimensional endowment to 
consumers in the periods when young and old, but their budget was later expanded by other 
authors using other sources of income and investment vehicles. Another budgetary source of 
income or investment instruments were labour and capital as used in the production OLG 
models (Diamond, 1965). This finally led to the distinction among productive investment 
assets and bubbly assets later introduced in Tirole‟s model (Tirole, 1985). 
Each consumer tries to maximize their homogeneous utility function by their decision on the 
distribution of consumption constrained by the available lifetime budget: 
)C;U(C 1+2t1tmax
        (1.5) 
Later on, we could specify the utility function explicitly. As an example, we may use a log 
function of present and future consumption, or some other form like the Constant Relative 
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Risk Aversion (CRRA)
5
(Mehra & Prescott, 1985) and we can manipulate the inter-temporal 
preferences switching from the states of having more patient to the states of having more 
impatient consumers.  In order to keep the focus of our analysis on explaining the broad 
incidence of bubbles, we will stick to the implicit form of the utility function similar to the 
simple model described by Samuelson. 
Samuelson tried to focus mainly on the inter-temporal problem of transferring 
consumption through generations. He simplified the economy defining non-dynamic, or the 
simplest possible budget constraint for each consumer, giving them a certain amount of 
endowment (an amount of the consumption good) in the period when young (w1t) and in the 
period when old (w2t+1).  
Samuelson also introduced a savings function, as an investment instrument that 
creates a bridge between the budget constraint in the period when young with the budget 
constraint in the period when old. This savings function, implies some level of achieved real 
return called the interest rate, which represents a reward for sacrificing today‟s consumption 
for consumption in the next period. By the use of this savings function, which transfers 
consumption between the two periods, the notion of a life-time budget constraint for the 
consumer is created. 
Technical solutions of the consumers‟ problem assumes plugging in this budget 
constraint into the utility function through consumption variables, or otherwise forming a 
Lagrangian with the application of the budget constraint defined by the lifetime budget 
constraint. Consumers solve their utility maximization problem, knowing the wealth given in 
the first and second period, and the return on savings (the interest rate, assuming a perfectly 
competitive savings market). This is a very important point for the use of the OLG model in 
asset price modelling, where different micro specifics could be added to the model, such as 
irrational expectation about the expected return from the investment asset used to transfer 
wealth between the two periods. Authors such as Delong, Schleifer, Summers and Waldman 
introduce a misperception as a random bias to the expected return, the interest, for that part of 
the agents described as “noise-traders” (DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, & Waldmann, 1990a).  
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Agents in the simple OLG model defined by Samuelson, solve their utility 
maximization problem by deciding only about their savings variable. Otherwise, if they 
cannot decide on their savings, they would have to consume all their wealth given in each 
period, which complicates their situation especially if they have wealth only in the first 
period, which without the availability of a transferring instrument, will cause them to starve 
and die in the period when they lack endowment or when they are old. This means that 
without the means of saving, or alternatively some social planner transfer, agents will not 
reach the desired Pareto optimal state of the economy, except in the case of the economy 
dominated by “extremely impatient” consumers. This corresponds to the issues of pension 
saving plans and the present debates about their systemic importance of smoothing the 
consumption of the population through their lives. 
In making a distinction between “patient” and “impatient” consumers, we arrive at the 
important distinction between the two types of financial market economies, determined by 
the different consumer inter-temporal preferences of their respective representative agents. 
The first type, where representative agents have preferences characteristic of the “patient” 
consumers, is called the “Samuelson economy” (Weil, 2008). The other type, where 
consumers have preferences characteristic of “impatient” consumers is called the “Classical 
economy”. Figure 1.2.1 depicts the distinctive features of the two types of financial market 
economies. 
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Figure 1.2.1.: Distinction between the “Samuelson” and the “Classical” OLG 
economy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This figure represents the utility of each generation cohort derived from its consumption when young C1 
and consumption when old C2. The two cases are presented where agents have different utility functions, 
one describing “patient” (left graph) and the other “impatient” (right graph) agents. The dotted line, 
describes the budget line under the assumption that agents can exchange their endowment (w1 and w2, 
for some reward based on their inter-temporal marginal rate of substitution). The slope of the budget line 
determines their intertemporal rate of substitution.A problem arises especially with the case of the 
market dominated by the impatient consumers, because it is not possible to transfer endowment from the 
future period to the current period, while the opposite is possible. 
 
Symbols in the graph are as follows: 
U1, U2-  Levels of the life-time utility function of agents, where U2>U1 
w1, w2- wealth endowment of the agents when they are young and old respectively 
C*1, C*2 –Agents’ optimal consumption structure when young and old, provided by the budget line 
whena saving/lending instrument is available (dotted budget line) 
S – is the savings demand, determined as a difference by the wealth in the period when young 
and the optimal level of consumption when young C*1 
 
Source: Authors interpretation of the distinction between the “Samuelson” and the “Classical” OLG 
economy inspired by the lecture notes from Professor Paula Verme Hernandez at Texas A&M University, 
US 
 
These two graphs depict the two utility optimisation solutions of the two separate 
types of agent, “patient” and “impatient”, in the Samuelson‟s OLG economy with endowment 
and without production (Samuelson, 1958). The different indifference curves describe their 
different inter-temporal consumption preferences and define the two separate types of 
“Samuelson” and “Classical” economies. Indifference curves are defined in the space 
C2 C2 
C1 C1 w1 
w2 
S 
C*1 
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U2 
U1 
w1 
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consumption when young C1 and consumption when old C2, constrained by the given wealth 
when young and when old, respectively W1 and W2. Indifference curves U1 and U2 represent 
lower and higher utility of consumers in the economy respectively. Their utility is determined 
by their consumption when young defined by C1 and their consumption when old defined by 
C2. Their optimal lifetime consumption and utility depends on their lifetime budget constraint 
and the available means for saving or for transferring, if preferred, a part of their wealth from 
the period when agents are young to the period when they are old, in order to reach inter-
temporal optimality. Agents who are “impatient” consumers would prefer to consume in 
excess of their available endowment when young, while agents who are “patient” consumers 
have a preference for saving and additional consumption in the period when they become old. 
We can see that in both types of economies, if there are no means to save or transfer 
part of the wealth from the period when young to the period when old, consumers will 
consume their whole given wealth in the period when their wealth is endowed.  
If we are in the economy consisting of “patient” consumers, as depicted by the graph 
on the left side (Figure 1.2.1), we could increase the utility of all agents if we could exchange 
part of the wealth from the young agents to the old agents, and keep this transferring rule 
forever so that the current generation of young agents when they become old receives part of 
the endowment of the next generation of young agents. This will lead to a higher level utility 
indifference curve or to a Pareto improving state of the economy. Such improvement could 
be done by an introduced rule of the social planner (social transfer), or by some market traded 
asset used for saving and for transferring wealth among generations in the decentralized 
market economy. This is called the “Samuelson case” economy, where there exists a 
meaningful use of money and some savings asset in the system as a socially agreed contract 
for wealth transfer among generations. If there is no such kind of asset or social contract 
introducing an investment vehicle for transferring wealth from young agents to the old, the 
economy will function in a Pareto suboptimal way. 
In the other case, depicted on the right hand side of Figure 1.2.1, representative agents 
have consumer preferences and corresponding indifference curves characteristic of 
“impatient” consumers. In this economy, consumers derive most of their utility– and 
correspondingly want to consume more than their endowment– when young.  They would 
prefer to transfer some of their endowment from the period when old to the period when 
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young to maximize their lifetime utility. In this case, a social planner or a market mechanism 
cannot improve the utility of agents by transferring part of the endowment from the old to the 
young, simply because it is not possible to transfer something from the future to the present. 
This arises because of the asymmetry of the OLG economy, which means that at the moment 
of the introduction of any social planers solution, the initial old generation has an incentive to 
consume at minimum its whole endowment. So the social planer‟s solution and, potentially, 
the market outcome – in this case called a “Classical type” economy – is Pareto optimal, and 
there is no meaningful use of money or any savings asset in this case. In other words, there is 
no way to improve the economy‟s welfare by introducing a savings asset. 
The crucial difference between the two types of economies is that in the case of the 
“Samuelson” economy young consumers have incentives to save and consume more when 
old, while in the “Classical” economy young consumers would like to spend more than they 
have and they don‟t want to save. Later on, when we introduce production and financial 
markets, we will see that the “Classical” economy is characterized by low levels of 
productive capital accumulation and high returns of productive capital, while the 
“Samuelson” Economy is characterized by low levels of returns of capital and productive 
capital over accumulation. In turn, this will raise the issue of the dynamic efficiency or 
inefficiency of the financial market, represented by the balance between the savings demand 
and the availability of savings vehicles. Such an issue, as later demonstrated through the 
example of the Croatian financial market, will lead us to the occurrence of rational asset 
bubbles. 
We can imagine a social planner who can, without any cost, transfer the required 
amount of endowment between the two generations by a rule in order to maximize the utility 
of the society.  Let‟s define the objective function of the social welfare function W: 
)Cα)U((+)C,αU(C=)C,W(C 22 211 0,1       (1.6) 
 The social planner has to maximize the utility of the initial old generation, described 
by the second additive part of the social welfare function )Cα)U(( 20,1 , together with every 
following generation cohort living and consuming when young and old as described by the 
first part of the social welfare equation )C,αU(C 21  as depicted in the Table 1.2.1. In this 
social welfare equation, the “α” coefficient represents the weight that the social planner puts 
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on the importance of the utility of all generations other than the initial old, when maximizing 
the utility of the society. If for example social planner sets α=1, this means that the social 
planner does not care for the utility of the initial old when maximizing the utility function of 
the society. This decision stresses the previously mentioned importance of the asymmetry in 
the model arising by the “big bang” moment of inception. 
The social planner wants to maximize the utility of all generations born at or after the 
“big bang” or period 1 of the economy, by setting their consumption when young C1 and 
when old C2. So, at each period, the social planner has a certain total amount of wealth of the 
agents available for division, which represents the social planner‟s budget constraint and is 
manipulated in his social utility maximization process. We will describe this available wealth 
in per young agent terms, by dividing its amount by the number of young agents, because this 
standardisation of wealth will help us to better explain the social planner‟s optimal solution 
for all present and future cohorts. We should also mention that wealth endowment used at this 
point, is only a simplifying assumption, where each agent is endowed by certain amount of 
the numeraire good, because the focus at this point is on the savings incentive. But further, in 
models with production, we could substitute wealth endowment by labour endowment, which 
agents could use to participate in the production process and earn wages.  
The total wealth defined as the available endowment to the social planer, in per young 
agent terms, is equal to w1 which is the amount of endowment of the young in per young 
agent terms, plus the endowment of the old in per young agent terms in the same period 
which equals w2/(1+n), because there are 1/(1+n) smaller number of old than young in every 
period. This total wealth available to the social planner defines its budget constraint and, at 
the tangency solution, will have to equal the consumption of the young per young agent C1 
plus the consumption of the old per young agent C2/ (1+n), again due to the fact that the old 
are of a smaller number compared to the young by 1/ (1+n). Formally, this maximization 
problem of the social planner previously described can be represented: 
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The social planner problem could be solved by setting some Gama function (Γ) where the 
budget constraint is defined by the Lagrangian condition: 

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Taking the first order derivatives with the respect of the control variable of consumption of 
young and old agents, and the Lagrangian, we get the First Order Conditions (FOCs) for the 
optimal solution, which gives us the rule by which the social planner will maximize the utility 
of the society. This rule represents the Marginal Rate of Substitution (MRS) optimality 
requirement and is formally represented in the following way: 
n+=
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)C;(CU
2
2 1
12
11


         (1.9) 
Here U‟1(.) and U‟2(.) represent the partial marginal utilities of the cohort agents 
determined by increasing their consumption by one numeraire unit of the consumption good 
when young and when old respectively. Their ratio, determines the marginal rate of 
substitution, and should equal the required reward for sacrificing one unit of consumption in 
period when young by an amount of units of consumption in the period when old.  
The intuition behind the social planner‟s solution is very simple, it says that the utility 
of the society will be maximized if and only if the marginal sacrifice of utility of the young 
when transferring one of their consumption units to the old equals the marginal benefit of the 
consumption of the old multiplied by one plus the rate of the growth of the population. This is 
solely determined by the fact that in each period there are 1+n more of the young than the old 
agents. This is similar to saying that the required reward for sacrificing one unit of 
consumption when young for one unit of consumption when old is equal to the rate of 
population growth. In other words, the reward for sacrificing consumption, known as the 
optimal interest rate from the savings market is equal to the rate of population growth rate in 
the socially optimal state of the economy. The rate of the population growth is the implicit 
interest rate in the case of the Social planers solution. The distribution of wealth satisfying 
this condition is known as the “Golden Rule” solution of the economy which is Pareto 
Optimal, and corresponds to the dynamic efficiency of the economy. 
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This means that the socially optimal rate at which the social planner should exchange 
wealth among the young and the old generations of consumers is the rate equal to the growth 
of the population. This is a very important rule and it is a benchmark for determining 
dynamic efficiency and Pareto optimality when analysing cases of decentralized market 
solutions in the economy without the presence of the social planner. 
We saw when analysing the two types of economies, that there is no need for savings 
in the “classical type” economy and so the Pareto optimal solution will lead to young agents 
spending their whole endowment when young, and old agents spending their whole 
endowment when old. So solving for market participants in the decentralized model, in the 
“classical” economy, there is no meaningful need for money as a mean to transfer wealth 
from one period to another, and there is no inter-temporal trade allocation which is Pareto 
improving. Conversely, in the “Samuelson” economy, allocation where young and old agents 
consume their endowment when young and when old without intergenerational transfer is not 
Pareto optimal and there exists a rational need for a savings instrument such as money 
balances, productive or non-productive saving vehicles, to provide the market execution of 
this inter-generational trade by transferring part of the endowment of the young to the period 
when they become old. 
This implies that when consumers have preferences describing them as “patient”, we 
are in the “Samuelson” economy and a pure market solution without savings instruments 
can‟t lead to a Pareto optimal solution. In this case, we need to introduce some social 
contract, such as money or some other savings asset to transfer part of the wealth and provide 
trade among generations that will lead the economy to the socially optimal outcome. 
By his work, Samuelson introduced and popularized one great model showing there 
can be market imperfection in other than the special case market economy (Samuelson, 
1958).Other authors later developed Samuelson‟s model further. Diamond introduced the 
government debt function and used production in the model, both of which introduced 
savings vehicles for lending to government and/or entrepreneurs and, thereby, allowed 
solutions of the dynamic inefficiency problem previously discussed (Diamond, 1965).  This 
way the OLG model was brought closer to the real functioning of the financial market 
economy and further increased its analytic popularity among economists. This gave the 
opportunity to analyse optimality and market outcomes when consumer agents are endowed 
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with a unit of labour in the first period when they are young, or a labour endowment which 
they use to engage in employment, earn wages and optimize their lifetime budget constraint 
by saving in different types of saving vehicles. So besides the market for goods, the modelled 
economy was enriched by a market for factors of production such as labour and capital and a 
market for government debt, a complication bringing the model closer to the functioning of 
the real world economy. 
In Diamond‟s model economy, young consumers are deciding on how much of their 
earned income to save to be able to provide spending in the second period when they don‟t 
have the ability to work and earn wages. Besides holding real money balances, in this 
extension to the OLG model, agents can save by lending to entrepreneurs. So they can 
transform part of their wage into capital, or invest, which in the second period will provide 
them with an amount of dividend. This capital is managed by entrepreneurs who, besides 
capital, also demand labour from the young generation at the market wage rate equalling its 
marginal rate of production.  
Finally, from the perspective of our interest in asset bubbles, the biggest progress of 
the OLG model in terms of enriching its micro-structure by introducing investment 
alternatives was the Tirole (1985) model. 
It was just a few years before the US stock market crash in 1987 that Tirole published 
his 1985 Econometrica paper on rational asset bubbles. He made an innovative step further 
from the Diamond OLG model with production and productive saving (investing in capital) 
by introducing so called non-productive saving, which made his model a seminal work in 
analysing asset bubbles. In his model investors have an option to pass forward their wealth by 
the use of capital investments, or so called “productive saving”, and/or by investing in some 
fixed supply of a non-productive fundamentally worthless asset, called “the bubbly asset”.  
At this point, when introducing the idea of the “bubbly asset”, it is important to mention 
Tirole‟s definition of the value of risky assets from his earlier paper on the non-existence of 
asset bubbles in a finite trades model (Tirole, 1982). Tirole thought that the market value of 
every risky asset consists of two parts: first is its “fundamental value”; and the second is its 
“bubbly value”. In the extreme, an asset may have zero fundamental value and all of its value 
might consist of the “bubbly” value. It is the “pure bubbly asset” which is used in Tirole‟s 
OLG model (Tirole, 1985). But, there can be a whole spectrum of assets between the fully 
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fundamental or fully bubbly type of asset. Tirole used only the two extremes in his Rational 
Asset Bubble‟s OLG micro-structure to analyse the pure effect on market dynamics of the 
overall value of the “bubbly” value of assets in the economy which, as we will see, gives very 
interesting insights. 
At the essence of the systemic solution in Tirole‟s OLG model is the “no-arbitrage 
condition” for the “interior solution”, which connects the two - or later, if extended, more 
than two - assets used for saving, assuming perfect foresight of investors who are as if risk 
neutral. We note that risk-neutrality was an implied feature of Samuelson‟s theory on 
“martingales” explaining asset price dynamics, which was widely accepted as a great 
contribution to the efficient capital markets theory (Samuelson, 1965). 
 In the later work of Tirole and Farhi, the authors extend the model using a three stage 
OLG model and introducing several saving assets (Farhi & Tirole, 2011). In this and many 
extensions, risk neutrality and the non-arbitrage condition plays the same significant role. 
At this point it is important to understand the intuition behind the “non-arbitrage” 
condition and the “interior solution”. The “Non-arbitrage” condition, as depicted below, 
means that with the perfect foresight assumption within risk neutral agents, we need to have 
the return on savings equal among all assets used for this purpose. Otherwise, there will be an 
arbitrage opportunity, which will be instantly cleared on the assumed perfectly competitive 
market.  
The other understanding of the “internal solution”, which follows the “non-arbitrage” 
condition, is in fact a solution where all introduced assets in the model are used for savings. 
Otherwise, in the “corner solution” we could have a situation where only productive capital is 
used but the bubbly asset is not. We will see, in solving the dynamics of the model, that this 
might happen if and only if the pure bubbly asset is not initially introduced at any point of 
time during the dynamics of the market economy, which is hard to imagine having significant 
empirical evidence showing the existence of asset bubbles. 
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Figure1.2.2.:  Structure of the savings market within the OLG modelled 
economy 
                       D E M A N D     S U P P L Y 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s own interpretation of the financial equilibrium in Tirole’s OLG economy 
 
Whenever we introduce a market transfer of wealth through periods, by the use of real 
money balances, per capita capital or a per capita non-productive investment asset such as the 
pure bubbly asset, we have as a result one or more not necessarily linear first order difference 
equations governing the market economy. They describe the dynamics of the evolution of the 
per capita savings instruments and the dynamics of whole market economy through time. 
Each of those difference equations is called an Equilibrium Law of Motion (ELM) and is 
formally specified for each separate investment instrument. So if there are n-multiple 
investment instruments, the market economy simultaneously evolves in n-different 
dimensions. In its evolution through time, the decentralized market mechanism is equilibrated 
at all times(satisfies the market clearing condition at any time), and the interaction of the 
rationality of agents (in terms of continuous optimisation of their own objective functions) 
and the market clearing determines the dynamics of the economy at any moment in time.  
At this point, we must stress that Tirole‟s model is deterministic, because there is no 
stochastic factor introducing uncertainty. Further, this assumption could be eased by 
introducing stochasticity into the inter-temporal marginal rate of substitution (MRS) among 
agents, which affects interest rates and asset prices, or we could also introduce stochasticity 
in the model through some other variable such as monetary policy etc. But for the moment, 
we will keep the deterministic character of the model. 
There are states of the dynamic variables, the variables describing the evolution of the 
market economy, at which dynamic equations mutually became stable. Those points are 
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called the Steady State (SS) equilibrium points and, most of the time, the dynamic system of 
equations (ELMs) will lead the economy to some of its SS equilibrium points, which are 
called “sink points”, but occasionally the system will tend to go away from these points, 
which are then called “source points”. 
So to analyse this system and its dynamics, we need to first find the locus of steady 
state points of each dynamic equation describing each ELM of the savings instrument 
governing the market economy, and then analyse the behaviour of the economy in the close 
neighbourhood of the steady state of all dynamic ELM equations simultaneously, which is 
called Dynamic Stability Analysis. Formally, this is done by inspecting the gradient matrix of 
partial derivative values (or difference values, since time is discrete in the model) in the close 
neighbourhood to the global steady state points. If the value of the partial derivative is 
0<dx<1, we have a stable monotonic dynamic to the steady state.  If -1<dx<0, we have a 
fluctuating dynamic but also leading to the steady state. In other cases, we have a dynamic 
exploding away from the steady state, which then defines a “source”. 
When we have more than one dynamic equation describing the system dynamics, we 
could use a phase diagram, inspecting the dynamics of the system in the plane around the 
steady state points or, alternatively, by applying matrix algebra and inspecting the first order 
partial derivatives of the system of linear or linear approximation difference equations at the 
SS points. Finding Eigen values and vectors and their determinant and trace values, helps to 
determine the overall system dynamics at those points. 
Back to Tirole's work (Tirole, 1985), the revolutionary point introduced in his paper 
was not that he used more means of saving, which complicates the dynamics of the system, 
but that he introduced non-productive saving, which can take the form of a non-productive 
rent-providing investment or an intrinsically worthless bubbly asset. When solving the model 
with more than one asset available for satisfying agents‟ savings demand, such as money and 
capital or capital and a bubbly asset as in the case of Tirole, rational investors tend to solve 
their consumer and savings problem by simultaneously holding both assets (the interior 
solution) only when the non-arbitrage condition is satisfied. This is actually the solution of 
risk-neutral agents to choosing among saving alternatives the one which gives them higher 
benefit in the future, under the perfect return foresight assumption. This means that at the 
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interior solution, both productive and non-productive “bubbly asset” will have the same 
expected rate of return.  
At this point, an important feature to stress is the diminishing rate of return from 
investments in productive capital, which plays a significant role by creating a systemic 
incentive for the introduction of the bubbly instrument. Without extensive countervailing 
technological improvements, the diminishing rate of return to productive capital investments 
will create a lack of productive savings instruments providing satisfactory real returns from 
savings, which is a direct consequence of the over-capital-accumulation. This problem is 
identified as a dynamic inefficiency of the financial market (Abel et al., 1989), which creates 
a systemic incentive to crowd out this over-accumulation into investments in other 
instruments such as the bubbly instruments. This intuition is well recognized in Tirole‟s 
model (Tirole, 1985). This incentive of unsatisfactory return from productive capital 
investments, originating from the lack of technological progress and innovation, could create 
financial innovation leading to increased use of bubbly instruments. 
Solving the model, Tirole‟s two first order difference equations for the capital per 
young agent (kt) and the bubbly asset per young agent (bt) were the following: 
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  “Equation 16‟‟ from (Tirole, 1985)(1.10) 
The first equation (Equation 16‟‟, Tirole, 1985) derived by the non-arbitrage 
condition describes the ELM of the bubbly asset per young agent tb . Here, the first derivative 
of the production function per young agent with respect to capital is described by )( 1 tkf and 
represents the marginal product of capital at the level of its accumulation in per young agent 
terms at time t+1, while n stands for the rate of population growth. Consequently, satisfying 
the non-arbitrage condition, the bubbly asset will grow in absolute value in per young agent 
terms if and only if the productivity of productive capital investments is greater than the 
natural rate of population growth. 
The second dynamic first order difference equation (Equation 16‟‟ at (Tirole, 1985)) 
defines the ELM for per young agent productive capital accumulation, which as seen by the 
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right hand side of the equation, is positively affected by the implicit savings function 
solution, and negatively affected by the crowding out effect of the use of the bubbly asset tb , 
satisfying the non-arbitrage condition.  
The savings function is assumed to be “normal”, which implies that the savings 
increase as the endowment when young increases and it also increase with the rise of the 
reward for saving, the interest rate. The savings function being “normal” also implies that 
savings decrease with the increase of endowment in the period when agents are old.  
Depicting the loci of the steady state points for the bubbly asset and for the productive 
capital following those two dynamic equations leads us to the phase diagram of the market 
economy. Having two savings instruments, productive and non-productive saving assets, 
which define two ELM functions governing the market economy, Tirole‟s phase diagram 
consists of two parts each describing the dynamics of the specific asset depicting the locus of 
its stability points (Tirole, 1985): 
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For the bubbly asset steady state solution we have one trivial solution, when there is 
no bubbly asset used for saving bt+1=bt= 0 , and indefinitely many non-trivial solutions 
satisfying the condition n+=)(kf+ +t
' 11 1 , when the bubbly asset is used. This means that 
the locus of stability points for the bubbly asset is a vertical line starting at the point of capital 
accumulation at which the marginal rate of return of capital equals the rate of growth of the 
population (Figure 1.2.3). 
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Figure 1.2.3.: Dynamics of the bubbly asset Equilibrium Law of Motion and its 
locus of stability points 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this figure: 
*In the stability loci, “b” is constant which solves the bubbly ELM to kt=f’-1(n) 
Kt- represents the level of productive capital per young agent at time t in the economy 
bt-represents the level of bubbly asset per young agent at time t in the economy 
Source: Authors own interpretation of Tirole’s rational asset bubbles model phase diagram  
 
Inspecting the dynamics in the near neighbourhood of the locus of stability points for the 
bubbly asset (Figure 1.2.3), depicted by the vertical line where the amount of the bubbly asset 
per young agent is stable bt=bt+1=b, we notice that if we are on the left side of the steady state 
locus, due to the fact that in this region we have less productive capital accumulation and 
return on capital is higher than the rate of growth of the population n>)(kf +t
'
1
, the bubbly 
asset ELM tends to increase the amount of bubbly asset per young agent through the non-
arbitrage condition. The opposite happens on the right side of the locus and in this region the 
ELM of the bubbly assets drives the economy to a lower level of the bubbly assets value per 
young agent. The two arrows, on the left and on the right of the steady state locus line for the 
bubbly asset, describe the vectors of systemic forces that determine the dynamics of bubbly 
asset accumulation. 
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 Analysing the ELM for per-young agent productive capital accumulation (kt), we also 
find one trivial and a continuum of non-trivial steady state points called the locus of stability 
points for productive capital per young agent. The trivial steady state (SS) is at the point 
where k t+1=kt= 0 and is located at the origin of the diagram. At this point no production and 
capital accumulation are observed. The other set of SS points follow a concave locus line of 
steady states for the productive capital in per young agent terms as described below (Figure 
1.2.4). At each point along this locus of steady state points kt+1=kt=k, which means capital per 
young agent is stable. The shape of the locus is determined by the diminishing returns of 
productive capital, and describes how aggressive, due to the non-arbitrage condition, capital 
accumulation is at points of high rate of returns near the origin point, driving up the value of 
the bubbly asset accumulation toward higher levels in per young agent terms. As more 
productive capital is accumulated, the effect of the diminishing rate of return to productive 
capital causes decreased interest for saving, which turns the curvature of the steady state 
locus of the productive capital accumulation in per young agent back to the bubble-less 
equilibrium point D.  
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Figure 1.2.4: Dynamics of the productive asset Equilibrium Law of Motion and its 
locus of stability points 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this figure: 
Kt- represents the level of productive capital per young agent at time t in the economy 
Bt-represents the level of bubbly asset per young agent at time t in the economy 
Source: Author’s own interpretation of Tirole’s rational asset bubbles model phase diagram  
 
 Again, to analyse the dynamics of this nonlinear first order difference equation in the 
near neighbourhood to the steady state locus for per-young agent productive capital 
accumulation, we need to determine the vectors describing the dynamics when we are below 
and above the locus line of stability points. When we are above the locus, the crowding out 
effect from the growth of the bubbly instrument dominates the savings market, crowds out 
productive savings and leads to decrease in productive capital accumulation in per young 
agent terms. The opposite happens when we are below the capital accumulation steady state 
locus line.  
Finally, we can represent the two dynamic ELM equations together to represent and 
analyse the complete dynamic of the system. The phase diagram derived from the separate 
diagrams for the ELM of the bubbly asset (Figure 1.2.3) and for the productive capital 
(Figure 1.2.4) is characterized by the vectors of forces directing the system dynamics at any 
time t in its two dimensional space according to the level of the bubbly asset and of 
productive capital accumulated per young agent. This joint interaction of the two ELMs is 
depicted in Figure 1.2.5. 
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Figure 1.2.5: Vectors of forces driving the accumulation of productive asset and 
bubbly asset in the economy 
 
 Q 1 
   Q 3 
 
 Q2 
 Q4 
         
Source: Author’s own interpretation of Tirole’s rational asset bubbles model phase diagram  
 
The two ELMs mutually govern the dynamics of the economy toward its general 
equilibrium steady state point, if such a point exists.  
If the financial market economy is characterized by higher returns of productive 
capital compared to the rate of growth of the wealth that has to be invested (equal to the rate 
of growth of the population), then – according to the non-arbitrage condition – given that the 
bubbly asset is present it rises in value. This region is represented by Quadrant 2 in Figure 
1.2.5., where the vector of forces shows bt and kt rising together up to the golden-rule steady 
state here the two loci intersect.  
If, on the other hand, the financial market economy finds itself in Quadrant 4 as 
depicted in Figure 1.2.5, this is the situation in which capital accumulation has proceeded 
beyond the point at which diminishing returns cause the rate of return on productive capital to 
be lower than the growth of the capital that has to be invested (population growth). In this 
case, the dynamics of the financial market lead to suboptimal productive capital over-
accumulation but bubble-less steady state. In this state, productive capital over-accumulates 
to the point where the rate of return is zero, in which case – through the non-arbitrage 
condition – the value of the bubbly asset is also zero.  
bt 
kt  O  D 
 ELM steady state 
locus of the bubbly 
asset 
 ELM Steady state locus 
of the productive capital 
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The other two quadrants, Quadrant 1 and especially Quadrant 3 are the area which is 
characterized by over-accumulation of the bubbly asset in the financial market. In this area – 
above the productive capital ELM – the bubbly asset is already highly present in the financial 
market. If the financial market economy finds itself in the Quadrant 1, the bubbly asset 
becomes a massive frenzy speculative investment episode. It completely takes over the 
financial market, increasingly crowding out productive capital accumulation, ending in a 
quick burst and bust cycle. Finally, in Quadrant 3, the financial market is characterised by 
low interest rates (because of productive capital over-accumulation) and bubbly asset over-
accumulation, hence will be driven toward lower levels of both productive capital 
accumulation (higher interest rates) and lower levels of the bubbly asset.  
But there is one crucial point that needs to be stressed, which as a conclusion was 
brought forward in the OLG model with endowment (Samuelson, 1958) and in the OLG 
model with production and productive savings(Diamond, 1965). 
In the Samuelson's solution, the market leads to a solution which is dynamically 
efficient if and only if interest rates, without the presence of the bubbly asset, are higher than 
the rate of population growth. Later the population growth could be understood by the rate of 
growth of the economy. This is because the growth of the economy, described in 
Samuelson‟s case simply as the growth of the population, determines the growth of the 
overall wealth and imposes a continuous incentive for inter-temporal wealth transfer within 
the budget constraint of agents. This is an incredibly important savings demand driving force, 
which initiates introduction of different savings and investment vehicles, as well as other 
innovative or bubbly vehicles, when productive saving vehicles are not productive enough to 
satisfy the need for transferring wealth from one period to another. The financial innovation 
and the introduction of bubbly assets come naturally when the pace of growth of the wealth 
per young agent cannot be followed by the productivity of capital, which is diminishing in the 
absence of technological innovations. So this balance makes the difference between the 
dynamically efficient and dynamically inefficient market economies where bubbles become 
rational. 
In Diamond's model (Diamond 1965), there is an efficient market solution, similar to 
Samuelson's, if the interest rates are higher than or equal to the population growth rate, which 
happens when consumers are impatient, as in the “classical” economy. Otherwise, the market 
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solution with production and capital is not efficient when equilibrium interest rates are lower 
than the population growth leading to capital over-accumulation, and a rational need for 
introduction of the bubbly asset. So we actually have the following two alternative cases for 
the dynamic efficiency of the economy with productive and non-productive savings (Figure 
1.2.6): 
Figure1.2.6: Dynamic analysis of the “Classical” and the “Samuelson’s” OLG 
market economy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s own interpretation of Tirole’s rational asset bubbles model phase diagram 
 
In the case when we are in the “classical” economy (Left hand side of the Figure 
1.2.6), where the market interest rates (r) of the OLG model with productive capital 
accumulation and without bubbly asset are higher than the growth rate of population (n), 
because the economy is dominated by agents not willing to save (impatient agents), then 
there exists a bubble-less rational equilibrium depicted by the point D. There could be 
speculative stages along the path to this bubble-less equilibrium, when certain bubbly 
instruments are introduced, but they lead to short episodes of aggressive speculative inflation 
and collapse cycles of the bubbly instrument. Ultimately, the economy follows the dynamic 
of capital accumulation to the Diamond steady state depicted by D (Diamond, 1965), which is 
stable and dynamically efficient in the context of the “classical economy”. Financial markets 
without bubbly instruments, as in this case, lead to the Social planer‟s Pareto optimal 
outcome. 
A) Dynamically efficient 
“classical” economy 
 
B) Dynamically inefficient 
“Samuelson‟s” economy 
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If the other case dominates, we are in the “Samuelson” economy, dominated by 
agents who are patient consumers, want to smooth their life-time consumption and are willing 
to save for consuming more when they get old. In this case, there exists an efficient 
asymptotic bubbly path that leads the economy to the “Golden Rule” steady state equilibrium 
(the point “bgs” in Figure 1.2.6.B), as defined by Phelps (Phelps, 1961).At this point, in 
Tirole‟s deterministic OLG market economy, the value of the bubbly asset per young agent 
(bt) is constant and its total value in the economy in absolute terms continues to linearly grow 
at the rate of growth of the population (in extensions this could be the rate of growth of the 
economy, or the rate of growth of wealth per young agent). Capital accumulation per young 
agent is constant as well at this point, and gives a return equal to the growth rate of the 
population. So at this state of the economy, bubbles as defined by Tirole, are a rational 
outcome leading the economy to its dynamically optimal Golden Rule steady state by 
preventing useless productive capital over-accumulation perceived as such by the agents 
(Tirole, 1985). This means that otherwise, if the system starts at a point of bubbly asset 
inception below the asymptotic saddle path leading to the Golden Rule steady state of the 
bubbly asset as depicted by level (bgs) in Figure 1.2.6.B, there will be a lower level of asset 
bubble reached, level (bl), below the golden rule steady state, and from this point the bubbly 
asset will subsequently decrease leading to the Diamond bubble-less suboptimal steady state. 
Diamond‟s SS is inefficient in this economic context, because it represents a steady state 
characterized by an over-accumulated level of capital per young agent and leaves a lower 
level of consumption to be divided among young and old agents of the economy through its 
infinite existence. So rational asset bubbles, crowd out some of the productive savings and 
investments, decrease the level of capital per young agent, increase productivity and provide 
a higher level of consumption to be divided among agents. This corresponds to the social 
planner Pareto optimal solution and is favoured compared to the market solution, which leads 
to the Diamond SS. Asset bubbles in Tirole's economy play a similar role to government debt 
in the Diamond economy, crowding out part of the capital, thereby leading the inefficient 
“Samuelson” economy to its Pareto optimal steady state represented by the “Golden Rule”. In 
the following graphical representation, we see the mutual interaction of the two dynamic 
equations in the dynamically inefficient “Samuelson” market economy (Figure 1.2.7). 
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Figure1.2.7: Heuristic phase diagram describing “Samuelsson’s” OLG market 
economy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s own interpretation of Tirole(1985) -rational asset bubbles model phase diagram 
 
This shows that in an economic environment with both productive capital and a 
bubbly asset, where agents rationally interact on the markets, asset bubbles can be a rational 
outcome. The zero point (Point O in Figure 1.2.7), with no capital and no bubbly asset as a 
trivial solution is non-stable, which means it is a source. The economy will eventually 
develop away from this initial point. If worthless assets, defined as “bubbly” are introduced 
near the asymptotically-bubbly saddle path, the economy moves to the global stability point 
depicted at GS on the graph. This point is optimal for the economy, and it represents a “sink 
point”, which means that the dynamics of the economy is attracted to it by its near 
environment or by the asymptotic path leading to it. When the economy reaches this point, 
ceteris paribus, it achieves its stable bubbly equilibrium.  
If on the other hand, the economy accepts the bubbly instrument below the 
asymptotically-bubbly path, the bubbly asset reach some maximum level (heuristically 
described by the point bl on the Figure 1.2.7), but then disappears attracted by the second 
“sink” point in the economy, the inefficient Diamond steady state. At this point, there is no 
bubbly asset in the economy, interest rates are very low and there is over-accumulation of 
productive capital which brings lifetime consumption and the utility of agents to a sub-
optimally lower level. 
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The third possible dynamics are achieved if, euphorically, the bubbly asset is 
introduced way above the asymptotically-bubbly saddle path. From this point, the bubble 
rapidly explodes, crowds out all of the productive capital and subsequently rapidly collapses 
itself to the origin (see Figure 1.2.7.A, graph on the left hand side). This cycle represents an 
inefficient speculation, which is a non-sustainable but possible outcome for the market 
economy. The logic of the existence of this phenomenon is described by many prominent 
economists explaining bubbly cycles on the stock market (Shiller R. , 2000).  
Tirole claimed that there can be infinitely many bubbly assets introduced in the 
inefficient “bubbly” market economy (Tirole, 1985).He claimed that there can be more than 
one bubbly asset, or even fundamentally worthy rent providing assets that belong to the 
category of non-productive assets. He also claimed that assets could be a mix of fundamental 
and bubbly assets (Tirole, 1982), which explains the bubble present on the stock market. In 
such a circumstance, only the total amount of all the bubbly and other non-productive assets 
could be observed growing to the SS depicted at the point GS. But the individual value 
dynamics of different bubbly assets, among and within the sum of the bubbly assets can 
wildly differ and fluctuate. Among the different bubbly assets, there is no possibility to 
determine which one will inflate and which will deflate and when; the only thing that can be 
expected to be observed is the dynamics of the sum of the bubbly assets toward their joint 
steady state (Figure 1.2.8).Tirole compares this process of fluctuation of the value among 
different bubbly assets with the occurrence of sunspots (Tirole, 1985). The only thing that can 
be predicted is the overall sum of the value of the bubbly instruments. Similar to the logic of 
Tobin's portfolio (Tobin, 1969), or “the overshooting mechanism” of interest rates introduced 
by Dorbusch (Dorbusch, 1976), there could be a large volatility between different groups of 
bubbly assets. Some groups will have negative correlation but the total of bubbly assets will 
be led to the steady state of the bubbly asset described by the point GS, which can be affected 
by some changes in the market microstructure.  This outcome together with the result that the 
sum of the bubbly assets will tend to reach its steady state level, leads to the conclusion that 
in general there will be a negative correlation among groups of bubbly assets or, when one 
falls, the sum of the others will have to rise offsetting the fall in value of the first one. This is 
similar to the empirically evidenced correlation between equity and bonds, both having 
characteristics of bubbly instruments, but also giving insights into the equity premium puzzle 
(Mehra & Prescott, 1985).  
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Figure 1.2.8.: The interaction within different “bubbly assets” as presented by 
(Tirole, 1985) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This Figure represents the evolution of the value of total of bubbly assets toward their steady state 
equilibrium level bgs, represented by the solid line. The dashed line heuristically describes the result of 
the fluctuation of value of one bubbly asset among different types of bubbly assets in the group. 
 
Source: Author’s own interpretation of (Tirole, 1985) rational asset bubbles model phase diagram 
 
Discussing the preconditions that trigger one intrinsically worthless asset to be used as 
a bubbly asset, Tirole specifies several factors. Those factors are durability, scarcity and 
common beliefs. Some of those factors, especially the common beliefs, will be extensively 
treated by the other schools on asset bubbles described further in this chapter. One asset 
needs to have a critical amount of those qualities, to arise and serve as a rational bubbly asset 
in the economy.  
Tirole indeed presented very compelling insights. However, the relationship between 
interest rates, growth of the economy and asset bubbles proved to be more complicated in 
reality than in Tirole's model. This complexity was seen during the last decade of the 
twentieth century. At a time of strong growth of the US economy during the 1990s, asset 
bubbles on the equity market were developing followed by high productive investment and 
high interest rates as opposed to the claims present in Tirole's result. It seemed that bubbles 
are possible even in the other type of economy, even in the classical dynamically efficient 
economy. But this could also be a result of insufficient understanding of the dynamic 
inefficiency criteria imposed within the OLG model. In our empirical strategy, we consider 
whether it might be not the growth of the population, or growth of the economy which best 
define the common dynamic efficiency criterion but, instead, the growth of the investable 
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wealth per young agent vis-a-vis the real return of the productive assets which determines the 
dynamic inefficiency of the economy and which brings the need for asset bubbles onto the 
stage.  
Farhi, Caballero and Hammour, three scholars from the new generation of leading 
economists, compared Tirole's results with the evidence of the equity market bubble in the 
late 90sin the US economy (Caballero, Farhi, & Hammour, 2006). Motivated by the findings 
of authors who, using the comparison between the growth rate of the economy and the return 
on equity investments (calculated by comparing the sum of dividend and stock repurchase to 
the net market value of equity), has found that the US and OECD economies were 
dynamically efficient (Abel et al., 1989), Farhi, Caballero and Hammour, searched for more 
explanation about the occurrence of asset bubbles in the US economy. In their model, based 
on the foundations set by Tirole, within the resulting savings function they introduced an 
extension, named “the growth-funding feedback”, which relaxes Diamond's SS result for the 
dynamically efficient economy.  
Compared to the simple non-linear savings function in Diamond's model, this 
extended “funding function” is not only determined by the wage of the young agents and by 
the interest rate or marginal productivity of capital, but also by other factors positively 
correlated to the level of capital accumulation in the system. This is atypical to the standard 
rational asset bubbles model result of Tirole, and allows for multiple equilibrium and 
occurrence of asset bubbles even in the classical dynamically efficient economy. Farhi, 
Caballero and Hammour accomplished this by introducing a “step” into the “funding 
function”, as described in the following equation from their paper (Caballero, Farhi, & 
Hammour, 2006): 
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In their step-funding function, when capital reaches some threshold value defined by 
some k
0
critical capital accumulation level, then the savings function initiates a “growth-
funding feedback” induced by the effect of some exogenous factor δ. This initiates a jump of 
the market economy to the new saddle path leading to a higher capital accumulation steady 
state called the speculative state. 
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This allows the system to have multiple steady state equilibriums and to be able to 
jump from one to another, provoked by some exogenous factor, such as a technological 
development, fiscal policy etc. The first steady state, the so called “normal” steady state, 
which corresponds to Diamond‟s result; and the other “speculative” steady state, which 
relaxes Diamond‟s result and can be achieved as a result of this growth-funding feedback. 
The resulting steady states are denoted k
N
 and k
S
, respectively in Figure 1.2.9. 
 
Figure 1.2.9.: Representation of the growth-funding feedback (Caballero, Farhi, 
& Hammour, 2006) 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Source: (Caballero, Farhi, & Hammour, 2006) 
 
On the left hand side in Figure1.2.9, there is a graph of the multiple equilibrium 
capital accumulation of the economy. There are two stable SS (sink) equilibriums for the 
capital k
N
 and k
S
. As capital reaches the critical level of capital accumulation described by 
the point
0k , funding initiates the jump above the 45 degree line and drives the economy to a 
new ELM for capital accumulation leading the economy to the new sink called “speculative” 
SS represented by k
S
. The dynamics of the new equilibrium SS are characterized by increased 
investments, a lower interest rate and an environment “friendly” for the development of 
rational asset bubbles. Farhi, Caballero and Hammour used a linear representation of the 
funding function for simplicity, so they used the graph represented on the right hand side of 
Figure 1.2.9 as a good approximation for the ELM of capital accumulation. 
This so called “speculative” SS equilibrium is characterized by over investment into 
productive assets and low interest rates as depicted by the point 
sk  on the graph. Farhi, 
This 
represents 
δ 
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Caballero and Hammour claimed that this point corresponds to the empirical data on the US 
economy in the 90s.  Higher capital accumulation SS, provides more capital funding itself by 
triggering speculative productive capital accumulation, which more than offsets the decrease 
of funding due to the lower interest rates. 
Another important phenomenon described in Farhi, Caballero and Hammour's work 
was the stock market boom-bust cycle, which accompanies this “speculative-growth 
episode”. They introduced capital gain, in the fashion of Tobin, denoting it by “q”, which is 
the driving ingredient in this jump to the new speculative SS equilibrium. This way, they 
introduced Tirole‟s description of asset prices being a sum of the intrinsic value of the 
underlying productive capital and its bubbly value (Tirole, 1982). They addressed the 
problem of having the system at which higher capital accumulation, which presumes lower 
marginal productivity of capital, drives higher investment interest in productive capital after 
the speculative jump of the economy, which was not an outcome of Tirole‟s model (Tirole, 
1985)but which was observed in the US economy in the 1990s. To solve this problem, they 
introduced “adjustment costs” of capital, being costs of moving away from the level of 
investment needed to maintain the effective capital stock, which create a wedge between the 
price of the installed capital and the marginal product of capital. This way, they assumed 
capital appreciation, which allowed for continual productive capital accumulation even 
though the marginal product of capital was decreasing.  This capital appreciation was the 
actual capital gain. In this way, Farhi, Caballero and Hammour introduced the potential 
bubble within the market pricing of the productive capital (Caballero, Farhi, & Hammour, 
2006), in line with the Tirole‟s logic (Tirole, 1982). 
 Finally, the authors derive the two equations governing the system dynamics. 
Different from Tirole (1985), where the dynamics of the pure bubbly instrument (bt) and the 
accumulation of productive capital (kt)  were the two dynamic equations determining the 
dynamics of the economy, here the authors use productive capital (kt) and capital gain 
described by (qt) as the two defining dynamic equations. They describe the bubble in a more 
artificial way by using capital gain-i.e. as a bubble within the pricing of a fundamentally 
worthy instrument such as equity and not necessarily as a pure bubbly asset such as in 
Tirole‟s model.   
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Farhi, Caballero and Hammour, define certain triggers which can jump-start this 
speculative growth path of the economy. Among the triggers are Technological Advance, 
Fiscal Surpluses, External Capital Flows and Financial Deregulation. 
Finally, focusing on Emerging Markets, Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2005) develop 
a stochastic OLG model with rational asset bubbles focusing on Emerging Markets. They 
show that although the return on productive assets can be much higher in Emerging Markets, 
their representative companies fail to capitalize their expected future returns due to poor 
equity ownership rights and protection. Such an issue increases the problem of the dynamic 
inefficiency, because of the lower effective returns on capital as stressed by Abel (Abel et al., 
1989). Caballero and Krishnamurthy focus on an open market economy, where agents can 
also use foreign financial market investments as saving vehicles. The combination of low 
returns abroad and on the domestic financial market together with the higher rates of growth 
of the wealth of the domestic agents, creates a fertile environment for the development of 
rational asset bubbles.  Although Caballero and Krishnamurthy stress the benefits of the 
rational asset bubbles developing on the domestic market, which tend to prevent capital 
outflows, they also warn of the negative implications due to the reverse cash flows when the 
bubble crashes in the stochastic environment. 
Caballero and Krishnamurthy focus on EM financial markets with significant 
openness and impact from foreign financial markets. Accordingly, for the investigation of 
this thesis their model has the disadvantage of displacing the focus of the analysis away from 
the role of domestic institutional investors such as the DC pension funds. Moreover, 
relatively modest portfolio capital flows to the Croatian equity market compared to the assets 
under management of the Croatian DC pension funds together with low integration of the 
Croatian equity market with global financial markets reinforce the case for using the Tirole‟s 
closed market OLG model with rational asset bubbles. No model in the OLG tradition 
attempts to include all possible characteristics of actual market economies, because the 
models would be intractable and so incapable of yielding useful insights. For these reasons– 
our focus on dominant domestic institutions in the context of low openness – we judge 
Tirole‟s model to be the most appropriate platform for addressing the impact of DC pension 
funds. 
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To support our view in this thesis that during the period under consideration the 
Croatian financial market was characterised by low openness, we note that during the boom 
of the Croatian equity bubble in 2005-2007 the total AUM of the Croatian pension funds was 
between 1.5 and 3 billion EUR, while the AUM of the Croatian Open End Mutual funds 
investing in Croatian Equity markets was 2 billion EUR. In comparison, the impact of the 
foreign portfolio equity inflows of less than of 200 million EUR per year on average can be 
considered as marginal. Table 1.2.2 provides an overview of the relevant flow data.  
Table 1.2.2 Dynamics of the foreign portfolio investments on the Croatian equity 
market 
 
Source: Calulated using data from the Croatian National Bank and Croatian stock exchange  
 
Moreover, current trends of increased global capital market correlations suggest that 
the degree of closedness/openness of the financial market could be achieved by controlling 
for a price related foreign capital markets variable in the model. This is the strategy we adopt 
in our empirical analysis, which is reported in Chapters 4 and 5.  
In accord with these arguments, we continue our theoretical modelling focusing on 
Tirole‟s OLG closed financial market model with rational asset bubbles. 
We won‟t lose generality in analysing the consequences of the introduction of 
institutional investors such as pension funds using Tirole‟s model. In other words, the same 
results applicable to pure bubbles would hold if bubbles were to be represented as a part of 
the price of the productive assets via some “capital appreciation” mechanism as defined in the 
Farhi, Caballero and Hammour model. 
We have analysed the OLG model of rational asset bubbles and some of the proposed 
extensions trying to give more complete and more insightful conclusions. Finally, we 
conclude that Tirole‟s contribution was seminal in understanding some of the most important 
characteristics of capital market asset bubbles (Tirole, 1985). They arise as a rational 
consequence driven by the dynamic inefficiency of the capital market, defined as a significant 
disparity between the accumulated wealth that needs to be continuously transferred from one 
period to another smoothing consumption between generations, and the systemic availability 
Values in mio. EUR
year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
estimated new foreign portfolio 
investments -5.1 178.9 -121.6 491.7 274.4 33.2 400.9
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of investment instruments to productively achieve such inter-period transfer of wealth with 
satisfactory returns. In this fashion, bubbles become a rational outcome for the system and for 
participating agents who accept them as an inevitable part of their portfolios. Although very 
abstract, providing significant depth of ideas, Tirole‟s model proves simple, insightful and 
capable of extensions in its microstructure which, in turn, will enable us to investigate the 
reaction of the overall market economy to specific changes such as the introduction of the 
mandatory pension funds that affect the investment behaviour of agents and the overall 
savings dynamics in the financial market economy. This is the reason why we will model our 
theoretical capital market economy, and derive our hypothesis on the asset bubble effect of 
the inclusion of pension funds, based on the theoretical framework of the OLG general 
equilibrium model. 
Having explained the main school of rational asset bubbles and the OLG general 
equilibrium theoretical framework, we move to critically evaluate other schools of thought on 
asset bubbles. These give additional, more micro-structure related specifics, which could 
explain and reinforce the process of systemic adoption of the bubbly financial instrument. 
The main ideas of these schools complement the analytical framework set by Tirole. We will 
provide a brief review of the ideas of other schools treating asset bubbles in the following 
sections, starting with the asset bubble theories based on the presence of asymmetric 
information in the financial markets. We will find that other schools as well, especially the 
noise-traders school, have widely accepted the OLG framework as their specific framework 
for financial market modelling. 
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1.2.2. Asymmetric information asset bubbles theory 
 
1.2.2.1 Capital markets in the environment of asymmetric information 
– a recognized critique to ECMH 
 
One of the strongest critiques to Fama's Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis (ECMH) 
(Fama, 1970) came from the prominent authors, representatives of “Information economics”, 
Grossman and Stiglitz. Their critique (Grossman & Stiglitz, 1980) followed naturally, 
because information efficiency was one of the major assumptions of Efficient Capital 
Markets Hypothesis and its implication was crucial to achieving efficient equilibrium market 
asset prices. In this respect, Grossman and Stiglitz, in their seminal work on the impossibility 
of the existence of perfectly information efficient capital markets, claim that market 
information, which is necessarily costly, in a situation when perfectly available to every agent 
participating in the capital market cannot lead to sustainable competitive market equilibrium 
(Grossman & Stiglitz, 1980). They prove their claim by formally stating a simple model 
where if information is costly even with a minimal cost, and if capital asset pricing reflects all 
information as one of the basic assumptions of the ECMH, then there won‟t be an incentive 
for the marginal trading agent to purchase any information, which will immediately hold for 
all market participating agents. In such a situation, no agent will have an incentive to be 
informed, getting the whole information for free from the observed asset prices and, 
consequently, there will be no equilibrium for the financial asset on the capital market 
(Grossman & Stiglitz, 1980). This simply means that a capital market on which asset prices 
perfectly reflect all available information about the asset is an impossible outcome. 
The only market outcome, to be a rational outcome when information is costly, is the one 
where agents have different private information, so that price does not perfectly reflect all 
information about the financial asset. Consequently, there exists a permanent disparity 
between the private and common knowledge relevant for asset pricing, which is the measure 
of information asymmetry. This leads to the existence of asset miss-valuation and to the 
creation of capital market asset bubbles as a possible rational market outcome, besides the 
assumption that financial markets react efficiently to new relevant information. The presence 
of miss-valuations may not be inconsistent with the empirical evidence confirming 
compliance of the hypothesis of short-run martingales asset price dynamics.  
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Grossman and Stiglitz in their influential theoretical work claim that trade on the financial 
markets is driven by heterogeneous beliefs of trading agents, and as we will later see, 
inspecting the consequences of the presence of asymmetric information, the biggest 
informational asymmetry affecting equilibrium market prices comes from the disparity 
between the private and common beliefs. The nonexistence of competitive market 
equilibrium in the world of perfect information, as shown by Grossman and Stiglitz, is also in 
compliance with the “no-trade theorem” (Milgrom & Stokey, 1982). The same nonexistence 
of market equilibrium happens in the other extreme situation when agents are wholly 
uninformed.  Grossman and Stiglitz, claim that the capital market always operates in an 
imperfect, asymmetric information context between those two extremes, and this leads to 
equilibrium pricing of the capital assets different compared to their intrinsic value (Grossman 
& Stiglitz, 1980). This persistent difference means that the bubbly value as a component of 
the price of the financial instrument, similar to the previous exposition by Tirole (1982) will 
always have a non-zero value, hence the continuous possibility of asset price bubbles.   
When this is compared to the evidence stated in the ECMH, it is clear that the empirical 
evidence in favour of the short-run martingale properties of asset price dynamics is not 
necessarily a proof that equilibrium market asset prices are reflecting the intrinsic value of the 
underlying asset. Moreover, if prices permanently reflect a bubbly component, which has 
martingale properties as in the case theoretically described by Tirole‟s “myopic bubble” 
(Tirole, 1982), besides their intrinsic component, then martingales could not be a proof of 
efficient equilibrium asset pricing. This corresponds to the recognized “joint hypothesis 
problem” stressed by Fama and French (Fama, 1991) (Fama & French, 2004).  
The Grosmann and Stiglitz critique was later widely accepted by Fama, especially the 
possibility of prices being away from the intrinsic value of the underlying assets (Fama, 
1991). This gives weight to the important role of asymmetric information arguments when 
defining the rational expectations models of equilibrium market asset pricing. The strength of 
the argument of persistent asymmetric information defined a new focus in the theory of 
finance, creating a rising group of authors belonging to the asymmetric information school 
describing reasons for the occurrence of asset bubbles. In the following section we will focus 
on some of the most important arguments and specific ideas introduced by those authors and 
on the insights of this school of thought towards explaining asset bubbles. We will also 
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present the arguments of this school on the roles of large institutional investors in the context 
of asymmetric information. 
 For this purpose, we begin with the very roots of the “information economics”. 
Authors such as Stiglitz, Akelrof and Spence, who won the Nobel Price for their “Information 
Economics” theoretical contribution, demonstrating that in the most commonly present 
information imperfect market environments, Adam Smith‟s “free hand” doesn‟t perfectly 
work when allocating scarce resources (Grossman & Stiglitz, 1976; Spence, 1973; Akelrof, 
1970). This means that the price mechanism tends to function imperfectly when market 
participants decide based on asymmetric information or, in other words, price as an allocation 
device doesn‟t reflect the objective intrinsic value of assets.  Akelrof shows in his “market for 
lemons” that information asymmetry between buyers and sellers could lead to “missing 
markets” for fundamentally sound assets and could drive out good in favour of bad assets 
when such information is hidden or unknown before the trade occurs (Akelrof, 1970). This 
set of ideas corresponds to Gresham's Law observed on the money market
6
. Its logic also 
leads to the outcome known as “the winners curse” or a Pyrrhic victory, which translates into 
a possession of a traded asset with smaller fundamental value by the less-informed auction 
“winner”.  
This analogy of simplistic relations developing in the environment of asymmetric 
information, leads to a financial market where, based on knowledge about the presence of 
imperfect information, an agent could decide to buy an asset at a certain price over its 
intrinsic value, believing that there will be another agent who, not knowing the true intrinsic 
value of the asset, will further bid its price to a higher level. Similar to this logic, agents in 
Tirole‟s rational asset bubbles model (Tirole, 1985) accept a bubbly asset into their savings 
portfolio. 
The analogy of the simple but extremely important ideas from the “market for 
lemons” could also be found on financial markets, where high numbers of traders interact in 
simultaneous auction games within the similar context of imperfect information, bidding up 
price away from its intrinsic value. The result could lead to persistent market price deviations 
from intrinsic asset values known as asset bubbles. Since information about common beliefs, 
                                                 
6
 Based on the observation by Sir Thomas Gresham in the 16
th
 century who found out that bad money, or money 
with a worse mixture of metals in terms of the intrinsic value of the coins, was driving out the good money 
from the market. 
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private beliefs of the other market participants and about disparities among them are the most 
profitable types of information for the individual market decision maker in such a market 
environment, especially if the market can be described by a sequential game, market 
participant will try to discover ways to learn this valuable information. The importance of 
market signalling and finding other ways of solving this persistent information imperfection 
problem is already recognized and is part of the modern theory of finance. 
 Imperfect financial market pricing mechanism as a signalling or information 
dissemination tool that disseminates the information about the value of financial asset from 
informed to ignorant market participants is a consequence of the asymmetric information 
market environment explained by Grossman and Stiglitz. Such financial market environment 
was in the focus of many of the following representatives of this asymmetric information 
school on asset bubbles. 
Jackson and Peck, stressed that in an asymmetric information environment, when the 
market game is simultaneous, actual price cannot enter the decision function of market 
traders a-priori because it is ex-post determined after the interaction of all trading decisions 
has been made (Jackson & Peck, 1999). This way the information about the current common 
beliefs, disseminated by the actual price, cannot affect a-priori the uninformed agents. 
Jackson and Peck further claim that the rational expectations capital market equilibrium 
model must account for this fact, which further causes (Jackson & Peck, 1999): 
1)  Excess volatility of prices vis-à-vis the volatility of the value of asset 
fundamentals; 
 2) “Uncoupling” of prices from the intrinsic value of assets, making the occurrence 
and persistence of asset bubbles possible; 
 3) Makes uninformed agents earn a lower premium from participation in the risky 
(bubbly) asset market; and 
 4) Makes market equilibrium price exhibit a “V” shape functional mapping related 
with the increase of costs of information. 
 Although known as being most efficient, it becomes obvious that financial market 
copes with plenty of inherent information problems and that the pricing relevant information 
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is not inexpensive. Those problems are especially present in less developed financial markets, 
with underdeveloped regulation, setting weak or non-existent issuer‟s transparency 
requirements and having less educated market participants, which has impact on their 
rationality and on the formation of their beliefs and investment decisions. Such financial 
market environments are more often found in countries such as the Croatian financial market 
belonging to the SEE group of countries where financial markets are young and where the 
asymmetric information problem is vividly present. On such markets the assumed speculative 
market premium is also higher. 
 
1.2.2.2. Asset bubbles, learning process and the role of “technical 
analysis” in financial markets with asymmetric information 
 
 There is a group of authors theoretically modelling financial markets operating in the 
environment of asymmetric private and common information. In their models the market 
context with asymmetric information is blamed as a major cause for the occurrence of asset 
bubbles. One of the seminal contributions within this branch of theories on asset bubbles is 
the work of Allen, Morris and Postlewaite (1993), who present a finite period general 
equilibrium model of an exchange economy with asymmetric information. In market 
conditions where: 
a) Each agent is short sale constrained for his trades with the risky (bubbly) asset; 
b) Agents‟ trades are not common knowledge; and 
c) Agents use their private information when determining their fair value belief for the risky 
asset; 
 The authors model a rational market outcome for the risky asset where the market 
value reached is higher than the asset‟s intrinsic value (Allen, Morris, & Postlewaite, 1993).  
They show that because of the presence of asymmetric information, even if all agents 
know the correct intrinsic value of the financial asset, because of the fact that they are not 
sure if the other agents have the same knowledge, or they are not sure that their private 
knowledge equals the common knowledge, they are prone to bid the price of the asset above 
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its intrinsic value. Agents act this way believing that there is another agent who could help 
them achieve capital gain at or over their rational, information constrained assumption of the 
expected return by buying the asset at a higher price. The intuitive logic behind the asset 
bubbles occurrence in such an environment could be explained by the decisive importance of 
the private information about other traders‟ beliefs affecting individual agents trading 
decision. Previous period price growth observation could lead to a conclusion that other agent 
beliefs are “bullish”, which could prevent the rational dominance of the decision to sell the 
asset for which the private intrinsic value calculation finds a much lower fundamental value 
than the present market value. This speculative decision is rational in the market game with 
asymmetric information as Allen, Morris and Postlewaite show. This is so because the 
assumed price dynamics pattern closely corresponds to the later observed one due to self-
fulfilling prophecies. The authors show by presenting theoretical examples with constrained 
private beliefs that, due to the existence of asymmetric information, although all agents know 
that the financial asset is worthless, they are ready to speculate on a higher price of the asset 
as they speculate on the content of the common knowledge about the value of the worthless 
asset (Allen, Morris, & Postlewaite, 1993). This idea intersects with the ideas of 
Brunnermeier, who went one step further, defining such expectations, which lead to short-run 
felicity derived from optimism, resulting in overestimating the positive outcome probabilities 
of events. He named this “near rational attitude” as “optimal expectations” (Brunnermeier & 
Parker, 2005). 
Authors call this extreme case a “strong bubble”, when everyone knows the financial 
asset is overvalued but they still bid its price up toward higher values. It corresponds to the 
idea popular with market practitioners called “The greater fool theory”. It says that market 
traders in such a case believe that they have unique private knowledge for the financial asset 
being worthless but, because of their belief that the common knowledge values the asset 
inaccurately over its fundamental value, they believe and optimally apply to their decision a 
model of belief that there will be another trader to whom they could further sell the asset at a 
higher price and achieve the expected higher returns. This is considered as a rational decision 
in such an informational setting where this prophecy is self-fulfilling. 
F. Allen, S. Morris and A. Postlewaite also question the objectivity of the criteria for 
the measurement of the intrinsic value, stating the heterogeneity of the different fundamental 
valuation approaches used (Allen, Morris, & Postlewaite, 1993). This issue is also recognized 
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by other authors such as Tirole who questions the implication of the existence of different 
intrinsic valuation models applied by different market agents (Tirole, 1982). 
 Further in this respect, Morris (1996) explains why in the context of asymmetric 
information, IPOs find that their values usually reach their maximum at the moment when the 
public offering takes place. Morris explains the learning process as a process of diminishing 
the effects of information asymmetry which, as Grossman and Stiglitz showed, cannot be 
completely eliminated. Morris claims that although this learning process continuously lasts, 
even small differences between agents‟ private beliefs could initiate the process of “eternal 
switching” in the trading positions of agents, leading to a bubbly outcome on the market. This 
means that a small information asymmetry leading to different private beliefs could initiate 
the process whereby groups of agents sequentially bid up the price among themselves, 
believing that after each bidding sequence there will be another agent who will help them 
realize capital gains (Morris, 1996). Analogue to this is the famous Cambridge story about 
Isaac Newton, a good example of a significantly rational agent, who speculated on the South 
Sea Bubble, nearly doubling his 3500 pounds initial investment on his first exit from the 
market, but then, realizing that the price continued growing, invested a larger sum again and 
finally made a significant loss. He famously remarked: “I can calculate the movement of the 
stars, but not the madness of men”. His attitude is a perfect example of the “switching 
process”. 
 So even in an environment with a minimal information asymmetry among private 
beliefs on all possible contingencies for the fundamental asset, speculative premiums tend to 
be positive, driving the market to a bubbly price equilibrium (Morris, 1996). 
In this respect, trying to model and understand private learning solutions for agents 
learning the beliefs of others and the common beliefs, as one of the most important tasks for 
them, even more important than establishing the fundamental value of the asset, leads to the 
importance of “technical analysis” and common opinion disseminators such as the media. It 
could be seen that today‟s media, answering to the high demand for this crucially important 
informational need of individual market decision makers, makes many innovations such as 
regular “expert opinion” interviews,  “technical analysis” and “price trend analysis” reports, 
selling this valuable information to the capital market participants. 
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One of the proposed solutions of the “market for lemons” problem, making individual 
investors more confident when making their investment decisions, is investing through 
professional financial institutions such as actively managed mutual funds. This is partly 
because investors believe financial institutions have better information or better and more 
sophisticated solutions to the lack of information about the common beliefs and beliefs of 
others for the intrinsic value of the asset. This is similar to the logic a buyer of a used car 
applies when he decides to go to a dealer believing that way he will make a better informed 
decision about the quality of the used car he is buying. 
 Another way to solve the “common knowledge learning problem” is the use of some 
innovative tools of learning or figuring out the common beliefs of the mass of investors. This 
set of tools is known as “technical analysis” tools and trend following techniques, which have 
gained significant popularity among investors. The popularity of books on technical analysis 
is amazing in recent times and corresponds to the massive demand of trading agents to 
develop tools for discovering changes in common beliefs before others do. This confirms the 
presence of the asymmetry of information and the importance of knowing such beliefs, being 
even more important than the knowledge of the fundamental values of assets.  
 Consequently, although authors such as Fama found evidence against the benefits of 
the technical analysis (Fama, 1965a), later empirical work weakened his claims showing the 
effectiveness of technical analysis.  Matthew Jackson tried to explain market outcomes when 
agents use a way to solve their problem of ignorance on the private beliefs of other market 
participants by utilising “technical analysis” methods, in that way trying to gain better pay-off 
through their market participation. He presents a model with “technical analysis” where 
market participants follow historical price dynamics by sketching price trends and reacting to 
sudden price breakthroughs from the trend, representing their private signal about the change 
of beliefs of other market participants (Jackson, 1993). He adds in the model this feature of 
“technical analysis” as a learning solution, by consequently affecting private decisions each 
time an agent observes two consecutive price moves in the opposite direction. Jackson names 
this technical analysis information as “speculative information” and tries to model its role and 
discover whether it gives additional value to market participants. He discovers and 
theoretically shows in his model that agents using this “technical analysis” information 
learning strategy are better off, since it helps them better predict the equilibrium bids of other 
agents and the consequent market returns (Jackson, 1993). This result represents an opposing 
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result to the claims implied by the ECMH where, due to the martingale properties of capital 
market asset prices, there is no market strategy based on historical prices that can make some 
traders better off compared to those who accept the current price as the best predictor for the 
price dynamics and the expected investment return in the next period (Fama, 1970). This 
theoretical result corresponds to the mounting empirical evidence on the long-run price 
regularities such as the mean-reversion process found by Shiller, LeRoy and many other 
authors (Shiller R. , Do Stock Prices Move Too Much to be Justified by Subsequent Changes 
in Dividends?, 1981; LeRoy, 1989). 
There are also other authors, who show that “technical analysis” gives valuable 
information to the trader in an asymmetric information context (Treynor & Ferguson, 1985; 
Brown & Jennings, 1989).  “Technical analysis” helps agents with superior fundamental 
information to better predict the time when the market learns about their already known 
information, which is crucial for them to realize their pay-off, as shown in the Treynor and 
Ferguson model (Treynor & Ferguson, 1985).  
“Technical Information” gives value, especially to the myopic agent in the Brown and 
Jennings model (Brown & Jennings, 1989), while Bennet and Sias show that the “money 
flow” indicator, which is defined as a difference between up-tick and down-tick dollar trading 
volume has significant asset return predicting value (Bennett & Sias, 2001). Even Fama in his 
earlier work admits himself that, in the short run there is some empirical evidence against 
perfect inter-temporal independence of prices, which at that time he explains by the time 
requirement of markets to absorb and evaluate the new fundamental information (Fama, 
1970). So even in a “weak form” of the ECMH, he admits that there could be some market 
imperfection potentially based on the asymmetry of beliefs, and then later on he applies this 
to the joint-hypothesis problem where the problem lies in the inability to separate the 
empirical testing of the hypothesis about the efficient equilibrium asset pricing models from 
the hypothesis about market information efficiency. 
 The expected return of the risky asset in this market environment with agents using 
speculative information is uncorrelated with the fundamental value of the traded financial 
assets. Jackson also finds that the use of speculative information increases the variance of 
financial market asset prices above the variation of their intrinsic values creating excess 
83 | P a g e  
 
market volatility (Jackson, 1993), a phenomenon realized by many other economists 
conducting empirical research (Shiller R. , 1981). 
 Jackson‟s work, belonging to the asymmetric information branch of theoretical asset 
bubbles, uses an OLG general equilibrium framework in his model, describing an infinite 
living market economy with agents living in two periods. He stresses the importance of 
defining the price formation mechanism for which he uses a Vickery auction model where 
single agents cannot price manipulate the market with individual extreme bids. Agents in 
such a context bid up prices using their optimal Nash equilibrium price responses, which 
means they use their private beliefs about the fundamental value of the asset together with the 
beliefs about the beliefs of others and common beliefs inferred from technical analysis when 
they make investment decision. The asymmetry of information about the beliefs of the beliefs 
of others, and the common beliefs, plays a crucially important role in the rational market 
decision making process. This was a factor much devalued by authors belonging to Fama‟s 
camp, where inference or learning tools such as “technical analysis” played an insignificant 
role.  The final outcome of this model produces departures from the intrinsic value of assets 
denoted as asset bubbles having risky assets priced at higher than their fundamental values 
(Jackson, 1993). Asset prices are prone to significant price crashes with low probabilities in 
this model, which corresponds to the permanent Paretian distribution defined by Mandelbrot 
and described by Fama (Fama, 1965a). 
 
1.2.2.3. Signalling, Leadership and the Role of Large Institutional 
investors in the context of asymmetric information 
 
Other very important work in this branch on asset bubble theories comes from the 
economists Corsetti, Dasgupta, Morris and Shin. They are trying to explain the role of large 
influential market participants on currency markets with asymmetric information (Corsetti, 
Dasgupta, Morris, & Shin, 2004). Claims that speculative attacks on Asian currencies in 1997 
were initiated by some large hedge funds such as the one owned by George Soros, making 
the currencies of those countries collapse, presented an incentive for this prominent group of 
economists to theoretically model and explain this particular situation. What they produced 
presents a significant improvement in the theory of asymmetric information on the capital 
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markets, especially on the role of the market microstructure, size and disparity among agents 
in equilibrium asset pricing. 
 It explained the role of the large market participants and their signalling role in 
particular, in this process of information discovery about the beliefs of other market 
participants and critically important discovery of common market beliefs. In their model, 
large market participants play a significant signalling role for the mass of small market 
players. Corsetti, Dasgupta, Morris and Shin model and assess the importance of the 
following four characteristics of agents in the context of financial markets with asymmetric 
information (Corsetti, Dasgupta, Morris, & Shin, 2004): 
 1)  The importance of the relative size of the market participants; 
 2) The importance of market participants‟ private information accuracy about the 
intrinsic value of the risky asset; 
 3) The importance of the extent of the differences of private information, which 
defines the level of asymmetry of information; and 
 4) The importance of the visibility of market actions by the large market participant to 
the rest of the market agents, which affects their signalling role. 
 Corsetti, Dasgupta, Morris and Shin, modelled two different types of market games: 
first, a simultaneous game; and second, a sequential game. They tested different outcomes 
based on predefined market environmental characteristics in each game. The conclusions 
confirm some previous conclusions and refine the understanding of the issues important for 
explaining asset bubbles based on asymmetric information (Corsetti, Dasgupta, Morris, & 
Shin, 2004). Their findings are as follows. 
 In the context of asymmetric information, the higher the asymmetry measured by the 
difference in fundamental valuation precision among large and small participants the larger is 
the price variation produced by the entrance of a large trader at the market. The threshold for 
speculative attack, or the trading decision threshold, in terms of the fundamental strength 
required for a speculative attack on a currency is higher when large market players are 
present in the market. The sole presence of the large trader makes small players more 
aggressive market participants by the fact that its presence and its signals “clarify” small 
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market participants‟ beliefs about the common beliefs, which is important decision 
determining information in their Nash optimal response function (Corsetti, Dasgupta, Morris, 
& Shin, 2004). 
Large traders in the environment with asymmetric information have a larger market 
power affecting the market equilibrium if their relative market size is larger or if they have 
better information precision about the fundamental value of the traded asset vis-à-vis the 
information precision of the rest of the relatively small agents. The second line of the 
argument actually confirms that the greater is the asymmetry of information the greater is the 
market power of a better informed large trader. A large trader increases its market influence if 
it can perform more effective signalling in the market environment, which may be enforced 
by its presence in the media (Corsetti, Dasgupta, Morris, & Shin, 2004). 
 Although not treating asset bubbles in particular, Corsetti, Dasgupta, Morris and Shin 
discover a significant influence of the large market player in the context of markets with 
asymmetric information. 
 In conclusion, according to this branch of theoretical work treating asset bubbles in 
the environment of asymmetric information, the presence of higher asymmetry of information 
measured by the imprecision and heterogeneity of private information about the fundamental 
values of financial assets and about the difference of the private beliefs, beliefs about the 
private beliefs of others and beliefs about the common beliefs, could be an important factor 
leading to the occurrence of asset bubbles. This informational asymmetry and its relative 
extent could be empirically measured by measuring the difference in price variability against 
the variability of information fundamentally important for asset valuation. Such difference in 
variability does not affect the efficiency of markets as defined by their timely reaction to new 
information. This reinforces the importance of the “joint hypothesis problem” of the ECMH 
as stressed by Fama, which points that prices may fully reflect all available information but 
still significantly depart from the intrinsic value of the corresponding assets based on the 
extent of information asymmetry.  Increased price variability which defines investment risks 
is one of the consequences of higher information asymmetry. In this respect, large traders 
such as DC Pension Funds and other institutional players, especially if their market actions 
are highly visible to the “herd” consisting of small market followers, could lead the market 
coordination game toward equilibrium with prices reaching values higher than the 
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fundamental value of financial assets with increased market volatility. The agency problem 
inherent to large institutional investors, connected to the potential moral hazard when 
investing, could even add to the arguments for asymmetric information market environment 
when explaining the creation of asset bubbles.  This visibility of the large institutional 
investors‟ market actions is also stressed by other authors such as Robert Shiller who in its 
famous “Irrational Exuberance”, categorizes the informational distribution of media about the 
moves of well-established and large market players among its 12 factors driving markets to 
the speculative bubbly asset equilibrium (Shiller R. , 2000). 
 
 
1.2.3. Agency problem school on asset bubbles 
 
1.2.3.1. Asymmetric information within the organisational unit of the 
institutional investors 
 
 The problem of the presence of asymmetric information has two dimensions relevant 
to financial markets, which are both important for explaining the occurrence of asset bubbles. 
The first dimension was covered in the previous text; namely, that is the asymmetry of 
information inevitably occurring between the trading agents participating in capital markets 
(Grossman & Stiglitz, 1980). The first dimension of informational asymmetry is concerning 
the inter-agents information asymmetry about private beliefs, private beliefs of others and the 
common beliefs. We have seen that this information asymmetry plays an important role when 
forming the expected asset returns among traders placing bids and offers to the market. 
Evidence from the growing literature on equilibrium asset pricing models contains significant 
empirical and theoretical arguments showing that asset bubbles could arise because of the 
specific interaction among traders developing in the context of asymmetric information.  
 The second dimension of the asymmetric information problem related to the 
occurrence of asset bubbles is the one focused on the information problem within the market 
participating agents, being institutions who are dominant market participants or traders. This 
information asymmetry affects the relationship and interaction between principals and agents 
within the organisational unit of the institutional investment industry. This second dimension 
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of the asymmetric information problem is partly the focus of the Agency Theory and it brings 
to the forefront the principal-agent problem present in the context of financial institutions. Its 
potential effect on the equilibrium asset pricing models could lead to financial asset bubbles, 
positive or negative (Allen & Gale, 2007). Before we explain the specifics of the Agency 
theory applied to financial institutions, affecting the equilibrium capital asset pricing models 
and their outcomes, such as the asset bubbles, we will first define the main subject of interest 
to the Agency theory, its main problems and its main solution ideas. 
 
1.2.3.2. The Agency theory and The Principal-Agent problem 
 
 The main subject of interest of agency theory is agency itself. The agency represents a 
contracted relationship between the provider of the means (principal) and the provider of the 
service (agent), where the product of their mutual incentives based on the division of the 
benefits and liabilities in their joint cooperative effort arises and defines the essence of the 
agency problem.  There are two main parties in the agency relationship treated by the theory, 
and those are the “principal” and the “agent”. The “principals” are most commonly the 
providers and owners of the capital engaged in the organisational unit, whose main interest is 
the preservation and the return on the invested amount of the capital. On the other side, the 
“agents” are the individuals who are hired to manage the given means or the capital, toward 
achievement of the goals of the principals compensated by a certain reward for the service. 
The relationship between the two parties is called the “principal-agent” relationship. 
 The most commonly treated relationship by academic researchers in relation to the 
“principal-agent” relationship is the one between the representatives of the owners of capital 
on the one side and the representatives of the management of the firm on the other side. But 
the principal-agent relationship could be found in many other instances among different 
economic relationships besides the stockowner-CEO relationship and its main principles 
could be used to explain relationships beyond the pure field of corporate governance.  
 In finance, and in particular in the equilibrium asset pricing theory, which will be the 
focus of agency theory explaining asset bubbles, the principal-agent problem will treat the 
relationship between the owners of capital or the individual investors and the institutional 
investors who are providing asset management and advising services to the investors, the 
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principals.  The problem of conflicting actions of agents against the interests of the principals, 
mainly based on the asymmetry of information within the organisation, is generally called 
“the principal-agent problem”. 
 The agency theory developed itself as a part of organisational theory, but it intersects 
with contractual theory and covers issues arising both in micro and macro contexts. This is 
because one of the most important tasks of the design of the contract, representing a primary 
focus of the contractual theory is finding the solution to the principal-agent problem. 
 One broad division of the theoretical work in the field of the general agency theory is 
made by recognizing two major streams of academic work in the field: 1) positivist agency 
theory research and 2) principal-agent research (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
 The first group, of the agency theory positivists, tends to recognize situations where 
principals and agents have differing goals and, without much mathematical rigour, tries to 
give prescriptions for solving such situations of differing incentives. Economists belonging to 
this first group are mostly focused on the relationship between the owners of the capital and 
the representatives of the capital managers. Their main propositions are focused on the types 
of contracts and the information systems used for the control of the agent. They generally 
claim that when more information about the outcome is known by the principal, or when 
information systems providing for such information are in place and are efficient, then the 
adequate principle-agent contract that aligns mutual interests is the “behaviour based” 
contract. In this case agents behave following the interests of the principles. On the other 
hand, when little information is available to the principal about the behaviour of the agent, 
the other type of so called “outcome based” contract could partly solve the information 
problem, the disparity of interests and the principal-agent problem (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 The second group, the principal-agent theorists, tends to use more mathematical 
modelling and rigorous analysis for explaining the principal-agent problem in different, 
broader and more general sets of environments than those covered by organisational theory 
and the agency positivists.  They compare and analyse the outcome and the effectiveness of 
the “outcome based” versus “behaviour based” contract incentives in different environments. 
The common environments under inspection are characterized by different levels of 
uncertainty about the final outcome, different quality and effectiveness of the informational 
systems, different levels of task programmability of agents operations and responsibilities, 
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different levels of risk aversion of the principal and the agent, different outcome 
measurability of the joint effort, different duration of the principal-agent relationship etc. 
Because their mathematical modelling includes a greater number of factors, principal-agent 
theorists manage to cover a wider range of agency problem issues, yielding more tailored 
prescriptions and insights. 
 
 
1.2.3.3. Asymmetric information, Moral Hazard and Adverse 
Selection 
 
 One of the most important factors of interest in agency theory, from both the 
perspective of agency positivists and principal-agent researchers, is the effect of the level of 
asymmetry of information between the principal and the agent in the principal-agent problem. 
There are two different cases of interest dependent on the extent of information asymmetry. 
The first one is when there is perfect and complete information within the principal-agent 
relationship, or when the principal perfectly knows what his/her agent is doing, what are 
his/her interests, his/her abilities and the outcomes of their cooperation. In this case there is 
no agency problem arising solely because of the fact that the perfect information relevant to 
the relationship is mutually known and because of the contractibility of all observable 
conflicting situations to the cooperative undertaking. This situation is extremely rare in 
practice. 
The other most commonly present situation is when there exist an asymmetric 
information between the two parties, when the principal does not perfectly know what his 
agent is doing on his behalf and what are the outcomes and implications of his work, given 
the agent‟s self-interest, and when the agent may or may not behave following the interests of 
its principal. In this second case, the agency problem arise causing outcome anomalies, which 
are subject for research by Agency Theory. The agency problem arises because the principal 
and the agent have different goals, and the principal cannot determine if the agent has 
behaved appropriately following the principal‟s interests.  
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 There are two aspects of the agency problem arising from the information asymmetry, 
which are commonly cited in the agency theory literature. The first is the problem of the 
“Moral hazard”, or a problem arising when the agent doesn‟t devote the contracted and 
expected effort and care for the benefit of the principal. This is also called “shirking”. The 
second problem is the problem of “Adverse selection” which refers to the misrepresentation 
of the personal abilities by the agent, which causes adverse selection or a non-identification 
of the correct critical values of the agent by the principal when the second is deciding on 
hiring the agent (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 The problem of “Moral Hazard” is explained as a direct consequence of the presence 
of asymmetric information in the relationships between the principal and the agent who 
engage in “risk-sharing” relationship, where agents‟ privately taken actions can affect the 
probability distribution of the outcome important to the principal. This definition of “Moral 
Hazard” with its especial importance for the insurance industry, carries even higher 
importance when such an agency problem and moral hazard arises within the institutions 
affecting the equilibrium financial asset pricing models (Holmstrom, 1979).  
 Although the pay-off or the outcome is observable, moral hazard could arise placing 
the informational system at the relationship between principal-agent at the highest level of 
importance. Inadequate “risk-sharing” among the principal and the agent combined with 
imperfect information about agents‟ behaviour, abilities and the outcome of their effort, 
produce sub-optimal Pareto equilibrium outcomes. Investing in monitoring and in 
instruments enforcing adequate “risk-sharing”, as proposed by Holmstrom may improve the 
equilibrium outcome (Holmstrom, 1979). 
 
1.2.3.4. The agency problem within financial institutions, equilibrium 
asset pricing models and asset bubbles 
 
The focus and treatment of the “Agency problem” and, in particular, the “principal-
agent” problem by researchers was on the particular relationship between the share-owners 
and the management of the firm rather than on its potential impact on equilibrium asset 
pricing models (Allen, 2001). Yet, the observation of an exponentially growing number and 
market participation of institutional investors in global financial markets, made by Franklin 
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Allen in his presidential address at the American Finance Association in 2001, motivated a 
rising group of economic researchers to begin inspecting the impact of the inherent principal-
agent problem within financial institutional investors on equilibrium asset pricing models. 
 Allen observes significant absolute and relative growth of assets invested by 
institutional investors. According to the Federal Reserve Board statistics that Allen cites in 
his exposition to the AFA, the total value of holdings of corporate equities in the US grew 
from 142.7 billion USD in 1950 to 19047.1 billion US dollars in 2000, or by more than 133 
times (Allen, 2001). This significant growth of corporate equity holdings was followed by a 
significant shift in the ownership structure in the last 50 years. In 1950, households 
dominated with 90,2% participation in total equity holdings, which means all of their 
investments they directly invested on the equity market. Later on, this participation was 
constantly falling, reaching 39.1% by the year 2000. On the other side, the participation rate 
of institutional investors was rapidly growing. Public and Private pension funds and 
insurance companies, referred to as “opaque”7 (or least transparent) institutional investors 
where the potential principal-agent problem predominates (Ross, 1989), increased their 
participation from 4.1% in 1950 to a significant 29.7% in 2000. Among this group the rise of 
assets under management is especially significant for the pension fund institutional investors 
who increased their participation rate from 0.8% in 1950 to 23.2% in 2000 or from 
insignificant amounts close to zero, to almost a quarter of corporate sector equity holdings in 
2000 (Allen, 2001).  
Allen stressed the fact that even in the group of household equity holdings, there was 
an incredible rise in assets invested according to the investment advice of institutional 
investors, investments which could also be considered as affected by the “principal-agent” 
problem, which might even increase the overall market participation or impact of institutional 
investors in today‟s financial world. Allen further asks, having in mind the fact that 
institutional investors are the most important investors in the present capital markets, and 
knowing the general common occurrence of the principal-agent problem among productive 
companies, why then there is a lack of interest in questioning the potential principal-agent 
problem among financial institutions and its impact on equilibrium market pricing models 
                                                 
7
 Ross classifies institutional investors as: 1) opaque or the least transparent; 2) translucent or mid transparent 
and 3) transparent. Mutual funds such as ETF‟s belong to the 3th group while the other extreme is represented 
by the pension funds, insurance companies and hedge funds (Ross, 1989). 
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(Allen, 2001). Allen notes that Mehra-Prescott‟s “equity premium puzzle” (Mehra & 
Prescott, 1985), or the extraordinary high average stock premium over the risk free rate of 
return observed within equities, and the other anomalies observed by the increasing amount 
of empirical research, such as the “size effect” on the applications of CAPM, the “value 
effect”, the “momentum effect” and other price anomalies and especially the occurrence of 
asset bubbles, all of them should inspire analysis and the rise of new ideas for different 
equilibrium asset pricing models (Allen, 2001).  
The new approach different from the classical asset pricing models based on the 
neoclassical Arrow-Debreu framework should stress the growing importance of institutional 
investors and the inherently present agency problem among them (Allen, 2001). The problem 
arising within the institutional investors, which could cause the occurrence of asset bubbles, 
is related to the previously mentioned “risk-sharing” problem in the insurance industry. 
Within the institutional investors this problem is called the “risk-shifting” problem and is 
similar to the agency problem between debt-owners and stock-owners in a company observed 
and explained by Jensen and Meckling. In their work (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), they find 
that debt financed firms could accept even projects with a negative net present value (NPV), 
because their owners, the stock-investors, shift a significant part of projects risk to the debt 
owners. This is the basic example of a “risk-shifting” problem or improper “risk sharing” 
among the two parties. The main reason simply arises from the fact that shareholders obtain 
most of the upside potential gain from the outcome of the risky projects but disproportionally 
bear the downside risk because of the limited liability of their participation in the joint 
contractual effort (Allen, 2001). 
  Allen and Gorton, being representatives of the earliest academic researchers focused 
on the agency problem within the financial institutions, examined the impact of the agency 
problem on the equilibrium asset pricing model (Allen & Gorton, 1993). They found that 
even knowing the price of the asset exceeds the maximum expected value of its cash flows, 
agents bearing only limited liability on the trusted funds for investment, could rationally bid 
up the price to higher levels because of the fact that they are not bearing the cost of a 
potential loss. Since agents take part only in the potential gain from their speculative action 
but bear no loss in case of the negative return, their expected return from the speculative 
investment becomes strictly non-negative even when the probability that the asset reaches a 
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higher price is extremely low. This argument has the highest importance for the further 
development of the theory of financial institutions‟ agency problem (Allen & Gorton, 1993). 
 Allen and Gorton compare the fund management contract of portfolio managers with 
a put-option, where the agents‟ only potential loss is the eventual loss of their jobs. With this 
type of investment incentive on the side of the institutional investors and their portfolio 
managers, if they start dominating the market as observed by the rising amount of their 
market participation (Allen, 2001), this may induce a shift in the probability distribution of 
the price of a bubbly asset toward the realisation of higher prices. The agency problem within 
institutional investors, dominated by the risk-shifting problem, makes portfolio managers 
increasingly risk-loving with respect to their attitude toward investments in speculative 
(bubble) assets (Allen & Gorton, 1993). This is explained by a simple model, where portfolio 
managers optimal response when their contract reward is being “outcome based” representing 
some percentage “α” of the achieved positive return on investments, makes them overinvest 
in the riskiest asset. This is called “risk-shifting”, which literally means that the risk about the 
negative performance of the risky investments is shifted from the portfolio manager to the 
investor principal, disproportionally in comparison to the shift in the expected return. 
The limited liability of the portfolio manager, combined with the “outcome based” 
reward inducing such “risk-shifting”, makes their personal expected return on the investment 
positively skewed within the range between the opportunity cost of losing their employment 
and positive infinity, which is different than the distribution of the actual returns of the risky 
asset. Even with “behaviour based” contract rewards for the portfolio manager, where the 
portfolio manager is rewarded with a predefined fixed amount of salary, “reputation 
incentives” which are especially present among inexperienced first-comer portfolio 
managers, could create a significant positive skew to their limited liability reward distribution 
from risky fund investments.  
Dass, Massa and Patgiri, in their empirical work observed that portfolio managers 
with lower salaries are more prone to taking risky investments and “ride on the bubbles” 
motivated by the “reputation” incentives or by a utility derived from making a reputation as 
good performers (Dass, Massa, & Patgiri, 2008). The whole point of the “risk-shifting” 
problem present within institutional investors points to the importance of certain contractual 
and personal characteristics that should be taken care of when employing a portfolio 
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manager. This especially can have a significant impact on equilibrium asset pricing and the 
occurrence of asset bubbles.  If the downside risk or liability from eventual loss on 
investment for the portfolio manager could be induced to be higher, which might come from 
the height of his salary raising the opportunity cost of losing his job, professional certification 
programs with high ethical dimension such as the CFA Institute program, age in employment 
in the investment firm, or some contracted incentive or bonus based on longer-run 
performance, then the principal-agent problem that tends to induce asset bubbles could be 
decreased. 
 
1.2.3.5. Central Bank Liquidity Policy and Asset Bubbles 
 
 Allen also stressed the importance of liquidity to asset pricing anomalies and the 
“cash-in-the-market pricing” in situations of sudden liquidity shortages (Allen, 2001). In their 
book on Financial Crisis, Allen and Gale, stress the importance of credit and liquidity 
inducing the principal-agent problem and equilibrium asset prices to their asset bubble 
equilibrium level (Allen & Gale, 2007). There is significant empirical evidence of the 
coincidence of loose monetary policy and the inflation of asset bubbles. Availability of credit 
and the low borrowing costs seem to coincide with the exponential rise in asset prices, as 
observed by Allen and Gale.  On the other side, the authors explain the collapse of the bubble 
by the interaction of the change in liquidity preferences by consumers/investors, and the 
decision to tighten monetary policy by the central bank (Allen & Gale, 2007). Such an 
explanation could closely describe a crash of the bubble in an OLG model, such as the 
rational asset bubble model (Tirole, 1985). 
 Allen and Gale develop a model, based on the asymmetry of information within the 
institutional investors and the presence of the principal-agent problem, where the random 
variable representing the aggregate amount of credit available to the financial institutions- 
banks in the system - denoted “B”, which is partly controlled by the central bank, enters the 
derived asset pricing function having a positive effect on asset prices (P). The result from 
their simple example is given below (Allen & Gale, 2007, p. 244). 
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)25.011(8 Bp      (1.14) 
The importance of this equation, derived from the example as stated in Allen and Gale‟s text, in our context 
comes from the fact that the price is a function of the amount of available credit, or of the monetary policy of the 
central bank. Here, p denotes the asset price, while B denotes the credit availability. 
The outcome of their simple example as stated above, is different compared to the standard 
asset pricing model based on discounted expected pay-offs.  When liquidity provided by the 
central bank is vast, the price path of the assets departs increasingly from their fundamentally 
established intrinsic value. 
Changes in aggregate credit can cause relatively large changes in asset prices 
when there is an agency problem 
(Allen & Gale, 2007) 
 
The author‟s also claim that in a situation when there is a liquidity shortage, which 
could be affected by the reserve requirement or the interest rate policy of the central bank, 
equilibrium asset prices could fall even below their intrinsic value measured by discounting 
assets future cash flows. This means that the bubbly part of the price of financial assets could 
take not only positive but also negative values. Allen and Gale call this “Cash-In-the-market” 
asset pricing, which could be even worsened by the sudden systemic need for liquidity 
resulting from shifts in the consumer inter-temporal preferences or the deterioration in the 
quality of banks assets (Allen & Gale, 2007).This situation is connected to the financial 
innovation of financial institutions for the purpose of risk rebalancing and liquidity needs 
(Ross, 1989). Allen and Gale explain the potential of the “cash-in the-market” asset pricing 
based on sudden liquidity scarcity as a basis for development of “negative” asset bubbles, 
which also represent market inefficiencies. Their occurrence could partly be solved by 
loosening monetary and credit policies by the central bank, a policy response widely 
observed as a response to the last crash of the real estate market bubble in the United States in 
2007/2008. 
The authors also find the health of the financial system and the balance sheets of the 
financial institutions to be directly connected to the occurrence of liquidity runs, which 
further affect capital market asset prices.  Allen reminds us that institutional interconnection 
96 | P a g e  
 
within economies and between national markets stresses the importance of further research 
into financial fragility and contagion (Allen, 2001). 
To conclude, the asymmetry of information is widely present not only between the 
market participants but also within the organisational structures of the institutional investors. 
This intra institutional asymmetry of information increases the importance of the “risk-
shifting” problem where, because of the limited liability for potential losses, asset managers 
turn into extreme risk lovers and tend to prefer assets with high investment risk where the risk 
shifting is the highest for their own benefit but at the cost of the final owners or lenders of the 
entrusted capital. In such a situation, young and inexperienced portfolio managers and those 
with low base salaries who are dominated by the “reputation” incentive, together with those 
whose contracted reward is based on the percentage of the achieved return over the return of 
the risk free asset, have the highest incentive for risk-shifting by bidding up the price of 
bubbly assets. Availability of credit and liquidity in such environment plays a crucial role, 
placing the central bank in a situation where it can stimulate the occurrence of the asset 
bubble by providing massive liquidity in the system, or could induce even a “negative” 
bubble to occur when it decides to tighten monetary policy in a situation of systemic 
increased liquidity preference, a situation called “cash-in-the-market” equilibrium asset 
pricing. 
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1.2.4. Irrational investors and asset bubbles 
 
1.2.4.1. Rational agents, rational expectations and opposing ideas 
 
One of the bases of modern economic theory and one the main assumptions of the 
theory of finance and its main efficient capital markets hypothesis is the rational expectations 
assumption characteristic for the principal rational agents in the capital market. The rational 
agent assumption is based on the idea that economies consist of only rational economic 
agents acting within the economy‟s micro-structure. This theoretical micro economic basis 
defines the concept of the “economic being” or the “economic man” as a primary economic 
agent representing the unit particle of the system. His actions represent a rational response to 
the relevant available knowledge and information about environmental changes and are 
aimed toward achieving individual maximum beneficial outcome established by his 
individual objective function. But there is an obvious difference between the notion of 
“rational agents” and “rational expectations” which must be distinguished. Simply explained, 
if an agent expects that path A will bring him home in half the time than path B, a rational 
agent would ceteris paribus choose path A, which makes the agent rational. But this doesn‟t 
mean that the expectation that path A gets him faster home that path B is rational, if the 
outcome has probabilistic character. He might mistakenly have calculated the expectation of 
path A being time wise shorter than path B which, although he made rational decision being a 
rational agent, would lead him to an irrational outcome, because he used an irrational 
expectation as an input in his decision making process. 
The “Rational expectations” theory imposes an additional requirement on the rational 
agent namely the presence of complete structural knowledge about the economy (Heaton & 
Brav, 2002). Often, irrational agents are confused with the rational agents who base their 
action on irrational expectations who are commonly named “noise traders”. So we must 
distinguish between noise traders and irrational agents, because the first are not the second. 
The notion of “Rational expectations” is based on the idea that within the process of 
forming outcome expectation or outcome forecasts by rational individual agents, being 
crucially important inputs in their decision making process, logical factor relationships are 
used by economic agents whether consumers, employees, entrepreneurs or investors. This 
idea implies that the real world laws of causality, relationships and interdependences between 
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observed events and expected or projected outcomes, which define the structural knowledge 
of the economy, as used by the agents, have or tend in their limit to have the identical 
probability distribution to the actual distribution of outcomes in the real world. This 
definition of rational expectation, which is the basis of the mainstream economic theory, and 
of the mainstream theory of finance, is based on a very strong set of assumptions, some of 
them strongly opposed by numerous observations of authors closely related to the science of 
psychology, which analyse and observe many common anomalies with respect to the 
assumption of rational human behaviour. 
One of the first economists, who openly confronted the ideas of the “economic man” 
as a rational decision maker, asking for “a fairly drastic revision” of the microeconomic 
foundations of economic theory, was the Nobel Prize winner Herbert Simon (Herbert, 1955). 
But even before him, Keynes stressed the importance of the “animal‟s spirit” within human 
behaviour, pointing to human beings‟ common departures from behaviour based on the 
rational expectations, especially in the context of the functioning of financial markets 
(Keynes, 1936).  
Besides Keynes and Simon's earlier work, it was not until recently that Behavioural 
Economics and Behavioural Finance opened a new chapter of strong reconsideration of the 
basic assumptions of rationality of the actions of market participating agents. Nobel prize 
winning psychologist Daniel Kahneman, and his close collaborating colleague Amos 
Tversky, initiated a new significant wave of thinking on the economic principal agent‟s 
rationality in the decision making process with their “prospect theory” (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979). Their ideas were further popularized by the considerations of economists 
such as Richard Thaler and Fisher Black (1986) who, in his American Finance Association 
presidential address (Black F. , 1986), introduced the idea of “Noise traders” being agents 
who make investment decisions based on irrational expectations, stressing their significant 
importance for the analysis of the functioning of financial markets.   
Kahneman and Tversky showed that subjects consistently tend to violate the 
assumptions of preference theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), which are the basis of the 
classical principles of utility theory (Mas-Colell, Whinston, & Green, 1995). Kahneman and 
Tversky in their “prospect theory” claimed that agents form their preferences under 
uncertainty based on some reference point, not on expected absolute changes, and decide 
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distinctly in situations faced with prospects of loss in comparison to decisions considering 
prospects of gains, which contradicts the principles of classical preference theory (Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1979). 
Further on, in his critique of Daniel Bernoulli‟s Utility Theory (Bernoulli, 1954), 
formed on axiomatic ideas about preference theory (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944), 
Tversky shows the existence of significant problems in the descriptive powers of utility 
theory based on economic agents‟ rationality (Tversky, 1975). Using experiments based on 
decision problems under uncertainty, mainly gamble choices among agents, Tversky 
determined the existence of significant common inconsistencies against the basic axioms of 
the preference theory such as transitivity. Later on, together with his colleague Kahneman, 
they showed that based on decision making experiments designed and conducted on 
university scholars and students, significant violations of utility theory were again confirmed. 
They criticized utility theory for significant departures from the empirical evidence, such that 
it should not be used for either descriptive or for normative purposes. 
Those two authors opened a new growing theoretical field of ideas, founded on 
significant evidence derived from experiments describing the psychological decision-making 
profiles of agents when deciding in the context of uncertainty. Hirshleifer (2001) documents 
the incredible track record of the main contributions of Kahneman and Tversky, as well as of 
other authors in the development of behavioural finance theory and towards finding 
explanations for the behavioural anomalies of decision makers observed through the work of 
these Nobel Prize winning authors. We will briefly review some of the main characteristics of 
the growing research of the behavioural finance school of thought describing the unit agent‟s 
irrationality of expectations and their judgemental biases in the following section based on 
Hirshleifer (2001). 
 
1.2.4.2. Behavioural Finance ideas on agent’s irrationality 
 
The rising empirical evidence following the work of Kahneman and Tversky (1974) 
against the correctness of the von Neumann Morgenstern Utility function theory and its main 
assumptions, motivated the interests of psychology scholars in treating the issues of 
rationality of choice and rationality of expectations of agents in the economy. Psychologists 
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stressed a significant number of biases to human rationality and behaviour, which 
significantly impacts the ideas of rational agents and rational expectations and opened a new 
field of theory of behavioural economics and behavioural finance. David Hirshleifer (2001), 
in his account of the progress made in the field of behavioural finance, synthesized the main 
findings on human behaviour, which present significant evidence against its rationality. In his 
exposition, Hirshleifer makes a wide survey of the theory and evidence regarding investors‟ 
psychology suggesting biased rationality as a determinant of market equilibrium asset prices. 
Focusing on the main contribution of Behavioural Finance, Hirshleifer states that the question 
that has to be primarily addressed and answered by this new theoretical branch, being 
essential for equilibrium asset pricing models, is how risk and investor‟s misperception affect 
the expected returns of investors and translate into pricing anomalies. On the increasing 
importance of psychology for the theory of finance Hirshleifer notes: 
Over time, I believe that the purely rational paradigm will be subsumed by a broader 
psychological paradigm that includes full rationality as a significant special case. 
(Hirshleifer, 2001) 
 
The dynamic psychology-based asset pricing theory, which is in its infancy, could 
potentially provide explanation and solutions of the anomalies associated with most of the 
mainstream asset pricing models based on the existence of only rational agents applying 
rational expectations. To arrive at the models including agents who base their actions on 
irrational expectations, in the following lines, we will first review some of the main 
psychological characteristics typical of human beings that bound their rationality of 
expectations. 
 
1.2.4.3. Judgemental biases bounding agent’s rationality of 
expectations 
 
Agents face two important subjective limitations not accounted for by the rational 
expectations theory and the ECMH, which currently dominate the theory of finance. Those 
two limitations are based on the information processing time and on the available cognitive 
resources of human beings. Facing those limitations on the one side and forced by the need to 
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efficiently make decisions on the other, the natural selection process has made human minds 
implement “rules-of-thumb” or heuristic simplifications as decision making short-cuts 
(Herbert, 1956). But this approach of applying simplifying algorithms and developing 
heuristics as an answer to resource limitations of the human brain creates misjudgement and 
decision biases, which significantly affect the outcomes observed on the markets vis-a-vis the 
theoretically modelled outcomes assuming complete expectations rationality of agents. 
It has often been argued by the rational expectations theory that valuation errors based 
on the mistakes made by cognitive resource limited agents cancels out (Friedman, 1953). 
However, psychologists and representative scholars of the behavioural finance theory have 
observed the presence of judgemental biases based on judgemental heuristics shared by most 
people, which level the potential expectations irrationality bias up to the systemic level 
making miss-valuation and misjudgement a common market-wide issue. Hirshleifer 
summarizes three broad groups of behavioural characteristics causing judgemental biases 
implying common miss-valuation and expectations irrationality among market participating 
agents. Those three main groups are the following (Hirshleifer, 2001). 
A) Heuristic Simplification, which presents a short-cut cognitive method for making 
conclusions developed by human reasoning with its limited attention, memory and processing 
capacities. Heuristic simplification associates with a thinking process focused on a small 
subset of information and on the use of subconscious associations when making economic 
decisions. One of the products of this heuristic simplification, as stressed by Tversky and 
Kahneman, is the so called “availability heuristics” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973), where 
common things that are easily noticed compared to more potentially substantial but difficult 
to notice characteristics, are the ones getting attention and consequently gaining misleading 
importance in the decision making process. Another implication of heuristic simplification is 
the tendency to develop “habits” that can be optimal mechanisms for human beings to make 
routine reactions, when addressing their problems of memory loss and limited cognitive 
abilities. Those “habits” create rules of self-regulated strategies, which could apply to 
investment decisions also leading to persistent misjudgements. In this respect, the Andreassen 
and Kraus experimental evidence, when conducting stock market experiments with educated 
agents, has shown that they tend to develop a “habit-like” response specific to a certain 
market situation. When they recognise a trend in the asset price dynamics, they tend to follow 
the trend, while when they recognize that prices are moving in a range, they adopt a different 
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“habit-like” response buying at range lows and selling at range highs (Andreassen & Kraus, 
1988). 
Another related effect to heuristic simplification is the “halo effect”, which associates 
all characteristics of one subject as being positive if and only if the judging person finds one 
simple salient main characteristic about the subject that he finds positive. 
The “Illusion of control”, or belief that the decision making agent is gifted with some 
ability of a “magical thinking” can make him use irrelevant cues leading to irrational 
judgements. This illusion can be found in the psychological profiles of many investors and it 
also relates to the heuristic simplification characteristic of human beings. This form of bias 
leads to the “illusion of control”, whereby people become overconfident in their belief that 
they have a magical but still rational way of thinking when making certain choices. It 
explains the observation that, commonly, lottery players act completely irrationally by 
applying irrational expectation when refusing an offer of being paid a positive amount of 
money in addition to another same lottery ticket for the exchange of the ticket he already 
personally picked. He foolishly believes that the fact that he picked the ticket himself 
increases the winning probability of the ticket based on his “illusion of control” bias. 
Further on, based on the idea of heuristic simplification, academics at the field of 
psychology stressed the importance of the use of “narrow framing” when making choices. It 
represents another biased characteristic of human cognitive behaviour related to financial and 
economic decisions. It is based on analysing problems in a too isolated fashion. An example 
of “narrow framing” is often stated by the common disparity of observed agents‟ decisions on 
the same problem presented differently. Agents tend to choose differently and inconsistently 
on a completely equal problem when the outcome is presented in terms of gains compared to 
an alternative presentation of the same outcome in terms of losses. One of the outcomes of 
the “narrow framing” of agents is the well-known “disposition effect” associated with 
investors‟ common habit of selling winning stocks and keeping losing stocks. 
The representative heuristics could also explain misjudgements arising from the 
“gamblers‟ fallacy” or a belief of the presence of a “hot hand” among gamblers, consequently 
providing additional explanation for agents‟ attitudes of “chasing trends” and other 
misperceptions.  Finally, there are a number of other examples of observed biases that 
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prevent agents forming rational expectations, which are also explained by the heuristic 
simplification argument. However, their further explanation exceeds the aim of this text. 
B) Self Deception is the second important psychological feature commonly tied to 
human beings as a decision making agents. The first in the group of biases caused by self-
deception is the “overconfidence bias”, arising from the commonly present misleading belief 
of agents about their own knowledge being more accurate than it really is. This leads to 
systematic misjudgements of the predicted probabilities of an expected event, skewed toward 
realisations of extreme outcomes. Psychologist experiments observe that agents‟ confidence 
intervals, when making projections about some economic outcomes, are systematically too 
narrow compared to the ones derived from the observed variation of outcome realisations. 
This “overconfidence bias” leads to the presence of “over-optimism”, which has vast 
influence on the irrationality of expectations and, thereby, on asset pricing on financial 
markets. Self-deception bias has also a feedback on the learning process creating Bayesian 
learning bias, which leads to the incidence of “rationalisation” and “confirmation bias”. 
Agents, when learning from their past experiences, commonly tend to understand and accept 
their own failures as being a consequence of a “bad luck”, in comparison to the understanding 
of successes, which are most commonly attributed to their own high personal abilities. This is 
also connected to the “false rationalisation” of agents, finding a biased ex-post explanation 
supporting the rationale of their previously made decisions. Finally, “confirmatory bias” and 
“belief conservativism”, where people try to find information confirming and enforcing their 
beliefs, shapes persistent rigidities among agents‟ knowledge and cognitive abilities, making 
for strong effects on their persisting self-deception and on their miss-valuation of financial 
assets. 
C) Emotion and self-control belong to the third group of psychological 
characteristics which bound and bias agents‟ rationality of expectations. Distaste for 
ambiguity, distaste for fear, avoidance of unpleasant feelings such as loss, or realisation of 
being wrong, and the effect of mood on investment decisions are only few of the many 
observed characteristics from this group of psychological characteristics affecting agents‟ 
investment behaviour.  
“The weather effect”, is one example of a mood related effect, where the weather over 
the stock market has an impact on the attitude of investors. This is just an example of the 
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expectation irrationality of agents affected by the impact of emotions. Empirical studies also 
show that disruption of sleep patterns caused by changes to and from daylight saving time, 
affecting the mood of investors, also can have an impact on stock returns (Kamstra, Kramer, 
& Levi, 2000). Time preferences and self-controls are also an important part of this group of 
behavioural characteristics leading to agents‟ irrationality of expectations. 
Having briefly explained commonly summarised psychological characteristics of the 
human psychological profile bounding its rationality of expectations, we could go further in 
defining its impact on the asset pricing models getting the theory of finance close to the 
functioning of the real world markets. Based on the arguments about the psychological biases 
on agents‟ rationality of expectations, behavioural finance theorists assume that agents will 
misjudge not only the random nature of the residuals  (mistakenly seeing patterns) but also 
the factors used in the causality models used for predicting the expected return of assets 
(Hirshleifer, 2001). With the increasing work of psychologists, showing that investors as 
human beings could act guided by irrational beliefs and expectations, a group of economic 
scholars introduced the idea and importance of modelling markets with investors deciding 
based on irrational expectations. The main such contribution is the “noise traders” model, or 
the DSSW models (DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, & Waldmann, 1989). This model use an 
OLG 2-stage framework similar to Tirole‟s rational asset bubbles model (Tirole, 1985), but 
with the inclusion of investors with irrational expectations acting side by side with the 
rational expectation investors. The main point in the DSSW model is that irrational 
expectation investors, or the “noise traders”, miss-value the expected return of the risky asset 
by some random number t , which might have some modelled probability distribution. 
Further, one could model any of the irrational expectation biases of such “noise traders”, as 
suggested by the behavioural economists, by modelling a predefined miss-valuation pattern. 
Irrational expectations investors, called “noise traders” do not know that they act irrationally; 
they are rational but guided by irrational beliefs, which again stress the important distinction 
between the rationality of agents and the rationality of expectations. On the other side, there 
are also rational investors endowed with rational expectations who are aware of the existence 
of “noise traders” who follow irrational beliefs, which promotes additional risk to those 
rational investor investments called the “miss-valuation risk”.  
This idea of including “noise traders” in the OLG model, gave important insights into 
asset valuation anomalies, their persistence, the mean reversion effects and short-run positive 
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and long-run negative auto correlations of asset prices observed, as opposed to the theoretical 
assumptions of the ECMH. With the publishing of the series of DSSW models, the number of 
further models based on the inclusion of “noise traders” in equilibrium asset pricing models 
increased significantly. Many authors tried modelling different patterns of miss-valuation 
based on observed psychological biases by adding different features to their irrational 
expected return formation. Besides the “pure noise trading” models, which we will examine 
in more detail below, there was an increasing number of authors trying to introduce different 
observed biases to the rationality of expectations, based on the work on psychologists, when 
formulating the miss-valuation rule in the model similar to the pure noise traders DSSW 
model.  
The “Positive Feedback Trading” effect, as one such characteristic bias, where 
irrational agents extrapolate trends, was an extension to the DSSW model made by De Long 
et al., who defined three types of agents: rational speculators; irrational speculators; and 
passive investors (DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, & Waldmann, 1990b). According to this 
study, rational speculators could increase market volatility only because they want to profit 
from the presence of foolish irrational expectation speculators who overreact, something that 
was explained to be an optimal investment strategy in such a context by George Soros, who 
claimed to use that strategy himself (Soros, 1987). Further on, in the Cutler et al. extension, 
adding “positive feedback trading” to the model, two types of noise traders were included, 
differentiated according to the speed of their reaction while trading with a positive feedback 
(Cutler, Poterba, & Summers, 1990). 
Other authors, (Gervais & Odean, 2001) go to an even more complicated modelling of 
irrational expectation agents‟ miss-valuation, trying to accommodate solutions of the learning 
process under biased self-attribution, which is related to the miss-valuation caused by the 
presence of “overconfidence bias” belonging to the group of “self-deception” biases present 
among agents. 
Generally, the DSSW model based on the OLG framework opened a wide range of 
theoretical investigation opportunities by introducing ideas of behavioural psychologists on 
the expectations irrationality of agents. Those ideas were applied to equilibrium asset pricing 
models in finance and the effects of noise traders were inspected. In the following subsection, 
we focus on the basic DSSW model with pure noise traders and its main implications, which 
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carry most of the intuition important for explaining asset price anomalies and the occurrence 
of asset bubbles.    
 
1.2.4.4. Asset bubble models with noise traders 
 
Increasing evidence and theoretical knowledge on the expectation irrationality of 
agents, paralleled by the need to explain occurring equilibrium market asset pricing 
anomalies, put forward the idea of modelling financial markets with inclusion of agents with 
irrational expectations. Those agents, named “noise traders” (Black F. , 1986), are agents who 
base their investment decisions on irrational expectations called “noise” or on irrelevant 
information that they consider to be important. This causes them to be rational in the sense of 
optimizing their objective function, but to be guided by irrational expectations instead of 
rational expectations. This definition of “noise traders” is in line with the arguments of 
behavioural economists, bringing onto the stage the psychological irrationality biases 
previously mentioned in the text explaining the reasons for the irrational expectations and 
consequently irrational investment decisions. 
 Bradford De Long, Andrei Shleifer, Lawrence H Summers and Robert J Waldman 
created a new branch of theories of asset bubbles based on the idea of the presence of 
irrational expectation agents, who represent investors deciding based on biased rationality as 
observed by behavioural economists. Their noise traders‟ asset pricing model is also known 
as DSSW after the capital letters of the authors‟ last names (DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, & 
Waldmann, 1990a). 
In their main paper (DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, & Waldmann, 1990a) from the 
series of DSSW contributions (DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, & Waldmann, 1989; 1990a; 
1990b; 1991), this group of economists use the OLG framework as a macro modelling basis 
for their theoretical investigation. Their originality is coming from the inclusion of “noise 
traders” or agents with irrational expectations, acting side by side with the rational 
expectations agents as main components of the micro-structure in the model. In the model, 
“noise traders” establish their expected return from their investments in stocks (the bubbly 
instrument) based on a misjudgement factor represented by a normally distributed number 
with a non-zero mean, added to the rationally expected rate of return. This misjudgement 
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factor “ρ”, as described by DSSW (DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, & Waldmann, 1990a, p. 
708), has the following normal distribution, where the mean is some positive value: 
 2,   Nt ,      (1.15) 
Here, ρt represents the value of the misjudgement added to the rationally expected return as applied by 
the noise traders at time t. It is assumed to have a normal distribution with a positive mean ρ*and a 
standard deviation σρ. 
 
 On the other side, rational arbitrageurs (also called rational speculators), establish 
their expected rate of return based on their rational expectations.  This imposes a logical 
necessity for the rational expectation investors to include the fact of the presence of “noise 
traders” when they define their investment demand decision function based on their rational 
expectations. Simply, the market impact of the “noise traders” becomes a part of the 
rationally expected return from the risky asset by adding uncertainty about the persistence of 
the noise traders‟ irrational trading positions. This affects rational expectation agents‟ 
demand for investment and influences the equilibrium asset pricing model by introducing an 
additional component, which DSSW called the “miss-valuation risk” or “noise trader risk”, to 
the pricing function. The presence of “miss-valuation risk” increases the overall risk of the 
financial instrument over its fundamental risks in the perception of the rational expectation 
agents and prevents them from fully arbitraging out the present mispricing from the rational 
value of the asset. 
 DSSW (DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, & Waldmann, 1989, p. 685), define the risk of 
such instrument with the following equation, now with the “noise traders” on the market, 
consisting of two independent elements: 
222
  R ,      (1.16) 
Here, besides the fundamental risk 2  coming from the variability of fundamentals of the asset itself, the 
total risk of the asset includes the noise traders’ risk, 2  which is uncorrelated to the fundamental risk, 
making the total risk of the asset 
2
R greater or equal compared to its value in the environment without 
the presence of “noise traders” in the perception of the rational expectation investors. 
 
As previously mentioned, this additional risk perceived by rational expectation 
investors, changes their rational investment market response. The corresponding additional 
108 | P a g e  
 
premium required by rational expectation agents is added because of the presence of “noise 
traders” and, in turn, this affects the equilibrium pricing of the risky instrument by imposing a 
higher rate of return.  Consequently, as a result of the overlapping generations model, the 
inclusion of the “noise traders” leads to a formal result of the equilibrium asset pricing 
equation such as the one derived by DSSW (DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, & Waldmann, 
1990a, p. 711)(the authors slightly changed their notation in 1990a compared to their 1989 
paper): 
   
 2
22
1
2
1
1
rrrr
p tt







,  (1.17) 
In this equation, pt represents the equilibrium price of the risky asset at time t, which is determined: first 
by its fundamental (rational) value of 1, representing the first pricing component on the right hand side of 
the pricing equation; second, the pricing effect of the actual young generation of noise traders bullishness 
or bearishness based on theirmisjudgement about the expected return of the asset defined by the 
difference between the actual misjudgement variable and its mean (ρt-ρ*) multiplied by the relative 
number of young noise traders in the market defined by µ and discounted by the dividend return of the 
asset 1+r; third, the effect on the price of the average bullishness or bearishness of the young noise 
traders positively depending on their relative number in the market µ and their mean misjudgement 
value ρ* capitalized by the dividend rate r; and fourth and the last component which determines the risk 
premium of all market participants which is determined by their mutual risk aversion exogenously 
defined by some risk aversion factorγ, the squared presence of noise traders in the market µ2 and the 
variance of their misjudgements σρ2. 
 
 The interplay between the persistence of noise traders‟ irrationality, their average 
misjudgement bullishness or bearishness and their relative presence in the market on the one 
side, compared to the constrained longevity of the investment horizon of risk-averse rational 
arbitragers on the other, imposes potential bounds on aggressive arbitrage profit exploitation 
opportunities created by noise trader‟s miss-valuations by the rational arbitrageurs (DeLong, 
Shleifer, Summers, & Waldmann, 1989). Rational arbitrageurs observe the presence of the 
“noise traders” and include their impact of prolonged asset price miss-valuation in their own 
investment decisions.  The presence of the noise traders plays a crucial role in the 
establishment of the equilibrium asset prices. Rational arbitrageurs, who are risk averse, as 
well as the noise traders, have a short-term investment horizon and bear liquidity risk, which 
actually reflects their potential need to sell their investment ahead of the time required for the 
realisation of its fundamental value, in order to satisfy their consumption needs. In this 
respect, as could be seen from the last component of the pricing equation (1.17), the risk of 
the next period misjudgement of the group of noise traders, as observed by the rational 
speculators, prevents them from arbitraging out the mispricing of the risky asset. This risk is 
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especially enforced when rational speculators are more risk averse, when noise traders have 
higher participation at the market and when their misjudgement has greater variance. Those 
are all characteristics common to young, illiquid and underdeveloped financial markets such 
as the financial markets in Croatia and the other SEE countries. In this case, mispricing of the 
risky asset could become persistent at the market and could create asset bubbles due to the 
presence of noise traders.  
As opposed to the assumptions of Friedman and Fama (Friedman, 1953; Fama, 
1965a), who claimed that rational arbitrageurs quickly wipe out present market mispricing 
profit opportunities created by the foolishness of others, and that irrational “noise” traders fail 
to survive, DSSW show that due to the presence of the “miss-valuation risk” or the “noise 
traders risk”, rational arbitrageurs might not attempt trading on the obvious arbitrage 
opportunity. This leads to noise traders taking more systemic risk and consequently gaining 
higher return from the premium they create by their own presence, leading to their ultimate 
market survival as a group (DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, & Waldmann, 1989; 1990a). 
Rational arbitrageurs include this risk from prolonged mispricing of the financial asset in 
their investment function, because of the present probability of a continued miss-valuation by 
noise traders, who have the power to lead the price to even more disparate values from its 
fundamental intrinsic value. This knowledge of the presence of irrational expectation noise 
traders, combined with the liquidity risk among rational arbitrageurs, could result in their 
avoidance of bidding against noise-traders and, finally, in prolonged asset price anomalies 
and in the creation of asset bubbles on financial markets.  
Even if financial markets are small and illiquid, noise traders might gain market 
power, which additionally lowers the incentive of rational arbitrageurs for aggressively 
betting against noise traders, and makes small and illiquid markets even more dominated by 
noise traders‟ behaviour (Palomino, 1996). Palomino, describes this situation as similar to a 
result of the “Cournot oligopoly”, where an irrational agent can cause more cost to rational 
agents then to himself. In the case of bounded competition such as oligopoly, irrational 
participants tend to produce more, in effect lowering the price, but causing more damage to 
the revenues of other rational participants than to their own revenue. This simple example 
explains the solution of Palominos extended DSSW model on non-competitive small markets 
leading to the dominance of asset price dynamics by the behaviour of noise traders, and to 
increased volatility and disparity from the fundamental value of assets. This also explains the 
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observed departure of the price from the fundamentals of small company stocks closed-end 
mutual funds‟ net asset value, known as the closed-end funds puzzle (DeLong & Shleifer, 
1991; Lee, Shleifer, & Thaler, 1991). Markets for closed-end funds and small stocks are 
similar to the non-competitive markets modelled by Palomino. Higher volatility of closed end 
funds discounts and premiums, as observed by De Long and Shleifer corresponds to this 
theoretical finding. 
 The importance and impact of noise traders on prices, perceived by the rational 
expectation investors and professional arbitrageurs, makes them spend much more resources 
on examining and predicting the signals of the group of noise traders, than spending 
resources on following and predicting the value of fundamentals of the asset. These 
“technical analysis” signals include sentiment indices, volume and price patterns and the 
forecasts of Wall Street gurus and analysts. Professional arbitrageurs find this information 
highly valuable and find it worthwhile to invest significant amounts in learning the 
mispricing attitude and mood of the noise traders. In their extended work on the impact of 
noise traders, modelling irrational expectation investors‟ miss-valuation as based on 
following a “positive feedback strategy” (DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, & Waldmann, 1990b), 
the authors find that rational arbitrageurs, knowing that noise traders would follow this 
pattern of miss-valuation, decide to speculate the price to a higher level over the 
fundamentally established asset price level on the occurrence of news at the market, or to 
overshoot the target price, in order to better exploit the opportunities provided by noise 
traders‟ response by further extending the price increase. This explains the “price 
overreaction hypothesis” and excess volatility as observed by Shiller, DeBondt and Thaler 
(Shiller R. , 1981; DeBondt & Thaler, 1985). In the models with noise traders, their presence 
adds on the volatility in the market. Further, Barsky and De Long, in their account for the 
major bull and bear markets of the 20
th
century, conclude that markets tend to over-react at the 
moments of highest optimism and highest pessimism, showing examples of respected 
scholars‟ statements that proved wrong about market perspectives8 (Barsky & De Long, 
1990). 
Returning to the pure DSSW noise traders‟ model, noise traders could be significantly 
compensated for bearing the risk they partly create by their own presence and actions based 
                                                 
8
They quote Irvin Fisher's statement in 1929, that markets have reached a "permanently high plateau". Fisher is 
not an outlier among academics commenting on the market. 
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on mispricing, simply because they over expose to the risky asset compared to the rational 
investors who restrain from investing because of the noise traders risk. Thereby noise traders 
on average earn higher risk premiums than the rational arbitrageurs. This could explain some 
observed market anomalies, especially the price/earnings mean reversion and the Mehra-
Prescott equity premium puzzle (Mehra & Prescott, 1985). One very important conclusion 
linked to the presence of market miss-valuation, and excess volatility, is the importance of the 
investment horizon of rational arbitrageurs. The longer the investment horizon of rational 
arbitrageurs, the shorter and milder is the impact of possible miss-valuation or “noise trader” 
risk on their aggressiveness in using the profit opportunities present from the departure of 
price from the fundamental values of financial instruments. 
In their earlier work inspecting the size and the incidence of losses from noise trading 
(DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, & Waldmann, 1989), DSSW find that a higher proportion of 
noise traders in terms of their wealth participation imposes a higher cost on rational investors 
by preventing their productive investments. Except in the case when noise traders are on 
average bullish, the economy is hurt by the presence of noise traders. In this special case, 
“noise traders” provide for lower interest rates, which increase the amount of capital, thereby 
outweighing the loss from rational arbitrageur‟s non-investment. DSSW prescribe solutions, 
associated with Keynes‟s ideas for taxing speculative capital and providing regulatory 
measures to stimulate a long-run investment perspective in order to decrease the cost from 
noise trader‟s speculations on the economy (DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, & Waldmann, 
1989).   
At another occasion, DSSW analyse the survival of noise traders using an infinite 
lived agent model, where authors analyse the dynamics of wealth distribution among the 
group of rational arbitrageurs and the group of noise trader investors (DeLong, Shleifer, 
Summers, & Waldmann, 1991). In their model, noise traders are assumed not to have any 
impact on market prices individually, which corresponds to a practical situation with a 
relatively small individual wealth of each single noise trader, which is opposed to Palomino's 
case where noise traders can individually affect prices (Palomino, 1996). In such a situation, 
although the idiosyncratic probability of each individual noise trader for losing all its wealth 
is close to certainty, as a group, they tend to dominate the wealth distribution because of the 
higher expected return and the cancellation of the individually present idiosyncratic risk 
within the noise traders as a group. DSSW assume, based on the previously mentioned 
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psychological characteristics of individuals, similar to the gamblers “hot hand” bias observed 
by psychologists, that noise traders‟ miss-valuations will have a positive correlation; in other 
words, they might act similarly to a herd and their actions will not cancel out (DeLong, 
Shleifer, Summers, & Waldmann, 1991). This finally leads to the increasing relative wealth 
participation of noise traders as a group and to the definite survival of noise traders in the 
market.  
Within this group of noise traders, there will be a significant number of losers and a 
small number of incredibly lucky winners. But the group will always survive in the market 
(DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, & Waldmann, 1991). The unknown is the result of the effects 
derived from their model, beyond the point of “invasion” of noise traders caused by the 
growth of their wealth participation in the market. In this case, the group of noise traders 
becomes so wealthy that they dominate the market and start impacting the price, which is 
against the assumption of the DSSW model (DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, & Waldmann, 
1991). So there is no conclusion on how the accumulation of wealth will continue to develop 
beyond that point of “invasion”, when the group of noise traders start influencing market 
prices, or what will be the further impact on the distribution of wealth among noise traders 
and rational arbitrageurs. 
Another interesting point is the presence of noise traders among institutional 
investors. Authors such as Dow and Gorton (1997) analyse the possibility that asset 
managers, when not having rational incentives or abilities to choose an investment asset, 
based on their contracted incentives, will act as noise traders which might have significant 
impact on the market due to the relative size of the assets under their management. Those 
ideas intersect with the principal-agent problem and stress the importance of the profiles and 
incentives imposed on the asset managers within institutional investors. 
Further research departing from the rational expectations assumption is the 
modification to utility theory made by Brunnermeier and Parker, introducing the idea of 
“Optimal Expectations” (Brunnermeier & Parker, 2005). The authors try to explain and 
introduce behavioural biases by defining and adding the benefit of optimism in agent‟s utility 
function. Their idea is connected to the agent‟s benefit from being optimistic and from having 
optimistic beliefs. This leads to a biased investment decision overestimating the returns from 
investment.  Even a small optimistic bias could create first-order gains within investors in 
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terms of creating positive initial utility from having optimistic beliefs, while future inevitable 
disappointments from overoptimistic investments will create unexpected financial loss and 
disutility.  Authors such as Alpert, Raiffa and Buehler show the presence of overestimation 
bias in expected returns among trading agents (Alpert & Raiffa, 1982; Buehler, Griffin, & 
Ross, 1994). This is the basis of the “Optimal Expectation” theory, where agents tend to be 
optimistic and to overestimate expected returns causing market miss-valuations. 
To conclude, we have seen that psychologists confronted the basic principles of 
preference theory, based on arguments from observational evidence about human behaviour 
under uncertainty.  Humans as unit economic agents display many biases from the 
theoretically assumed rational expectations behaviour, which further questions the normative 
usability of the classical utility theory when modelling rational expectations. Authors such as 
DSSW (De Long, Schleifer, Summers and Waldmann) opened a new page in analysing 
financial markets by introducing the impact of the presence of noise traders on the market 
equilibrium outcome.  The “noise traders” are the ones who depart from deciding and 
investing based on rational expectations, but their decisions are affected by multiple 
behavioural biases. DSSW show that “noise traders” will not disappear as previously 
believed, and- on the contrary - that they will survive to accumulate wealth on the market. 
Their actions will cause persistent asset price miss-valuations based on their interaction with 
the rational arbitrageurs. This is a simple consequence of the added “noise trader” miss-
valuation risk on top of the “fundamental risk” from investing in risky instruments. This can 
explain the occurrence and persistence of asset bubbles. On the other hand, crowding out of 
the rational arbitrageurs by the noise traders is increased in small and illiquid markets, 
because they gain market power. This explains the close-end funds premium/discount and the 
miss-valuations observed within small company stocks. Further research analyses the 
potential noise trading behaviour of institutional investors, affected by poor asset manager 
selection and by the wrong contracting incentives with the asset managers. Those issues 
intersect with the issues stressed in the agency theory explanation of asset bubbles, and are of 
significant importance for analysing the impact of pension funds on the induction and 
dynamics of asset bubbles in small illiquid markets. 
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Conclusion 
 
Reviewing the equilibrium asset pricing theory, we could conclude that, mainly due to 
the repeated observational evidence against the efficient equilibrium asset pricing hypothesis, 
the theory of efficient capital markets is losing its popularity.  Although financial markets in 
the developed countries preserve informational efficiency in the short run, vast empirical 
evidence shows that they tend to develop persistent asset miss-valuations in longer market 
cycles. This regularity points to the occurrence and the importance of the theories of asset 
bubbles. 
We saw that the OLG framework provides a useful tool for theoretical modelling and 
analysing the investment/consumption behaviour of rational agents with or without rational 
expectations. Moreover, as the seminal model of Tirole reveals, in a situation when wealth is 
abundant, consumers are patient and optimistic and when the economy cannot provide 
sufficient fundamentally based (productive) investment vehicles to transfer wealth from one 
period to the next with a satisfactory return, such market economies are prone to financial 
innovation and are faced with the ease of rational acceptance of bubbly asset instruments. 
Those instruments could be pure bubbly instruments, or could be a combination of 
instruments whose price is composed of an intrinsic and a bubbly part such as common 
equity. The question that Tirole posed at the end of his seminal paper is what characteristics 
such instruments have to satisfy to become accepted as rationally bubbly instruments? What 
is so special about gold?  
But reviewing the rest of the theory on asset bubbles, which focused not as much on 
the macro-impact and rationality of bubbles, but on micro-characteristics, we see that it is not 
so much about the character of the instruments but, rather, about the market micro-structural 
characteristics of the dynamically inefficient economy. In this respect, a high level of 
asymmetric information on the market, the prevalence of agency problems within the 
institutional investors, and a substantial participation of “noise traders” or traders with 
irrational expectations, are the three main micro structural characteristics that could make it 
easier for rational agents to accept bubbly instruments of any type and so rationally bid them 
to their bubbly equilibrium (following the logic of Tirole). We have also seen that in the 
context of such bubbly capital market dynamics, monetary policy affecting the availability of 
liquidity could, in turn, affect the returns on the capital markets and impact on the occurrence 
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of asset bubbles. The competitiveness of the market, determined by its structure, also plays a 
significant role.  
In this chapter, we have gained significant understanding of theoretical modelling at 
the macro market level together with the micro-structural characteristics causing asset 
bubbles to occur. In the following chapter we develop a specific OLG model economy with 
an illiquid capital market, to which we add defined contribution pension funds in order to 
investigate the effect of their influence on equilibrium asset pricing and on the potential 
occurrence of asset bubbles. 
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Chapter 2: OLG Model of rational asset bubbles, DC pension fund and 
an illiquid asset market 
 
2.1.  OLG model with productive savings, rational asset bubbles and 
an investment rule based fully funded DC pension scheme 
 
In this chapter, we present an OLG model with rational asset bubbles developing on 
illiquid equity markets upon the introduction of influential Defined Contribution (DC) 
Pension Funds. The Defined Contribution (DC) Pension funds are institutional investors, part 
of the World Bank led reform of the pension system in many developing countries (World 
Bank, 1994). They subtract a significant part of the gross salary from every current employee 
in the country and invest this amount in the financial market for each employee account in 
order to provide pensions when the employee becomes old. In general we distinguish 
between defined benefit and defined contribution pension funds, where the second group is 
becoming more popular than the first (Butrica, Iams, Smith, & Toder, 2009). DC pension 
funds are part of the so called second pension pillar, the first being the Pay-As-You-Go 
(PAYG) pillar of direct inter-generational transfers, which with the ageing of the population 
has proved unsustainable(Ramaswamy, 2012); and the third being the voluntary pension 
scheme, which is still of marginal importance in the developing countries due to its voluntary 
nature and the low interest in its utilisation by the actual employed citizens(Antlin, 2008). So 
the second pillar mandatory DC pension funds now represent the most important pillar of the 
pension fund reforms in many transition and developing countries. 
The aim of this chapter is to theoretically model the systemic financial market 
implications, with respect to the occurrence of asset bubbles in particular, as a result of the 
introduction of influential institutional investors such as mandatory DC pension funds that 
affect economy-wide savings behaviour. These types of pension funds were introduced in 
some of the South East European (SEE) countries, such as Croatia, during the first decade of 
the 21
st
Century and there are a number of countries where their introduction is considered as 
part of the pension system reform under the guidance of the World Bank. This fact makes this 
issue highly relevant for the small financial markets of those developing and transition 
countries, especially since the occurrence and collapse of asset bubbles may have a 
117 | P a g e  
 
significant impact on the functioning of their fragile financial markets and, hence, on their 
real economies. 
We introduce the Defined Contribution(DC)Pension funds in the OLG model 
framework following their basic institutional characteristic, which is taxing a certain 
percentage of the gross salary of each employed young agent, investing it directly to the 
domestic financial market based on some predefined investment rule, and later distributing 
the value of their investments back to the agents at the time when they arrive at their old age 
(at their period when “old” using the common characterisation of the OLG model). 
 At the beginning, before we formally set out the rational asset bubbles general 
equilibrium model with DC pension funds, we must recall the two main types of the financial 
market environments in our OLG model, which affect the productive capital accumulation 
and rationality of the bubbly asset investments. This is important, because it will have 
consequences for the sustainability of the bubbly asset equilibrium after the DC pension 
funds are introduced and established. The two types of financial market environments are the 
following:  
-   First, are the “dynamically efficient” types of financial markets, where rational 
asset bubbles are non-sustainable and Pareto sub-optimal. In this case, there is a lower 
systemic incentive for bubbly assets to appear and develop, and if they appear, they shortly 
after collapse in a speculative episode to the financial market Diamond Steady State (SS) 
(Diamond, 1965); and 
-  Second, the “dynamically inefficient” types of financial markets where rational 
asset bubbles could appear, sustain for as long as the financial market is dynamically 
inefficient, and bring the economy to its Pareto optimal steady state defined as the “Golden 
Rule” SS (Tirole, 1985). 
 Intuitively explained by recalling our discussion in the previous chapter, and this 
intuition is of crucial importance, the distinction between the two states of the financial 
markets lies in the systemic disparity between the amount of investible wealth in the 
economy from the one side, and the availability and return of the productive capital 
investment opportunities on the other. When the investible wealth and its growth are higher 
than the productivity of capital investments, then agents have no option but to accept bubbly 
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instruments in order to achieve higher required returns, avoid productive capital over 
accumulation and suboptimal steady states with lower than optimal long term consumption 
and utility. In other words, they would prefer investing in any financial instrument that could 
bring the economy to its Pareto optimal “Golden Rule” steady state (Phelps, 1961). This 
disparity between the growth of the investable wealth and the available return on productive 
investments, which creates the environment and a strong incentive for the bubbly assets to 
occur, could be monotonically achieved through the path of the development of the economy 
due to the diminishing return of capital investments, but also could be achieved by some 
fundamental shock, such as the introduction of DC pension funds, which suddenly changes 
the amount of investable wealth and the savings attitude in the overall economy. One of the 
more general claims based on this argument is that the introduction of institutional investors 
in the developed markets, especially the boom of the popularity and the assets under 
management of the pension fund industry in the OECD countries (Allen, 2001), led to a 
historically unprecedented rise in the equity asset prices in the last 20 years on their financial 
markets. This is a much wider topic for discussion focused on the global role of the pension 
funds to the global financial markets. We will keep our focus on the simpler example of the 
SEE countries such as Croatia and their illiquid and relatively isolated financial markets. 
Abel, Mankiw, Summers and Zeckhauser (Abel et al., 1989), in their critique of the 
methods used to measure the dynamic efficiency of financial markets, give us an important 
insight into the criteria that we further use to assess the dynamic efficiency of the Croatian 
Financial market. Namely, the authors criticise the widespread use of Short-Term 
Government Interest (STGI) rates, represented by the returns on Treasury Bills, as a 
misleading benchmark for the return on productive capital in assessing the dynamic 
efficiency of the financial markets. They suggest that the sum of Dividend and Stock 
Repurchase (distributions of the corporate sector) as a percentage of the amount of total value 
of equity is a much better measure of the return of productive capital. Using a data set for the 
period between 1952 and 1985, they show that the Return on Capital measured in this way 
leads to that conclusion that the US financial markets were dynamically efficient, as opposed 
to the STGI rates that suggest the opposite. They also suggest: 
The competitive return of any other asset can also be useful in determining whether 
the economy is dynamically efficient or inefficient (Abel et al., 1989). 
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The problem with the use of the Equity Repurchase and the Dividend distribution as a 
percentage of the value of Equity arises due to the volatility of the value of equity. This is 
issue even strongly present in the models where the market of equity might contain both 
intrinsic and speculative-bubbly value. Accordingly, we argue that the long-term interest rate 
on Long- Term Government Bonds is a much better substitute for the criticized Short-Term 
interest rates as an indicator of the productive capital return rate. Its long-term perspective is 
a perfect substitute for the long-term perspective of equity investments if such investments 
are seen as productive capital investments. 
This long-term rate of return on Government Bonds will be our key benchmark for 
determining the dynamic efficiency of the Croatian financial market in our empirical 
analysis. Moreover, long-term government bonds present one of the key investment 
benchmarks in the portfolios of the DC pension funds worldwide. 
The real return on productive investments, due to the low capital accumulation levels, 
is high in the emerging economies (Campbell R. H., 1995), but individual representative 
agents invest relatively little on the financial markets, which might be a sign that they are 
sufficiently impatient. The fact that most of the savings of representative agents are held in 
the form of bank deposits, and away from the equity market, supports this assumption. 
One other factor characteristic of SEE financial markets is the illiquidity of their 
young equity markets. Such illiquidity of their equity markets is a consequence of the 
inelastic supply of equity, which is widely evidenced in the SEE equity markets and 
confirmed by the low number of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs). Low supply of new equity 
produces shallow equity markets, on which investors with a desire to buy or sell greater 
amounts of equity find it difficult to transact on the market without accepting high a 
illiquidity premium. This by definition classifies their equity markets as illiquid. To model 
such illiquidity of the equity market in our theoretical OLG structure, we give the 
theoretically modelled financial market a fixed supply of equity, which may include the 
characteristics of a bubbly asset corresponding to the lack of new equity emissions on the 
SEE equity markets. We use the notion of a pure bubbly asset, although its implications could 
be taken to refer to the potential bubble within the price of the productive investment such as 
common equity (Tirole, 1982). 
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Theoretical foundations explained in detail in the previous chapter on asset bubbles 
theory, put in place the platform for developing our theoretical model and, later on, for the 
empirical investigation of how DC pension funds induce asset bubbles on the Croatian 
financial market. Besides the issue of the overall rationality of asset bubbles modelled by the 
OLG framework, the micro-structural characteristics giving incentives to the occurrence and 
the initial acceptance of the bubbly instrument, such as the presence of an agency problem 
within pension funds and the multiplication of this problem when they invest into local open-
end equity mutual funds, the extent of informational asymmetry in the SEE markets and the 
presence of noise traders on the SEE market are important characteristics for our empirical 
investigation. Especially later in our empirical study of the Croatian experience with the 
introduction of the DC pension funds, we see that the introduction of local open-end mutual 
funds as an investment instrument that significantly increase this information asymmetry, 
could be a great catalyst for the occurrence of asset bubbles systemically developed by the 
investments of the DC pension funds. 
Although those micro-structural characteristics have their importance as stressed by 
the different schools of the asset bubbles theory, the OLG model presented in the following 
section is focused only on systemic implications from the introduction of the DC pension 
funds, and does not include all the micro structural elements in the model, because such 
complication of the model would not add value to the theoretical investigation of the pure 
effect of the introduction of the DC pension funds. This does not mean that we should not 
later investigate the micro-structural characteristics of the financial market, which could give 
additional explanations for the formation of asset bubbles and the acceptance of certain 
bubbly investment instruments.  
 Among those micro-structural characteristics that can affect the occurrence of asset 
bubbles by stimulating speculative behaviour of DC pension funds is the potential agency 
problem as discussed by Allen and Gale, which is not specific only to the pension funds but 
also to other types of institutional investors such as mutual funds (Allen & Gale, 2007). 
Especially at their onset, pension fund management companies and, especially, more short-
sighted open-end mutual fund management companies, could be characterized by a lack of 
specialized human capital among their investment managers, erroneous asset managers‟ 
incentive mechanisms and weak controlling mechanisms, all of which could lead them to 
overinvest on the domestic illiquid equity markets and accept high risks and bubbly assets 
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due to the significant amount of “risk shifting”. This effect of the agency problem could even 
further multiply if pension funds invest indirectly on the equity market using the local open-
end mutual funds
9
, because the indirect investment vehicles extend the chain between the 
principal and the agent and strictly increase the agency problem in the investment process. 
 As we saw when investigating the implications of asymmetric information on asset 
bubbles, they present another important characteristic within the market micro-structure 
potentially leading to a bubbly equilibrium on SEE financial markets. Pension funds could 
suddenly be perceived as leading market participants and thus as gaining a strong signalling 
role for the herd of small investors who, in such a context, would react much more 
aggressively when investing in the bubbly instruments. This characteristic is especially 
stressed in market specific contexts where there exists a large asymmetry of information on 
the fundamental value of assets, and where naturally small individual speculators are seeking 
a leading signalling role from a large institutional investor. So, in this context, when the 
leading investors‟ signalling role points to the acceptance of the bubbly asset, it may trigger 
mass investments by the ignorant speculators. 
Finally, the noise trader school on asset bubbles gave arguments about the potential 
behaviouristic biases among portfolio managers in pension funds, which are especially 
important for the case of the young SEE financial markets. This could be especially an issue 
at the early stages of the development of the DC pension fund management companies, due to 
the lack of knowledgeable and experienced employees who have direct investing 
responsibilities. As a consequence of the lack of educated investment analysts within the 
early circles of the professional investment societies in SEE financial markets, such as, for 
example, internationally recognised chartered financial analysts (CFA Institute charter 
holders), pension fund managing companies could find themselves lacking in professionals of 
high prudence, ethics and analytical qualities.  This characteristic, from the inception of the 
DC pension funds in the illiquid SEE financial markets, could create influential institutional 
investors with significant market power, undertaking investment decisions based on false 
“misjudging expectations” (DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, & Waldmann, 1990a). Such 
                                                 
9
 Open-end investment funds are institutional investors who collect assets from investors on a voluntary basis 
and invest them according to a pre-defined investment policy stated in the prospectus of the Fund. 
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attitudes could easily provoke induction of a wave of bubbly market price dynamics and 
could play a destabilising role on the financial market.  
Although the common OLG models do not distinguish between small and large 
financial markets, we establish the difference by introducing a constraint on the supply of the 
bubbly equity, making the equity market shallow which is a common characteristic of small 
and underdeveloped equity markets. However, other factors are also characteristic of small 
financial market economies, which can affect the occurrence of asset bubbles. One among 
those factors can be the sensitivity to foreign capital inflow shocks, which can trigger a jump 
to the speculative growth steady state of the market economy. This was very strongly 
evidenced by the empirical data from some small Asian and Latin American emerging 
economies going through speculative boom-bust financial market cycles (Krugman, 2008). 
Although we also believe that foreign capital inflow played a significant role, we present a 
closed market OLG model for reasons of simplicity. In this respect, during the empirical 
study, the external or global financial market influence is controlled by introducing an 
external (exogenous) factor variable in the model. 
The best way to see the effect of the introduction of DC pension funds on the steady 
state and the dynamics of the OLG model with rational bubbles is to start with the canonical 
model developed by Tirole (Tirole, 1985)and then augment this model by introducing the 
institutional reform of DC pension funds and enforcing a capital saving scheme within the 
budget constraint of each consumer. The way we do this is by adding an external institution 
that taxes the wealth of the young generation in the period when they are young.  Then it uses 
this collection of real wealth taken from all young consumers to invest in the bubbly assets by 
following a predetermined investment rule (in the simplest and most extreme way, investing 
all taxed real wealth in the bubbly asset).This way, the DC pension fund actually significantly 
decreases the savings and inter-temporal consumption decision discretion of the individual 
agents. Later, this investment rule could be actively manipulated, to bring it closer to the 
active portfolio management strategies introduced by different pension funds or by the 
regulatory bodies. But the outcome and the insights about the occurrence of the bubbly 
equilibrium on the financial market, caused as a result of the introduction of the pension 
funds, would not change by introducing a specific investment rule defined in the strategy of 
each fund, unless that rule were to correspond to the exact individual saving decisions of each 
young person in the OLG structure (in which case no first-order difference is made by 
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pension reform). We logically accept that the primary reason for introducing a mandatory DC 
pension scheme is found in the mismatch between the aggregate outcomes of otherwise 
individual voluntary pension investment decisions as compared to the investment decision 
rule introduced by the pension funds. The presence of this mismatch can be seen in the 
experience of countries that introduced only the voluntary, third pillar of the pension funds 
reform, such as Serbia, which was able to voluntarily attract only a marginal amount of 
popularity and assets under management. This implies that there would be an inherent shock 
in the amount of investible wealth in the market economy caused solely by the introduction 
of the mandatory DC pension funds, in turn causing a shock on the illiquid financial market 
with a limited supply of equity. 
A further important characteristic of the model is that individual agents are aware of 
the investment rule applied by the DC pension funds which, in turn, affects their own 
additional investment decisions with the rest of their available income. Based on their 
knowledge they behave rationally, which means that this knowledge will lead them to 
anticipate the new equilibrium returns of the bubbly asset and rationally adapt their financial 
market behaviour.  Through the no-arbitrage condition of their portfolio decision when 
saving and investing, individual agents will adopt investments in the bubbly asset as well.  As 
previously mentioned, we won‟t shift from the rational expectations assumption of Tirole‟s 
model, although the presence of noise traders among individual agents could easily be 
assumed. Such noise traders could be modelled in a similar way as in the DSSW models, by 
introducing some misjudgement stochastic variable with a predefined distribution, adding 
some random erroneous value to individual agents‟ expected return and investment decision 
functions. We believe that the introduction of such a feature could only intensify the direction 
of the formation of asset bubble and market volatility, and the simpler OLG structure used in 
Tirole‟s work without additional micro-structural complications would give sufficient 
insights into the pure effects of the introduction of DC pension funds into the Croatian 
financial market as a representative of the SEE markets. 
By formally solving the model in this chapter, we will show that one of the largest 
effects from the introduction of the mandatory defined contribution pension funds is shifting 
the financial market to a higher absolute productive capital accumulation state at which 
bubbles could boom in the financial market more intensively. Depending on the dynamic 
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efficiency of the economy, this inflation to the higher bubbly valuations could be permanent 
(stable) or only short lived. 
This points toward a conclusion about the main hypothesis of this dissertation; 
namely, that the introduction of a DC pension fund institution transferring part of the wealth 
of the young consumers to the illiquid bubbly asset market will induce a higher bubbly steady 
state of the economy, assuming that the financial market is or becomes dynamically 
inefficient. In the following section, we present our model of productive saving and rational 
bubbles in the presence of a mandatory DC pension fund. 
 
2.2. The Model 
 
We define an elementary two-stage OLG model market economy similar to the basic 
Samuelson‟s model (complete model solution derivations available in Appendix II), where at 
the initial period t=1, there are N0 initial old agents, and N1=(1+n)N0 first generation young 
agents. The population of young agents Nt grows at exogenous fixed rate n, which represents 
the main driver of the growth of the economy in this model and consequently of the investible 
assets. Later in the empirical model specification, this growth rate of the investible assets is 
indicated by the growth rate of the new subscribers in the DC pension schemes. 
Agents when they are young are endowed with one unit of labour and nothing when 
they are old, and they have complete knowledge about their actual and future working ability. 
They must engage in employment when they are young and earn their lifetime salary to be 
able to derive a positive utility in the two periods which, at the minimum, determines their 
survival. All agents have a homogenous von Neumann - Morgenstern (vNM) utility function, 
which provides for them to utilize consumption in both periods. The novelty in the model is 
that part of agents wage earned when they are young is “taxed” by the introduced DC pension 
fund, which simultaneously invests the whole taxed amount for their account in the bubbly 
asset according to a rule. Consumer agents on the other side invest both in the bubbly or/and 
in the productive asset. The fact that the pension fund invests only in the bubbly asset is made 
for simplicity. In reality, the pension funds invest in equity or open-end mutual funds, whose 
investment price consists of both its intrinsic value and its bubbly value (Tirole, 1982). Using 
the pure bubbly asset in the model gives better insights on the dynamics of an overall bubble 
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in the financial market, although similar effects potentially arise from either a pure bubbly 
asset or a bubbly part of the valuation of some asset with non-zero intrinsic value such as 
equity or an equity related open-end mutual fund. 
What is characteristic to the DC type of pension scheme, which is introduced in this 
model, is that the retirement benefits it provides are not predefined and are fully dependant on 
the market outcome. This increases the agency problem called “risk shifting”, as compared to 
the “Defined Benefit” pension funds where the pension fund management company has a 
liability for a certain amount of promised asset return. In the case of Defined Contribution 
pension funds, because the pension fund management company has only a very limited risk 
of its own private loss if their investments turn out worthless, this makes the defined 
contribution pension funds a more aggressive risk taker and on average faster to accept 
bubbly instruments into their portfolio. 
Returning to the description of the model and the division of agents‟ first period 
salary, the rest of it left after subtracting the contribution given to the defined contribution 
pension fund is the amount of income available for consumption and/or personal voluntary 
investment by the young agents in the period when they are young. Based on their personal 
inter-temporal consumption preferences characterised by the implicit utility function (being 
patient or impatient consumers) and the knowledge of the investment rule applied by the 
pension fund which covers them (affecting in return their own lifetime budget constraint), 
individual agents individually decide how to invest and/or consume the rest of their salary. 
Their individually chosen investments are realized through investing in capital (productive 
saving) and/or bubbly asset (non-productive saving), comparing and deciding between the 
two investment opportunities according to the non-arbitrage condition. 
Markets for labour, productive capital and the bubbly asset are perfectly competitive 
in this model. In the next period, when the initial generation of agents becomes old, the 
pension fund sells the number of previously invested units of the bubbly asset and transfers 
this amount as pension compensation to the old agents split according to the share of their 
initial contribution. In this model all young participants live equally long and survive to 
consume their mandatory pension fund savings together with their individual savings in the 
second period when old. 
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There is also production in this model undertaken by rational entrepreneurs, 
represented by the constant returns of scale (CRS) production function implicitly defined as 
F(Kt,Lt).Constant returns of scale implies that, Fk(k=0)=∞ and Fk(k=∞)=0, hence diminishing 
returns to capital in the economy. This also implies that as the growth of investments in 
productive capital pushed by the increase of the amount of investable wealth in the economy 
increases, the profitability of the investments decreases. In the case of the dynamically 
inefficient economy, this opens space for financial innovation and introduction of bubbly 
assets keeping the rates of return in the economy at a higher level and avoiding suboptimal 
productive capital over-accumulation. This assumption is the crucial one, which creates the 
incentive for introduction of bubbly instruments. Otherwise, without diminishing return on 
productive investments, bubbly assets would be continuously crowded out by productive 
investments. This intuitively implies that real sector innovation, keeping productivity rates 
higher compared to the rate of growth rate of investible assets, would be a permanent 
alternative to the second best outcome with rational bubbles in place. 
Producers/Entrepreneurs who govern production are fully rational, so they make decisions on 
the margin when they participate in the market looking to employ production resources 
provided by the young consumers.  
We will operate in per-young agent terms for all variables in the model. We 
standardise the production function and all economy/market variables by dividing them by 
the number of young agents, which equals Lt (Labour in the economy at time t), since each 
young agent is endowed with only one unit of labour when young. 
There are two types of investment assets available for transferring wealth from one period to 
another. 
1) Productive asset - physical capital, whose return - solving the producers‟ first order 
condition(FOC) for capital per young agent - is defined by: 
δ+)(kf=R +t
'
+t 111         (2.1) 
Here kt stands for the amount of per young agent capital at time t, while δ is the yearly 
depreciation rate of the capital invested. The total rate of return of capital (RHS in 
equation 2.1) equals the marginal productivity of capital minus its depreciation rate 
(LHS in equation 2.1). This is the well-known marginality principle in micro-
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economics. This represents a small departure from Tirole‟s result, who did not 
account for the depreciation of capital now common in OLG structures. Its inclusion 
does not affect Tirole‟s result, but brings the economy closer to its real functioning. 
This may be particularly relevant to economies in transition, such as those in SEE. 
Introduction of such depreciation cost can be used to apply “transition” costs on 
capital, which might significantly decrease the expected return on equity and add 
more pressure on the dynamic efficiency of the equity market. 
2) Bubbly asset – asset which in the fashion of Tirole is intrinsically worthless 
In our model, following the Tirole Rational Asset Bubbles model, we also 
introduce the second investment vehicle, the pure bubbly asset (bt). Due to the 
introduction of the DC pension funds which invest in the bubbly asset, the equation 
describing the return of the bubbly asset will differ in our model from the equation 
describing the return of the bubbly asset defined in Tirole‟s model. We will compare 
the two after we derive the new equation. 
 We begin the derivation of the dynamics of the bubbly asset by defining the 
value of the bubble per young agent bt (LHS in equation 2.3.1) equal to our fixed 
supply of units of the bubbly asset “B” multiplied to the price of the unit of the bubbly 
asset ∏t and divided by the total number of young agents Nt(RHS in equation 2.3.1): 
 
t
t
t
N
B
b


      (2.3.1) 
Now we introduce the DC pension fund investments to the market of the bubbly asset 
impacting the residual supply of the units of the bubbly asset in the RHS of equation 
2.3.1. This is done by considering the net effect of the investment rule of the DC 
pension fund at each time period. The investment rule of the DC pension fund 
operates in the following way. The DC pension fund invests/buys a certain amount of 
units of the bubbly asset which equals to the amount of the tax gathered from the total 
number of young agents (τ*Nt) divided by the price of the bubbly asset in the current 
period ∏t (equation 2.3.1a) 
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Simultaneously, the DC pension fund also sells a number of units of the 
bubbly asset to provide pension to a number of agents Nt-1 who were young in the 
previous period when they were taxed by the pension fund, and who are now old in 
the current period and should receive pension income. The number of units of the 
bubbly assets that has to be sold equals the tax of the DC pension fund multiplied by 
the number of old agents and divided by the price of the bubbly asset from the 
previous period ∏t-1when this investment was made(equation 2.3.1b) 
1
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    (2.3.1b) 
When we subtract and add the investments made by the DC pension fund from 
the total supply of the bubbly asset B in equation 2.3.1, introducing the net investment 
impact of the DC pension fund, we derive equation 2.3.2.This represents the value of 
the bubbly asset at time t, including the net effect of the DC pension funds investment 
rule.  
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In the brackets on the RHS of the equation 2.3.2, we introduce the mechanics 
of the investment of the DC pension fund on the market with the bubbly asset 
affecting the constant supply of the bubbly asset “B”.  Applying the dynamics of the 
population growth “n”, knowing that “Nt=(1+n)Nt-1“we substitute for Nt  in equation 
2.3.2 to get to equation 2.3.3. 
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We still need to apply the impact of the consumer agent investment solution in 
order to establish the clearance of the market of the bubbly asset. 
Now we apply the impact of the consumer agent‟s investment decisions in 
order to reach the clearing condition of the market with the bubbly asset. In order to 
introduce their impact, we define their inter-temporal consumer problem, solve it and 
apply the result of their inter-temporal optimisation of consumption and saving using 
both productive and bubbly assets as investment vehicles. This yields the Non-
Arbitrage condition, which connects and simultaneously clears the markets of the two 
investment vehicles in our financial market. The agents‟ inter-temporal utility 
problem together with its first order conditions of the utility maximisation solution are 
presented in the equations 2.3.4. 
   


















12
1
11
11
121 ..,max
ttt
t
t
tt
ttttt
tt cbkR
bkcw
tsccU


 
    








 

 12
1
112111121 ),(max ttt
t
t
ttttttttt cbkRbkcwccU 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 (2.3.4) 
 
Finally, the investment solution of the consumer agent is derived from the first 
order conditions of his/her inter-temporal utility maximisation. This result is called 
the Non-Arbitrage condition, which we present in equation 2.3.5 and shows that in the 
interior solution, when both investment vehicles are used on the financial market to 
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transfer wealth from one period to the other, market clearing conditions should 
simultaneously drive the returns of the both investment assets to be equal. 
t
t
tR
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        (2.3.5) 
Finally, we apply the Non-Arbitrage condition (equation 2.3.5), and thereby 
the impact of the rational consumers, to the bubbly asset market clearing condition 
represented in equation 2.3.3. We further solve and we obtain equation 2.3.6. 
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In order to derive the Equilibrium Law of Motion of the bubbly asset we first 
use the equation 2.3.6 describing the market value of the bubbly asset per young agent 
at period t and, describe a system of two consecutive periods of market value of the 
bubbly asset at periods t and t+1 as shown in equation 2.3.7 
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 And, after manipulation: 
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Dividing the two equations(t+1 by t) presented by the system in 2.3.7, and 
substituting the market clearing condition represented by the consumer‟s solution of 
the non-arbitrage condition, we obtain the Equilibrium Law of Motion (ELM) of the 
bubbly asset presented with the rate of return on the LHS in equation 2.3.8. 
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Comparing equation 2.3.8, with Tirole‟s dynamic market equilibrium solution 
of the bubbly asset presented in equation 2.3.9, we see the difference implied by the 
introduction of the DC pension funds. In a hypothetical case when we exclude the DC 
pension fund from the system by setting τ=0 in equation 2.3.8, we reduce our ELM in 
equation 2.3.8 to the solution to the Tirole‟s dynamic market equilibrium for the 
bubbly asset presented in equation 2.3.9. 
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Finally, we substitute in equation 2.3.8 the return of the productive 
investments in order to connect the market evolution of the two 
investment assets, which is required by the non-arbitrage condition. The return of the 
productive asset is derived from the producer‟s first order condition as presented in 
equation 2.1. Applying some additional algebraic transformations to equation 
2.3.8(details in Appendix II) we obtain the first difference equation of the value of the 
bubbly asset representing its Equilibrium Law of Motion (equation 2.4) 
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           (2.4) 
This is our first dynamic first order difference equation representing the equilibrium 
law of motion (ELM) of the value of the bubbly asset per young agent (bt) in our OLG 
    11tkf
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modelled economy (equation 2.4). For the ease of comparison, we reproduce Tirole‟s 
bubbly asset ELM 
n)+(
b)(k(f
=b t+t
'
+t
1
)11
1

 - Tirole‟s bubbly asset ELM   (2.5) 
 
Comparing our modelled ELM for the bubbly asset (equation 2.4) with the 
result obtained by Tirole(1985) (equation 2.5), we come to the conclusion that the 
introduction of a positive defined contribution pension fund tax “τ” invested on the 
bubbly asset market significantly impacts the evolution of the bubbly asset. Whenever 
the return of the productive asset is greater than the growth rate of the population 
(investible assets), the term in the brackets multiplied by “τ” 
on the RHS of equation 2.4 will be positive, causing more rapid positive evolution of 
the value of the bubbly asset with every positive DC pension fund investments in the 
bubbly asset. The economic mechanism proceeds from the bubbly asset to real 
investment via the non-arbitrage condition: a real rate of return greater than the rate of 
population growth induces investment in productive assets together with – via the 
non-arbitrage condition – investment in the bubbly asset. The introduction of the 
defined contribution pension fund brings a faster dynamic to the value of the bubbly 
asset toward its equilibrium. This implies the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Faster and more aggressive rise in the value of the bubbly asset could 
be expected with the introduction of the DC pension fund on the financial market.  
Now in order to derive the second dynamic equation describing the 
equilibrium law of motion of the productive capital per young agent (kt), we turn to 
the clearing condition of the savings market in our modelled economy. The savings 
market embraces all consumer agents with their own investment decision. 
 
tt1+tt
'
tttt Nb+K=δ)+)(kfτ;τ;)(k(wSN  1    (2.6)
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On the left hand side of the equation (2.6) is the demand for savings of all 
agents in the economy, determined by the number of young agents‟ at time t (Nt), 
multiplied by their individual implicit savings function S(.). Their individual savings 
function S(.), as an implicit solution of their consumer problem FOC defined at 
(2.3.4), is dependent on their income in the first period (from which the DC pension 
fund subtracts an amount “τ” to achieve the individual pension investment), their 
income in the second period (when the pension fund adds to their income the amount 
subtracted in the first period and multiplied by its investment return) and the third 
component of the saving function is rate of return on savings. We assume the implicit 
savings function of every agent is “normal”, which means that its partial derivative 
with respect to the wealth in the first period is positive – meaning that if having more 
wealth when young, agents will strictly save more; its partial derivative with respect 
to wealth in the second period is negative – meaning that if agents know they will 
receive higher wealth when old, they strictly save less when they are young; and the 
partial derivative with respect to the interest rates is positive – meaning that higher 
interest rate makes strictly positive effect on savings: 
0(.);0(.);0(.) 21  rSSS  
In other words, this so called “normality” of the savings function presupposes 
that rational young agents with more expected income in the future period would have 
less incentive to save today, but as the today‟s income and expected return from 
saving increase, agents would have incentive to add more to their saving to transfer 
some of their consumption in the later period. 
Going back to the savings market, the right hand side of the market clearing 
equation (2.6) represents the supply of savings instruments available to the consumer 
agents in the economy. It consists of the sum of the productive capital and the sum of 
the bubbly instrument, which are the instruments that could satisfy the savings needs 
of the consumer agents. Here Kt+1, represents the economy‟s productive capital 
investment opportunities at time t which turn into capital in t+1, while (btNt), 
represents the total market value of the bubbly asset at time t. Their sum gives the 
total savings instrument vehicles supply at the savings market at time t in our 
modelled financial market. Dividing the savings market clearing condition (equation 
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2.6) by the number of young agents Nt from the both sides in order to represent the 
dynamics of the productive capital and the bubbly asset in per young agent terms, we 
get the equilibrium law of motion for the productive capital represented in equation 
2.7. The savings function (the first component in the numerator on the RHS of 
equation 2.7) is represented in its implicit form with its components in the brackets: 
the explicit definition of the wealth in the period when young; the wealth in the period 
when old; and the rate of return from saving. 
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     (2.7) 
Equation (2.7) describes the evolution of the value of productive capital per 
young agent kt+1, which increases with the increased savings demand S(.) but 
decreases with the growth of the bubbly asset bt, as seen from the RHS of equation 
2.7.This means that the bubbly asset crowds out part of the productive capital 
investment. Savings demand tends to increase at a decreasing rate, due to the 
diminishing productivity of capital which, in turn, decreases the return of capital. The 
bubbly asset prevents the suboptimal productive capital over-accumulation by 
crowding out part of the investments in productive capital. 
Thus far we have derived the two first order difference equations describing 
the dynamics of the financial market in the fashion of Tirole‟s settings augmented by 
a DC pension scheme. If we recall the result derived by Tirole (equation 1.10 in 
Chapter 1), we notice that if we cancel the DC pension scheme in our model by 
making 0=τ , then we get the same dynamic first order difference equation for the 
per young agent productive capital (kt) and per young agent bubbly asset (bt) as in 
Tirole's result (Tirole, 1985, p. equation 16' and 16'') as shown below: 
Our economy‟s two ELM equations with DC pension scheme: 
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Setting the DC pension scheme “tax” τ=0, which means cancelling the pension 
scheme, we obtain Tirole's result (Tirole, 1985): 
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This implies our second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Manipulating the value of τ, which could be in the hands of the law setting 
body responsible for the introduction of the DC pension fund in the system, affects the 
intensity of the effect of the DC pension fund on the financial market and on the dynamics of 
the productive and bubbly investment assets in the economy. 
 In the extreme, setting τ=0, would mean cancelling out the influence of the DC 
pension scheme on the financial market, obtaining the equilibrium demonstrated by Tirole 
(1985). Conversely, if we introduce a tax “τ” close to the whole amount of young agents‟ 
wage, then the regulator would account completely for the dynamics of the productive and 
bubbly investment asset in such an economy. 
 In order to understand the impact of the introduction of the DC pension funds on the 
dynamics of the financial market, described by the two equilibrium laws of motion for value 
of the productive capital and the value of the bubbly asset, we will continue with Phase 
diagram analysis. The impact of the introduction of the DC pension fund on the shapes of the 
two steady states loci describing the steady state points of the ELM of the bubbly asset and of 
the productive capital have a crucial importance on the difference in the dynamics of the 
system affected by the introduction of the DC pension funds. 
 
2.3 Phase diagram analysis 
 
In order to analyse the dynamics of the financial market governed by the two 
equilibrium laws of motion describing the dynamics of the value of productive capital and the 
value of the bubbly asset, we use Phase diagram representation. Phase diagrams are graphical 
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presentations of the dynamics of a system of two or more dynamic variables interacting 
among each other, represented in two or more dimensional space. Phase diagrams graph the 
dynamics from every starting state of the system, described by the two (or more) dynamic 
variables and picture its dynamic path to some steady state point governed by the temporal 
evolution of the two (or more) equilibrium laws of motion. In our case, we have two dynamic 
variables, which are represented by the ELM of the value of productive capital instrument 
and the ELM of the value of the bubbly asset.  
By the use of a Phase diagram, we gain more intuitive understanding about the 
implied impact of the introduction of a DC pension fund into the financial market with 
respect to the joint dynamics of productive capital investments and of the bubbly asset. This 
would be accomplished by analysing its joint impact on the evolution of the financial market 
through the analysis of the Phase diagram simultaneously analysing the two equilibrium laws 
of motion.  
We first begin in Figure 2.1 by graphing the locus of SS points for the bubbly asset 
equilibrium law of motion, finding its locus of steady state points and thus identifying the 
dynamics in the environment close to the locus of steady state points. For this purpose, we 
work with the already derived ELM function for the bubbly asset (equation 2.4): 
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The locus of steady state points is a set of points where the dynamic variable has no 
dynamics. This means that on the locus of SS points (bt=bt+1), meaning that, ceteris paribus, 
there will be no further dynamics in the value of the bubbly asset per young agent once the 
SS locus is reached from any direction. In our model of the financial market, it will be 
represented by some continuous line on the Phase diagram (Figure 2.1). Analysing the Phase 
diagram for the bubbly asset ELM (Figure 2.1), we notice that there is no trivial SS for the 
bubbly asset, where 01  tt bb , as in Tirole‟s model (Tirole, 1985). This is because of the 
existence of the pension scheme, which accepts the bubbly asset in its portfolio and precludes 
the corner solution as long as the pension fund is in place and the rule 0 strictly holds. 
There are indefinitely many non-trivial solutions for the steady state of the bubbly asset 
ELM, represented by the vertical line on the graph (Figure 2.1). They occur only when the 
return of capital decreased by its depreciation rate equals the growth rate of the economy or 
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its investable assets (population growth rate) (    tkfn 11 ).(The growth rate of the 
population will be replaced by the growth rate of the pension fund subscribers in the later 
empirical study, since it directly affects the growth rate of economy‟s financial market 
investable wealth.) The result for the locus of steady state points for the bubbly asset is the 
same as the one present in Tirole‟s model except for the exclusion of the zero point, which is 
excluded by construction because the introduced DC pension fund invests a non-zero amount 
in the bubbly asset. This means that the main criterion for the rationality of asset bubbles on 
the financial market, the dynamic efficiency threshold, does not change with the introduction 
of the DC pension funds. The criterion stays the same and is defined by the relationship 
between the return of the productive capital and the rate of growth of the economy (defining 
the rate of growth of the investible assets). 
 
Figure 2.1: Phase diagram representation for the ELM of the bubbly asset (bt) 
and is SS locus 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O 
bt – represents the value of the bubble in per young agent terms 
kt – represents the value of the capital in per young agent terms 
kt=f’-1(n) – the inverse of the marginal product of capital at the rate of return equal to the growth of the 
population, derived as follows: f’(k)=r => take inverse =>f’-1(r)=k and, as our condition is r=n, it follows 
that f’-1(n)=k.  
Source: Author’s own graphical representation of the bubbly asset ELM  
 
The intuition of the Phase diagram of the bubbly asset ELM is given by the arrows on 
the left and on the right side of the vertical steady state locus of the bubbly asset ELM. If the 
kt=f‟
-1
(n) 
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economy and its financial market is found on the left side of the SS locus, then due to the 
lower productive capital accumulation and its consecutive higher marginal productivity rate, 
and due to the non-arbitrage condition, the ELM of the bubbly asset would produce a 
growing upward force on the value of the bubbly asset per young agent (bt+1>bt). This could 
be seen by looking at ELM of the value of the bubbly asset presented in equation 2.4. When 
the system is positioned left from the vertical line in Figure 2.1 denoted by 
   tkfn 11 , the term 
n
kf t

 
1
1)( 1  multiplying bt on the RHS of the equation 2.4 
is greater than one producing increasing dynamics of the value of the bubbly asset bt+1 . This 
is why the arrow on the left is pointed upwards. Conversely, to the right of the locus of steady 
state points, when we have higher states of productive capital accumulation per young agent, 
and lower marginal productivity of capital, due to the non-arbitrage condition we would have 
a falling value of the bubbly asset per young agent (bt+1<bt). In this opposite case right from 
the vertical line in Figure 2.1 we have    tkfn 11  that makes the term multiplying bt 
on the RHS of the equation 2.4 smaller than one producing decreasing dynamics of bt+1. This 
is why the arrow representing the dynamics of the bubbly asset per young agent on the right 
side of the locus of steady state points downward. However, the economy and its financial 
market are not governed solely by the bubbly asset per young agent but also by the dynamics 
of the productive capital accumulation per young agent. Consequently, we need to also graph 
the locus of steady state points for the previously derived first order difference equation 
representing the evolution of the accumulation of productive capital per young agent in the 
economy. Due to the inclusion of the implicit savings function in the ELM representing the 
accumulation of productive capital per young agent (kt), the locus of its steady state points is 
not a straight line. We recall the previously derived productive capital ELM (equation 2.7) in 
the following line:  
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We take a heuristic approach when drawing the locus of steady state points for the 
level of productive capital per young agent. This means that we could find only the intercept 
points on the x-axis, when the value of the bubbly asset is zero, and the shape of the curvature 
which is based on the assumed normality of the savings function and the non-arbitrage 
condition. In Tirole‟s model, which uses the same “normal” savings function, there is one 
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trivial steady state point, where the value of capital accumulation equals zero. This point 
implies that the economy is not existent, since there cannot be any production without any 
capital accumulation. Moreover, this point is impossible in our model with DC pension funds, 
due to the assumption that the pension fund immediately accepts the bubbly asset in its 
portfolio and the non-arbitrage condition has to hold at all times, which implies immediate 
productive capital accumulation in the individual consumer agents‟ portfolios. Consequently, 
we begin depicting the locus of steady state points for the productive capital accumulation 
immediately after the origin excluding the origin point. Next, we determine the direction of 
the SS locus by analysing the direction of the productive capital accumulation close to the 
inception of the economy when there is very little capital invested. At this point, the marginal 
productivity of capital is extremely high- in fact it tends to infinity - as we are close to zero 
capital per young agent, and so accumulation increases rapidly. Due to the non-arbitrage 
condition, this means that the bubbly asset must be accumulating in value at the same speed 
in order to provide the same return as the productive capital in the interior solution. So the 
locus of steady state points for the productive capital per young agent increases in the 
positive direction for both kt and bt. 
At this point it is important to distinguish between the rates of return of the productive 
capital established when the financial market is in dynamic equilibrium, and the rates of 
return of the productive capital along its path to the financial market dynamic equilibrium. 
Along the path of productive capital accumulation, it is normal for the financial markets to 
pass through the phase of higher interest rates compared to the rate of growth of investable 
assets. In this phase of productive capital accumulation, bubbly assets might occur and rise in 
value together with the accumulation of productive capital. However, the bubbly assets will 
not be sustainable on the market if the productive capital continues providing competitive 
rates of return – i.e. higher than the rate of growth of the wealth that has to be transferred 
from one period to another on the financial market to keep pace with population growth – 
which defines the financial market as being dynamically efficient. In this case bubbly assets 
will disappear, being crowded out by the productive asset, and the financial market will stay 
dynamically efficient without the presence of bubbly assets. On the other hand, when the 
return of the productive assets tends to decline below the rate of growth of the investible 
assets, then the bubbly asset would sustain on the financial market. In this case, the presence 
of the bubbly asset will prevent the occurrence of productive capital over-accumulation, 
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which is a Pareto inferior state compared to the one with the presence of the bubbly asset on 
the financial market and lower productive capital accumulation. It is assumed in this model 
that financial markets move rapidly towards their dynamic equilibrium point. 
The line of the steady state locus for the productive capital per young agent has a 
decreasing slope (the second derivative of the slope is negative), due to the diminishing rate 
of return of capital and the “normality” of the savings function (decreasing investment return 
causing decreasing savings). So, finally, the SS line hits the x-axis again at the “Diamond” 
steady state, where bubbly assets per young agent are fully crowded out by productive capital 
accumulation.  In Figure 2.2, we represent the locus of steady state points for the productive 
capital, comparing Tirole‟s result with the one that we get including the DC pension funds in 
the economy. The two biggest differences are the shape of the locus of steady state points and 
the level of capital accumulation representing the Diamond steady state. The immediate 
impact of the introduction of the DC pension fund, especially in an economy where agents 
are not investing a great part of their incomes, which implies that impatient consumers 
dominate the economy, is to crowd out a significant part of the productive capital investments 
and add to investment in the bubbly asset. In Figure 2.2, this immediate impact is represented 
by a higher value of the bubbly asset per young agent (bt) and a lower value of productive 
capital per young agent (kt). This translates into a higher sloped steady state locus of the 
productive capital accumulation in the economy, where for every steady state for the 
productive capital accumulation, as compared to the state of the economy without the 
existence of the pension funds, a higher level of bubbly asset accumulation in the economy is 
required when the DC pension fund is introduced. 
The introduction of the DC pension fund in effect is the institutional capturing of a 
significant part of the discretionary representative agent inter-temporal consumption decision. 
This means that, as the pension scheme captures higher amounts of agents‟ income and 
invests it by its own decision rule, it lowers the impact of the individual representative 
agent‟s inter-temporal consumption preferences on the economy‟s savings and investment 
outcomes. More practical understanding would be to imagine an economy where all agents 
would prefer to spend most of their income today, but the introduction of the pension scheme 
captures most of their current income and invests it. This way the institution commands them 
to change their inter-temporal consumption attitude from being extremely impatient to being 
extremely patient. This causes a shift of the steady state locus for productive capital 
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accumulation pushing the Diamond steady state point further to the right making the 
economy potentially more dynamically inefficient or bubbly as shown in the previous chapter 
(Figure 1.2.6). This also implies that the bubbly asset could impact the system more strongly 
than the capital accumulation due to its acceptance by the DC pension fund (Figure 2.2). 
 
Figure 2.2: Phase diagram representation for the ELM of productive capital (kt) 
and its SS locus 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*the steady state loci are a heuristic presentation to demonstrate the relative positions of the curves, 
whereas the relative position of the peaks is not explicitly determined within the model (because of the 
use of an implicit savings function). 
Source: Author’s own graphical representation of the productive capital per young agent ELM  
 
Analysing Figure 2.2, we can see that if the financial market is below the locus of 
steady state points for the productive capital accumulation per young agent ELM (kt), this 
means that the lower level of the value of the bubbly asset creates a lower drag on the 
accumulation of the productive capital (it crowds out less from the productive capital). This 
translates into more productive capital investments, which drives the dynamics of the system 
below the productive capital SS locus to the right. The opposite holds above the locus of the 
steady state points of the productive capital accumulation, where the accumulation of the 
bubbly asset is higher and crowds out higher amount of the productive capital investment that 
decreases the amount of productive capital. This effect is due to the presence of the non-
arbitrage condition, and this is the reason why the arrow showing the dynamics of the 
tb
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Our result for the 
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ktwith the inclusion 
of DC pension funds 
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productive capital accumulation above the locus of SS points to the left in Figure 2.2. The 
most important insight for our analysis at this point is the change of the shape of the locus of 
steady state points for the productive capital accumulation (kt), created due to the 
introduction of DC pension funds in the system. If we observe the productive capital ELM in 
equation 2.7, and determine the steady state locus for the productive capital accumulation as 
the line where kt+1=kt=k, we describe the locus by the following equation: 
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Now if we increase the DC pension fund investments by increasing the tax or, as 
previously discussed, by capturing part of the investment discretion from each individual 
agent, we will decrease its first period available income defined by “wt(k)-τ” (the first 
component of the savings function), which negatively affects her savings function and the 
investment in the productive capital. In addition, the rational agent considers receiving higher 
income in the next period from the pension fund (the second component of the saving 
function), which additionally decreases its incentive to save in the productive asset. On the 
other side, the investment of the DC pension fund will positively affect the value of the 
bubbly asset, which also has a negative effect on the level of productive capital investments. 
The joint outcome of the introduction of the DC pension fund is a higher value of the bubbly 
asset at each state of the productive capital accumulation, or in other words, a strictly higher 
positioned locus of steady states for the ELM of the productive capital accumulation. 
The impact of the introduction of the pension funds on the representative agent‟s 
savings function is to increase the overall economy-wise investable assets and so move the 
Diamond equilibrium to the right, making the sustainability of the bubbly assets higher, 
ceteris paribus. To understand this difference, taking an extreme situation into consideration, 
if the Pension fund taxes close to the amount of whole of the first period wage of the 
individual agents, it automatically commands its saving function making it similar to an 
extremely patient agent, which leads to the acceptance of even negative interest rates and 
extremely suboptimal productive capital over-accumulation. In other words, the introduction 
of DC pension funds, by greatly increasing the amount of saving and investments, pushes the 
financial market toward its dynamically inefficient state, where asset bubbles become a 
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rational outcome. This same logic, explained from the point of view of Tirole‟s model, 
implies the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: The introduction of the mandatory DC pension fund to a closed illiquid 
financial market increases significantly the probability that the economy becomes 
dynamically inefficient and that it requires a bubbly asset to be introduced to overcome the 
potential issue of productive capital over-accumulation.   
Now that we have explained the effect on the two separate equilibrium laws of motion 
for the productive capital kt and for the bubbly asset bt, we merge the effects of the two 
dynamic equations to analyse the dynamics of the economy and its financial market governed 
simultaneously by productive capital and the bubbly asset accumulation. Drawing the joint 
phase diagram of the economy in bt/kt space, with the consequences of the introduction of the 
DC pension funds, we get the dynamics as depicted in Figure 2.3: 
Figure 2.3: Phase diagram representation for the joint effect of the ELM of the 
productive capital (kt) and the ELM of the bubbly asset (bt) in the dynamically 
inefficient economy before and after the introduction of the mandatory DC 
pension fund 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s own graphical representation of the locus of steady state points for the productive 
capital per young agent(kt) ELM,and the bubbly asset per young agent (bt) before and after the 
introduction of the DC pension fund 
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Now we analyse the overall effect of the introduction of the DC pension fund on the 
equilibrium of the financial market. The fact that the kn, or the Diamond steady state reached 
without the presence of the DC pension fund, is already at a level of productive capital 
accumulation where the marginal rate of return (interest rate) is lower than the rate of growth 
of the population “n”, shows that we are initially in the dynamically inefficient economy, 
where bubbly assets are required to bring the financial market back to its Pareto efficient 
Golden Rule state as described by the steady state point (gn). Although bubbly assets could 
bring the financial market to its dynamically efficient state, still they might not be introduced 
or they might be only marginally accepted, driving the dynamics of the system through the 
dynamic path C (Figure 2.3). This is avoided by construction in the case of our financial 
market with the DC pension fund, because we introduce the bubbly asset in the pension 
fund‟s portfolio. 
The greatest change caused by the introduction of the DC pension fund arrives by 
shifting the equilibrium productive capital over-accumulation point, called the Diamond 
steady state point, to the right, from the point kn to kp (Figure 2.3). This is a consequence of 
the fact that the introduction of the pension fund changes the economy‟s savings attitude and 
commands part of agents‟ inter-temporal consumption preferences toward those characteristic 
of more patient consumers. We previously explained, when analysing the locus of steady 
state points for of the ELM of the productive capital, that the introduction of the DC pension 
fund assigns a higher value of the bubbly asset for every steady state level of the productive 
capital accumulation, shifting the steady state locus upward. This ultimately means that the 
steady state locus will intercept the x-axis at a point further to the right. Ultimately, this 
increases the probability that the economy, without sufficient innovation in the productive 
sector required to sustain the marginal productivity of capital at a higher level, would become 
dynamically inefficient from the financial market perspective and, without the introduction of 
some bubbly asset, would lead to even higher suboptimal productive capital over-
accumulation represented by the new Diamond steady state kp. Such a shift of the productive 
capital steady state locus upwards and to the right intersecting the x-axis of the productive 
capital accumulation at a higher Diamond steady state indicated in Figure 2.3 by the point kp. 
With respect of the dynamics of the bubbly asset, this would mean that the Golden 
rule point would move to a higher value of the bubbly asset per young agent, defined at the 
point gp. Intuitively, this means that as the overall “patience” of the representative agent is 
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increased by command of the pension fund investment rule, the investable amount in the 
economy increases and the financial market requires a higher value of the bubbly asset to 
bring the dynamically inefficient economy to its Pareto optimal Golden Rule steady state 
defined by gp (Figure 2.3). At this point, the additional value of the bubbly asset generated as 
a consequence of the introduction of the defined contribution pension fund equals the 
difference between gp and gn multiplied by the number of young agents Nt.  
The immediate effect of the introduction of the DC pension fund to the other case of 
dynamically inefficient economy is depicted by Figure 2.3. The immediate consequence of 
such a change would be an upward shift in the value of the bubbly asset and a shift of the 
dynamics from the asymptotically bubbly path of the economy without the DC pension fund 
as described by (B) to the asymptotically bubbly path of the economy with the DC pension 
fund as described by a higher bubbly level path (A) (Figure 2.3). The immediate effect of the 
introduction of the defined contribution pension fund to the dynamically inefficient economy 
would be an increase in the valuation of the bubbly asset on the financial market. An 
important implication to discuss is the effect of future potential termination of a DC pension 
fund that was previously introduced. The consequence of the termination of the DC pension 
fund to the dynamics of the financial market and the economy will be discussed at the end of 
this section, when discussing the causes of the collapse of the bubble.  
Now, we need to investigate the other more interesting case, which is potentially more 
characteristic for the Croatian and other SEE financial markets; namely, the potential effect 
of the introduction of the DC pension fund to the dynamically efficient financial market. This 
is the financial market, as previously described, where agents are predominantly impatient 
consumers who are not very keen on saving most of their wage when young, so that the 
economy‟s Diamond bubbly-less steady state of the productive capital accumulation (kn) 
brings in a dynamic equilibrium where the marginal rate of return (interest rate) of the 
productive capital investments is higher than the growth rate of the investible assets as 
described by the growth rate of the population. This means that the Diamond steady state is to 
the left of the locus of stability points of the bubbly asset ELM and there is no systemic 
attraction toward higher values of the bubbly asset. This case is depicted by the Figure 2.4. 
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Figure 2.4: Phase diagram representation for the joint effect of the ELM of the 
productive capital (kt) and the ELM of the bubbly asset (bt) in the dynamically 
efficient economy before and after the introduction of the mandatory DC 
pension fund 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s own graphical representation of the locus of steady state points for the productive 
capital per young agent(kt) ELM,and the bubbly asset per young agent (bt) before and after the 
introduction of the DC pension fund 
 
Here in the case when representative agents are predominantly impatient consumers 
and require a lot of liquidity, and the economy is dynamically efficient. In this case, there is 
no need for the existence of the bubbly asset to bring the economy to its Pareto optimal 
steady state prior to the introduction of the DC pension funds, because such an optimal state 
is already reached at the equilibrium point kn. We later see that the speculative introduction of 
the bubbly asset into such economy could be only short lived (C), again leading to the 
ultimate bubbly-less Diamond steady state point kn. Here, in this type of the economy, the 
introduction of the defined contribution pension fund could have even more disturbing effects 
on the market. The introduction of the defined contribution pension fund to the system could 
significantly change the relative savings and investment attitude on the financial market to an 
extent causing a shift of the dynamically efficient state to the dynamically inefficient state of 
the financial market. In such a state the new Diamond steady state equilibrium point is 
represented by kp (Figure 2.4), a steady state point which is Pareto sub-optimal to the bubbly 
tk
nk
pk
f‟-1(n) 
ng
pg
147 | P a g e  
 
steady state equilibrium point gp because it leads to productive capital over-accumulation and 
lower consumption and utility.  In this economy, the introduction of the DC pension fund 
would by itself make the occurrence of the bubbly asset a rationally likely outcome, because 
of its impact on the economy-wise savings demand and its misbalance with respect to the 
productive investment opportunities. This means that the financial market would eventually 
produce the asymptotically bubbly path (A) leading to the bubbly steady state gp from a much 
lower bubbly-less state of the market. In this case, the introduction of the DC pension fund 
would initially produce an even higher relative increase of the value of the bubbly asset on 
the financial market bringing the economy to the dynamic path F as depicted on Figure 2.4. 
We saw from the analysis of the Phase diagrams for both dynamically efficient and 
dynamically inefficient economies, investigating the impact of the introduction of the DC 
pension funds, that in both cases we could expect an increase in the value of the bubbly asset 
in the economy. Comparing the two cases, we arrive at another hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 4: The increase of the value of the bubbly assets, consequent upon the 
introduction of DC pension funds, would be relatively much more dramatic and 
unsustainable in the case when the starting point is a dynamically efficient economy, if the 
capturing effect on income is so intensive that the introduction of the pension fund shifts the 
financial market to becoming dynamically inefficient.  
This could be an expected consequence when the economy has a small, illiquid and 
closed financial market, when DC pension funds at the beginning of their functioning tend to 
predominantly invest at home, and when they dramatically affect the overall investible assets 
and investing attitudes on the financial market. Next, we turn to the investigation to some of 
the potential triggers for the crash of the rational bubble. 
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2.4. Potential triggers causing the Crash of the bubbly asset 
 
In our theoretical model, there are two major factors causing bubbly asset price 
volatility and potentially its crash: the first one has its origin in the change of consumer inter-
temporal preferences; and the second one in the changes in the fundamentals determining 
economic growth (and the growth of investible assets). This widely corresponds to the 
intuitive understanding of the main factors causing market volatility and the crash of a pricing 
bubble often commented on by market professionals. Inter-temporal consumer preferences, as 
a primary reason for the volatility and ultimately for the crash of the price of the bubbly asset, 
are in part highly reflected in the psychology of the mass of investors. Not every generation 
lives with equal optimism for the prospects of its living standard, future income and overall 
expected utility, which defines its inter-temporal consumption preferences and its investment 
attitude. In other words, if we suddenly face fear that tomorrow we won‟t exist, then we 
would like to consume everything today, which would collapse even the ultimately bubbly 
asset, fiat money, leading to the collapse of the overall economy. Analysing this argument in 
the light of the Global Financial Crisis in 2008, we could connect the sudden investors fear 
with the higher risk premiums and higher required rates of return, which in our model could 
make many financial markets suddenly become dynamically efficient without any rationality 
for sustainable asset bubbles. 
Robert Shiller (2000), in his seminal work on investor animal spirits and asset bubbles 
on financial markets, describes 12 factors determining equity market dynamics that 
correspond to and stimulate investors “irrational exuberance”. However, our model suggests 
that the “irrational exuberance” of consumer agents is not the only potential source of 
financial market asset bubbles. Our model suggests that institutional reform could be another 
such source. When we introduce the defined contribution pension fund to the economy, the 
institution actually takes command to an extent of the consumer investment discretion 
typically promoting a higher level of financial market investments in the less developed 
economies. This could have a relatively strong effect on the market-wise investment attitude 
that is especially strong when defined contribution mandatory pension funds are applied to 
the dynamically efficient economy, in which most consumers had no investment experience 
prior to the introduction of the DC pension fund. 
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As indicated above, the fundamental drivers of financial market dynamics are 
technology and consumer preferences. Our model is not designed to pursue the implications 
of technical progress. However, our model, focused on institutional change, can illuminate 
the implications of two main factors liable to cause the crash of a rational bubble: a change in 
the inter-temporal consumer preferences and saving behaviour; and the termination of the 
institutional reform and the DC pension funds. The relative impact of both of these two 
factors depends on the relative control over aggregate saving behaviour by the pension funds. 
This means that not only changes in consumer preferences but also the termination of DC 
pension funds could return the financial market to a bubble-less steady state.  
We consider two cases. The first is characteristic of the transition and developing 
markets. Consumers in such markets are predominantly impatient and consumer inter-
temporal preferences are only of secondary importance to the primary impact of DC pension 
fund investment decisions on the dynamics of the bubbly assets. The second case is 
characteristic of developed markets. Consumers in such markets are relatively more patient, 
possessed of higher discretionary income and have relatively greater influence on market 
saving behaviour; hence the DC pension fund impact is correspondingly lower. 
In both cases, the termination of the DC pension funds will affect the financial 
market, although this effect will be stronger in the case of less developed financial markets; 
for example, in the SEE financial markets, which are characterised by being very young with 
very limited supply and demand for investment instruments. In this environment, the 
experience of the termination of the DC pension fund in Hungary in 2010 is instructive. In 
the 12 months following the nationalisation of the DC pension funds in Hungary at the end of 
the 2010, equity markets suffered a loss of over 20%. Conversely, in developed markets, 
which are more commonly dynamically inefficient and bubbly, the termination of the DC 
pension fund would have smaller impact on the dynamics of the bubbly asset. 
On developed financial markets which are already bubbly, or which are already 
dynamically inefficient before the introduction of defined contribution pension funds, 
individual investors are already significantly impacting system-wise investment attitudes on 
financial markets. In this context, although the introduction of the DC pension funds, as 
previously seen in Figure 2.3, has an increasing impact on the value of the bubbly assets, 
stochastic change of the inter-temporal consumer preferences of the representative agents as a 
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group would have a primary role vis-a-vis the pension funds. In this case, changes in 
consumer preferences - such as might be induced by fear in periods of crisis -could be the 
primary cause for the crash of the bubbly asset. 
In this respect, to answer the question of how inter-temporal consumer preferences 
defining the investment attitude (controlled to an extent by the DC pension fund) can crash 
the bubbly asset, we will refer to our phase diagram derived for the two cases of the 
economy. Inter-temporal consumer preference, as we already mentioned, determines whether 
the economy is dynamically efficient or dynamically inefficient. When consumers are 
“scared” about their future income and prospects, they become more impatient consumers 
and require immediate liquidity to maximize their lifetime utility function. This drives the 
dynamically inefficient economy very fast to a state of being dynamically efficient, which 
translates to a market state of increased supply surplus of long-term financial assets. In such a 
state, the bubbly instrument is no longer rationally required to provide the Pareto optimal 
outcome, and the bubble crashes rapidly. The generation which gets “scared” consumes more 
today, but loses a significant amount of lifelong utility due to its reaction and due to the crash 
of the bubble. This situation is depicted in Figure 2.5. 
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Figure 2.5: Phase diagram representation for the effect on the asset bubble 
when the dynamically inefficient financial market suddenly becomes dynamically 
efficient triggered by change in inter-temporal consumer preferences or a 
reversal of DC pension fund investments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s graphical representation of the locus of steady state points for the productive capital per 
young agent(kt) ELM,and the bubbly asset per young agent (bt) before and after the change of consumer 
preferences or after the termination of the DC pension funds 
 
In Figure 2.5, sudden change in consumer preferences, towards being extremely 
impatient consumers, or termination of the DC pension fund investments, have qualitatively 
similar effects. In both cases, the intersection of the stability points locus for productive 
capital accumulation is driven from point k1to point k2. The market economy changes from 
being dynamically inefficient to being dynamically efficient. The bubbly asset is no longer 
rationally needed, which breaks the non-arbitrage condition. Consumer agents become aware 
of the speculative character of the bubbly asset and are no longer risk indifferent between the 
bubbly asset and the productive capital. In such a case, the market will instantly collapse the 
bubble, following the path Z1 or Z2 depending on the starting point, and will soon reach the 
new bubble-less steady state k2. In the new steady state, productive capital accumulation is at 
a lower level, finding its new stability point depicted at the point k2, which represents the new 
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bubbly-less Diamond dynamic equilibrium, which is Pareto-optimal for such a dynamically 
efficient economy. This way we arrive to our final hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5: The crash of the bubbly asset could result from the sudden change of financial 
market dynamic efficiency caused either by a termination of the DC pension scheme or a shift 
in the inter-temporal consumption preferences of individual investors affected by some 
domestic or foreign risk event such as the Global Financial Crisis. 
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Conclusion 
 
In this chapter adapting the canonical rational asset bubbles OLG model as our 
modelling platform (Tirole, 1985), we developed and analysed a dynamic financial market 
model with DC pension funds and illiquid supply of financial assets. This model analyses the 
dynamics consequent upon introducing the DC pension fund reform into young and illiquid 
financial markets such as those of the SEE economies. 
The model describes the dynamic properties of the financial market with its 
productive and bubbly assets before and after the introduction of DC pension funds as 
influential institutional investors as well as upon the impact of the Global Financial Crisis. 
Based on the dynamics simulated by phase diagrams, we derived five hypotheses to be 
analysed and tested in the following empirical part of the dissertation. 
Our first hypothesis suggests that the introduction of the DC pension fund on the 
financial market would induce faster and more rapid dynamics into the value of the bubbly 
asset. The intensity of such impact, as suggested by the second hypothesis, is governed by 
regulating bodies by setting the extent to which the DC pension fund captures the saving 
discretion from the consumer agents, which is defined by the height of the pension tax on 
their income. 
The third hypothesis suggests that the introduction of the DC pension funds could 
affect the dynamic efficiency of the financial market, creating a fertile platform for the 
occurrence of a rational asset bubble. This is followed by the fourth hypothesis, which 
suggests that the increase in the value of the bubbly asset will be especially strong when the 
influential DC pension fund is introduced to a small, underdeveloped and dynamically 
efficient financial market. Finally, the fifth hypothesis derived from our theoretical model 
suggests that events causing significant change in the dynamic efficiency of the financial 
market and changing the saving attitude of the economy, such as the Global Financial Crisis 
or the cancelation of the already introduced DC pension scheme, could cause a sudden and 
rapid crash of the already developed rational asset bubble. 
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In the second empirical part of the dissertation we will test these hypotheses with data 
from the Croatian financial market. 
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Part II: Empirical Testing based on data from the Croatian financial 
market 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In this second part of this Dissertation, we test the hypotheses derived in Chapter 2 
about the effect of the introduction of the DC pension funds on the value of the 
speculative/bubbly assets in an illiquid and underdeveloped financial market. We focus on 
analysing data from the Croatian financial market. In order to test the theoretically 
hypothesized consequences of the introduction of the DC pension funds to the Croatian 
financial market, we proceed through the following chapters.  
Chapter 3 is focused on describing the data used. Most of the variables required by 
our theoretical model are not readily available. Accordingly, we explain in detail how the 
variables in our theoretical model are translated into observable counterparts for econometric 
analysis. For example, we had to measure the relative value of both the Croatian and US 
equity bubble and to establish a measure of the dynamic efficiency of the Croatian financial 
market. To construct our dataset, we had to derive data values from different data sources and 
apply transformations. In particular, we had to correctly assign values from the numerous and 
diverse financial reports of the DC pension fund‟s investments and, for certain variables, 
make interpolations from lower to higher frequencies. This whole process of collecting and 
explaining the characteristics of the dataset is undertaken in Chapter 3, preparatory to the 
econometric modelling reported in Chapters 4 and 5. 
In Chapter 4, we use the data set to test our hypotheses by estimating a model with 
two investment variables representing the activity of the DC pension funds - respectively, 
their direct equity and indirect equity investments - derived from the pension funds‟ audited 
financial statements and interpolated from their genuine yearly to a monthly frequency. We 
used a Vector Error Correction Model with two co-integrating long-term relationships, which 
confirmed the significant positive impact of the DC pension fund investments on the creation 
of the Croatian equity market asset bubble and identified the indirect DC pension fund 
investments through the Croatian and SEE equity focused open-end mutual funds as the 
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bubbly asset accepted by the Croatian DC pension funds. However, this model suffered from 
structural instability of the estimated coefficients and from the cross-correlation of the two 
investment variables produced by their interpolation method. These issues motivated our 
estimation of a much simpler model in Chapter 5. 
Because of the drawbacks of the model presented in Chapter 4, in Chapter 5 we 
estimate a VEC Model with a single investment variable and two long-term co-integrating 
relationships. This model overcomes the issue of cross-correlation of the DC pension fund 
investment variables by using a single investment variable, has stable estimation coefficients 
and is much simpler compared to the model presented in Chapter 4. Yet its results are 
consistent with the results of the model reported in Chapter 5, again confirming the positive 
impact of the introduction of the DC pension funds on the development of the Croatian equity 
bubble. It also confirms that the dynamic inefficiency of the financial market creates a 
positive platform for the development of asset bubbles. 
Finally, both empirical models in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 confirm that the Global 
Financial Crisis, which was introduced as a structural break variable in the co-integrating 
vectors in both models, changed the dynamic efficiency of the Croatian financial market and 
was the major trigger for the rapid crash of the Croatian equity bubble. 
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Chapter 3: Data collection, derivation and description 
 
Introduction 
 
This Chapter is focused on explaining the data used for testing the theoretical OLG 
model derived in Chapter 2. We used data from the Croatian financial market, which after the 
introduction of the DC pension reform in 2002 experienced a strong speculative episode on 
its equity market in the period 2006/2008. Moreover, the Croatian equity market by its size 
and volume dominates the financial markets in the surrounding SEE countries, which were 
also affected by the speculative episode. In order to determine the data set we need to extract, 
we first recall the implicit function defining the dynamics of the bubbly asset and the 
variables having an effect on the value of the asset bubble. Then, we derive and measure the 
value of the bubble on the Croatian equity market and we analyse its properties. Further, we 
also measure the value of an asset bubble on the US equity market using the same 
methodology. This “external market effects variable” is to be included in the model in order 
to control the effects of foreign financial markets. Next, we define the Dynamic Efficiency 
variable of the Croatian financial market describing the necessary condition for the 
appearance and sustainability of the bubble and we analyse its properties. Finally, we derive 
and explain the vector of variables describing the investments of the DC pension funds into 
our two potentially bubbly assets: Croatian Equity; and Croatian and SEE equity-focused 
Open-end Mutual Funds. We divide this vector of variables explaining the DC pension fund 
investment into three categories: First, are the dummy variables signifying some important 
legislative changes affecting the DC pension funds‟ introduction and investment decisions in 
the bubbly assets; Second, are the annual frequency variables representing net investment 
into the bubbly assets, which are used to derive higher monthly frequency variables; and, 
Third, are the monthly data on the estimated new investments in the Croatian and SEE 
Equity-focused Open End Mutual Funds made by the DC Pension funds. We describe the 
properties of all variables before we move to the next chapter, which uses them in 
econometric analysis. 
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3.1. Implicit function and the explanatory variables describing the 
dynamics of the rational asset bubble 
 
Based on the theoretical model of rational asset bubbles with DC pension funds that 
we developed in Chapter 2, we determine the implicit function explaining the occurrence of 
the equity asset bubble on the Croatian financial market in the period of 2006-2008. 
Following our OLG theoretical model, Bm represents the value of the pure bubble in the 
financial market at the month m (B_Marketm). This value can be observed as an attached 
value to the intrinsic value of the bubbly asset, representing the relative difference between 
its market and its intrinsic value expressed in percentage points.  The dynamics of the value 
of the bubble at time m (Bm), based on the OLG model, are explained by an implicit function 
including the following set of variables (Equation 3.1). 
 mmmmm ExternalDYNEFBfB ,,,1         
           (3.1)
 
We recall from our result in Chapter 2, that the dynamics of the bubbly asset Bm was 
defined by a first-order difference equation depending on the state of factors such as the 
dynamic efficiency of the financial market and the DC pension funds‟ investments into the 
bubbly asset. In addition, the influence of external/global financial markets could affect the 
emergence or the crash of the asset bubble, and because of this– in spite of the fact that our 
theoretical model represents a closed financial market economy – we control for this external 
factor in our model. To describe those factors in our implicit function specified by our 
theoretical model as determining the dynamics of the bubble, we define: 
 a variable “DYNEFm”, which represents the dynamic efficiency of the financial market at 
the month m, and  
 the τm vector of variables representing  
o the introduction of the Defined Contribution Pension Funds and  
o the investments in the bubbly asset by the DC Pension Funds (Equation 3.1). 
As we already briefly mentioned, although our OLG theoretical model of rational asset 
bubbles with DC pension funds was specified for a closed market economy, in order to take 
account of the inevitable effect of the international capital markets we also introduce  
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 a vector of external factor variables (Externalm).  
As discussed in Chapter 2, external factors, especially through the information channel, 
could spread pessimistic news about the future from the global financial market and give rise 
to sudden shift in inter-temporal consumer preferences, thereby changing the dynamic 
efficiency of a small financial market. This could trigger a rapid crash of a developing asset 
bubble if it turns the financial market environment into the state of being dynamically 
efficient, in which case rational asset bubbles become unsustainable. We also suspect that 
those external global financial influences could fuel the exuberant attitude on a specific 
market and could support the bubbly asset price dynamics independently or jointly with the 
internal factors. Consequently, we had to isolate this potential external financial market effect 
in our empirical analysis of the Croatian equity bubble and so we introduced the “Externalm” 
vector as potential explanatory variables.  
Regarding the role of our variables representing the driving forces of the savings market 
equilibrating mechanism, we recall the functioning of the financial market as depicted earlier 
in Figure 1.2.2 in Chapter 1.  There we had the supply function of savings vehicles, which in 
our case represents the supply of both productive and bubbly assets, where productive assets 
are subject to diminishing returns and where the rates of return of both asset types are aligned 
by the non-arbitrage condition.
10
 On the other side, we have the demand, which arises from 
both the productive and the bubbly asset investments of the representative agents in the 
economy, but also from the bubbly asset investments of the DC pension funds. The 
interaction of the supply and demand determines the market interest rates or the rates of 
return of both the productive capital and the bubbly asset through the non-arbitrage condition. 
In our empirical model, the interest rate is contained within the dynamic efficiency variable, 
where the long-term interest rate of the Croatian government bond is used as a benchmark. In 
turn, our main interest is the impact of the investments of the DC pension funds in the bubbly 
asset, which represents part of the demand for investment vehicles. Under the assumption that 
the price of a productive asset could be composed of both intrinsic and bubbly value 
                                                 
10
 Figure 1.2.2 is general for OLG models. In Tirole‟s model in particular, and in our extension, non-productive 
saving takes place only by means of the bubbly asset. In the model, productive assets are supplied according to 
the objective function of the representative entrepreneur. Yet there is no such objective function for the bubbly 
asset; rather, once the productive asset is supplied, it has the potential to develop a bubbly value in addition to 
its productive value (Tirole, 1982). However, in the model under consideration, for analytic convenience assets 
are separated into two types, productive and bubbly. 
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components, then the DC pension fund investment into the bubbly asset could 
correspondingly be channelled through different routes to the bubbly equity assets. One such 
route is direct equity investment and another could be indirect equity investments. Each of 
the two could have a more or less speculative character, but in total they should account for 
the impact of the DC pension funds on the relative value of the equity bubble on the Croatian 
equity markets. 
Having specified our implicit model and variables affecting the value of the bubble, 
based on our theoretical model assumptions developed in detail in the previous chapter, next 
we have to work on measuring and explaining our dependent and independent variables. 
 
3.2. Defining, measuring and describing the value of the asset bubble 
“B_Marketm” 
 
Our first task is to define a measure for the value of the bubbly asset on the specific 
financial market, Bm. This is not an easy task, since there is no standard accepted measure 
published by the stock markets to show the extent of speculative investment and its value on 
the financial market. So we had to produce our own indicator of the value of the pure bubble 
attached to the price of equity.  
We begin with the plain vanilla definition of the asset bubble representing a deviation 
of the price away from the intrinsic value of the underlying asset. Consequently, we had to 
define the connection between the intrinsic value of equity as a potentially bubbly asset 
(using the broad equity market index in our definition) and the fundamental factors of the 
economy such as the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). We begin with the following equation 
(3.2) connecting the value of the broad market equity index (P) with GDP, which is then 
decomposed into two ratios: 
GDP
E
E
P
GDP
P
          (3.2) 
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 Here, P represents the absolute price of the broad market equity index such as the 
CROBEX or the SP500 index; E represents the total end of period earnings of companies 
comprising the market index; and GDP represents the Gross Domestic Product of the 
economy represented by the equity market index. And the decomposition is accomplished by 
taking the P/GDP ratio and then dividing and multiplying by Earnings. This trick is borrowed 
from the analytical toolset used in the CFA Level 2 literature (CFA Institute, 2013, p. 587 
Book 1), with a slightly changed order in the equation. Taking natural logarithms on both 
sides of the equation yields Equation 3.3. 
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 This “ratio elasticity” equation (3.3) gives an insight to the factors defining the change 
of the P/GDP ratio. The percentage change of the ratio between the price of the equity market 
index (P) and the GDP of the economy is decomposed into the sum of the percentage change 
of the P/E ratio and the E/GDP ratio. In the long run, both of those ratios are expected to be 
stable, which implies that the relationship between price of the equity market index (P) and 
the GDP is also expected to be stable in the long run (CFA Institute, 2013, pp. 587, Level 2 
Book 1). The exception exists only when we have a market abnormality such as an asset 
bubble. Then, we could have short to medium run fluctuation of the P/E ratio around its mean 
and consequently an abnormal P/GDP ratio, while the E/GDP ratio is relatively much more 
stable (CFA Institute, 2013). Many authors, such as Nobel Prize winner Shiller, recognize the 
mean-reverting character of P/E ratio (Campbell & Shiller, 1988; 2001). Shiller‟s CAPE 
(Cyclically Adjusted P/E) is often referred as a good long-term market predictor in the 
finance industry. 
This way, we could say that when the equity market index is valued at its long-term 
average P/GDP ratio, then it is fairly valued and the price of the index consists solely of the 
price characterized by the intrinsic value of its constituent companies. Any positive deviation 
from the index price consistent with the long-run P/GDP ratio corresponds to the extent of the 
bubbly value within the observed price of the market index. This way of defining an indicator 
of the value of the bubble is also in line with the theoretical approach of Tirole, who assumes 
that within the price of an asset such as common equity, which has a certain determinable 
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intrinsic value, could also exist a bubbly value attached, represented by the difference 
between the current market price of that asset and its current intrinsic value (Tirole, 1982).  
Joining those two approaches together we use the following formula in order to derive 
the indicator for the value of the bubbly asset within the price of the equity market index 
(Equation 3.4) 
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In the numerator on the right-hand side of equation (3.4) we calculate the ratio 
between the current price of the market index (P) and its corresponding eleven month average 
GDP compared to its long-term mean. We smooth the GDP values first by assigning the 
yearly value of GDP for every month in the particular year of the analysed period, and then 
by creating a moving average value as an average of the current month value and all five 
previous and consecutive monthly values of yearly GDP. This way, we smooth the yearly 
GDP kinks, which otherwise appear between December of the current and January of the 
consecutive year, and we also include the GDP information about the previous and future 
months in the smoothed GDP series, which brings a forward looking approach to the index 
pricing. We use the eleven month moving average for preserving symmetry where, besides 
the current month GDP, we include five previous and five consecutive months in the 
calculation. We compare the current monthly ratio of the index price to the smoothed GDP 
with the long-term all-period mean of the same ratio (the denominator in Equation 3.4). This 
gives us the measure of the relative value of the asset bubble Bm, expressed in percentage 
points, representing the relative deviation of the current P/GDP ratio from its long-term mean 
value. 
Both the price of the equity market index and the GDP should be measured in the 
same currency to avoid disturbances caused by the dynamics of the currency market. Based 
on the efficient capital markets hypothesis, in the long run, this ratio should be solely based 
on the fundamental value of assets and should not significantly change on other than 
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fundamental grounds. In other words, the price dynamics of the broad equity market index 
should follow the potential or long-term rate of growth of GDP. Deviations of the ratio 
should represent market mispricing and the corresponding relative value of the equity asset 
bubble. 
Having defined the indicator for the relative value of the asset bubble on a specific 
equity market, we continue by measuring the data series with the values of the relative equity 
asset bubble in Croatia and in the US, which are two variables important in our empirical 
model. 
 
3.2.1. Equity Asset Bubble in Croatia “Bm(Croatia)” and its first-order 
difference 
 
We used this approach to measuring the absolute value of the equity market asset 
bubble with data from the Republic of Croatia. Using the Croatian equity market index values 
(CROBEX) and the Croatian GDP, we determined the following data series. We used the 
IMF public database for extracting the yearly GDP time series for the Republic of Croatia in 
HRK (Croatian Kuna currency) for the period 1997-2013 and we smoothed the yearly value 
by the previously explained formula (Figure 3.2.1.1). 
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Figure3.2.1.1 Republic of Croatia yearly absolute GDP values in million HRK 
smoothed at monthly frequency using Equation 3.4. 
 
 
Source: Data extracted from the IMF public database; own calculation 
 
Next, we collected data on the broad equity market index of the Croatian Equity 
Zagreb Stock Exchange (CROBEX). The CROBEX equity market index was established at 
the beginning of September 1997 with an initial value of 1000 HRK and represents the 
portfolio of the 25 most liquid companies representing the highest market capitalization on 
the Croatian Equity Market. We used price data from the public database of the Croatian 
Stock Exchange available at the following webpage (www.zse.hr). The CROBEX Index 
dynamics can be seen in Figure 3.2.1.2. 
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Figure3.2.1.2: Dynamics of the value of the Croatian main equity market index 
CROBEX (in HRK) 
 
 
Source: Croatian Stock Exchange (Zagreb Stock Exchange www.zse.hr) 
 
Applying our equation for the calculation of the relative value of the asset bubble on 
the Croatian equity market (Equation 3.4), we obtained the following data series represented 
in Figure 3.2.1.3. It represents the monthly percentage point deviation of the actual ratio of 
the price of the CROBEX market index to the smoothed Croatian GDP (numerator) to its 
fundamental long-term average value (denominator) calculated following Equation 3.4. The 
fundamental long-term average of the P/GDP ratio for the Croatian equity market was 
0.006628 based on our data set, which according to Equation 3.4 would represent the 0 value 
of the measurement variable of the relative value of the Croatian equity bubble “B_Croatia”. 
During the peak of the equity market asset bubble, in 2007, the P/GDP ratio reached 
0.009152 or a value of 138 in terms of “B_Croatia”, representing 138% overvaluation of the 
market index estimated fundamental value. 
We would like to stress that the CROBEX index includes within its 25 constituent 
companies the Croatian Telecom (HT) stock, which we later exclude from the investment 
HRK 0.00
HRK 1,000.00
HRK 2,000.00
HRK 3,000.00
HRK 4,000.00
HRK 5,000.00
HRK 6,000.00
Dynamics of the CROBEX equity index at the end of each 
month in the period (1997-2012)
166 | P a g e  
 
variables of the DC pension funds, because it was the only stock that undertook IPO during 
the speculative episode on the Croatian equity market. Although HT stock accounted for less 
than 10% of the Crobex index, considering the fact that HT stock price was much less 
volatile its inclusion might cause a slight negative bias in the actual value of the Croatian 
equity bubbly as measured on the rest of the 24 index participants. 
 The dynamics of the relative value of the asset bubble on the Croatian equity market, 
especially in the years 2005-2008, are reflected in the dynamics of the “B_Croatia” indicator 
presented in Figure 3.2.1.3. Looking at the figure, we notice that just as the equity prices 
might move over their intrinsic value in a positive direction, there might also be periods, and 
especially after a crash of the bubble, when the actual P/GDP ratio may indicate the existence 
of a negative bubble when compared to its long-run average value. As we see from the Figure 
3.2.1.3, this is of a smaller intensity compared to the intensity of the positive bubble. 
Figure 3.2.1.3: Relative value of the Croatian equity bubble “B_Croatia” 
measured at a monthly frequency using Equation 3.4 
 
Source:  Computed based on IMF and Zagreb Stock Exchange Data in Stata 12 
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This variable indicating the value of the bubbly asset within the price of the Croatian 
market index “B_Croatia”, is the variable that we try to explain by relating it to the other 
variables specified by our theoretical model. 
Relating to our theoretical model developed in Chapter 2, we need to stress that our 
single bubbly asset is measured as the value of the equity market over its intrinsic value as 
explained above. Such a pure bubbly asset is part of the price of the equity itself, represented 
by the part above its intrinsic value and measures with our “B_Croatia” variable. Based on 
this intuition, when a pension fund invests into Croatian equity, if the price of the equity is 
below or equal to its intrinsic value, then the investor invests only in the productive capital. 
But if the price is above the intrinsic value, the investor invests both in the productive and in 
the bubbly value of equity based on their ratio in the total price of the equity. Consequently, 
the units of equity or stocks, are the carrier of the value of the Croatian equity bubble. 
In this respect, relating to our theoretical model in Chapter 2, investments in the 
bubbly asset attached to the intrinsic value of Croatian equity could be undertaken through 
direct purchase of equity and/or through indirect purchase using intermediary investment 
vehicles. Such a channel of indirect equity investments is provided by the Open End Mutual 
Funds, which are focused on investments in Croatian and SEE equity market.  
Although these direct and indirect investment vehicles are formally equivalent from 
the perspective of their ultimate allocation of investments in Croatian equity, there is a crucial 
distinction from the perspective of how they operate and how are they viewed by the 
investors. Namely, the indirect investment vehicles such as the Open End Mutual Funds 
increase asymmetry of information and introduce an agency problem, while investors focus 
on the value of the Fund rather than on its individual investments. In turn, this veils the 
fundamental performance of the underlying assets and correspondingly creates an affinity 
between the indirect investment vehicle offered by the Open End Mutual Funds and the 
bubbly part of the equity valuation. Accordingly, we treat the indirect investments into the 
Open End Mutual Funds as the actual channel for investing in the bubbly or speculative part 
of the Croatian equity market. 
Furthermore, we need to stress that the time series of “B_Croatia” and the other 
variables are used up to the year of 2011 due to the fact that we could collect investment data 
about the DC pension fund investments only up to this date. In 2011, the transparency in the 
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annual reports of the DC pension funds decreased significantly not allowing us to extend our 
series. 
 We summarize its statistical properties and check for some important data 
characteristics, which are of importance when the variable is later used in econometric 
analysis. For this purpose, we calculated summary statistics for the variable. Test for unit root 
of the variable will be reported at the last section together with the unit root tests for all 
endogenous variables presented in this Chapter. As can be seen from the data summary 
statistics of our “B_Croatia” variable presented in Table 3.2.1.1, its mean by construction 
equals zero because, using Equation 3.3, this variable represents the deviation of the actual 
P/GDP ratio from its long-term mean. The data is positively skewed toward more extreme 
positive values of the bubble, as seen in Figure 3.2.1.4, which is actually the consequence of 
the massive and intense asset bubble occurring in the period 2006/2008 (Figure 3.2.1.3). 
Table 3.2.1.1: Summary statistics of the “B_Croatia” variable 
 
Source: Author, using JMulti Output 4.24 
 
Figure 3.2.1.4: Histogram representing the distribution of “B_Croatia” variable 
 
Source: Author, using Stata 12 
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 As we will see from the last section of this chapter, our variable “B_Croatia” is non-
stationary and integrated at level one I (1). Therefore we also generated a new transformed 
data series consisted of the first-differences of the “B_Croatia” variable, which we named 
“FD_B_Croatia”. By first differencing the variable, we keep the information about the shorter 
period dynamics of the variable, but lose significant information about the mid- to long-term 
dynamics of the variable such as the potential long-term trend within the process. The 
dynamics of the “FD_B_Croatia” variable are presented in Figure 3.2.1.5. Figure 3.2.1.5 
plots the differenced variable, which – allowing for a few outliers – reveals an essentially 
stationary evolution.  
Figure 3.2.1.5: “FD_B_Croatia” variable distribution through time, where the x-
axis represents the monthly time periods counted from Oct-1997 represented 
as t=1 to Mar-2013 represented as t=186 
 
Source: Author, using Stata12  
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3.2.2. Equity Asset Bubble in the US “B_USA” and its first-order 
difference 
 
 Our theoretical model in Chapter 2, assumes that the financial market belongs to a 
closed market economy, without impact from external financial markets. However, we need 
to augment our empirical specification by controlling for the effect of the foreign financial 
markets. In order to control for the potential effect of global financial markets on the creation 
of the equity asset bubble in the Croatian market, we also need a measure of the equity asset 
bubble on external equity markets. For this purpose, we measured the value of the equity 
asset bubble on a representative global financial market; namely, the US market. We 
collected the value of the SP500 equity market index representing the stock market of the US 
economy and the variable representing the dynamics of the US GDP. We applied the same 
approach measuring the relative value of the asset bubble, using equation (3.4), and we 
created the “B_US” time series variable represented in Figure 3.2.2.1. 
Figure 3.2.2.1: Relative Bubbly Asset Value within the SP500 Index “B_US” 
measured at a monthly frequency using Equation 3.4 
 
Source: Excel calcuclation based on SP500 and US GDP data 
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 Applying Augmented Dickey-Fuller test to the “B_US” variable, we could not reject 
the null hypothesis that the variable has a unit root (Table3.2.2.1) which was expected for a 
stock market derived variable. In other words, “B_US” is also a non-stationary variable and 
we continued by first differencing it. By first differencing the values of the “B_US” variable 
representing the relative value of the US bubble we created a new time series variable 
“FD_B_US”, which represents the short term innovations or changes of the value of the 
relative asset bubble (Figure 3.2.2.2).  
Table 3.2.2.1: Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test on “B_US”: 
ADF Test for series:      B_US  
sample range:             [1998 M8, 2013 M2], T = 175 
lagged differences:       8  
no intercept, no time trend 
1%         5%         10%        
-2.56      -1.94      -1.62      
value of test statistic: -1.5234 
 
intercept, no time trend 
 1%         5%         10%        
-3.43      -2.86      -2.57      
value of test statistic: -1.5197 
 
intercept, time trend 
1%         5%         10%        
-3.96      -3.41      -3.13      
value of test statistic: -2.2128 
 
Source: Author, using JMulti 4.24  
 
Figure 3.2.2.2: “FD_B_US”, First difference of the “B_US” variable where the x-
axis represents the monthly time periods counted from Oct-1997 represented 
as t=1 to Mar-2013 represented as t=186 
 
Source: Author, using Stata 12  
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We then tested “FD_B_US” for stationarity and confirmed that even with 99% level 
of confidence, similar as with the case of “FD_B_Croatia”, we could reject the null 
hypothesis claiming that the variable has a unit root. Consequently, we consider the first 
difference transformation variable to be stationary (Table 3.2.2.2). 
Table 3.2.2.2: Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test on “FD_B_US”: 
ADF Test for series:      B_US_d1  
sample range:             [1998 M8, 2013 M2], T = 175 
lagged differences:       8  
no intercept, no time trend 
 
1%         5%         10%        
-2.56      -1.94      -1.62      
value of test statistic: -3.9209 
 
intercept, no time trend 
 
1%         5%         10%        
-3.43      -2.86      -2.57      
value of test statistic: -3.8933 
 
intercept, time trend 
 
 1%         5%         10%        
-3.96      -3.41      -3.13      
value of test statistic: -3.8848 
 
Source: Author, using JMulti 4.24  
 
 Since the two variables representing the value of the bubble on the domestic 
(Croatian) and on the global financial market represented by the US market, “B_Croatia” and 
“B_US” respectively, are non-stationary and integrated of order one (I(1)), we wanted to 
analyze whether there is some long-term relationship among them, because by first 
differencing them and using the first differences, we would lose this information about the 
potential long-run relationship between the two stochastic variables. For this purpose, we 
tested for co-integration between the two variables, by making a regression of the original 
non-stationary variables “B_Croatia” and “B_US” and then testing whether the regression 
residuals are stationary (again by performing the ADF test).  
Based on the findings of Eagle and Granger, if the residuals of the simple OLS 
regression between the two variables are stationary, then there exists a vector of coefficient 
constants which, when multiplied by the matrix consisted of the values of the two or more 
non-stationary variables, creates a combination which is stationary. This vector of 
coefficients consists of the OLS coefficients from the regression of the co-integrated 
variables in levels (Engle & Granger, 1987). Further if such stationarity of the residuals is 
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present, it signifies that there exists a long-term relationship between the two variables and 
that, in the short and medium term, the dynamics of the variables are partly affected by “error 
correction” toward the joint long-term co-integrated path of the two variables. This way, the 
residual could be used as a correcting variable in the short-term effect regression model with 
first differences, which could explain part of the short-term dynamics in the model, caused by 
the long-term connection of the two series. This approach is popularly known as an Error 
Correction Model (ECM), and the dependent variable could have such a relationship with any 
of the stochastic variables originating from the same level of integration as the level of 
integration of the original dependent variable. Johansen (1988) extended the idea to a Vector 
Error Correction Model (VECM) where we have a vector of co-integrating relationships. 
 Regression coefficients from the model, regressing “B_Croatia” on “B_US” using 
simple OLS, were insignificant at 90% significance level (Table 3.2.2.3) and the residuals 
failed to display stationarity according to the ADF test (Table 3.2.2.4). We conclude that the 
dynamics of the bubbly value in the two markets do not follow a consistent jointly related 
long-term path. Hence, we turn to the analysis of short-term relationships between the two 
markets, without the risk of losing information about their long-term connection. This fact of 
no-co-integration between the dynamics of the values of the bubbles could support the 
assumption that the Croatian market is still very young and not well integrated with the 
centres of the global financial market such as the US market, which additionally gives 
relevance to our theoretical model aimed at analysing a small, closed and illiquid financial 
market. The non-co-integration also gives signs that there are other, internal reasons for the 
occurrence of the equity bubble which we try to explain by our model. 
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Table 3.2.2.3 Regressing “B_Croatia” to “B_US” – Determining co-integration 
 
 
Source: Author, using Stata12  
 
Table 3.2.2.4: Augmented Dickey-Fuller test results on the residuals from the 
regression of “B_Croatia” to “B_US” 
 
ADF Test for series:      Residuals  
sample range:             [10, 185], T = 176 
lagged differences:       8  
no intercept, no time trend 
 
1%         5%         10%        
-2.56      -1.94      -1.62      
value of test statistic: -2.5350 
 
intercept, no time trend 
  
1%         5%         10%        
-3.43      -2.86      -2.57      
value of test statistic: -2.5277 
 
intercept, time trend 
 
1%         5%         10%        
-3.96      -3.41      -3.13      
value of test statistic: -2.5885 
 
Source: Author, using JMulti 4.24 
 
 Finally, regressing the first differences of the values of the bubbles within the equity 
indexes on the Croatian and the US markets, we found a positive and significant relation 
between the “FD_B_Croatia” and the first lag of “FD_B_US” and also with the second lag of 
“FD_B_Croatia” (Table 3.2.2.5).The one period lagged first difference of the value of the 
Croatian equity bubble, “FD_B_Croatia” and the contemporaneous first difference of the 
value of the US equity bubble of the US equity market, “FD_B_US” both proved to be non-
significant and were excluded from the model in first differences (Table 3.2.2.5). We 
conclude that with a lag of one month, bubbly dynamics, or the value of bubbly innovation on 
                                                                              
       _cons    -.1782503   3.086547    -0.06   0.954    -6.268044    5.911543
        B_US    -.2176878   .1396722    -1.56   0.121    -.4932628    .0578872
                                                                              
   B_Croatia        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    326750.578   184  1775.81836           Root MSE      =  41.978
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0077
    Residual    322470.157   183  1762.13201           R-squared     =  0.0131
       Model    4280.42034     1  4280.42034           Prob > F      =  0.1208
                                                       F(  1,   183) =    2.43
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     185
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the US equity markets, translates positively into the bubbly dynamics on the Croatian equity 
market. We expand this relationship in our further research when exploring the domestic 
factors that could affect the bubbly outcome. 
Table 3.2.2.5a: Regressing “FD_B_Croatia” on the first lag of “FD_B_US” and the 
second lag of “FD_B_Croatia” 
 
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0206692   .5781308    -0.04   0.972    -1.161498    1.120159
              
        L2D.     .1797482   .0646471     2.78   0.006     .0521796    .3073167
   B_Croatia  
              
         LD.     .9031449   .1247108     7.24   0.000     .6570523    1.149237
        B_US  
                                                                              
 D.B_Croatia        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    14492.8759   181  80.0711376           Root MSE      =  7.7954
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.2411
    Residual    10877.6167   179  60.7688084           R-squared     =  0.2495
       Model     3615.2592     2   1807.6296           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  2,   179) =   29.75
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     182
. reg D.B_Croatia LD.B_US L2.D.B_Croatia
                        H0: no serial correlation
                                                                           
       4                2.791               4                   0.5933
                                                                           
    lags(p)             chi2               df                 Prob > chi2
                                                                           
Breusch-Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0000
         chi2(1)      =    26.93
         Variables: fitted values of D.B_Croatia
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
. estat hettest
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Source:  Author, using Stata 12 
 
       Because we could not reject the test of no-heteroskedasticity of the residuals in the 
estimated linear model presented in Table 3.2.2.5a (first regression), we also reported a 
regression with robust standard errors (second regression). We found that the first month lag 
of “FD_B_US” variable positively and significantly impacts on the contemporaneous change 
of the Croatian equity bubbly “FD_B_Croatia” (p-value<0.001). In order to further confirm 
the exogenous character of the US market in our further modelling, or that the US market is 
not an endogenous variable in the process of the evolution of the Croatian equity bubble, we 
perform Granger causality analysis in JMulti presented in Table 3.2.2.5b. 
Table 3.2.2.5b: Testing non-causality between “B_Croatia_D1” and “B_US_D1” using 
Granger-causality test statistics in JMulti 4.24 
 
TEST FOR GRANGER-CAUSALITY: 
H0: "B_Croatia_d1" do not Granger-cause "B_US_d1" 
 
Test statistic l = 0.4344 
pval-F( l; 2, 356) = 0.6480  
 
 
TEST FOR GRANGER-CAUSALITY: 
H0: "B_US_d1" do not Granger-cause "B_Croatia_d1" 
 
Test statistic l = 27.4211 
pval-F( l; 2, 356) = 0.0000  
 
Source: Author, using JMulti 4.24 
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0206692   .5708516    -0.04   0.971    -1.147134    1.105795
              
        L2D.     .1797482   .0898089     2.00   0.047     .0025279    .3569684
   B_Croatia  
              
         LD.     .9031449   .1754475     5.15   0.000     .5569335    1.249356
        B_US  
                                                                              
 D.B_Croatia        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  7.7954
                                                       R-squared     =  0.2495
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  2,   179) =   13.94
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     182
. reg D.B_Croatia LD.B_US L2.D.B_Croatia, vce(robust)
177 | P a g e  
 
 Looking at the results from Table 3.2.2.5b, we find supporting evidence on the 
assumption of an exogenous role of the US markets by rejecting the null hypothesis that the 
“B_US_D1” do not Granger-cause “B_Croatia_d1” at 99.9% level of confidence. 
 Now, as we have defined and analysed the variables measuring the value of the 
bubble within the equity market index in Croatia and in the US, we turn to the explanatory 
variables derived from our theoretical model in Chapter 2, which should explain the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the occurrence of the equity asset bubble on the 
Croatian financial market. 
 
3.3. Estimating the Dynamic Efficiency of the Croatian financial 
market “DYNEF” 
 
 The next important explanatory variable in our model is the one measuring the 
Dynamic Efficiency of the Croatian financial market. The Dynamic Efficiency of the 
financial market is not explicitly defined in our theoretical model but, based on the intuition 
from our theoretical model; it defines the necessary condition for the occurrence of the 
bubble and even more importantly the sufficient condition for the crash of rational asset 
bubbles. When the financial market is dynamically inefficient it then represents a fertile 
platform for the occurrence of a rational asset bubble, while if there is a bubble present on an 
already dynamically inefficient market and the market suddenly becomes dynamically 
efficient this transition would be a sufficient condition causing the bubble to collapse. 
Dynamic efficiency represents a variable measuring the existence of the fundamental 
dynamic balance on the financial market, between the productive capital investment 
opportunities on the one side and the saving/investment needs on the other side. If there exists 
a misbalance between the two, characterizing the market as dynamically inefficient - 
represented by, for example, having much greater need for savings compared to the available 
productive capital investment opportunities - there will be an incentive creating a fertile 
environment for a positive bubbly asset to rationally occur and increase in value. On the other 
side, asset bubbles would collapse by becoming irrational in the situation when the financial 
market becomes dynamically efficient. 
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Based on the Tirole (1985) OLG model of Rational Asset Bubbles, the point when 
financial markets become a fertile environment for rational asset bubbles to occur is the 
moment when productive capital accumulates over the accumulation point at which it 
provides a rate of return lower or equal to the population growth rate n. This point is called 
the dynamic efficiency threshold of the financial market. So there are two components 
defining the measure of dynamic efficiency: first, is the growth rate of the demand for 
investments (savings to be invested on the financial market); and, second, the rate of return of 
the productive investments showing the supply capacity of the financial market. By 
comparing the two, we calculate the threshold used as a major criterion for assessing the 
dynamic efficiency of the financial market. As previously mentioned, Abel et al. (1989) 
criticizing the use of short-term government interest rates, suggested that the value of 
repurchase of equity plus dividends or some comparable rates of return on capital, such as  
long-term government bond interest rates, should be used to calculate the dynamic efficiency 
of the financial market by comparing them with the growth rate of the economy. But why is 
the growth rate of the economy or the population growth used for the calculation of the 
threshold criterion? Based in the theoretical model of rational asset bubbles made in the OLG 
framework, it determines the growth rate of investment demand (demand for saving), or the 
demand of investment assets used to transfer wealth from period one to period two in the 
model. The growth rate of investment demand is directly connected to the growth rate of the 
young population in the OLG structure. If this rate is higher than the rate of return provided 
by the productive capital investments, this is used as a sign of a suboptimal level of 
productive capital accumulation per young agent, which makes the occurrence of asset 
bubbles a rational outcome in order to avoid Pareto sub-optimal inter-temporal consumption 
outcomes in such a financial market economy. 
In this respect, for the economy with a significantly underdeveloped financial market 
and DC pension funds, such as an early transition economy where the population lacks 
almost any tradition and experience of using the equity market for investments, the rate of 
growth of the new participants in the mandatory Defined Contribution Pension Fund could be 
the best estimator for the rate of growth of investment demand in the economy, especially for 
the part of the investment demand channelled through the equity market. This indicator plays 
a much better role in the context of the underdeveloped equity markets for the estimation of 
their dynamic efficiency than would the population growth rate, because of the low general 
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participation of the population on the equity market. This is why we define our crucially 
important dynamic efficiency variable as a linear relationship between the Long-Term (LT) 
interest rates of the Croatian government bonds being a proxy of the risk-free rate of return of 
the productive capital in the economy on the one side, and the rate of growth of the 
subscribers to the DC pension funds on the other side. As Abel et al. (1989) discussed in their 
critique of the use of different rates of return to measure dynamic efficiency, long-term 
interest rates relate much more closely to the return on productive capital than do the short-
term interest rates. For this reason, we used the long-term interest rates when measuring the 
dynamic efficiency of the Croatian financial market. 
We collected data from the National Central Bank of Croatia on the dynamics of the 
Long-Term interest rate and compared it with the data representing the rate of growth of the 
new subscribers to the DC pension funds, which we collected from the Croatian pension 
funds reports and the Capital Market Supervision Agency HANFA (Data available in 
Appendix 3.1). For the period before the introduction of the DC pension funds, we 
extrapolated the data set using the 1997-2002 yearly average growth rate of population (0.3% 
p.a.). The near zero growth rate of the Croatian population in the years before the 
introduction of the DC pension funds, translates into a similar effect on the growth rate of 
investment demand, as if the participation rate prior to the introduction of the pension funds 
was zero. After the introduction of the pension funds, there was a real equity market shock 
with the rapid increase of investments demand placed on the financial market caused by the 
introduction of the DC pension funds.  
On the other side, it could be seen that the Long-Term interest rates fall gradually 
after the introduction of the DC pension funds, especially in the first years after their 
introduction. This is a normal consequence of the increase of the amount of investable assets 
on the financial market, causing a gradual decrease in the financial market dynamic 
efficiency. We graphically present these two data series and their relationship in Figure 3.3.1. 
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Figure 3.3.1 Dynamics of the Croatian government Long-Term interest rates 
and the subscriber growth rate to the DC pension funds in the Republic of 
Croatia (in annual percentage points) 
 
Source: Croatian Central Bank and HANFA – Croatian Capital Markets Regulation Agency 
 
Using the two data sets presented in Figure 3.3.1, we created a new variable called 
“DYNEFm” which measures the dynamic efficiency of the financial market at month m. We 
set “DYNEF” to take the values equal to the difference between the Republic of Croatia 
Long-Term interest rates and the rate of growth of the number of new members of the 
Croatian DC pension funds. When “DYNEF” takes positive values, it means that the financial 
market is dynamically efficient; and in the case when “DYNEF” takes negative values, the 
financial market becomes dynamically inefficient. We used the following formula to generate 
the values of the “DYNEF” time series variable (Formula 3.5). 
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The result from using Long Term interest rates data from the one side, and the DC 
pension funds subscription growth rates data from the other, plugged in our “DYNEF“ 
formula, gave us the following Dynamic Efficiency variable (Figure 3.3.2).  
Figure 3.3.2 Dynamic efficiency variable “DYNEF” for the financial market in 
Croatia 
 
Source: Computed from data sourced by the National Bank of Croatia and HANFA, data on this graph in 
monthly data from the period 1997-2013 
 
 Due to the high level of interest rates of the Long-Term government debt in the period 
1997-2001 (Figure 3.3.1), together with the low growth rate of population at an yearly 
average of 0.3% (the first 50 monthly observations), the resulting value of “DYNEF” was 
highly positive for this period (Figure 3.3.2), which is associated with a dynamically efficient 
financial market not favourable to the development of rational asset bubbles. Later, in 2002, 
when the DC pension funds were set in place, thereby rapidly changing the aggregate 
savings/investment attitude on the financial market, the growth rates of the pension fund 
subscriptions were especially high, which created a shock to the demand for investment 
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assets required to be invested on the financial market. During the first period of the 
introduction of the DC pension funds (2002-2005), subscriber assets were predominantly 
invested into domestic government debt instruments. Decreased LT interest rates combined 
with the shocking increase of the rate of growth of investible assets (Figure 3.3.1), made the 
financial market dynamically inefficient in the first years after the introduction of the DC 
pension funds (Figure 3.3.2). DC pension fund subscription rates started a slow decrease after 
its peak rates at the introduction of the funds, which was normal as the subscription rates are 
expected to approach the long-term population growth rate. Besides the falling subscription 
rates in the DC pension funds after initiation, they were still very high in the first years 
(2002-2007), and because of significantly decreased LT interest rates in the same period 
(reaching near 3% in 2008 as compared to near 10% in 1997), caused the financial market to 
stay dynamically inefficient and the “DYNEF” variable to have negative values. This 
suggested a bubble-fertile financial market environment on the Croatian market. 
 In 2008 there was another external shock event in terms of the dynamic efficiency of 
the financial market caused by the global financial crisis. The trend of the decrease of the DC 
pension fund subscription rate continued, reaching a 3% annual growth rate compared to the 
10% rates at the introduction of the system, but there was a significant shocking growth of 
the LT Government interest rates, caused as a consequence of the global financial crisis 
hitting the debt markets of the Republic of Croatia. This caused the financial market to 
sharply switch to being dynamically efficient once again in 2008, a state in which the 
necessary condition for the rational sustainability of asset bubbles no longer exists because, 
once again, productive capital investments provide a satisfactory return. Long-Term 
government interest rates are used as the best proxy for the return of the productive capital 
investments inspired by the research of Abel at al. (1989), as they represent a benchmark for 
the required premium of productive capital investments. 
 Based on the dynamic efficiency criteria, we assume that this rapid switch to the state 
of the financial market being dynamically efficient was one of the major causes for the crash 
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of the equity asset bubble present on the Croatian equity market. The mechanism of the crash, 
following the logic of the dynamic efficiency of the financial market, was actually brought 
about as the major financial market actors, the Croatian DC pension funds, abandon their 
bubbly asset investments and turn to the LT debt assets as their main investment instrument.  
Based on our augmented OLG model with rational asset bubbles, and based on the 
actions of the DC pension funds which allocated all their further investments into LT 
government bonds, increased dynamic efficiency of the market and the fear among individual 
investors caused by the Global Financial Crisis, crashed the Croatian equity bubble. The LT 
government interest rates stabilized once again but due to the decreased rate of growth of the 
DC pension funds subscribers rate, falling gradually from the initial near 10% to near 3%  in 
2010, the financial market stayed near the threshold value in terms of its dynamic efficiency 
from 2010 on (Figure 3.3.2). 
In order to capture the effect of the turning point in the state of the dynamic efficiency 
of the financial market, we also generated a dummy variable named “dummy_DYNEF” 
which takes a value of 1 when the financial market is dynamically efficient (DYNEF>0) and 
value of 0 when the financial market becomes dynamically inefficient. We created this 
dummy variable, to be able to use it to check if the turning point gives sudden impact on the 
bubbly asset or the effect is smooth and dominated by the influence of the DYNEF variable. 
We analyse and report the stationarity of “DYNEF” and its first order difference 
transformation “DYNEF_D1” in the last section of this Chapter. Now, we continue with the 
definition and measurement of our vector of variables representing the introduction and 
investments of the Croatian DC pension funds. 
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3.4 Vector of ‘τ’ variables describing the introduction of DC pension 
funds and their investments 
 
Based on our theoretical model developed in Chapter 2, we determined that the 
necessary condition for the rational asset bubbles to occur is the presence of dynamic 
inefficiency on the financial market of the closed economy. This is also suggested by the 
basic model defined by Tirole (1985). The difference between Tirole‟s model and our DC 
pension fund augmented version of the Rational Asset bubbles model is the inclusion of the 
DC pension funds, which subtracts part of each individual agent‟s wealth and invests it into 
the equity market and in the Open-end Mutual Funds market, both identified as being 
potentially bubbly investment instruments. The dynamic outcome identified by our 
theoretical model of DC pension fund investment in the bubbly assets is a sufficient condition 
for a rational asset bubble to occur and increase in value.  
Once again we stress that there is only one bubbly asset in our model and it is 
attached to the units of Croatian equity. Its value is represented by the value of Croatian 
equity over its intrinsic value as measured in the previous Section by the “B_Croatia” 
variable.  
Because by investing in Croatian equity we could invest both in its intrinsic and in the 
bubbly value attached to the unit of equity, we can identify two potential investment vehicles 
providing investors with a market approach to investment in the bubbly asset: namely, direct 
equity investments; and indirect equity investments through the Open End Mutual Funds, 
which focus their investments in the Croatian Equity market. Later in this Chapter, we will 
explain in detail the measurement of the DC pension fund investments via those two 
investment vehicles. The distinction between the two, caused by different agency problems 
and asymmetry of information, creates the perspective among investors that the indirect 
investment represents the bubbly or speculative part of Croatian equity. In this case, we 
would observe different investment attitudes of the DC pension fund investors towards those 
two investment vehicles connected to the same underlying asset, Croatian equity, such that 
direct investments correspond to investment into productive assets, while indirect 
investments through the Open End Mutual Funds correspond to bubbly equity investments. 
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In the theoretical model we defined the introduction and investments of the DC 
pension funds as a vector of variables „τ‟, which we now divide into two groups based on 
their character.  
 The first group is represented by a set of four discrete dummy variables 
(“Dummy1”-“Dummy4”), which signify important temporal moments of the 
introduction of the legal acts important for the investments and introduction of 
the DC pension funds in Croatia.  
 The second group represents continuous variables measuring the absolute 
monthly investments of the DC pension funds into the bubbly assets,  
o Croatian Equity and 
o the Croatian and SEE equity focused Open-end Mutual Funds. 
In the following section we explain the collection process and the measurement of both sets 
of variables representing DC pension fund investments. 
 
 
3.4.1. Dummy variables explaining the effect of the introduction of 
Legal Acts regulating the introduction and investments of DC Pension 
Funds in Croatia 
 
In order to investigate different moments in time, when the DC pension funds were 
introduced, and when they were allowed to accept the bubbly assets such as Croatian equity 
or local equity related Open-end Investment Funds in their portfolios, we conducted detailed 
chronological research into the legal acts defining the pension reform and introduction of the 
second pillar of capital based DC pension funds in the Republic of Croatia.  
There are two levels of legal acts, based on their judicial and practical importance, 
which govern the investment policy of the pension reform introducing DC pension funds in 
the Republic of Croatia. First, are the Legal Acts introduced by the Parliament; and the 
second are the Bi-Laws introduced by the DC Pension Fund‟s regulatory Agency (HANFA). 
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Both those sets of acts have a determining importance for the introduction and for setting the 
investment scope of the DC pension funds, defining the general strategic allocation directions 
at the highest asset-class level and also the ones with respect of its acceptance of the 
potentially bubbly assets. Those legal acts are a prerequisite for the actual investment policies 
and investments of the DC pension funds, which are further decided within the DC pension 
fund management companies themselves and which will be discussed in the section on 
pension funds‟ investments.  
As we previously discussed, Regulatory Acts are set at two levels. At the highest level 
stand the Legal Acts regulating the operation and investments of the DC pension funds and 
they set the broadest investment policy rules and qualitative and quantitative bounds for the 
acceptance of, and investment in, certain types of financial instruments. Compared to the 
Legal Acts, Bi-Laws are always more detailed and more strict, and are introduced by the 
pension fund regulatory agency. Bi-Laws incorporate more restrictive legal definitions for 
investment policy than the ones included in the Legal Acts. In the following Tables (Table 
3.4.1.1a-b and Table 3.4.1.3a-b) we present a chronological account of the development and 
implementation of the two types of legal regulation with concise explanation of how each 
legal change affects the investment policies and the actual investments of the DC pension 
funds. We placed the mark “/” when there was no important legal change made affecting the 
bubbly asset investments. We mark with grey shading the potentially important changes in 
the definitions of the legal acts, which might significantly affect the investment policy of the 
DC pension funds toward the bubbly assets such as equity and open-end equity mutual funds. 
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Table 3.4.1.1a: Legal Acts governing the DC Pension Funds and their bubbly asset 
investment treatment 
LEGAL ACTS       
Quarter 2Q1999 2Q2000 2Q2003 
Reference 49/99 63/00 103/03 
Articles 
regulating direct 
investments in 
Croatian Equity 
Maximum 30% investment (5% per 
issuer) in Croatian Equity allowed; 
but the allowed issuer has to be 
quoted on the "first" official market 
/ 
/ 
Articles 
regulating 
investments into 
Croatian Open-
end Mutual 
Funds 
Articles 69 and 72 required that 
Open-end Mutual Funds are quoted 
on the official Croatian market, which 
is not a common practice and it 
practically banned investments in the 
Croatian Open-end Mutual Funds. 
/ 
Open-end investment funds 
moved to Article 69.9 and 
were allowed by Article 
72.1, if they predominantly 
invest in Croatian Equity. 
Max 15% per fund 
investment allowed 
Other important 
Articles for the 
investments into 
the bubbly assets 
DC Pension funds, and the system 
was set to begin on 1.7.2000; Max 
15% investments were allowed in 
foreign currency which practically 
focused most investments at home 
The start of the DC 
pension funds and the 
reformed pension system 
postponed for 1.1.2002 
/ 
exact date 7.5.1999 1.7.2000 12.6.2003 
Source: (National Gazette of the Republic of Croatia, 1999/49; 2000/63; 2003/103; 2004/177) (National 
Gazette of the Republic of Croatia, 2007/71; 2010/124; 2011/114) 
 
The Law regulating the introduction of the Pension Reform in the Republic of Croatia 
was introduced at the beginning of 1999. Although the Law assumed the middle of 2000 as a 
starting date for the new reformed pension system, this starting date was postponed until 
1.1.2002, with the Revision of the Legal Act only a couple of days before 1.7.2000 when the 
system originally was set to start. Because this new starting date (1.1.2002) is the date 
signifying the actual start of the capital based DC pension system in the Republic of Croatia, 
we assigned the “Dummy1” variable a value of 0 up to this date and a value of 1 after this 
date. This is represented by the first green highlighted box in Table 3.4.1.1a. 
The system started operating in January 2002, and the DC pension fund companies 
started collecting pension fund subscription amounts as a percentage of subscribers‟ gross 
salaries and began investing them mostly into government bonds, which are a proxy for the 
productive capital instruments in our model, thereby affecting interest rates and the dynamic 
efficiency of the financial market. However, it was not until the middle of 2003 that 
potentially bubbly domestic instruments were for the first time allowed as an investment 
destination in the Legal Acts.  At the beginning of the pension fund reform in 2002, the 
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regulator allowed domestic equity and domestic open-end mutual fund investments only in 
Equity and Mutual Funds quoted on the “First official market” tier of the Croatian Stock 
Exchange, and those were only a few Companies and none of the Croatian Open-end Mutual 
Funds. For the part of the Open-end Mutual Funds, this practical ban on investments by the 
unfortunate legal definition was because for the Open-end investment funds it is technically 
unpractical to quote shares on the official market.  
So investment into potentially bubbly Croatian equity focused Open-end Mutual 
Funds did not coincide with the introduction of the pension funds in Croatia in 2002. It was 
not until 7.2003 that the revision of the Legal Act regulating pension funds‟ investments 
correcting the previous illogical condition, allowed for the first time investments into 
Croatian equity focused Open-end Mutual Funds, which fully invest into Croatian Equity. 
This was one of the major moments in terms of the Legal Acts, which concerned DC pension 
funds‟ investments into this potentially bubbly asset. This is why we denote as “Dummy2” a 
variable with value of 0 until 7.2003 and 1 after this date, in order to capture the information 
about this important date for the bubbly investments in the model. We see further, when 
inspecting the investment decisions of the DC pension fund companies themselves from their 
balance sheets, that it was not until 2005 that the first investments into the Domestic Croatian 
Equity-focused Open-end Investment funds were actually made. This was because of the fact 
that, although the Domestic Open-end Mutual funds were allowed as an investment 
instrument in 2003, there was another qualitative requirement about each individual open-end 
investment fund set down by the Regulatory Agency‟s Bi-Laws, which made none of the 
actual Croatian Open-end Investment funds an allowable investment instrument until 2005. 
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Table 3.4.1.1.b: Legal Acts governing the DC Pension Funds and their bubbly asset 
investment treatment 
LEGAL ACTS         
Quarter 4Q2004 3Q2007 3Q2010 3Q2011 
Reference 177/04 71/07 124/10 114/11 
Articles 
regulating direct 
investments in 
Croatian Equity 
/ 
Restriction for the 
required quotation on 
the "first tier" market 
was changed to the 
broad "official" 
Croatian market 
/ / 
Articles 
regulating 
investments into 
Croatian Open-
end Mutual 
Funds / 
Maximum increased 
to 30% (5% per fund), 
with no restriction 
about the investments 
as long as registered 
in Croatia or OEDC 
/ / 
Other important 
Articles for the 
investments into 
the bubbly assets 
/ 
Max 30% in foreign 
currency assets was 
allowed, an increase 
from previous 15% 
Max. 70% equity and 
corporate bonds in the 
fund. Also venture 
capital investments 
allowed. 
/ 
exact date 10.12.2004 21.6.2007 22.10.2010 30.09.2011 
Source: (National Gazette of the Republic of Croatia, 1999/49; 2000/63; 2003/103; 2004/177) (National 
Gazette of the Republic of Croatia, 2007/71; 2010/124; 2011/114) 
 
The Bi-Laws defining more strict rules on investments in the Croatian Equity-
Focused Open-end Mutual funds, required for the funds‟ Net Asset Value (NAV) to be a 
minimum of 10 million EUR, in order for the Open-end Mutual Funds to be allowed as an 
acceptable investment instrument forthe DC pension funds‟ portfolios.  
In 2003, when Open-end investment funds were practically allowed for the first time 
by the Legal Acts, there were only 11 Domestic Open-end Mutual funds satisfying this 
minimum of 10 million EUR NAV condition, and all of them were non-equity related (i.e. 
money market and bond funds, which are not suitable instruments for indirectly reaching 
Croatian and SEE bubbly equity assets). In 2004, the number of allowed Open-end 
Investment Funds based on the NAV condition increased to 17, but only 2 of them were 
investing in Croatian Equity. By 2005, the number of Croatian Equity-focused Domestic 
Open-end Mutual Funds increased to 3 but the number of such funds surged in 2006 to 13. So 
in the period 2005/2006 there was a significant increase in number of Domestic Croatian 
Equity-focused Open-end Investment funds, which were allowed as an investment destination 
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for the Croatian DC Pension Funds, and consequently DC pension funds poured a significant 
amount of assets into those instruments (Table 3.4.1.2 and Figure 3.4.1.1). 
Table 3.4.1.2 Estimated DC Pension Fund yearly new investment/disinvestment into 
Croatian Equity and Croatian/SEE Equity Open-end Mutual funds in the period 2002-
2010 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Total in EUR €11,204,267 €3,099,600 €8,201,733 €4,436,133 €171,997,800 
Croatian Equity €11,204,267 €3,099,600 €8,201,733 -€744,933 €39,914,133 
Croatian and SEE equity 
focused open-end mutual funds €0 €0 €0 €5,181,067 €132,083,667 
* Based on the Financial Statements of the four DC pension Funds 
 
  
** 2009 data of AZ OMF were interpolated based on the average change of the rest of 3 funds 
 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Total in EUR €324,949,200 €10,051,413 €36,009,331 €52,218,711 
Croatian Equity €161,223,600 €211,557,643 €21,254,457 €68,879,628 
Croatian and SEE equity 
focused open-end mutual funds €163,725,600 -€201,506,230 €14,754,875 -€16,660,917 
* Based on the Financial Statements of the four DC pension Funds 
  
** 2009 data of AZ OMF were interpolated based on the average change of the rest of 3 funds 
Source: Data derived from the Audited Yearly Financial Statements of the four DC pension funds 
 
Figure 3.4.1.1 DC Pension Fund yearly new investment/disinvestment into 
Croatian Equity and Croatian and SEE Equity focused Open-end Mutual funds 
(OIF) in the period 2002-2010 
 
Source:Data derived from the Audited Yearly Financial Statements of the four DC pension funds 
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 The peak of the popularity of the SEE and Croatian Equity-focused Open-end Mutual 
Funds, satisfying the condition of having NAV over 10 million EUR, reached over 20 such 
funds during the period 2007-2008, and suddenly dropped to 11 in 2009 with the crash of the 
bubble. So, practically, although the middle of 2003 was the year when Legal Acts for the 
first time allowed the acceptance of the Croatian and SEE equity focused Open-end Mutual 
funds, because of the Bi-Laws quantitative condition requiring those funds to have a 
minimum of 10 million EUR AUM in order for them to be allowed as an investment 
destination, there were no investments in such instruments until the end of the year 2005. The 
same trend is presented also by the assets under management of the portfolio of Croatian and 
SEE-equity focused Open-end Investment funds which were used by the Croatian DC 
pension funds as an investment destination presented in Table 3.4.1.3 and Figure 3.4.1.2. This 
group of Open-end Mutual Funds managed barely 0.1 million EUR in 1999 increasing to 23.8 
million in 2004 and experienced their boom reaching 1788 million EUR assets under 
management at the peak of the asset bubble at the end of 2007 (Table 3.4.1.3 and Figure 
3.4.1.2). After the crash of the bubble, their assets under management dropped from nearly 2 
billion EUR to only 267 million EUR in 2010. 
Table 3.4.1.3: End of year assets under management (AUM) of the Croatian Open-end 
and SEE Equity-focused Mutual Funds used as an investment destination by the 
Croatian DC pension funds in the period 1999-2010 (in EURO) 
 
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
End of Year AUM (EUR) 105,178 492,052 1,283,321 7,534,705 12,055,974 23,886,065 
CROBEX corrected End of Year AUM (EUR) 105,178 395,467 887,170 4,596,403 7,276,635 10,911,887 
inflow/outflow based on CROBEX corrected AUM (EUR) 105,178 290,289 491,702 3,709,233 2,680,232 3,635,252 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
End of Year AUM (EUR) 89,138,695 633,688,951 1,788,119,192 303,937,532 292,215,537 267,450,797 
CROBEX corrected End of Year AUM (EUR) 31,920,322 141,232,861 244,140,526 126,235,771 104,300,618 90,628,410 
inflow/outflow based on CROBEX corrected AUM (EUR) 21,008,435 109,312,540 102,907,665 -117,904,755 -21,935,153 -13,672,208 
 
Source: HANFA – Croatian financial market regulatory agency and Audited Reports of the four DC pension 
funds for the period 2002-2010.  
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Figure 3.4.1.2: Graphical presentation of the end of year assets under 
management (AUM) of the Croatian and SEE Open-end Equity-focused Mutual 
Funds used as an investment destination of the Croatian DC pension funds 
(1999-2010) 
 
Source: HANFA – Croatian financial market regulatory agency and Audited Reports of the four DC pension 
funds for the period 2002-2010 
 
 The second tier of the legal acts defining the DC pension fund operations and 
investments, having an equal and even more defining effect on investment into potentially 
bubbly assets for the Croatian DC pension funds, are the Bi-Laws. These are set and 
introduced by the Croatian Financial Markets Regulatory Authority (HANFA). The Bi-Laws 
have a more detailed and more restrictive role in defining the quantitative and qualitative 
criteria for the allowable investments of the DC pension funds. Table 3.4.1.4a-b, gives a 
detailed description of the legal conditions included in the Bi-Laws, which impact on the 
investments of the DC Pension Funds. 
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Table 3.4.1.4a-b: Bi-Laws governing the DC Pension Funds and their bubbly asset 
investment treatment (important changes are highlighted in grey) 
Bi-Laws           
Quarter 1Q2002 4Q2002 3Q2003 4Q2003 4Q2007 
Reference 35/02 128/02 144/03 200/03 129/07 
Articles 
regulating 
direct 
investments 
in Croatian 
Equity 
Croatian Equity 
investments must be lower 
than 5% per issuer; Equity 
must be quoted on the 
"prva sluzbena kotacija" 
and have minimum 10 
million EUR market cap. 
\ \ \ 
max 30%; 5% per issuer; 
Broader "official market" 
Croatian equity allowed; 
minimum 750 mio HRK market 
cap. or min 1000 mio HRK 
market cap. for shares with less 
than 20% free float at the other 
market segments. Also max 15% 
investments into the other than 
the official market segment. 
Articles 
regulating 
investments 
into 
Croatian 
Open-end 
Mutual 
Funds 
Maximum 5% into 
individual fund issue; Net 
Asset Value of the fund 
must be over 10 mio EUR 
and min 80% of funds‟ 
invested into OECD 
investment grade or 
Croatian investments 
without quality restriction 
\ \ \ 
max 5% per issuer; max. 20% of 
the mutual fund; no allocation 
restrictions; fund must have min 
100 mio HRK AUM 
Other 
important 
Articles for 
the 
investments 
into the 
bubbly 
assets \ 
Only 
regulating 
investments 
into mutually 
connected 
entities 
\ \ \ 
exact date 22.3.2002 23.10.2002 28.8.2003 15.12.2003 13.12.2007 
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Bi-Laws           
Quarter 1Q2008 3Q2008 4Q2008 1Q2009 4Q2009 
Reference 32/08 112/08 121/08; 02/09 09/09 141/09 
Articles 
regulating 
direct 
investments in 
Croatian 
Equity 
Further relaxed 
investment 
requirements for the 
Croatian Equity. 
Allowed up to 10% of 
the issue from the 
"official quotation" 
market; min 650 mio 
HRK market cap. 
Required for the other 
market quoted equity 
Minor change: 
Croatian 
companies with 
less than 10% 
free float of their 
equity, must 
have over 100 
mio EUR  
market cap 
\ Further 
Relaxed 
direct 
investments 
in the 
domestic 
stocks 
Relaxed investment in 
domestic equity on the 
secondary market. 
Market cap requirement 
lowered from min 650 to 
min 300 mio HRK. 
Articles 
regulating 
investments 
into Croatian 
Open-end 
Mutual Funds 
DC Pension Fund must 
publish every 
significant exit/entry 
transactions into Open-
end Mutual Funds 
defined as every over 
10% transaction when 
the mutual fund has 
over 400 mio HRK 
AUM; or when buying 
units of the mutual 
fund valued over their 
last 10 day average 
price. \ \ \ \ 
Other 
important 
Articles for the 
investments 
into the bubbly 
assets 
Pension Fund must 
publish every 
transaction higher than 
25% of the daily stock 
market trade volume 
\ 
Every foreign 
transaction 
amounting over 
5mio EUR be pre-
announced to the 
Regulatory Agency 
\ \ 
exact date 13.03.2008 9.2008 10.2008 1.2009 26.11.2009 
Source: (National Gazette of the Republic of Croatia, 2002/35; 2002/128; 2003/144; 2003/200) 
(National Gazette of the Republic of Croatia, 2007/129; 2008/32; 2008/112; 2008/121) (National 
Gazette of the Republic of Croatia, 2009/02; 2009/09; 2009/141) 
 
 Based on Table 3.4.1.4a-b, representing the changes of the Bi-Laws regulating the 
investments of the DC pension funds, there are two additional dates with potential importance 
for the investments of the DC pension funds in the potentially bubbly assets on the financial 
market in the Republic of Croatia (highlighted in gray in Table 3.4.1.4a-b). We take account 
of their potential effects, by the following two dummy variables indicating the introduction 
dates of those two Bi-laws: 
-  “Dummy3”, representing  the change introduced at the end of 2007 (129/07) 
which, for the first time, based on the previous change of the Legal Act just few 
months earlier, allowed a broad direct investment into Croatian Equity. Besides 
permission to invest in the small number of equities from the “first official” tier of 
the financial market and to approach equity investment indirectly via open-end 
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mutual funds, now DC pension funds were able to invest into a broad range of 
Croatian equity even from the “secondary tier” of the market. Based on this 
regulatory change we define “dummy3” such that it takes the value of 1 after 
12.2007 and  0 up to and including this month; 
 
- “Dummy 4”, is the final dummy variable, indicating a more minor legal change 
that might have a negative impact on the already large investments into the 
Croatian Open-end mutual funds. It represents the change made in the March 
2008 Bi-laws revisions, when for the first time DC pension funds were obligated 
to publish all market-significant transactions they made (valued at more than 25% 
of the average market value of the Croatian market). This could have triggered 
significant avoidance of further investments on the Croatian equity market and 
even exit from the open-end investment funds registered in Croatia. We define 
“Dummy4” with the value of 1 after this month and 0 before and at this month. In 
our opinion, based on the arguments of the agency-theory school on asset bubbles, 
the Croatian mutual funds industry, especially the part of it representing Open-end 
Mutual funds focused on Croatian and regional SEE equity (financial markets 
such as Macedonia, Serbia, BiH and Slovenia), could have presented a bridge for 
the DC pension fund industry to the local market bubbly equity, which was 
practically banned from direct investment until the end of 2007. So this legal 
change represented by “Dummy4”could capture an important change in the 
opposite direction for investments in the Croatian open-end mutual fund industry. 
 
Finally, we should note that the dummy variables representing changes in the legal 
acts and bi-laws, should be used with a lag of one month in the empirical modelling, because 
some of the regulations were published just before the end of the month and there is a legal 
period of time, usually 7-8 business days, which has to pass for the legal act to become 
enforceable after being published in the National Gazette. A one month lag would also allow 
for the DC pension funds to adapt their investment attitude based on the new regulation. 
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3.4.2. Continuous variables explaining the actual investments of the 
Croatian DC pension funds into Croatian Equity and SEE equity 
focused Open-end Mutual Funds 
 
We determined that the “τ” vector of variables consists of two subsets. One, which 
we explained in the previous subsection, consisting of four dummy variables describing 
certain periods, at end-of-month frequency, during which important legislative acts were 
introduced connected to investments of the DC pension funds in potentially bubbly assets. 
The next important set of variables comprising the remainder of “τ”, measuring the 
investment of the DC pension funds in the bubbly assets, are the actual net investment 
amounts of the DC pension funds in Croatian Equity and in the Croatian and SEE equity-
focused Open-end mutual funds. This is very important data for our empirical analysis, which 
is not freely available. Accordingly, we had to make an in-depth analysis of every audited 
yearly report of each of the four DC pension funds in the Republic of Croatia for the period 
2002-2010 in order to extract this data.  
We encountered several problematic issues when collecting this data set. The first was 
to determine the net investment amount such that it is free from the period change of the price 
of the CROBEX equity market index, which on the other side enters our Bm(Croatia) variable 
representing the value of the equity bubble. When looking at the data about the investments 
in Croatian Equity and about the investments in Croatian SEE equity-focused Open-end 
investment funds available in the DC pension funds yearly audited reports, we find three 
figures in the balance sheet and the profit and loss report (P&L Report) that contain 
information about the investment positions in the potentially bubbly assets: the beginning of 
the year market value of each asset held in the portfolio; the end of the year market value of 
each asset held in the portfolio; and the purchasing costs of investments in the specific asset 
during the accounting year. Both the beginning of the year and the end of the year market 
values of investment are subject to direct influence by changes in the market prices of the 
asset (equity or open-end mutual fund), which is linearly affected by the market value of the 
bubble. This linear relation would lead to spurious regression results were we to use the 
change of the market value between the beginning and the end of the accounting period as an 
explanatory variable for the value of the bubble. In this case, the pure calculation of the 
absolute change of the value of a certain investment position based on the difference between 
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the beginning and end of period asset market values would contain in itself the value of the 
bubble and, hence, could lead to a biased conclusion about the impact of DC pension fund 
investments when we include this variable in a regression explaining the value of the equity 
asset bubble as the dependant variable. 
 The way to overcome this problem is based on understanding the accounting rules. 
At the beginning of each accounting year, the accounting position named “purchasing costs 
of investments” is set at the amount of the market value of the specific asset established at the 
last day of the previous accounting year and then adds new investments during the current 
year according to their purchasing costs. So, if there are no new investments, then the 
difference of the “purchasing costs of investment” and the previous end of the year market 
value of investments would equal zero.  Any positive difference would signify the new 
amounts of net investment into a certain asset, while any negative difference would suggest 
that there was a net disinvestment from that particular asset. So, by subtracting the end of the 
previous period market value of the investment figure in a certain asset from the end of the 
current year purchasing value of that asset, we get the net amount of investment value in that 
particular asset during the current accounting year, free from the price effect
11
. Consequently, 
the method that we use to establish the net investment amounts in a particular potentially 
bubbly asset by the DC pension funds is presented by Equation 3.6. 
1)()(sin)(  ttt AarketValueEndOfYearMAgCostPurchaAentNewInvestm  (3.6) 
 We applied this approach and derived a yearly time series of the net investment 
amounts in Croatian Equity and in the Croatian and SEE equity-focused Open-end mutual 
funds for all four DC pension funds. 
                                                 
11
 This could be explained by a short example of a Pension Fund equity transaction. Assume a Pension Fund 
owns 1 million stocks that have a market price of £10 p.s on 31.12.2000, and assume the fund purchase 100.000 
shares at a price of £14 p.s. during the year 2001  (Spending total of £ 1.400.000). Assume the price at the end 
of the year on 31.12.2001 reaches £13 and the new value of stocks held by the Pension Fund is 
13*1100000=£14300000. In the Balance Sheet for 2000 we can only see the value of the end-of-year assets 
equalling £ 10.000.000, and at the end of 2001 balance sheet this value is £14.300.000. In the Income statement 
of the 2001 Report, we can‟t find the 1.400.000 spent as a separate position, but only the position Cost of 
Purchase, which represents the value of the equity at the end of the previous accounting year at the last day of 
the year plus all cash expenses for stock purchase in the current year. This position in our example will amount 
to £11.400.000 in the Income statement of 2001. If we subtract from it 10.000.000, the end-of-year assets value 
from the Balance Sheet of the previous year (2000), we are left with the £ 1.400.000, the exact amount spent on 
purchasing stocks free of asset price appreciation. 
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The next problem we faced had to do with transparency. Namely, for unknown 
reasons, one of the DC pension funds did not published the detailed structure of its 
investments at the end of 2009 (Croatian DC pension funds presented in Table 3.4.2.1). This 
was the Allianz managed AZ OMF fund, which had around a 30% market share in 2009. This 
was also one of the more aggressive funds in terms of the amount invested in, and later 
disinvested from, Croatian Equity and the Croatian and SEE equity-focused Open-end mutual 
funds. Actually in the spectrum of aggressiveness, only the RZB OMF invested more in the 
Croatian and SEE Equity-focused Open-end Investment funds than did AZ. 
Table 3.4.2.1 Names of the Croatian DC pension funds and their pension fund managing 
companies 
Number 
1 2 3 4 
Name of the DC 
pension Fund 
AZ OMF RZB OMF ERSTE PLAVI OMF PBZ Croatia 
Osiguranje OMF 
Name of the 
pension fund 
management 
company 
AZ Mirovinski 
Fondovi d.d. 
Raiffeisen 
Mirovinsko Drustvo 
d.d. 
Erste d.o.o. PBZ Croatia 
Osiguranje d.d 
Owners of the 
pension fund 
management 
company* 
Allianz New 
Europe Holding 
Gmbh and 
Zagrebacka Banka 
Raiffeisenbank 
Austria d.d. Zagreb 
Erste and 
Seiermarkische Bank 
d.d.; Erste Group Bank 
AG; Steiermarkishe 
Bank und Sparkassen 
AG; Zavarovalnica 
Triglav; TBIH Financial 
Services Group NV; 
Istarska Kreditna 
Banka d.d. 
Privredna Banka 
Zagreb and 
Croatia 
Osiguranje d.d. 
* Based on the company data from December 2013 
  Source: Data taken from the Croatian DC pension funds web pages. 
 
We tried contacting the AZ fund management company by e-mail, requesting the 
investment structure for the year 2009, but received no answer. There was only a figure 
available for both the total value of equity and total value of open-end investment fund 
positions at the end of the year in the audited report for 2009, which was not a common 
practice until that date, and so we had to use a derivation method to estimate the net 
purchasing value of Croatian Equity and SEE equity-focused Open-end Mutual funds; 
namely, by interpolating data for 2009, based on average ratios of end of year market value of 
asset class positions to the value of year purchasing costs taken from the other three DC 
199 | P a g e  
 
pension funds representing the rest, cca. 70%, of the market share, and knowing that DC 
pension funds in Croatia including the AZ Fund had a very similar yearly attitude toward 
investments in those two asset classes in the other periods (Figure 3.4.2.1).  
AZ OMF published the detailed structure once again in 2010, which showed that it 
decreased its 2007 end of year investment position by nearly EUR 113 million into Croatian 
and SEE equity-focused Open-end investment funds (about 35mio at the end of 2008) to zero 
in 2010. Based on the interpolation, using information from the other three funds and the 
value of the AZ OMF aggregated Open-end investment fund “purchasing costs” position for 
the end of 2009, published as 27.1 mio EUR, using our equation 3.6 we calculated the 
position of the new net investment into Croatian and SEE equity related Open-end Mutual 
Funds of AZ pension fund at negative 2.12 mio EUR in 2009, a continuation of disinvestment 
after selling over 77 mio in 2008. 
Figure 3.4.2.1: Individual DC pension fund’s net yearly amounts invested in 
Croatian and SEE equity focused Open-end Investment Funds 
 
Source: Data derived from fund’s audited yearly reports for the period 2002-2010 
 
 We faced the same problem with the end of 2009 data in the audited report of AZ 
OMF when measuring the variable representing the direct investment into Croatian Equity. 
Again, we overcame the problem of having only the year end figure for the market value of 
Croatian equity at the end of 2009, and not the net purchasing cost during the year, by 
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estimating the net purchasing value in that year by using the average ratio of net purchasing 
value to year end value from the rest of the three funds and applying this ratio to the end of 
the year value of Croatian Equity of the AZ OMF for 2009.  
We have also corrected the value of the direct equity investments into Croatian equity 
by subtracting the net investments made in the HT (Croatia Telecom) from the data series. 
We did this because the Croatian Telekom (HT) had its Initial Public Offering (IPO) in 
October 2007 at the peak of the equity bubble, and since our model is based on the 
assumption of rigid supply of the bubbly asset, we subtracted the this company from the pool 
of potentially bubbly equity instruments on the Croatian Market. We also subtracted the 
minor investments that the DC pension funds had in the Global Depository Receipts (GDR‟s) 
of domestic companies in foreign markets. As a result, we established the following structure 
and dynamics of absolute direct investment into Croatian Equity made by the four Croatian 
DC pension funds (Figure 3.4.2.2).  
Figure 3.4.2.2: Individual DC pension fund’s net yearly amounts invested directly 
into Croatian equity (excluding GDR’s and the stocks of Croatian Telecom – 
HT) 
 
Source: Data derived from fund’s audited yearly reports for the period 2002-2010 
 
 Finally, we were interested also to estimate the value of the total from the direct and 
indirect investments (through Croatian and SEE equity focused open-end investment funds) 
into the Croatian and SEE equity market made by the Croatian DC pension funds. For this 
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purpose, we summed our two series and arrived at our final series estimating the amount of 
total direct and indirect investment into the Croatian and SEE equity markets, made by the 
Croatian DC pension funds in the period between 2002 and 2010 (Figure 3.4.2.3). What 
could be noticed by looking at Figure 3.4.2.3 is that, starting from 2005 onward, the DC 
pension funds were rapidly increasing their yearly new net exposure to Croatian and SEE 
equity-focused open-end mutual funds. This was initiated first in 2005 by investing indirectly 
over 3.4 million EUR through the Croatian and SEE equity-focused Open-end Mutual funds. 
Interestingly, in the same year direct investment of the DC pension funds in Croatian equity 
was negative (a disinvestment of 0.7 million EUR). In 2006, DC pension funds rapidly 
increased their net new investment in Croatian and SEE equity focused open-end mutual 
funds by 112 million EUR. During the same year, they also increased their direct exposure to 
Croatian equity by investing close to 40 additional million EUR, or less than half of what 
they invested in the Croatian and SEE equity-focused open-end investment funds. 2006 was 
the year of a wide acceptance of the bubbly asset into their portfolios, increasing the total 
new investment into the Croatian and SEE equity markets from 2.7 to over 150 million of net 
new investments, or more than 56 times. Finally, at the peak of the Croatian bubble in 2007, 
their investments peaked at over 150 million EUR in each of the two observed asset classes, 
jointly reaching over 300 million EUR of new investments into Croatian and SEE equity 
related instruments (ex. HT and GDR‟s) or almost two fold increase compared to the 
previous year (Figure 3.4.2.3).  
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Figure 3.4.2.3: Individual DC pension fund’s net yearly new amounts invested 
directly and indirectly into the Croatian and SEE equity markets (excluding 
GDR’s and the stocks of Croatian Telecom – HT) 
 
Source: Data derived from fund’s audited yearly reports of the DC pension funds for the period 2002-
2010 
 
However, in 2008, the situation rapidly changed, but much more rapidly in terms of 
DC pension fund exposure in the Croatian and SEE equity-focused Open-end investment 
funds than in terms of their direct exposure to Croatian equity. Croatian DC pension funds 
suddenly decided to exit Croatian and SEE equity-focused Open-end mutual funds (with over 
200 million EUR of net sales), while at the same time continuing their positive direct 
investment into Croatian Equity by almost the same amount of 200 million EUR. (This was 
actually the year when they for the first time got legal permission for broad equity investment 
in most stocks onthe Croatian market.) Their exit from the Croatian and SEE equity-focused 
Open-end mutual funds investment fully compensated their increased direct investment in 
Croatian equities. So their net new total investment on the Croatian and SEE equity markets 
(excluding HT and GDR‟s) in 2008 was close to zero. After 2008, DC Pension funds 
continued only with their direct investment into the Croatian Equity market, but with much 
slower and decreasing amounts of new investments, while continuously exiting their Croatian 
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and SEE equity-focused Open-end Investment fund‟s positions. The new total SEE and 
Croatian direct and indirect equity investment achieved only marginal importance after 2008. 
 Based on our analysis of the audited balance sheets of the DC pension funds in 
Croatia in the period 2002-2010, we derived two important time series for our empirical 
analysis. First, concerning the direct investment of the DC pension funds into Croatian 
equity, a variable which we named “PFInvDirecty”; and the second, concerning the indirect 
investments through the Croatian and SEE equity-focused Open-end Mutual funds, which we 
named “PFInvIndirecty”. Both variables represented new investment amounts made by the 
DC pension funds in those two connected potentially bubbly asset classes measured at a 
yearly frequency. There was one large problem, and that was the fact that all our other data 
are measured at higher monthly frequencies, in contrast to these two important variables. This 
mismatch is due to the fact that detailed investment data are presented and made available 
only in the audited end-of-year reports of the DC pension funds. 
To solve this issue, we had to find a way to interpolate monthly frequency data out of 
this yearly frequency data set. For this purpose, we used a method called “Cubic-spline” 
interpolation (Jianquing & Qiwei, 2005). The cubic-spline method, interpolates the higher 
frequency values using the stochastic lower frequency time series by defining a cubic 
function passing through the lower frequency data points. This polynomial (cubic) function, 
which fits the lower frequency data, enables us to impute the missing higher frequency 
values, and create monthly frequency investment variables.  
We used a STATA program available on-line, which we adjusted to our frequency 
and matrix dimensions, and transformed our yearly stochastic data series into a monthly 
series. We present the sample STATA program in Appendix III.2. As a result of the 
transformation we created the following monthly series estimating the two investment 
variables of the DC pension funds‟ direct and indirect investment into Croatian and SEE 
equity markets (Figure 3.4.2.4a-b). 
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Figure 3.4.2.4a: Monthly frequency data of the DC Pension funds net new 
investments into Croatian and SEE equity-focused open-end mutual funds 
(PFInvIndirectm) derived using cubic-spline interpolation on annual series 
(PFInvIndirecty) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Data derived using cubic-spline interpolation program in STATA 
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Figure 3.4.2.4b: Monthly frequency data of the DC Pension funds net new direct 
investments into Croatian equity, excluding GDRs and HT stocks 
(PFInvDirectm) derived using cubic-spline interpolation on annual series 
(PFInvDirecty) 
 
 
Source: Data derived using cubic-spline interpolation program in STATA 
 
We also derive the joint total new investment variable as a sum of the two, direct and 
indirect new investment. We present the monthly series of the total new investment into 
Croatian and SEE equity markets in Figure 3.4.2.4c. We note that, based on our theoretical 
OLG model of rational asset bubbles with DC pension funds, we attribute a value of zero to 
the variables presenting the net investments of the DC pension funds in the bubbly assets 
throughout the period of non-existence of the DC pension funds prior to 2002. This follows 
the implied logic of our theoretical model; namely, that the states of the economy when there 
is no DC pension fund, and when the pension funds exist but do not invest in the bubbly 
asset, have equivalent implications for the dynamics of the bubbly asset. 
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Figure 3.4.2.4c: Monthly frequency data of the DC Pension funds net new direct 
and indirect investments into Croatian and SEE equity excluding GDRs and HT 
stocks (PFInvTotalMonthlym) 
 
Source: Data derived using cubic-spline interpolation program in STATA 
 
 We will examine the results of the unit root tests of our two DC pension fund 
investment variables “PFInvDirect” and “PFInvIndirect” in the last section of this Chapter. 
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3.4.3. Continuous variable explaining the monthly dynamics of the 
new investments into the Croatian and SEE equity-focused Open End 
Mutual Funds – “OMF_AUMIndex” 
 
In this Section we explain how we construct a variable capturing DC pension fund 
investments into the bubbly asset expressed by a genuine monthly data set. This is 
accomplished by estimating the monthly inflow/outflow of the value of assets under 
management (AUM) of the portfolio of Croatian and SEE equity-focused Open-end mutual 
funds, which were particularly used as a bubbly investment instrument by the Croatian DC 
Pension Funds indirectly approaching the Croatian and the SEE equity markets.  
The Croatian financial market regulating agency (HANFA) publishes data on the 
monthly dynamics of the assets under management (AUM) of all registered Open-end Mutual 
funds in the Republic of Croatia individually. Unfortunately, they do not publish data about 
the change of the number of the accounting units, which would be a perfect measure of the 
inflow/outflow of investments in and out of the fund. Instead, the only figures that HANFA 
publishes are the Beginning Period AUM, the End Period AUM and their absolute and 
relative difference. This measure is far from a perfect measure of the inflow/outflow of new 
investments into each Open-end Mutual Fund, because it is directly and positively affected by 
the change of the market price of the underlying assets, in our case the bubbly equity asset. 
Therefore, we had to correct the relative difference between the end period AUM and the 
beginning period AUM by dividing it with the relative change of the CROBEX equity market 
index for each monthly period. This way we factored-out the price change information 
component of the dynamics of the CROBEX index from the change of the Assets Under 
Management (AUM) index of the Open End Mutual Funds, to get a closer estimate of the 
actual change of AUM due to the decisions of investors to increase or decrease their positions 
in the Open-end Investment funds rather than to the change of the market value of the bubble. 
In order to relate this derived index of the AUM of the Open-end investment Funds 
investing in Croatian and SEE equity to the actual investment portfolio of the DC pension 
funds, we only used those funds actually used by the DC Pension Funds themselves by 
referring to the yearly portfolio structure of the DC pension funds. We used the following 
methodology when establishing our monthly index of the change in the CROBEX corrected 
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AUM of the Open-end Investment Funds focused in SEE and Croatian Equity markets used 
by the DC Pension Funds. 
First, we had to divide the Croatian Open-end investment funds used by the DC 
pension fund into three groups. The first group, which invested up to 100% of its assets into 
SEE and Croatian equity markets, we call “fully exposed”. The Second group, which invested 
up to 50% in the Croatian and SEE equity markets, we call “partially exposed”. And the 
Third group, which did not invest any assets into Croatian and SEE markets, we call the 
“non-exposed” group of Open-end Investment Funds. We made the categorization by 
checking the portfolio exposure around the peak of the asset bubble 2007-2008, based on the 
availability of data. We present the three group categorization with its members in Table 
3.4.3.1. 
 
Table 3.4.3.1 Croatian Open-end Investment Funds used by the DC Pension funds in 
the period 2005-2010 divided by their exposure: fully, partially and non-exposed to 
Croatian and SEE equity markets 
   
1) FULLY EXPOSED   2) PARTIALLY EXPOSED  3) NON-EXPOSED
  
RBAI-U-RCEU 
PBZI-U-EQTF9 
ERSI-U-EADE 
KD VICTORIA 
HI-GROWTH 
ILIRIKA JUGOISTOCNA EVROPA 
SELECT EUROPE 
OTP INDEKSNI 
ZB AKTIV 
ST GLOBAL EQUITY 
HPB DYNAMIC 
PBZI-U-GLBF 
 
RBAI-U-RBAL 
ERSI-U-ERIN 
ICF BALANCED 
HI-BALANCED 
OTP URAVNOTEZENI 
ILIRIKA JIE BALANCED 
ZB GLOBAL 
HPB GLOBAL 
 
PBZI-U-HRKN 
PBZI-U-NVCF 
NEXP-U-ALPH 
ICAM-U-FOST 
ZB EUROAKTIV 
VB CASH 
ZB PLUS 
HI-CASH 
PBZI-U-EURN 
RBAI-U-RCAS 
AZIN-U-AFCA 
AGRAM CASH 
HPB NOVCANI 
PBZI-U-STKF 
  ALLIANZ CASH 
ERSI-U-ERMO 
OTP NOVCANI 
SELECT NOVCANI 
ERSI-U-ERBO 
ICF MONEY MARKET 
 
Source: Annual audited balance sheets of the Croatian DC pension funds 2002-2010 
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Second, we had to estimate the portfolio weights of each open-end investment fund in 
its specific group characterized by its investment focus (Table 3.4.3.2) as a ratio between the 
absolute amounts invested by the DC pension funds in each fund and the total amount 
invested in the group of funds to which each fund belongs. As an example in order to 
demonstrate the logic we refer to the year 2005 when there were only two Open End 
Investment Funds from the group “partially exposed” used by the four DC pension funds. 
Those were the “RBAI-U-RBAL” and the “ZB GLOBAL” funds. Based on the year end 
values of the DC pension fund portfolios, those two Open-end mutual funds participated with 
81.5% and 18.5% respectively in the portfolio of the total DC pension fund investments being 
part of the “partially exposed” Open End Investment Funds portfolio during the year 2005 
(Table 3.4.3.2). Consequently, we built the index of the dynamics of AUM of the “partially 
exposed” Open End Mutual Funds for the year of 2005 by including 81.5% of the AUM 
index of the “RBAI-U-RBAL” and 18.5% of the “ZB GLOBAL” fund. In other words, the 
index is composed of 81.5% of the dynamics of “RBAI-U-RBAL” and 18.5% of the 
dynamics of “ZB GLOBAL” in 2005. This way we capture the dynamics of the AUM of the 
“partially exposed” Open End Mutual Funds, taking into account only those funds receiving 
investments as part of the DC pension funds‟ portfolio in that year. We change the weights on 
the index every year, based on the actual year-end structure of the Open End Mutual Funds‟ 
Investments. We did this only for the funds “fully exposed” and “partially exposed” to SEE 
and Croatian Equity market, because only those funds were of interest. We present the 
weights in Table 3.4.3.2. 
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Table 3.4.3.2 Weights of the individual “Fully” and “Partially” SEE and Croatian Equity 
exposed Open-end Mutual Funds in their group for each year from 2002-2010 for all 
four funds together 
Matrix of weights (calculates the weights of each Open-end Mutual Fund within its group) 
FULLY EXPOSED   2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
PBZI-U-GLBF 
 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 30.9% 18.3% 12.8% 5.5% 2.4% 
RBAI-U-RCEU 
 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 21.6% 9.5% 4.1% 9.0% 12.8% 
PBZI-U-EQTF9 
 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 27.3% 33.0% 35.8% 40.5% 36.6% 
ERSI-U-EADE 
 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 14.4% 23.0% 26.3% 14.0% 5.9% 
KD VICTORIA 
 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.0% 4.3% 2.4% 0.5% 
HI-GROWTH 
 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.7% 2.3% 1.0% 0.4% 
ILIRIKA JUGOISTOCNA EVROPA 
 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 4.3% 6.0% 3.6% 3.0% 
SELECT EUROPE 
 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.8% 5.8% 7.3% 2.4% 0.0% 
OTP INDEKSNI 
 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 11.4% 24.2% 
ZB AKTIV 
 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 4.1% 1.2% 0.8% 9.6% 14.2% 
ST GLOBAL EQUITY 
 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 
HPB DYNAMIC 
 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.7% 0.0% 
PARTIALLY EXPOSED   2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
RBAI-U-RBAL 
 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 81.5% 72.1% 23.2% 0.2% 20.0% 42.0% 
ERSI-U-ERIN 
 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 8.6% 16.2% 19.9% 17.6% 10.4% 
ICF BALANCED 
 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 5.4% 6.3% 7.7% 10.0% 0.0% 
HI-BALANCED 
 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.1% 1.5% 0.0% 0.0% 
OTP URAVNOTEZENI 
 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 4.7% 6.7% 4.0% 2.4% 
ILIRIKA JIE BALANCED 
 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.1% 2.8% 0.0% 0.0% 
ZB GLOBAL 
 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 18.5% 13.9% 36.5% 44.9% 19.8% 12.5% 
HPB GLOBAL   0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 9.8% 16.1% 28.7% 32.7% 
Source: DC pension funds end of year balance sheets; own calculations 
 
Finally, using the data on the absolute monthly change of assets under management 
(AUM) of each open-end investment fund in the Republic of Croatia, published by the 
Croatian Financial Market Authority (HANFA), weighted by the actual yearly weights of 
each individual fund in the “fully exposed” or the “partially exposed” portfolio structure of 
the DC pension funds‟ investments into Croatian and SEE equity-focused Open-end 
investment funds (Table 3.4.3.2), we built two monthly indices: the first one, representing the 
monthly dynamics of the AUM of the portfolio from the group of “fully exposed” open end 
investment funds; and the second representing the AUM dynamics of the group of “partially 
exposed” open end investment funds. We corrected both monthly indices by the change of 
the CROBEX stock market index: the “Fully exposed” by the full percentage change of the 
CROBEX equity index; and the “Partially exposed” by 50% of the change of the CROBEX 
equity index. This way we eliminated the effect of the change of the equity market prices on 
the change of assets under management. Finally, we joined the two indices together into one 
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index, based on the weights of each group of “fully exposed” and “partially exposed” open 
end investment funds in their total portfolio presence in the DC pension fund asset structure 
for each year (Table 3.4.3.3). 
 
Table 3.4.3.3: Weights of the group of “fully exposed” and “partially exposed” Open-
end Investment Funds in the SEE and Croatian equity market, based on the previous 
end-of-year absolute value of investment 
 
    2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
FULLY EXPOSED 
    
22.92% 64.98% 68.85% 70.17% 77.89% 82.77% 
PRATIALLY EXPOSED         77.08% 35.02% 31.15% 29.83% 22.11% 17.23% 
 
Source: Derived from yearly audited balance sheets of the DC pension funds 2002-2010 
 
Using, the weights presented in Figure 3.4.3.3 and our two CROBEX-corrected 
indices on the change of AUM of each group of “fully exposed” and “partially exposed” 
Open-end Investment Funds investing into SEE and Croatian equity, we established a 
variable called “OMF_AUMIndex”, which represents an index estimating the relative 
dynamics of the monthly new net investments of the DC pension funds into the open-end 
investment funds exposed to the SEE and Croatian equity markets. This variable is presented 
in Figure 3.4.3.1, and its first difference “FD_OMF_AUMIndex” in is presented in Figure 
3.4.3.2. 
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Figure 3.4.3.1: Dynamics of the “OMF_AUMIndex” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author, using Stata12  
 
Figure 3.4.3.2: Dynamics of the “FD_OMF_AUMIndex” variable 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author, using Stata12  
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Since the “OMF_AUMIndex” variable is a stochastic time series variable with a 
genuine monthly frequency, we had to check whether or not it is stationary and, if not, what 
is the order of integration of the variable before using it in our empirical modelling. For this 
purpose we continue with the last part of this Chapter, where we present the test results for 
the presence of a unit root in the data generating process of each one of our stochastic 
endogenous variables. 
 
3.5. Unit root tests and the order of integration of our endogenous 
variables “B_Croatia”, “DYNEF”, “PFInvDirect”, “PFInvIndirect” and 
“OMF_AUMIndex” 
 
Before we continue with the empirical modelling, in order to determine the proper 
empirical strategy in our following empirical chapters, we check the order of integration of 
our set of endogenous variables. We are dealing with variables based on stock market 
dynamics, for which it is common to have a unit root and to be non-stationary. In the 
following section we will first test for the presence of unit root in the data generating process 
of the level forms of our endogenous variables, and then we continue by examining the unit 
roots for first difference transformations of the variables to establish their level of integration. 
 
 
3.5.1. Testing if the level forms of the variables have a unit root 
 
In order to determine whether our data has unit roots, we perform several tests. We 
approach testing for presence of unit roots by both testing the null hypothesis of “non-
stationarity”, where rejecting the null confirms that the series is stationary and by performing 
tests where the null hypothesis is “stationarity” of the data generating process. By applying a 
combination of tests, we get better inference on the actual order of integration of each 
variable. In the following lines we give a brief review of the tests we use and the results from 
testing our endogenous variables in their level form. 
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We first perform the Augmented Dickey Fuller tests (Dickey & Fuller, 1979) where 
the null hypothesis is that the Data Generating Process (DGP) of a time series has a unit root. 
This implies that the variable is non-stationary and integrated at a level higher than zero. The 
distribution of the test statistic of the ADF test has a negative skew and the design of the test 
requires a one-sided test. When the test statistic is above the critical values in absolute value 
(determined at 1%, 5%, or 10% level of significance), we reject the hypothesis of “non-
stationarity” and we accept the alternative, that the DGP is stationary (with a probability of 
making a Type 1 error of 1%, 5% or 10% respectively). If the test statistic is significantly 
positive on the other side, we could expect that the data generating process is explosive. The 
original Dickey-Fuller model is augmented by adding lagged differences in the design of the 
test statistic in order to overcome the potential problem of residual autocorrelation, which if 
present, could make test statistic biased. On the other side, when we deal with a shorter data 
sets (at the case with some of our variables with less than 50 observations) we require a 
parsimonious model, which is unbiased and at the same time has the lowest number of 
augmented lags. In order to achieve the best balance between the two, we made our decision 
on the order of lags used in the ADF test based on the p-values of the Portmanteu test (with 
12 lags) for residual autocorrelation, accepting the smallest lag in the ADF test, that suggests 
no-auto-correlated residuals. In all ADF tests applied on our variables in the level form, we 
reject the residual autocorrelation in the ADF test by augmenting it with 0 to 8 lags 
depending on the case. Only the interpolated investment variables “PFInvDirect” and 
“PFInvIndirect”, due to their interpolation from annual to monthly frequency with a cubic 
function, required 28 lags in the test in order to assure no residual autocorrelation. Such a 
high number of lags consumed too many degrees of freedom for the test applied on our small 
data set, which was not acceptable, and based on the last significant coefficient included in 
the ADF test (Sjö, 2008, p. 9), we decided to use a maximum of 4 lags in the ADF test for 
those variables.  We present the critical values of the ADF test for the level variables in Table 
3.5.1. 
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Table 3.5.1a ADF test of non-stationarity (H0: data generating process being non-
stationary) performed on our endogenous variables “B_Croatia”, “DYNEF”, 
PFInvDirect”, “PFInvIndirect” and “OMF_AUMIndex” in level form (and the relevant 
test statistic critical values) 
 
ADF Test (H0: Non-
Stationarity) B_Croatia DYNEF PF_InvDirect PF_InvIndirect OMF_AUMIndex 
no constant, no trend -2.1133 -2.0152 -0.6932 -2.1738 -2.2087 
constant, no trend -2.1077 -2.0086 -1.2978 -2.1727 -1.331 
constant and trend -2.2588 -1.7334 -2.3181 -2.1757 -0.6963 
critical values 1% 5% 10% 
no constant, no trend -2.56 -1.94 -1.62 
constant, no trend -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 
constant and trend -3.96 -3.41 -3.13 
 
Source: Author, performing tests in JMulti 4.24 (full reports available in Appendix III.3) 
 
In this case, looking at the one per cent level of significance, we fail to reject the non-
stationarity hypothesis for all five endogenous variables. When we include only a constant or 
a constant and a trend, we fail to reject the null at any conventional level of significance. The 
results thus suggest that our variables are integrated at some higher level of integration than 
zero. To assure to this we also perform the KPSS test. 
The KPSS test (Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, & Shin, 1992) is a unit root test 
where the H0 hypothesis, opposite to the H0in the ADF test, states that the DGP of the tested 
variable is stationary, or the level of integration is zero. The alternative hypothesis on the 
other side is that the variable is integrated at a level higher than 0. Looking at the test results 
presented in Table 3.5.1b below, we notice that with the exception of the test for the 
interpolated variable “PFInvIndirect”, the KPSS test of Level stationarity yields test results 
on all other variables suggesting that the DGP of the variable is non-stationary. Such results 
correspond to the results of the ADF test results. The only non-rejection is present with the 
“PFInvIndirect” variable, and could be due to the residuals autocorrelation, which is a 
product of the used cubic interpolation from a low – annual to a high monthly frequency of 
the data. This variable in substance is very similar to the “OMF_AUMIndex” variable, which 
has a genuine monthly frequency, and which strongly rejected the KPSS test of stationarity. 
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Table 3.5.1b KPSS test of stationarity (H0: data generating process being stationary) 
performed on our endogenous variables “B_Croatia”, “DYNEF”, PFInvDirect”, 
“PFInvIndirect” and “OMF_AUMIndex” in level form (and the relevant test statistic 
critical values) 
 
KPSS Test (H0: 
Stationaroty) B_Croatia DYNEF PFInvDirect PFInvIndirect OMF_AUMIndex 
Level stationarity test 
statistic 0.7656 0.4778 1.3816 0.1407 2.0805 
Trend stationarity test 
statistic 0.3778 0.2501 0.2079 0.1338 0.544 
critical values 1% 5% 10% 
Level stationarity 0.347 0.463 0.739 
Trend stationarity 0.119 0.146 0.216 
 
*we used the same number of lags used in ADF test which showed no autocorrelation of residuals 
Source: Author, performing tests in JMulti 4.24 (full reports available in Appendix III.3) 
 
Finally, the DGP might be affected by an outlier or a shift in the series. This means 
that it is possible that the DGP of the variable, outside this impulse or a shift, has stationary 
dynamics.  This is why we also perform an ADF test augmented by an impulse dummy and 
by a shift dummy. We used the JMulti search algorithm for finding the most probable 
impulse/shift date, and applied the test with this date. We present the ADF test results in 
Table 3.5.1c. We applied similar principle for choosing the lag of the ADF test, as previously 
explained in relation to the ADF test. All test reports are available in Appendix III.3. Looking 
at the test results, we fail to reject the Unit Root null in the presence of a structural break on 
all variables at the highest level of significance (10%). The test results suggest that the 
variables are non-stationary and integrated at higher level of integration than zero. 
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Table 3.5.1c Unit Root ADR test with Structural Break (H0: data generating process 
being non-stationary) performed on our endogenous variables “B_Croatia”, “DYNEF”, 
PFInvDirect”, “PFInvIndirect” and “OMF_AUMIndex” in level form (and the relevant 
test statistic critical values) 
 
Source: Author, performing tests in JMulti 4.24 (full reports available in Appendix III.3) 
 
We conclude, based on the three unit root tests applied, that all our endogenous 
variables have an order of integration higher than zero, which means they are non-stationary. 
We believe that although the KPSS test suggested the opposite for the “PFInvIndirect” in the 
stationarity test in Levels, the ADF test and the ADF test in the presence of a structural break 
both suggested the opposite for this variable.  We continue by first differencing the variables 
in order to determine whether they are integrated at level one. 
 
3.5.2. Testing if the first differences of the variables have a unit root 
 
Having found evidence that our variables have higher level of integration than 0, in 
order to find their level of integration, we need to find the order of their first differencing 
transformation that makes them stationary. For this purpose, we continue by first differencing 
all our endogenous level variables and performing the unit root test on their first difference 
transformations. We use the same previously explained approach for determining the correct 
number of lags in the test. 
UR with Structural Break B_Croatia DYNEF PF_InvDirect PF_InvIndirect OMF_AUMIndex 
Impulse dummy date Dec-07 Feb-09 Nov-98 Sep-98 Dec-07 
Constant, no trend -2.3645 -2.0988 -1.3254 -2.2097 -2.334 
Constant and trend -2.1903 -1.8894 -1.9431 -2.253 -1.925 
Shift dummy date Aug-98 Feb-09 Sep-98 Sep-98 Oct-08 
Constant, no trend -1.9953 -1.7435 -1.3254 -2.2097 -2.1565 
Constant and trend -2.0289 -2.0812 -1.9431 -2.253 -2.212 
Critical values 1% 5% 10% 
 Test with constant and no 
trend -3.48 -2.88 -2.58 
 Test with constant and trend -3.55 -3.03 -2.76 
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Table 3.5.2a  ADF test of non-stationarity (H0: data generating process being non-
stationary) performed on the first difference transformations of our endogenous 
variables “B_Croatia”, “DYNEF”, PFInvDirect”, “PFInvIndirect” and 
“OMF_AUMIndex” (and the relevant test statistic critical values) 
 
ADF Test (H0: 
Non-Stationarity) B_Croatia_D1 DYNEF_D1 PF_InvDirect_D1 PF_InvIndirect_D1 OMF_AUMIndex_D1 
no constant, no trend -5.3135 -10.4827 -3.8384 -4.5906 -4.118 
constant, no trend -5.3008 -10.4898 -3.8698 -4.5763 -4.5591 
Constant and trend -5.2836 -10.5266 -3.8509 -4.5739 -4.7039 
 
critical values 1% 5% 10% 
no constant, no trend -2.56 -1.94 -1.62 
constant, no trend -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 
constant and trend -3.96 -3.41 -3.13 
 
Source: Author, performing tests in JMulti 4.24 (full reports available in Appendix III.3) 
 
Looking at the ADF test results, testing the null hypothesis suggesting the first 
difference transformations generate non-stationary series, we reject the unit root null 
hypothesis for all variables which presents supporting evidence that all our endogenous first 
differenced transformations represent stationary data generation processes. Looking at Table 
3.5.2a, we find that we uniformly reject the null hypothesis even at the 10% level of 
significance for all variables in all three variants of the test (except for “PFInvDirect” for 
which we have a borderline result in the least restricted version of the test). In order to search 
for more evidence on the stationarity of the first differenced transformations, we perform the 
KPSS test. Looking at Table 3.5.2b which reports the KPSS unit root test results, we fail to 
find evidence for rejecting the Null hypothesis that the first difference transformations of our 
endogenous variables are represented by stationary data generating processes. 
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Table 3.5.2b: KPSS test of stationarity (H0: data generating process being stationary) 
performed on the first difference transformations of our endogenous variables 
“B_Croatia”, “DYNEF”, PFInvDirect”, “PFInvIndirect” and “OMF_AUMIndex” (and 
the relevant test statistic critical values) 
 
KPSS Test (H0: 
Stationaroty) 
B_Croati
a_D1 
DYNEF
_D1 
PF_InvDire
ct_D1 
PF_InvIndire
ct_D1 
OMF_AUMIn
dex_D1 
Level stationarity 0.1053 0.1381 0.1382 0.0759 0.000 
Trend stationarity 0.1063 0.0542 0.1389 0.0701 0.000 
 
critical values 1% 5% 10% 
Level stationarity 0.347 0.463 0.347 
Trend stationarity 0.119 0.146 0.216 
 
Source: Author, performing tests in JMulti 4.24 (full reports available in Appendix III.3) 
 
Based on the Unit root test results, we conclude that all our endogenous variables are 
integrated at order of one I(1). Having described the derivation and the meaning of our 
variables, together with their order of integration, we continue with the estimation of our 
empirical models in Chapter 4 and 5. 
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Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we explained the intuition behind the variables to be used in our 
econometric analysis (reported in the next chapters) together with the process of their 
collection and generation. We started first by defining the variables of our implicit functional 
relationships describing the dynamics of the equity asset bubble derived from our theoretical 
model developed in Chapter 2.  
We defined the variable “B_Croatia” as a stochastic non-stationary variable, which 
would be used as the dependent variable in our model of asset bubbles. We used the same 
methodology that we used for generating “B_Croatia” also for generating the “B_US” 
variable, explaining the bubble US market as representative of global financial markets. We 
will use this variable as an exogenous variable to isolate the short-term effect of the foreign 
markets on the Croatian Financial market in the model. We also found that “B_Croatia” and 
B_USA are not co-integrated, which suggests that the Croatian market is still young and not 
sufficiently integrated with global financial markets. While influenced in the short-run by 
global financial markets there is, as yet, no long-run equilibrium relationship with them.  
Further, we defined the “DYNEF” variable, which is a stochastic and non-stationary 
variable measuring the dynamic efficiency of the Croatian financial market. When the 
financial market is dynamically efficient, this value takes positive values and when the 
financial market is dynamically inefficient it takes negative values. This variable is integrated 
of order one, I(1), and should measure the necessary conditions for the occurrence of the 
bubble or, more precisely, its positive values should identify the necessary conditions for the 
crash of the bubble. We also generated a dummy variable which signifies the moments when 
financial market passes over the dynamic efficiency threshold. 
Finally, we defined a set of variables explaining the investments of the DC pension 
funds into the bubbly Croatian equity and Croatian and SEE equity focused open-end mutual 
funds. First, we defined a set of dummy variables assigned value 1 for periods defined by 
legal changes affecting the investment policies of the DC pension funds. Next, we also 
defined a set of level variables describing the new investments of the Croatian DC pension 
funds. We measured new pension fund investments based on the yearly audited financial 
reports of the pension funds and we used cubic-spline interpolation to create the monthly 
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frequency of the investment variables based on the cubic function connecting the yearly data. 
This way we determined three variables: “PFInvIndirect“, “PFInvDirect“ and 
“PFInvTotalMonthly“, respectively representing the DC pension funds yearly absolute 
investments into Croatian and SEE equity-focused Open End Investment Funds, Croatian 
direct equity investments, and their Total expressed at monthly frequency.  
In order to identify a genuine monthly variable representing the new net investment 
into the Croatian and SEE equity-focused Open End Investment funds, we also created a 
CROBEX-free index variable measuring the monthly Assets Under Management (AUM) of 
the Croatian Open End investment funds weighted by their acceptance within the DC pension 
funds portfolios. We named this variable the “OMF_AUMIndex”, whose relative dynamics 
should represent the monthly investment/disinvestment of the DC pension funds in the Open 
End Investment Funds investing in Croatian and SEE equity. This variable should add value 
to our model by containing actual rather than interpolated monthly information about the DC 
pension fund investments, which was not contained in the “PFInvIndirect” variable 
Finally we found supporting evidence that all our endogenous variable are integrated 
at order one I(1).  
Having the complete data set presented in Appendix 3.2, we now pass on to testing 
our hypotheses in the following chapters. 
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Chapter 4 – Model1: Explaining the Croatian equity bubble with the DC 
pension fund investments represented by “PFInvDirect” and 
“PFInvIndirect” 
 
Introduction 
 
 The goal of this chapter is to test our theoretical model of rational asset bubbles with 
DC pension funds developed in Chapter 2 using the data set from the Croatian financial 
market presented in Chapter 3. 
 We focus on two main Vector Error Correction (VEC) Models. This chapter presents 
the first empirical model, estimated using both Direct (“PFInvDirect”) and Indirect 
(“PFInvIndirect”) investment variables as endogenous explanatory variables representing the 
DC pension funds‟ investments. Those variables represent investment data extracted from the 
yearly audited financial statements of the Croatian DC pension funds. The second model 
presented in the following chapter will use, as an explanatory investment variable, the index 
of the assets under management of the Croatian and SEE equity focused Open-end 
Investment Funds weighted by the exact yearly exposure of DC pension funds to those funds 
“OMF_AUMIndex”. 
 To estimate each VEC Model, we use the JMulTi 4.24 software package, which 
allows a structured estimation procedure derived from the theoretical and empirical time 
series analysis literature. Following this procedure, we first check the order of integration of 
each variable; in Chapter 3, we found that all stochastic variables in our model are integrated 
of order one. We then test for the optimal lag order of the underlying VAR model in levels, 
and we examine whether there exists a co-integration relationship among our endogenous 
variables. Finally, we estimate our VEC Model, check its diagnostic tests and investigate the 
dynamics suggested by the model long-term and short-term equation components and by the 
use of Impulse Response Function (IRF) Analysis. 
 We also introduce a control dummy variable representing a structural shift in the co-
integration relationship among our model variables caused by the escalation of the global 
financial crisis. The reason we take account of this structural break variable is because the 
significant disturbing effects that the Global Financial Crisis caused on the international 
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financial markets. We find that this structural shift variable plays a significant role in the 
long-term relationship, especially as a trigger for the crash of the bubble which we quantify 
and explain. 
 Finally, we summarize all our empirical results in relation to the hypotheses drawn 
from our theoretical model in Chapter 2, showing that the suggested theoretical relationships 
are confirmed by the empirical analysis of the Croatian financial market. 
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4.1. Summary of the endogenous, exogenous and deterministic 
variables in our Croatian financial market data set 
 
 In the previous chapter we described the data collection and measurement of the 
variables of interest, which will be used to test our theoretical model of rational asset bubbles 
with DC pension funds. Before we begin with the structured empirical analysis using our 
Croatian data set, we present a table containing the order of integration and description of 
each endogenous and exogenous variable of interest introduced in Chapter 3. The variables 
with their main characteristics are presented in Table 4.1.1. 
Table 4.1.1: Model variables, their type, character, order of integration and frequency 
Name Description Type Frequency 
Order of 
Integration 
B_Croatia 
Relative value of the 
Croatian equity bubble 
Endogenous 
(continuous) 
Monthly 1 
DYNEF 
Dynamic efficiency of the 
Croatian equity market 
Endogenous 
(continuous) 
Monthly 1 
PFInvDirect 
Croatian DC Pension funds 
direct investments into 
Croatian equity 
Endogenous 
(continuous) 
Monthly 
(interpolated) 
1 
PFInvIndirect 
Croatian DC Pension funds 
indirect investment  in 
Croatian equity through the 
SEE and Croatian equity 
focused Open End Mutual 
Funds 
Endogenous 
(continuous) 
Monthly 
(interpolated) 
1 
OMF_AUMIndex 
Index (T1=100) describing 
the dynamics of the assets 
under management of the 
portfolio of SEE and 
Croatian equity focused 
open end mutual funds 
(weighted by DC pension 
funds investment) 
Endogenous 
(continuous) 
Monthly 1 
B_US 
Relative value of the US 
equity bubble 
Exogenous 
(continuous) 
Monthly 1 
dummy1 
Official start of the DC 
pension fund system in 
Croatia 
Deterministic 
(discrete) 
Monthly / 
dummy2 
Legal Acts allowing 
investments in the bubbly 
Croatian and SEE equity 
focused Open End Mutual 
Deterministic 
(discrete) 
Monthly / 
225 | P a g e  
 
Funds 
dummy3 
Legal Acts allowing broad 
direct investments in 
Croatian Equity 
Deterministic 
(discrete) 
Monthly / 
dummy4 
Legal Acts requiring 
higher DC pension funds‟ 
transaction transparency 
Deterministic 
(discrete) 
Monthly / 
dummy_DYNEF 
DYNEF passing the 0 
threshold 
Deterministic 
(discrete) 
Monthly / 
L_shift_M9 
Bankruptcy of  Lehman 
Brothers in 09/2008 
Deterministic 
(discrete) 
Monthly / 
 
Source: Author using own calculations 
  
4.2. Vector Error Correction modelling and the order of integration of 
the variables of interest 
 
There are two common approaches for overcoming the spurious regression outcome 
when having variables with positive order of integration. First, transforming the continuous 
non-stationary variables of interest into stationary variables and using them in this form in the 
regression model. This is done by differencing them until their transformation becomes 
stationary and then using them in the regression model. In our case, as we saw in Section 
3.5.2, this is achieved by first differencing all the variables, since they are all integrated at 
order of 1.  
This approach has one significant issue, and that is the loss of most of the long-term 
information contained in the level form of the variable each time the variable is first 
differenced. The other problem associated with such an approach can be the loss of 
meaningful interpretation of the variables and of the model in which they are used, especially 
if they have to be more than once differenced before they become stationary (suggesting a 
higher order of integration).  This is why most empirical research done in time series with 
non-stationary variables is done by the application of the second approach, which is 
estimation of Error Correction (EC) (Engle & Granger, 1987) and Vector Error Correction 
(VEC) Models (Johansen S. , 1988).  
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The advantage of the EC and VEC models is that the long-term information or the 
equilibrium relationship between the variables of interest is preserved. This relationship is 
described as a co-integration relationship between the variables, which is the requirement for 
the use of the EC and VEC Models in modelling time series. This is why the next step is to 
determine the rank of co-integration between the variables. 
 But before we move on determining the rank of co-integration, we need to find the 
order of the lag of the underlying Vector Auto Regression (VAR) model. This is because the 
Vector Error Correction Model presents a first order transformation of the underlying VAR 
model. So for the unbiased estimation of the co-integration coefficient matrix of the VECM 
and for determining the rank of the co-integration, we first need to define the order of the 
underlying VAR, which represents the optimal lagged model based on the explanatory power 
and diagnostic properties of the model.  
  
4.3. The lag order of the underlying VAR model 
 
The theory and practice suggests two common approaches for determining the 
optimal lag order of the underlying VAR model (Lütkepohl & Krätzig, Applied Time Series 
Econometrics, 2004). One is to find the optimal lag of the underlying VAR model by 
comparing its explanatory powers defined by certain information criteria. Information criteria 
compare the value of the determinant of the residual covariance matrix of the model for 
different lagged versions of the VAR model, corrected by some penalty criteria usually 
defined by the number of lags and the dimension of the coefficients in the model. This way, 
the information criteria define the most “informative” model, presented by the one with the 
smallest information criterion value which corresponds to the amount of un-modelled 
variance. 
The most commonly used information criteria are the Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIK) (Akaike, 1974), the Hannan-Quinn Information Criterion (HQ) (Hannan & Quinn, 
1979) and the Schwarz Information Criterion (SC) also known as Bayesian Information 
Criterion (Schwarz, 1978) (4.1). Each information criteria tries to minimize the log 
determinant of the residuals covariance matrix “∑u”, subject to a penalty rule which increases 
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its value with the number of lags of the model “m” times the number of endogenous variables 
“K”. This penalty rule decreases with the increase of the time periods T used for the 
estimation of the VAR model. 
2
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    (4.1) 
JMulti finds the optimal number of lags “m” that minimizes each information 
criterion from a pre-set maximum number of lags of the VAR model. The comparison of 
different outcomes for different information criteria could serve to choose the most 
informative VAR model. 
Although, the use of an information criterion gives information about the power of 
descriptiveness and the efficiency of the VAR model at different lag orders, it does not take 
into account the diagnostic properties of the proposed optimally lagged VAR model. In other 
words, the information criteria might select a model with poor diagnostics, which can be 
biased and inappropriate. Moreover, as noted by Lütkepohl and Krätzig, there is 
inconsistency among different information criterion, where the AIC criterion asymptotically 
overestimates the optimal order with positive probability, while the HQ and SC estimate the 
order consistently under quite general conditions if the actual data generation process has a 
finite order and the maximum order is larger than the true order (Lütkepohl & Krätzig, 
Applied Time Series Econometrics, 2004). Even in small sample VAR models with I(1) co-
integrated variables, Lütkepohl warns of the following relationship (4.2) among the 
information criterion p-values (Lütkepohl, 1991).  
      (4.2) 
This means that there is likely to be a conflicting outcome from different information 
criterion used, which is another argument in favour of the usage of an additional criterion 
when deciding about the order of the underlying levels VAR model. Searching for the 
optimal lag order of the VAR model of our endogenous variables, we get the following 
results for the three information criterion previously discussed (Table 4.3.1). Besides the 
)(ˆ)(ˆ)(ˆ AICpHQpSCp 
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endogenous variables, we also included the shocks from the exogenous and dummy variables, 
because they also contribute to the description powers of the model. We lagged the dummy 
variables for one period because of the required enforcement time after the publication of 
legal acts in the National Gazette, as suggested in Chapter 3. 
Table 4.3.1: Optimal lag order of the VAR model of our endogenous variables 
“B_Croatia”, “DYNEF”, “PFInvDirect” and “PFInvIndirect” based on different 
information criterion and estimated in three different model specifications with respect 
of the deterministic components 
 
a) VAR model without a constant or trend 
endogenous variables:     B_Croatia DYNEF PFInvDirect PFInvIndirect  
exogenous variables:      B_US_d1  
exogenous lags (fixed):   5  
deterministic variables:  dummy1_L1_d1 dummy2_L1_d1 dummy3_L1_d1 dummy4_L1_d1 
Dummy_DYNEF_L1_d1  
sample range:             [1998 M12, 2010 M12], T = 145 
  
optimal number of lags (searched up to 12 lags of levels): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    5             
Final Prediction Error:   5             
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   5             
Schwarz Criterion:        5             
 
 
b) VAR model with a constant and no trend 
 
endogenous variables:     B_Croatia DYNEF PFInvDirect PFInvIndirect  
exogenous variables:      B_US_d1  
exogenous lags (fixed):   5  
deterministic variables:  dummy1_L1_d1 dummy2_L1_d1 dummy3_L1_d1 dummy4_L1_d1 
Dummy_DYNEF_L1_d1 CONST  
sample range:             [1998 M12, 2010 M12], T = 145 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 12 lags of levels): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    5             
Final Prediction Error:   5             
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   5             
Schwarz Criterion:        4             
 
c) VAR model with a constant and a trend 
 
endogenous variables:     B_Croatia DYNEF PFInvDirect PFInvIndirect  
exogenous variables:      B_US_d1  
exogenous lags (fixed):   5  
deterministic variables:  dummy1_L1_d1 dummy2_L1_d1 dummy3_L1_d1 dummy4_L1_d1 
Dummy_DYNEF_L1_d1 CONST TREND  
sample range:             [1998 M12, 2010 M12], T = 145 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 12 lags of levels): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    7             
Final Prediction Error:   5             
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   5             
Schwarz Criterion:        4             
 
Source: Author, using JMulti 4.24  
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 To avoid the problem of potential bias in the information criteria and especially its 
exclusion of the suggested VAR model diagnostics, for the purpose of finding the optimal lag 
of the underlying VAR model, we score different lag VAR models based on the diagnostic 
test of each model. When checking the residual diagnostics at different lags of the underlying 
VAR model, we also investigate different model structures depending on the inclusion of a 
constant and a time trend variable in each model. We mainly check for the following two 
diagnostic tests on each model: first, is the one checking the existence of an autocorrelation in 
the residuals, which is of primary importance due to the fact that auto-correlated residuals 
impose bias on the estimated VAR model coefficient matrices; and, second, we test for the 
normality and the component distributional characteristics (skeweness and kurtosis) of the 
VAR model residuals.  
We implement the Lagrange Multiplier F (LMF) – Autocorrelation test based on the 
Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange-Multiplier (LM) test of residual autocorrelation (Godfrey, 1988), 
which is adjusted for use with small sample data where the test statistic tends to the F-test 
distribution at its limit (Doornik, 1996). Edgerton and Shukur showed that the original LM 
test gives biased results in small samples and suggested the use of the LMF test statistic 
(Edgerton & Shukur, 1999).  The LMF test is testing the null hypothesis H0: 
B1
*
=B2
*
=...=Bh
*=0 against the alternative that at least one of the “B” coefficient matrices is 
non-zero. Here “B” matrices are the coefficient matrices in the residual autocorrelation model 
as presented in equation 4.3. The test hypothesis is considering the residual autocorrelation of 
the “h” lags of the residuals. 
ththtt euBuBu  
*
1
*
1 ...     (4.3)
 
Finally, the LMF(h) test statistic is compared with the critical value from the F 
distribution; if it gives a value lower than the F critical value, then we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis that there is no autocorrelation of the error terms in the VAR model. Otherwise we 
reject the null and accept the alternative hypothesis claiming the presence of autocorrelation 
in the residuals of the VAR model making the VAR coefficients biased. The LMF test – as 
opposed to some other tests such as the “Portmanteau” or the LM test – is suitable for smaller 
data series such as the one that we use (with T<200). 
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 In Table 4.3.2 we present the LMF test statistic for the test of residuals no 
autocorrelation, and their respective p-value‟s for different lags of the underlying VAR model 
inspected in three cases: first without a constant or a trend; second with the constant term 
only; and third with both a constant and a trend term. We first analyse the underlying VAR 
where DC Pension fund investments are represented by both direct and indirect investments 
“PFInvDirect” and “PFInvIndirect” variables, based on the DC pension funds yearly balance 
sheets. Later, in the following chapter, we will apply the same analysis in a model using the 
“OMF_AUMIndex” as our investment variable on a smaller dataset.  
Based on the values of the LMF test, we conclude that the underlying levels VAR 
models – i.e. without constant or trend and with only a constant – at 5 lags are optimal in 
terms of satisfying the regression diagnostics with respect to the residuals no-auto-correlation 
criterion.  
Table 4.3.2: LMF-no-autocorrelation test statistics with 2 and 3 lags applied on different 
structures of the VAR models of our endogenous variables, T=145 
  no constant or trend constant, no trend constant and trend 
  LMF(2) LMF(3) LMF(2) LMF(3) LMF(2) LMF(3) 
VAR(1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
VAR(2) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
VAR(3) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
VAR(4) 0.0004 0 0.0009 0 0 0 
VAR(5) 0.1966 0.0823 0.0799 0.0304 0 0 
VAR(6) 0.1172 0 0 0 0.0036 0 
VAR(7) 0.0833 0.0012 0.0776 0.0005 0.1103 0.0061 
VAR(8) 0.0001 0 0 0 0 0 
Source: Author, using JMulti4 
 
In addition to our LMF diagnostic test, we also present the autocorrelation graphs of 
the estimated residuals autocorrelations for each of the four endogenous variable equations 
“u1” to “u4” in our best candidate VAR(5) model without a constant and trend, for visual 
inspection. The autocorrelation graphs are presented in Figure 4.3.1a-d, where the 
autocorrelation of the residual with each of its lagged values up to 10 lags is compared with 
the 95% confidence interval critical value in order to visually inspect the significance of its 
intensity.  
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Figure 4.3.1a Autocorrelation of the residuals of the “B_Croatia” equation in 
the VAR (5) model without a constant or a trend: autocorrelation and partial 
autocorrelation coefficients 
 
Source: Author, using JMulTi4.24 
 
This approach in addition helps to confirm whether the residuals of the underlying 
level VAR model with 5 lags without a constant or a trend has a problem of regression 
residuals autocorrelation. 
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Figure 4.3.1b Autocorrelation of the residuals of the “DYNEF” equation in the 
VAR (5) model without a constant or a trend: autocorrelation and partial 
autocorrelation coefficients 
 
Source: Author, using JMulTi 4.24 
 
Figure 4.3.1c Autocorrelation of the residuals of the “PFInvDirect” equation in 
the VAR (5) model without a constant or a trend: autocorrelation and partial 
autocorrelation coefficients 
 
Source: Author, using JMulTi 4.24 
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Figure 4.3.1d Autocorrelation of the residuals of the “PFInvIndirect” equation in 
the VAR (5) model without a constant or a trend: autocorrelation and partial 
autocorrelation coefficients 
 
Source: Author, using JMulTi 4.24 
 
Looking at the auto-correlation plots in Figure 4.3.1a-d, we notice that there is no 
significant auto correlation of the residuals at any equation in the system. We conclude that 
the underlying levels VAR model with 5 lags of the endogenous variables has no-significant 
residual autocorrelation both by the formal test and by the visual test. 
  We continue by applying the residuals normality tests as part of the VAR 
diagnostics. Residuals normality tests are applied on the regression residuals from the VAR 
model at different lag orders, without constant or trend, with only a constant and with both 
constant and trend. For the testing purpose, we use the generalized version of the Lomnicki-
Jarque-Bera (L-J-B) test as given by Lütkepohl and Krätzig as well as the Jarque-Bera tests 
of normality for the residual of each equation in the VAR (Lütkepohl & Krätzig, 2004). The 
L-J-B test statistic is based on the principal component analysis of the covariance matrix of 
the residuals of the VAR system, whose matrix is used to compute the third and the fourth 
moment, the skewness and kurtosis, of each residual. They are then compared against 
skewness and kurtosis characteristic for the normal distribution, deriving the L-J-B residuals 
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normality test statistic. The L-J-B test statistic is asymptotically Chi-square distributed and 
represents the sum of the skewness and kurtosis test statistics (Lütkepohl & Krätzig, 2004). 
We present the results of the residuals normality tests in the Table 4.3.3. 
Table 4.3.3 Residual normality tests for VAR models with different lag orders 
normality tests – p values               
                    
    
no const 
or trend 
constant, 
no trend 
constant 
and 
trend     
no const or 
trend 
constant, 
no trend 
constant 
and 
trend 
VAR(4) Jarque-Berra       VAR(6) 
Jarque-
Berra       
  U1 0.0006 0.0007 0.187   U1 0.0006 0.0003 0.1309 
  U2 0 0 0   U2 0 0 0 
  U3 0 0 0   U3 0 0 0 
  U4 0 0 0   U4 0 0 0 
  
Joint test 
LJB 0 0 0   Joint test 0 0 0 
VAR(5) Jarque-Berra       VAR(7) 
Jarque-
Berra       
  U1 0 0 0.0205   U1 0.0422 0.0301 0.3258 
  U2 0 0 0   U2 0 0 0 
  U3 0 0 0   U3 0 0 0 
  U4 0 0 0   U4 0 0 0 
  
Joint test 
LJB 0 0 0   Joint test 0 0 0 
Source: Author, using JMulti 4.24 
 
Investigating the residuals normality test results for different lag orders of the 
underlying level VAR model, we find that the VAR model suffers from the problem of non-
normality of the regression residuals at every lag order. Looking at Table 4.3.3, where the 
results for the residual normality tests of the VAR model without a constant, with a constant 
and with constant and trend at different lags are displayed, we see that at all level orders of 
the VAR model, there exists non-normality of the residuals.  We only find normality of the 
residuals in the first equation of the system explaining the “B_Croatia” variable in the case of 
the VAR model with 4, 6 and 7 lags in the VAR model with a constant and a trend. 
Considering the information criteria and diagnostic tests, our choice for the optimal 
lag order of the underlying level VAR model will be the lag of 5 for the model without a 
constant and a trend (we will investigate also the model with a constant). This model was 
preferred by all of the information criteria, and it passed the non-autocorrelation LMF test 
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with one of the highest levels of confidence of the LMF test. The only weakness of the 
VAR(5) model without a trend or a constant, was that it showed poor results on the normality 
of the residuals. Still, we give more weight on the residual no-autocorrelation tests when 
deciding on the lag order of the underlying VAR. Choosing VAR(5) without a constant or a 
trend as an underlying model means that our Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) would 
be the one with a restriction on the constant and the trend and with 4 lags. Yet this model 
could potentially have a constant within the error correction term, representing an otherwise 
un-modelled growth process. Accordingly, in order to get the proper form of the VECM, we 
present the transformation of the VAR(5) with a constant and a trend into a VEC(4) Model in 
the next section. 
 
4.4. Transforming the VAR(5) into a VECM(4) model 
 
We begin with the VAR(5) model with a constant and a trend. In Equation 4.4 “y” 
represents the vector of endogenous variables (in our case 4x1 vector) which is lagged 5 
periods. “A” matrices (4X4) represent the coefficients on each vector of lagged endogenous 
variables; they are specific for each of the five lags in the model. Finally, we have the vector 
of constants “c0” and time-trend coefficients “δ”, which we could later restrict giving one or 
both the value of zero.  
ttttttt etcyAyAyAyAyAy   05544332211
                     (4.4) 
In order to transform this VAR(5) system into a VECM, we begin by adding and 
subtracting the coefficient matrix “A” in front of the last level lag of y (A5 in the first step) 
multiplied by the previous lag of y (t-4 in the first step). In the first step, this is done by 
adding and subtracting “A5yt-4” from the RHS of the equation. By doing this we get to our 
first transformation 4.4a. 
ttttttttt etcyAyAyAyAyAyAyAy   045455544332211
 
  ttttttt etcyAyAAyAyAyAy   045454332211
  (4.4a) 
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We continue the same process for all lags, the next addition and subtraction on the 
RHS of 4.4a is made by adding and subtracting “(A4+A5)yt-3”. By doing this we get to the 
next transformation represented by 4.4b. 
  ttttttt etcyAyAAyAAAyAyAy   04535435432211 )(
  (4.4b) 
We continue the same way until there is only the first lagged level form of the 
endogenous variables left in the transformation of the VAR model, then we subtract the first 
lag of the level form vector of endogenous variables “yt-1” from both sides of the equation, 
which subtracts an identity matrix in the first bracket on the RHS, and we get the following 
equation 4.4c   
 
ttt
tt
etcyAyAAAA
yAAAAAIy




04515432
154321
.....)(
    (4.4c) 
 Finally, we have transformed our VAR(5) model into a VECM(4) model. The final 
representation of the VECM model is simplified in equation 4.5. We see that the model 
consists of two parts: first, the long-term relationship of the level endogenous variables (the 
“yt-1” vector) represented by the error correction matrix ∏ which generates an I(0) 
process(the component variables of the “y” vector are all I(1), yet one or more linear 
combinations of these variables can be I(0)); and second, the VAR model of first differences 
of the endogenous variables being I(0), representing the short-term effects characterized by 
the “Гi” matrices.  
ttttt etcyyyy   044111 ...
 
t
i
ititt etcyyy  

 0
4
1
1
     (4.5) 
If the rank of the “∏” error correction matrix equals zero (r=0), then there is no co-
integration of the endogenous variables and the model is reduced to its VAR component in 
first differences, i.e.to a short-term effects VAR model. At the other extreme, when “∏” has a 
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full rank (r=k), then the VECM is equivalent to the VAR model, so we should use the 
original VAR model (Juselius, 2006). In all other cases, the rank of the ∏ matrix is smaller 
than its full rank (0<k<r), which means there is at least one independent co-integration vector 
that transforms the set, or two or more subsets, of the endogenous variables into one or more 
I(0) process. This co-integration vector represents some long-run relationships among the co-
integrated variables. In this case, we should use the VECM and we decompose the (kxk) ∏ 
matrix into its component matrices: α (kxr) called the “loading matrix”; and β(kxr) containing 
the co-integration vectors. Applying this transformation we obtain equation 4.5a. 
tt
i
ititt etcyyy  

 
4
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     (4.5a) 
This means that if some dis-equilibrium occurs from the long-term relationship of the 
co-integrated endogenous variables represented by the co-integration matrix “β”, this 
disturbance (error) feeds into each endogenous variable of the system by the coefficients of 
the loading vector α, which determines the speed of adjustment. This describes the error 
correction effect toward the long-term relationship among the endogenous variables. This 
error correction, together with lagged VAR relationships of the first differences of the 
endogenous variables, other I(0) variables, representing exogenous or deterministic shocks, 
and a constant, together explain the short term contemporaneous dynamics of the vector of 
endogenous variables “Δyt”.  
Now let us see what happens with the trend and the constant through the 
transformation from VAR(5) to VECM(4). Let us first assume there is only a constant and no 
trend in the VECM model as shown in equation 4.5b 
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      (4.5b) 
The constant included in the VECM represents both a vector of intercepts within the 
long-term co-integration relationships β, and a drift outside the co-integration vectors in the 
short-term VAR represented by the first differences. To see this, apply expectations on the 
    1tyE
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co-integration vectors. Namely, the expected value of the long-term relationships is some 
vector of constants μ.  
 
On the other side the expected value of the first differences of the endogenous 
variables is some other value γ . 
 
If we transform 4.8b using expectations, then we get the following decomposition of 
the constant in the VEC Model: 
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This shows that the constant in the VECM defined and estimated outside of the co-
integration vector, contains both the mean (intercept) of the co-integration relationship 
represented by , and the growth component or a drift in the first differences part of the 
model represented by 
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We continue by analysing the trend component in the VECM represented by “δt” in 
our equation 4.8a. We could also decompose the trend component into two parts, one related 
to the co-integration relationship (where ρ represents the coefficient on the time 
trend within the co-integration relationship), and the other related to the growth rate “τ” 
outside the co-integration relationship.   
We summarize the two decompositions of the constant and the trend (Juselius, 2006): 
, the first representing the (constant, when γ=0) growth rate of y 
             , and the second representing the (constant, when τ=0) trend growth rate  
 Plugging the two decompositions in equation 4.5a, we get the following form of the 
VECM represented by equation 4.5c. Here we see that the constant and the trend from the 
 0c
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VAR model are now present in both the co-integration long-term relationship and in the part 
of the model explaining the impact of the lagged first-differences of the endogenous 
variables.  
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 This is an important point for understanding the role of the constant and the trend in 
the VEC Model. We have several possible combinations of the inclusion/exclusion of 
constant or/and the trend when estimating our VEC Model: 
- First is the fully restricted model without a constant and a trend in the co-
integration vector or outside the co-integration vector. This model presumes that 
the long-term drift in the system is determined by the average value of the error in 
the correction relationship, which could be a non-zero value. 
- Second, is the restricted constant case, when we set the restriction μ=0 and 
estimate only γ, the constant outside the co-integration vector. In this case γ 
includes both the mean of the co-integration relationships and the drift (an average 
growth in the model). 
- Third, is the unrestricted constant, when we have both a constant in the co-
integration vector and a constant outside the co-integration vector. The constant 
inside the co-integration determines the mean of the co-integration relationships 
and the constant outside the co-integration vectors determines the pure drift or 
temporal growth of the system. It is important to note at this point, that if the co-
integration relationship exhibits some systemic shift, then there could be a 
structural shift in the mean within the co-integration relationship at certain point in 
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time. This shift could be modeled by inserting a dummy variable in the co-
integration vector that changes the mean at a certain date. 
- Fourth, is the case with a constant restricted to the co-integration vector. This 
implies a non-zero mean within the co-integration relationship, but no drift 
(growth) in the short-term relationships part of the model.  
- Fifth, is the restricted trend, when we add the trend in the co-integration 
relationship but restrict the trend outside the co-integration relationship by setting 
a restriction on τ=0. In this case we imply existence of some joint trend within the 
endogenous variables in the long-term co-integration relationships. To accept this 
model, we need both theoretical background hypothesizing such a relationship and 
empirical testing for the presence of such a trend within the co-integration vector. 
- Sixth, is the unrestricted trend, when we have no restriction on the trend variable 
and we add it both in the co-integration vector and outside of the co-integration 
vector. This implies not only that the co-integration relationship has some linear 
trend, but also the system grows non-linearly (the trend itself grows with the 
passage of time). This is a very rare case and we need hard theoretical evidence to 
use such strong model restrictions. 
We could further have other different combinations of restrictions for the constant and the 
trend. 
Finally, we could add a set of exogenous                        and deterministic variables           
in the VECM(4) as long as they are integrated of order 0. In our case, we use lagged first 
differences of the “B_US” variable as an exogenous variable and the first differenced dummy 
variables representing one time shock events on the Croatian financial market. Alternatively, 
we could also lag the differenced dummy variables if we believe their impact on the system 
might be prolonged due to the enforcement delay as suggested in Chapter 3. Including the set 
of exogenous and dummy variables in the model we get to our final reduced form VEC 
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Model (without applying restrictions on the constant and the trend) represented by Equation 
4.6 
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          (4.6) 
 Now that we specified our VECM(4) model, we continue by testing for the 
existence of co-integration among our endogenous variables. 
 
4.5. Estimating the rank of the co-integration matrix 
 
The Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) has one important requirement placed 
on the data series used in the modelling process. This requirement as previously discussed, is 
the existence of one or more co-integration relationship(s) between the variables in levels 
and, hence, their underlying data generation processes (DGP). Two or a sequence of variables 
are said to be co-integrated, if there exists a vector of constants which, when multiplied by 
the matrix consisted of the variables in its columns - each individually integrated at a certain 
order of integration higher than 0 - generates a new data series integrated at a lower level. In 
the most common case, co-integration is associated with the existence of at least one vector 
of constants, which presents a linear combination of the I(1) variables producing a new time 
series integrated at level 0 (I(0)) .  
The cause of the existence of such a linear combination between variables, which 
produces a stationary linear combination, is the existence of a common stochastic trend 
which, in the long term, connects the individual variables among themselves. In other words, 
although a set of variables might contain non-stationary properties when observed 
individually, when combined together by a certain linear combination with other non-
stationary variables, due to some joint long-term relationship they share, they will generate a 
stationary joint outcome.  
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When Error Correction (EC) is applied to a single equation model, with K non-
stationary variables which are co-integrated, there can be only one (1xK) independent vector 
of coefficients defining their stationary long-term relationship. This vector could be estimated 
using OLS regression as shown by Engle and Granger, which produces “super consistent” 
coefficient estimates (Engle & Granger, 1987), although the asymptotic properties of the 
estimated co-integration coefficients are not normal, and the corresponding OLS standard 
errors and t-statistics are biased (Stock, 1987). 
In the case when we are analysing a system of equations, such as the one represented 
by an unrestricted VAR model, when there can be a higher order of independent vectors of 
constant coefficients defining different independent co-integrating relationships among the 
variables in the model, then the matrix consisted of independent vectors of co-integrating 
relationships among the variables in the system used in the VEC Model, is denoted by the 
Greek letter “∏”. This matrix is a square matrix with dimensions equal to the number of 
equations of the VEC Model or the number of endogenous variables in the system (k). Its 
rank is most commonly smaller than its dimension and it represents the number of 
independent co-integration vectors (r).  As previously discussed, the co-integration matrix 
“∏”, is decomposed to its two component matrices (4.7). Here “α” is a (Kxr) matrix 
representing the “loading” or “the speed of adjustment” coefficients, or correction 
coefficients for each co-integration vector contained in the “β‟” matrix to different 
endogenous variable in the VECM system.   
           (4.7) 
 Knowing the optimal number of lags in the levels VAR model, we proceed with the 
next step where we estimate the rank of co-integration matrix “∏” between the endogenous 
variables. This is the crucial test, whose outcome would decide not only if there exists one or 
more long-term equilibrating relationship(s) among our endogenous variables in their levels 
forms (the case when the co-integration rank is higher than zero), but also would tell us if we 
can use the VEC Model in the further analysis or, rather, that we should restrict our analysis 
to the VAR model with first differenced transformations of our endogenous variables (the 
case if the rank of co-integration matrix is equal to zero). 
 We test for co-integration using the “Johansen Trace” test criteria. The test requires 
the use of the previously determined optimal order of the VAR in levels model, because when 
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determining its Maximum Likelihood (ML) Reduced Rank (RR) estimator, the Johansen 
method requires the use of the optimal lag order of the VECM model (Johansen S. , 1988; 
1991; 1995).  
The test aims at discovering the number of Eigen values of the co-integration matrix, 
which are statistically different than zero. The test is drawn from the basic laws of linear 
algebra, that a square matrix would contain R non-zero Eigen values if and only if it consists 
of R independent vectors which determine its rank. The Johansen Reduced Rank test 
methodology defines two test statistics that identify the rank of the co-integration matrix. The 
first is the “Johansen trace statistic”; and second is the “the maximum Eigen value statistic”. 
We briefly explain each test statistic. 
 
 4.5.1. Johansen trace statistic 
 
The Johansen likelihood ratio trace statistic H, tests the null hypothesis that the co-
integration matrix   is of rank “r” against the unrestricted model where  is of full 
rank “k”. The procedure first estimates all Eigen values “λi” of the co-integration matrix ∏, 
and orders them from the highest to the lowest (λ1>λ2>...>λk). Then we determine the number 
of characteristic roots that are different from zero, which equals the number of independent 
co-integration vectors. The simplest case is the one of no-co-integration, when all 
characteristic roots are not different from zero. In this case ln(1-λi)=0 for all Eigen values, 
and all Eigen values are not different from 1. In another case, when the rank of ∏ equals 1, 
which means there exist one independent co-integration vector, only the root of the highest 
Eigen value will be different from zero or ln(1-λ1)<0.  
The Johansen trace statistics looks at the sum of the estimated roots of the Eigen 
values multiplied by the number of observations T. This test is performed in a sequence of 
tests controlled by r which is increased from zero to k-1 in each consecutive test, each time 
estimating the test statistic H (equation 4.8). 
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The test is done for a specific rank of the co-integration matrix. The null hypothesis 
based on the H in equation 4.8 is equivalent to saying that the co-integration matrix  
has (k-r) unit roots, where k is the number of endogenous variables or the full rank of ∏, and 
r is the number of co-integrating vectors. This test statistic is often referred as the “Johansen 
trace” statistic, because it is associated with the sum of diagonal values of the Eigen value 
matrix, which is the trace of the Eigen value matrix. This statistic is expected to be close to 
zero, if there are at most “r” linearly independent co-integrating vectors. This is simply 
because in such a case, the r+1 to k-
th 
Eigen-values, should have values statistically not 
different from zero.   
The test statistic is calculated for every rank restriction of the co-integration matrix in 
a pre-specified lag order VEC Model. The null hypothesis for each test states that the rank of 
the matrix is lower or equal to “r”, and the alternative is that the rank of the co-integration 
matrix is higher than “r”. The testing procedure usually starts from the restriction of “r”=0. If 
we reject the null, then we continue testing for each higher rank restriction until we reject the 
null for the first time. We accept the highest rank restriction for which we fail to reject the 
null on the corresponding rank of the co-integration matrix. 
 
4.5.2. Johansen maximum Eigen-value statistic 
 
 Another similar test statistic, related to the Johansen methodology is the “maximum 
Eigen value” test or the “ max ” test statistic. The idea of the estimator and the test is to 
discover the highest Eigen value for which the test statistic )ˆ1ln( 1 rT  is not statistically 
different from zero. If the r+1 Eigen value is not statistically different from zero then all 
lower Eigen values are also not statistically different from zero, which can be used to define 
the number of non-zero Eigen values and the rank of co-integration 
 The asymptotic distribution of the LR test statistic is a function of a Brownian motion 
(Johansen S. , 1991) and is tabulated by Osterwald-Lenum (Osterwald-Lenum, 1992). Most 
statistics software packages such as STATA or JMulTi, have the tabulated critical values of 
the Johansen co-integration tests and compare them to the generated test statistic at different 
reduced rank restrictions.  
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4.5.3. Johansen “Trace Test” and the rank of co-integration of the 
Croatian data 
 
We use the predetermined VAR system in levels with 5 lags in the Johansen trace test 
which transforms to a VECM with 4 lags. The null hypothesis is tested for every reduced 
rank restriction (RR) starting from zero up to the maximum possible rank determined by the 
dimension of the co-integration coefficient matrix (k). Each time, the null hypothesis will be 
that the actual rank of the matrix is lower than or equal to the tested one. In other words, the 
null hypothesis for the rank restriction of zero would claim that the rank is lower than or 
equal to zero. If we reject this hypothesis, we continue testing the same null hypothesis for 
the ML reduced rank estimator of a higher rank, the rank of one. There, the null hypothesis 
will be that the rank of the coefficient matrix is lower than or equal to one. The alternative 
hypothesis is that the rank of the co-integration coefficient matrix is higher than one and so 
on. So, if we fail to reject the null that the rank is lower than or equal to 1, having previously 
rejected the null that the rank is lower than or equal to zero, we would logically conclude that 
the rank of the co-integration matrix is one, which is same as saying that there exists one 
independent vector of coefficients that represents a linear transformation of variables making 
them stationary.   
In Table 4.5.3.1, we present the co-integration tests for the rank of the co-integration 
matrix between the endogenous variables “B_Croatiam”, “DYNEFm”, “PFInvDirectm” and 
“PFInvIndirectm”. We perform the test by including first only a constant, and secondly a 
constant and trend in the co-integration matrix. We also test allowing for a potential structural 
break (the Global financial crisis, 2008 Month 9). We will be using the 95% level of 
confidence as our decision criteria. We note that in the case without the structural break, we 
have stronger evidence of the existence of one co-integration vector; while when we include 
the structural break in the co-integration vector, we have strong evidence of the existence of 
two co-integration relationships.  
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Table 4.5.3.1 Johansen Trace Test for co-integration 
 
a) Not allowing for a structural break 
Johansen Trace Test for:  B_Croatia DYNEF PFInvDirect PFInvIndirect  
unrestricted dummies:     dummy1_L1_d1 dummy2_L1_d1 dummy3_L1_d1 dummy4_L1_d1 
Dummy_DYNEF_L1_d1  
restricted dummies:         
sample range:             [1998 M5, 2010 M12], T = 152 
included lags (levels):   5  
dimension of the process: 4  
intercept included 
response surface computed: 
----------------------------------------------- 
r0  LR       pval     90%      95%      99%      
----------------------------------------------- 
 0   63.03    0.0056   50.50    53.94    60.81   
1   32.34    0.0980   32.25    35.07    40.78   
 2   9.01     0.7371   17.98    20.16    24.69   
 3   1.16     0.9146   7.60     9.14     12.53   
 
Johansen Trace Test for:  B_Croatia DYNEF PFInvDirect PFInvIndirect  
unrestricted dummies:     dummy1_L1_d1 dummy2_L1_d1 dummy3_L1_d1 dummy4_L1_d1 
Dummy_DYNEF_L1_d1  
restricted dummies:         
sample range:             [1998 M5, 2010 M12], T = 152 
included lags (levels):   5  
dimension of the process: 4  
trend and intercept included 
response surface computed: 
----------------------------------------------- 
r0  LR       pval     90%      95%      99%      
----------------------------------------------- 
 0   86.30    0.0001   60.00    63.66    70.91   
 1   40.03    0.0938   39.73    42.77    48.87   
 2   18.69    0.3056   23.32    25.73    30.67   
 3   5.04     0.5975   10.68    12.45    16.22   
 
 
 
 
b) Testing for co-integration in the presence of a structural break (2008 Month 9) 
 
Johansen Trace Test for:  B_Croatia DYNEF PFInvDirect PFInvIndirect  
unrestricted dummies:     dummy1_L1_d1 dummy2_L1_d1 dummy3_L1_d1 dummy4_L1_d1 
Dummy_DYNEF_L1_d1 D[2008 M9] D[2008 M10] D[2008 M11] D[2008 M12] D[2009 M1]  
restricted dummies:       S[2008 M9]  
sample range:             [1998 M5, 2010 M12], T = 152 
included lags (levels):   5  
dimension of the process: 4  
intercept included 
response surface computed: 
----------------------------------------------- 
r0  LR       pval     90%      95%      99%      
----------------------------------------------- 
 0   143.89   0.0000   58.87    62.37    69.31   
 1   47.05    0.0118   38.80    41.73    47.61   
2   11.67    0.8015   22.60    24.96    29.80   
 3   2.68     0.8514   10.35    12.19    16.18   
 
Johansen Trace Test for:  B_Croatia DYNEF PFInvDirect PFInvIndirect  
unrestricted dummies:     dummy1_L1_d1 dummy2_L1_d1 dummy3_L1_d1 dummy4_L1_d1 
Dummy_DYNEF_L1_d1 D[2008 M9] D[2008 M10] D[2008 M11] D[2008 M12] D[2009 M1]  
restricted dummies:       S[2008 M9]  
sample range:             [1998 M5, 2010 M12], T = 152 
included lags (levels):   5  
dimension of the process: 4  
trend and intercept included 
response surface computed: 
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----------------------------------------------- 
r0  LR       pval     90%      95%      99%      
----------------------------------------------- 
 0   148.80   0.0000   65.92    69.77    77.37   
 1   60.88    0.0014   44.36    47.58    54.02   
 2   22.33    0.2668   26.62    29.20    34.46   
 3   5.92     0.6450   12.52    14.42    18.45   
 
 
Source: JMulti co-integration test 
 
This is a very important outcome, which points to the existence of two co-integrating 
vectors of constants for our endogenous variables in the model with a structural break 
occurring at the onset of the Global Financial Crisis. We conclude that there exist two long-
term co-integrating relationships among the relative value of the Croatian equity bubble 
“B_Croatiam”, the dynamic efficiency of the Croatian financial market “DYNEFm”, direct 
equity investments of the DC pension funds into the Croatian equity market “PFInvDirectm”, 
and the indirect investment of the DC pension funds into the Croatian and SEE equity market 
through the Croatian and SEE equity focused open end investment funds “PFInvIndirectm”.  
Knowing that our non-stationary endogenous variables are co-integrated with a rank 
of one (excluding the structural break) but with a rank of two when accounting for the 
structural break, we can accept the use of and correctly specify the VEC Model in order to 
estimate both the long-run and the short-run relationships in the system. 
 
4.6. Vector Error Correction Model Estimation 
 
Concluding that our endogenous variables are best fitted by a VAR model of order 5 
(which transforms into optimal lag of the VECM model of 4), and that there are two co-
integration relationships when the model accounts for a structural break caused by the onset 
of the Global Financial Crisis, we chose to estimate a VECM (4) with two error correction 
vectors. Although the model with a constant and a trend compared to the model with only a 
constant restricted to the co-integration vector showed more significant evidence of the 
existence of two co-integration vectors, we prefer the model with a restricted constant and no 
trend in the co-integration vector. This choice is made because the theoretical model 
developed in Chapter 2 does not suggest the existence of a deterministic trend in any of the 
endogenous variables, especially not in the value of the bubble or in the dynamic efficiency. 
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The explicit structure of our VECM(4) model with two co-integration vectors, structural 
break and a restricted constant in the co-integration vector is represented in the following 
equation 4.9. 
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In this general equation describing the VECM (4) system, the “Г” matrices are the 
coefficient matrices of the lagged difference variables in the model, which are squared (4x4) 
matrices in our case with four endogenous variables. Matrices “Xi” represent the coefficient 
matrices of the exogenous stochastic variables in our model. We have only one stochastic 
exogenous variable, which is the first difference of the relative value of the equity bubble on 
the US equity market “B_USm”. Each matrix of coefficients “X” has a dimension of 4x1 
containing the coefficients of the lagged impact of the exogenous variable on our endogenous 
variables in the system. Then, our “ψ” matrix contains the coefficients measuring the impact 
of shocks captured by the deterministic variables, including all the dummy variables that are 
suspected to have an impact on our endogenous variables in the system. They are lagged at 
one period, due to the enforcement time required after the introduction of the legal acts. 
Finally, the co-integration matrix ∏ is presented in its decomposed form α[β‟:η‟], where η 
represents the co-integration coefficients of the deterministic term, in this case the constant 
(μ) and the structural shift (l_dShift_m9), which are part of the co-integration matrix. All 
variables in the VEC model are divided into three major groups - endogenous, exogenous and 
deterministic - and are presented in their vector form below in 4.10. 
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When we first difference our optimal five-period lagged levels VAR model, we 
generate a four period lagged VEC model. This is why we choose an optimal lag of 4 when 
estimating the VEC Model using JMulti. Because we want to estimate the VECM model in 
the presence of exogenous variables and with the optimal sub-set model restrictions, we use 
the two stage estimation procedure. For the estimation of the co-integration matrix in the first 
stage we performed S2S method. In such a case, JMulti eliminates all exogenous variables in 
the first stage, when estimating the co-integration matrix. Bruggeman and Lütkepohl 
proposed the use of S2S as a more efficient method with a small sample for estimation of the 
co-integration matrix in the first stage compared to the Johansen ML estimator (Bruggemann 
& Lutkepohl, 2005). The S2S method consists of two estimation steps. In the first step, we 
estimate the co-integration matrix using Least Square (LS) estimation. We identify the “α” 
and the “β” component matrices from the first predetermined “r” columns of the ∏ matrix. 
This requires that we pre-specify the rank of the co-integration matrix and properly structure 
the data before estimation. We found in the previous step using the Johansen test procedure, 
that the rank of the co-integration matrix equals two when we include a structural break. 
JMulti automatically normalizes the two co-integration vectors in the estimation procedure: 
the first, by restricting the value of the coefficient for the first variable “B_Croatia” to one 
and by restricting the second coefficient – on “DYNEF” – to zero; and the second, by 
restricting the value of the coefficient on the first variable “B-Croatia” to zero and 
normalizing the coefficient on the second variable “DYNEF” to one. This solves the 
identification problem, since otherwise there is an indefinite number of vectors spanning the 
vector space of each linearly independent co-integration vector. Given our theoretically 
determined ordering, this default procedure implemented by JMulti exactly identifies the two 
co-integrating vectors as economically meaningful long-term equilibrium relationships. 
The decision as to which two variables are to be ordered at the beginning of the vector 
of endogenous variables is determined by theoretical reasoning. In our case, we place the 
relative value of the Croatian equity bubble “B_Croatia” first and the dynamic efficiency of 
the Croatian financial market “DYNEF” second. These two variables are then normalized in 
the two co-integrating equations and related to the two DC pension fund investment variables 
“PFInvDirect” and “PFInvIndirect”, which are placed in the third and the fourth positions 
respectively in the vector of endogenous variables. This is the most logical order based on the 
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theoretical grounds in Chapter 2. It allows for two economically meaningful co-integrating 
vectors in the estimation process: first, where the relative value of the Croatian equity bubble 
“B_Croatia” is related to the two DC pension fund investment variables, while restricting the 
coefficient of the “DYNEF” to zero; and Second, where the Dynamic efficiency of the 
Croatian financial market “DYNEF” is related to the two DC pension fund investment 
variables, restricting the coefficient of “B_Croatia” to zero. Then, the co-integration matrix is 
estimated using the S2S method, and the “α” and “β” component vectors are estimated in the 
first step using OLS. 
What follows is the second step, which now expands the EC model by estimating the 
coefficient matrices on the short-term – i.e. first differenced – variables in the VECM system. 
JMulti uses Generalised Least Square (GLS) to estimate the short-term VAR system of first 
differences as part of the VECM conditional on the previously determined long-term 
equilibrium relations among the endogenous variables (Lütkepohl & Krätzig, 2004). Besides 
the inclusion of the exogenous and deterministic variables in the model, we also include a 
constant in the VECM. The constant term is restricted to the co-integration vector of the 
VECM system. The theory suggests that there should not be a trend connected to the 
development of the asset bubble so, by theory, a constant restricted to the co-integration 
vector without a trend represents the most suitable model. The estimation results of the 
unrestricted VEC Model, using the two-stage approach in the JMulti software are presented 
in Table 4.6.1. 
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Table 4.6.1 Unrestricted VECM estimation results of a two-stage method [1st:S2S;2nd: 
EGLS] 
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Before we specify a subset model by restricting the “Г”, “X” and “ψ” matrices from 
our basic VECM model as represented in equation 4.9 and estimated in Table 4.6.1, we test 
for the significance of the intercept as a deterministic component in the VECM.  We did this 
by estimating the model without the constant term. We present the residual statistics of this 
restricted model in Table 4.6.2.  
Table 4.6.2: Residuals statistics from the restricted model (omitting the constant term) 
 
20394321.2det(cov),
1
8519.01
2221.01870.01
0091.00143.00672.01
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Then we check the significance of the inclusion of the constant term in the model by 
calculating the Likelihood Ratio (LR) test statistics as presented in the equation 4.11. 
  TLR restrictededunrestrict  ~ln~ln  
 (4.11) 
The LR statistic is calculated as the difference between the natural log of the 
determinant of the VECM residuals covariance matrix of the unrestricted model (with 
intercept) and the natural log of the determinant of the restricted model (without intercept). 
The distribution of the LR test statistic asymptotically goes to the chi-square distribution with 
the degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions. In our case, the vector of constants 
within the co-integration matrix has a dimension of 1x2, which means we placed two 
restrictions on our restricted model setting the value of the two constants to zero.  Based on 
the determinants of the residuals covariance matrices of the restricted and the unrestricted 
model, equalling 2.211588E+20 and 2.394321E+20, and their natural logs 46.84541 and 
46.92480 respectively, we calculated the LR statistic of 12.07 for our sample of T=152. The 
value of the test statistic 12.07 is higher than the critical value of the Chi-square distribution 
at two degrees of freedom of 5.99 for p=0.05, which suggests a strong rejection of the null 
and thus favours acceptance of the alternative hypothesis that the deterministic constant term 
in the co-integration matrix of the VECM has significant explanatory power.  
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We also want to check the subset VEC Model, which is constructed according to 
different selection criteria by placing zero restrictions on selected (non-significant) regression 
coefficients. JMulti provides several subset model selection methodologies, such as the “top 
down approach”, the System SER and SER/Testing procedures and the method of elimination 
by t-statistic criteria. All methods, except for the elimination by t-statistics, use one of the 
three information criteria to select the optimal model restrictions. The AIC, HQ and SC 
information criterion are used within the Sequential Elimination of Regressors (SER), aiming 
at sequentially eliminating regressors that lead to a significant decrease of the underlying 
criterion used to compare the restricted and unrestricted method at each step. Brüeggemann, 
Krolzig and Lütkepohl, showed that choosing AIC, HQ or SC decision criteria for a model 
with 20 regressors based on T=100, gives a restriction results corresponding to a method of 
regressor elimination based on t- statistics that are not significant with 15-20%, 10% or 2-3% 
confidence levels respectively (Brüeggemann, Krolzig, & Lütkepohl, 2002). 
In order to select the optimal subset model selection criteria, we choose to apply not 
only all the available filtering approaches but also the diagnostic tests for each resulting 
model, as well as the LR-test statistic comparing the restricted model with the unrestricted 
model. We present the results of the selection process in Table 4.6.3. 
Table 4.6.3 Subset model selection criteria results for the VECM(4) 
Model 
Number 
of 
variables Testing residuals autocorrelation 
Testing joint residuals 
joint normality (p-
value) LR-test Det(Σ(u)) 
    LM(2) p-value LM(3) p-value       
Unrestricted 128 0.0046 0.0009 0 1 2.21E+20 
Top down -AIC 67 0.1252 0.1189 0 0.8158 3.21E+20 
Top down -HQ 51 0.599 0.4904 0 0.3914 3.76E+20 
Top Down -SC 40 0.4492 0.4768 0 0.1321 4.29E+20 
Restricted by abs(t)>2 55 0.8397 0.9288 0 0.7145 3.52E+20 
System SER (AIC) 72 0.2482 0.4438 0 0.999 2.66E+20 
System SER (HQ)* 60 0.9817 0.9899 0 0.9627 3.13E+20 
System SER (SC) 43 0.4422 0.5235 0 0.2171 4.16E+20 
SER/Testing procedure (AIC) 72 0.6683 0.8945 0 0.9906 2.89E+20 
SER/Testing procedure (HQ) 57 0.9561 0.6363 0 0.5257 3.59E+20 
SER/Testing procedure (SC) 46 0.6647 0.375 0 0.127 4.24E+20 
Source: Author, using JMulti 4.24 
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 Based on comparing different filtering criteria for the selection of the optimal subset 
model, we find that the System SER (HQ) selection criterion has advantages over the other 
selection criteria. It provides a model with the best balance between the number of 
explanatory variables kept in the model and the unexplained variance measured by the 
determinant of the residuals covariance matrix. It also rejects the residuals autocorrelation 
LM test with very strong confidence. We decide to use System SER based on the HQ 
information criterion as an optimal subset filtering method. We present the resulting subset 
regression model in Table 4.6.4 suggested by applying the System SER (HQ) subset selection 
criterion. 
Table 4.6.4 Subset Model with the System SER (HQ) selection method estimated by 
the two-stage method [1st:S2S;2nd: GLS];T=152 
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LR test (H1: unrestricted model) p-value = 0.9627 with 73 degrees of freedom 
Source: Author, using JMulti 4.24 
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4.7 VEC Model diagnostic tests results 
 
Having estimated our restricted subset model, we need to make sure that its diagnostic 
tests confirm that we could rely on it being unbiased.  We already undertook the formal 
autocorrelation tests based on the Lagrange Multiplier test, which showed that the residuals 
are not serially correlated (Table 4.6.3). We confirm this by checking the auto-correlation 
plots of the residuals from each of the individual equations of the subset VECM, with their 
lagged values up to the tenth previous month. We present the outcomes in Figure 4.7.1 
Figure 4.7.1 Subset VEC Model residual autocorrelations up to the 10th residual 
lag (with a 99% critical value bands): autocorrelation and partial correlation 
coefficients (u1 – u4, the residuals from equations 1-4 in the VECM) 
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Source: Author, using JMulti 4.24 
 
 We find that the graphed residuals autocorrelations of all four VECM equations 
confirm the outcomes of the LM tests of autocorrelation as presented in Table 4.6.3. Looking 
at the graphs, there is no statistically significant autocorrelation, breaking the critical +/- 
2/sqrt(T) bounds, at any lag of the residuals in any of the four equation in the model. In Table 
4.7.1, we report the results of the residuals autocorrelation test and normality test, and in line 
with the formal LM test, we conclude that there is no substantial autocorrelation of the 
regression residuals. 
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Table 4.7.1: Residuals autocorrelation and non-normality tests of our restricted VEC 
model 
 
LM-TYPE TEST FOR AUTOCORRELATION with 4 lags 
 
LM statistic:             42.4349  
p-value:                 0.9828   
df:                      64.0000  
 
TESTS FOR NONNORMALITY 
 
Reference: Doornik & Hansen (1994) 
joint test statistic:     11168.4728  
p-value:                 0.0000   
degrees of freedom:       8.0000   
skewness only:            721.2511  
p-value:                 0.0000   
kurtosis only:            10447.2216  
p-value:                 0.0000   
 
Reference: Lütkepohl (1993), Introduction to Multiple Time Series Analysis, 2ed, p. 153 
joint test statistic:     6645.8887  
p-value:                 0.0000   
degrees of freedom:       8.0000   
skewness only:            296.5880  
p-value:                 0.0000   
kurtosis only:            6349.3007  
p-value:                 0.0000   
 
*** Tue, 28 Jul 2015 16:46:11 *** 
JARQUE-BERA TEST 
 
variable        teststat   p-Value(Chi^2)  skewness   kurtosis   
u1              29.3274    0.0000          0.3476     5.0365    
u2              3820.0687  0.0000         -2.7762     26.9236   
u3              2507.8390  0.0000         -0.2039     22.8949   
u4              4729.6457  0.0000         -2.7046     29.7867 
Source: Author, using JMulti 4.24 
 
 We also check for the presence of cross-residual correlation. This is especially 
important for the further investigation of the results by impulse response function analysis.  
For this purpose, we look at the covariance matrix of our restricted model in Table 4.6.4. Our 
critical value for deciding if some contemporaneous cross-residual correlation is significant, 
is determined by the 2/sqrt(T) ratio, which equals 0.162. Comparing the critical value with 
the residuals correlation matrix in Table 4.6.4 we notice that the residuals of “B_Croatia” are 
not significantly correlated with any of the other equation residuals, while the strongest cross-
residual correlation exists between the residuals of the equation of “PFInvDirect”  and 
“PFInvIndirect”, amounting at -0.87. This negative cross correlation among the two 
investment variables occurs because of their generation process. Both variables are 
interpolated from their yearly frequency to a monthly frequency using a cubic formula, which 
induces greater similarity in the data generating process. This is why, even applying a 
structural VAR model estimation, with contemporaneous interactions among the variables, 
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we still find similar negative correlation of the residuals of the two investment equations. 
Based on the fact of the presence of the residual cross-correlation, we should be careful when 
analysing the impulse response functions. 
 In order to investigate further the existence of lagged cross-correlation of residuals, 
we also present the plot of cross correlations for all four residuals with each other. We see in 
Figure 4.7.2a-b that the residuals of “B_Croatia” and “DYNEF” equations are not cross-
correlated with the other equation residuals. This is especially important for our main 
equation of interest explaining “B_Croatia”. We also could not spot significant residual cross 
correlations of lags between the residuals for the equations describing “PFInvDirect” and 
“PFInvIndirect” presented in Figure 4.7.2c-d. 
Figure 4.7.2a Cross-residuals correlation of the “B_Croatia” residuals with the 
other equation residuals up to 10 lags 
 
Source: Author, using JMulTi 4.24 cross-correlation graphs 
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Figure 4.7.2b Cross-residuals correlation of the “DYNEF” residuals with the 
other equation residuals up to 10 lags 
 
Source: Author, using JMulTi 4.24 cross-correlation graphs 
 
Figure 4.7.2c Cross-residuals correlation of the “PFInvDirect” residuals with the 
other equation residuals up to 10 lags 
 
Source: Author, using JMulTi 4.24 cross-correlation graphs 
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Figure 4.7.2d Cross-residuals correlation of the “PFInvIndirect” residuals with 
the other equation residuals up to 10 lags 
 
Source: Author, using JMulTi 4.24 cross-correlation graphs 
 
 Referring to our test results in Table 4.7.1, we confirm that all residual distributions 
are statistically different from the normal distribution. The visual inspection of the residuals 
from all equations in the system is presented in Figure 4.7.4. 
We also plot the Error Correction mechanisms from our two co-integration vectors 
including a constant and a structural break dummy variable. We note the apparently mean 
reverting, hence non-trended nature of each co-integrating vector (as required), which is 
consistent with stationarity (Figure 4.7.3). 
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Figure 4.7.3 Dynamics of the residual from the Error-Correction equation 1 and 
2 
 
Source: Author, using JMulti 4.24 
 
Figure 4.7.4: Dynamics of the residuals in each equation in the VECM (4) 
 
Source: Author, using JMulTi 4.24 
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 4.8. Testing VECM structural stability 
 
The next important step in our empirical testing is the stability analysis of the model, 
i.e. of the estimated coefficients. Here we check whether the estimated model coefficients are 
stable as we expand our data series or across different subsets of our full data series. Stability 
of the coefficients is a requirement to confirm that the model is time-consistent. There are 
several visual checks and formal tests for the stability of the coefficients (Lütkepohl & 
Krätzig, 2004). We first visually analyse the stability of the most important “loading” 
coefficients in our model using recursive coefficients estimation and then we evaluate the 
formal Chow test for overall coefficient stability in the model.  
The recursive coefficients estimation technique, as described by Lütkepohl and 
Krätzig, estimates the regression coefficients starting with the minimum required data set 
beginning with the first observation (because of the degrees of freedom, estimation requires a 
minimum length of the data series). Then, the technique gradually expands the data set, 
finally reaching the complete data set of observations (Lütkepohl & Krätzig, 2004). JMulTi 
re-estimates the coefficients at each stage at which it expands the dataset, and presents the 
dynamics of the consecutively estimated coefficients with their confidence interval.  
It is expected for the coefficients to demonstrate non-stability at their initial 
estimations, because of the small subsets being used for estimation, but they should soon 
stabilize as we expand the data-set and approach the complete data set. Any abnormal shift 
that occurs after the initial stabilisation of the estimated coefficients signifies that there might 
be some structural shift in the data generation process that should be accounted for in the 
empirical analysis. Since we have 60 coefficients in our subset model presented in Table 
4.6.4 and just a little over 150 time periods we note that it could be normal to expect non-
stable coefficients on our visual inspection for the first half of the dataset. We use visual 
investigation only on the statistically significant loading coefficients from the “α” matrix, 
which determines the effects of disequilibrium in either or both of the co-integration vectors. 
There are 5 such coefficients in our subset model. JMulti determines the co-integration vector 
coefficients from the full data set. After showing recursive loading coefficients, we continue 
by applying the Chow testing procedures, which test the null hypothesis of stability of the 
overall model coefficients against the alternative of non-stable coefficients. 
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Looking at the recursive coefficient graphs of the alpha matrix loading coefficients, 
based on the short-run error correction mechanism of the two established co-integration 
relationships between the relative value of the Croatian equity bubble, the dynamic efficiency 
of the Croatian financial market and the two DC pension fund direct and indirect equity 
investment variables, we find that the error-correction loading coefficients, which affect the 
relative value of the Croatian equity bubble are relatively stable through time. The first graph 
in Figure 4.8.1 shows that after the initial period when the coefficient stabilized, in the later 
years the loading coefficient of the first error correction mechanism in “B_Croatia” was 
relatively stable taking values close to the average value of -0.175. This is very encouraging, 
especially because our main interest is the consistency of the long-term equilibrium equation 
with respect to the value of the Croatian equity bubble. We could not obtain a graphical 
presentation for the loading coefficient of the error correction mechanism of our second co-
integration vector into “B_Croatia” which had a value of -0.361 estimated using the full data 
set.  The third “loading” coefficient is for the second co-integration equation affecting the 
contemporaneous short-term dynamics of the direct investments of DC pension funds into 
Croatian equity “PFInvDirect”. This coefficient, after its initial instability, showed stable 
dynamics around its average of 789.687. Finally, looking at the last two graphs in Figure 
4.8.1, we couldn‟t obtain a graphical presentation of the impact of the first error correction 
mechanism on “PFInvIndirect”, but the impact of the second error correction mechanism 
showed the highest instability.  
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Figure 4.8.1 Recursive alpha vector estimation and coefficient stability 
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Source: Author, using JMulTi 4.24 
 
The instability of the loading coefficient for the second error correction mechanism on 
“PFInvIndirect” could be explained by the fact that it was not until 2006/2007 that the DC 
pension funds actually started investing in the SEE and Croatian Equity focused Open End 
Investment Funds. So it is normal to expect that the estimated loading coefficient would drift 
because the initial variation in this variable occurred in the period of 2007 and after. In other 
words, the DC pension fund indirect investment variable had values other than zero only after 
2006/2007, which produces a shift in the value of its loading coefficient. This means that the 
stabilisation of the coefficient is expected to occur later for this investment variable. 
In order to check for the stability of the coefficients of the whole subset VEC model, 
we also apply two variants of the Chow test. We present in Figure 4.8.2 the sample-split (SS) 
and the breaking-point (BP) Chow tests p-values for the null hypothesis of having time-
consistent coefficient estimates in the VECM. The bootstrapped p-values of this null 
hypothesis are estimated for the period 2003-2008 with 1000 replications in JMulTi. The 
logic behind the Chow time consistency sample-split test is to compare the log of the 
determinants of the residual covariance matrix of the model with the same explicit structure 
estimated with the whole data set to the one estimated with the two consecutive period 
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subsets from our complete data set (Lütkepohl & Krätzig, 2004). The formal definition of the 
test statistic is based on first finding the determinants of the covariance matrix based on the 
complete and partial data sets as presented in Equation 4.12 below, and then using them to 
calculate the two model time-consistency statistics, the Chow sample-split (SS) and the Chow 
breaking-point (BP) as presented in Equation 4.13 
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In Equation 4.12, we present the calculation of the different residual covariance 
matrices based on the same explicit model structure, but obtained from estimation applied on 
different data subsets. Here ∑u ,∑(1) and ∑(2) ,∑1,2 ,∑(1,2)represent covariance matrices of the 
regression residuals obtained from the full data set, from the data set from T=0 to T1 , from 
the data set from the point T2+1 to the last observation T, and for the two combined data 
subsets sets together respectively.  
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 Using the determinants of the covariance matrices of the model estimated on different 
subsets of the complete data set, the two Chow test coefficients for the sample-split (λSS) and 
for the break-point (λBP) are calculated. Both test statistics presented in Equation 4.13 are 
asymptotically χ2 distributed. We used JMulti, to obtain the values of the two test statistics 
for our subset model. The JMulti software expands the initial data set T1 by an increment of 
one month at a time and displays p-values for both test statistics of the stability null 
hypothesis. We see the graphed p-values of the bootstrapped estimation of the sample-split 
and break-point Chow test statistic in Figure 4.8.2a-b. The graph gives the p-values of the 
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tests on the null hypothesis of stability of the coefficients as the software expands the data set 
from the highest viable T1 value to the lowest viable T2 value, determined by the number of 
parameters in the model. For the periods when the p-value exceeds the critical level of the 
test, we cannot reject the null that the overall model coefficients are stable across the two data 
subsets.  We notice that, based on the Chow SS test statistics, except for the period before 
2002 when the pension funds were introduced, we could reject the coefficients stability 
hypothesis and accept the alternative that the coefficients in the model are not-stable.  The 
same is confirmed with the Chow BP test statistic where the p value equals zero. 
Figure 4.8.2a Sample-split Chow test statistic for the coefficient in our VECM (4) 
 
Source: Author, using JMulti 4.24 
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Figure 4.8.2b Break-point Chow test statistic for the coefficient in our VECM (4) 
 
Source: Author, using JMulTi 4.24 
 
Before we explain the intuition behind our estimated model results, we note that in the 
next empirical Chapter 5 we will present another model where, instead of using interpolated 
lower to higher frequency data of DC Pension fund investments (“PFInvDirect” and 
“PFInvIndirect”) we use an alternative DC pension fund investment explanatory variable, the 
variable measuring the investment of the Croatian DC pension funds into the potentially 
bubbly instrument the Croatian open-end mutual funds focused on Croatian and SEE equity 
investments (“OMF_AUMIndex”). Finally we will compare the two models and try to gain 
more insights based on their results.  
We continue by adding some intuitive explanation of the regression results. We 
explain the economic meaning of the long-term co-integration relationships as well as some 
of the short-term impact coefficients on the relative value of the Croatian equity bubble.  
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4.9. Economic meaning of the regression results 
 
4.9.1. Long term equilibrium relationships 
 
As we previously noted, we use the results from our theoretical model in Chapter 2 to 
determine the order of the endogenous variables for the estimation of our two co-integrating 
vectors. We set the two co-integrating long-term relationships normalized to the relative 
value of the Croatian equity bubble “B_Croatia” in the first co-integration vector, and to the 
dynamic efficiency of the Croatian financial market “DYNEF” in the second co-integration 
vector. This is because, based on the theoretical model, there are two logical long-term 
relationships governing the dynamics of the value of the bubbly asset: first, between the 
relative value of the Croatian equity bubble “B_Croatia” and the two investment variables of 
the DC pension funds (“PFInvDirect” and “PFInvIndirect”); and the second between the 
investment variables and the dynamic efficiency of the Croatian equity market “DYNEF”. 
For the investments in the bubbly asset to become rational, the necessary condition is 
determined by the dynamic inefficiency of the financial market, and this relationship is 
captured in the second co-integrating vector. The sufficient condition for the bubble to rise in 
its value is determined by the actual investments of the DC pension funds in the bubbly asset, 
which is captured by the first co-integrating relationship. We analyse those two estimated 
long-term relationships separately in the following lines. 
A) Error Correction Mechanism normalized on the relative value of 
the Croatian equity bubble “B_Croatia” 
 
 Looking at the first co-integration vector in our estimated subset model in Table 4.6.4, 
we find the most important equilibrium relationship between the variables of interest, the 
relative value of the Croatian equity bubble “B_Croatia” and the two DC pension funds 
investment variables, “PFInvDirect” representing the direct investments in Croatian equity 
and “PFInvIndirect” representing the indirect investments through the SEE and Croatian 
equity focused open-end mutual funds. Our first Long-term equilibrium relation based on the 
estimated VECM in Table 4.6.4 is presented in equation 4.14a-b (with t-statistics in 
parentheses).  
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 We notice that both direct investment in Croatian equity “PFInvDirect” and indirect 
investment of the DC pension funds through the Croatian and SEE equity focused open-end 
mutual funds “PFInvIndirect” have a positive long-term relationship with the relative value of 
the Croatian equity bubble (Equation 4.14b). We also find that this relationship is stronger 
and statistically more significant for the direct equity investments. However, we must note 
that the t-statistics in this context cannot be compared with the t-student distribution to 
determine significance, because in the presence of stochastic trends within the error 
correction vectors the critical values are nonstandard and unknown (Stock, 1987).  
Based on the co-integration coefficients, a one million EUR additional yearly 
investment by the DC pension funds in Croatian equity corresponds to a 0.8 percentage point 
higher relative value of the Croatian equity bubble. This same amount additionally invested 
in the Croatian and SEE equity focused open-end mutual funds, corresponds to a 0.2 
percentage point increase in the relative value of the Croatian equity bubble. This shows that 
the introduction of the DC pension funds with positive investments on the Croatian equity 
market positively affects the possible occurrence of the bubbly asset and its relative value. 
With an intercept of -24.8 percentage points, for the relative value of the Croatian equity 
bubble to be non-negative, DC pension funds would be required – ceteris paribus - to invest 
over 50 million euro‟s yearly (25*0.8+25*0.2), when the amount is equally split between the 
direct and indirect equity investments. For the relative value of the bubble to exceed 100 
percentage points as it was the case during the Croatian bubbly episode, this investment 
amount should be five times higher or over 250 million euro‟s a year. 
Finally, looking at the first long-term equilibrium relationship, we notice that the 
structural shift caused by the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) had a strong effect on the long-
term balance between the relative value of the Croatian equity bubble and the Croatian DC 
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pension fund investments. The occurrence of the GFC, creating a positive shift in the error 
correction value by 20.8 percentage points, required either a strong correction in the value of 
the Croatian equity bubble, or a strong increase in the DC pension fund direct and indirect 
investments into the Croatian equity required to sustain the relative value of the asset bubble 
to its value just before the GFC. The Global Financial Crisis, ceteris paribus moved the 
equilibrating value of the Croatian equity bubble by 20.8 percentage points lower compared 
to its previous value.   
To see how the system adjusts to the new equilibrium when the first error correction 
mechanism is disturbed as demonstrated by the occurrence of the GFC, we look at the 
statistically significant loading coefficients, which explain the first order adjustment 
mechanisms. Of course, the second, third and fourth order adjustments are present because of 
the higher order lagged influence of the change in the endogenous variables in the system and 
their effects will be completely described by the impulse response analysis. 
If we impose a positive disturbance in the first error correction mechanism, as was the 
case with the occurrence of the GFC, then in order for the system to return to its long-term 
equilibrium, it needs to either negatively affect the relative value of the Croatian equity 
bubble “B_Croatia” or positively affect the two investment variables through the loading 
coefficients.  We find that the first error correction mechanism negatively feeds into the 
system through the correction of the relative value of the Croatian equity bubble “B_Croatia” 
and, at the same time, positively feeds into the system through the investments of the DC 
pension funds in the Croatian and SEE equity focused open-end mutual funds 
“PFInvIndirect”. So, although with different signs, the two loading coefficients are both 
stabilising the disturbance of the first error correction mechanism. One interesting insight at 
this point is that the direct equity investments are not used to bring the bubbly asset to its 
long-term equilibrating relationship with the investment variables, but only the indirect 
investments through the Croatian and SEE open-end mutual funds. This is our first sign that 
the Croatian and SEE equity focused open-end mutual funds “PFInvIndirect” are our 
candidate bubbly asset. Obviously, when equity becomes expensively valuated in speculative 
valuation territory, this is identified by the DC pension funds only through the direct equity 
investments.  
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To find the intensity by which the system corrects itself, we analyse the absolute and 
relative impact of the two loading coefficients. The first loading coefficient, impacting the 
relative value of the Croatian equity bubble “B_Croatia”, has the value of -0.175 (t statistic of 
-3.73) and is the most intensive one. This means that ceteris paribus, a unit error disturbance 
from the first co-integration relationship, measured in percentage points of the relative value 
of the Croatian equity bubble, is corrected through its effect on the relative value of the 
Croatian equity bubble by more than 85% during a period of 10 months (1-((1-
0.175)
^10
)=0.854) or over 90% in a period of one year. On the other side, the second 
statistically significant loading coefficient is the one affecting the indirect DC pension fund 
investments through the Croatian and SEE equity focused open end mutual funds 
“PFInvIndirect”. Although with a positive value of 947.48 (t statistic 2.71), or less than one 
thousand euro‟s per unit of the first error correction term, it also has stabilizing role on the 
dynamics of the Croatian equity bubble. This is because “PFInvIndirect” negatively affects 
the error generated within the first co-integrating relationship (equation 4.14a). In other 
words, although its loading coefficient is positive, multiplied by its coefficient within the first 
error correction mechanism, which is negative, changes in “PFInvIndirect” create a 
decreasing next period effect on the value of the error correction term. Finally, comparing the 
two loading coefficients, we note that the adjustment through the relative value of the bubble 
itself dominates the adjustment mechanism. 
We conclude that, to be sustained, the value of the bubble must be maintained by the 
investment of the DC pension funds either directly in Croatian equity and/or indirectly 
through SEE and Croatian equity focused open-end mutual funds. But if there is a positive 
shock on the first co-integrating relationship, we either need some irrationally high increase 
in DC pension fund investment or the system will tend to stabilize to the new equilibrium by 
decreasing the relative value of the bubble through the collapse of its price which, based on 
the loading coefficients, is the more likely outcome. 
B) Error Correction Mechanism normalized on the dynamic 
efficiency of the Croatian equity market “DYNEF” 
 
The second co-integration vector is the one that explains the platform, or the fertile 
environment for the occurrence of the bubbly investments. It actually explains how the DC 
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pension fund investment variables in the productive and the bubbly assets co-exist with the 
dynamic efficiency of the Croatian financial market.  
We previously explained that although both direct and indirect investments in 
Croatian equity represent the same ultimate allocation of financial assets in the Croatian 
equity, perceptions about the two investment vehicles are different, reflecting the extended 
agency problem and information asymmetries present in the case of indirect investments 
through the Open End Mutual Funds. Due to this, indirect investments through the Open End 
Mutual Funds might be more closely associated with the bubbly part of the value of the 
Croatian equity compared to the direct equity investments. Moreover, as both investment 
vehicles are available to the DC pension funds, their use of the two investment vehicles in a 
different manner at a same point of time could signal that, although allocating investments to 
the same underlying asset, those two vehicles are treated and viewed differently by the 
institutional investors: respectively, as direct investment in the intrinsic value of productive 
equity investment; and indirectly – via the Mutual Funds – as a way to invest in the bubbly 
component of the price of equity. 
We also stress that although the DC pension funds, as previously explained in Figure 
1.2.2 in Chapter 1, are present on the demand side for investment assets, absorbing part of the 
supply of the bubbly asset, they also can be on the supply side. In cases when they are 
required to sell a number of units of the bubbly asset in excess of the number of units they 
have to purchase, they actually play the role of a net supplier of the bubbly asset to the 
financial market from their own accumulated stock of units of the bubbly assets.  
As was hypothesized by our theoretical model, the financial market environment 
could be stimulating or restricting the occurrence of the asset bubble. The long-term 
relationship between the DC pension fund investments and the dynamic efficiency of the 
Croatian financial market is presented by the second co-integrating equation (4.15a-b). 
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 Looking at the second co-integrating long-term relationship, we see that the low and 
negative dynamic efficiency co-exists in the long-term equilibrium with a high level of DC 
pension funds direct equity investments. This suggests that direct equity investments 
represent the productive investments from our theoretical model in Chapter 2. As the 
productive investments increase, their diminishing rate of return negatively impacts the 
dynamic efficiency of the financial market, which is consistent with the theoretical model. In 
contrast, the indirect investments presented by “PFInvIndirect” provide an alternative 
investment vehicle crowding out part of the productive investments, thereby having an 
indirectly positive impact on their investment returns and solving the problem of dynamic 
inefficiency of the financial market. 
This identification of the direct investments “PFInvDirect” with the productive asset 
in our theoretical model, compared with the indirect investments “PFInvIndirect” as the 
bubbly asset in our theoretical model, is consistent with the different agency problems and 
informational characteristics of the two asset classes. The agency problem and the imperfect 
information issues increase in the case of indirect investments using open-end mutual funds, 
which helps to explain their potentially more speculative character making them better 
candidates for being accepted as a bubbly asset. Conversely, DC pension funds are more able 
to understand the fundamental value of the Croatian companies when directly investing in 
their equity, more likely characterizing them as a productive investment vehicle. 
 The overinvestment into productive capital (direct equity investments), as shown in 
our theoretical model, is associated with the financial market becoming dynamically 
inefficient and this could be seen in our second co-integrating relationship. As the amount of 
direct equity investments increase, the financial market returns decrease, which indicates that 
the financial market becomes less and less dynamically efficient. Namely, from the equation 
4.19b, we see that 1 million euro‟s of additional yearly direct equity investments coexist with 
reduced financial market efficiency by 0.2 measurement units. Such interaction of the 
productive investments and financial market dynamic efficiency is described in the 
theoretical model in Chapter 2. When the financial market becomes dynamically inefficient 
due to over-accumulation of productive investments, this creates a fertile platform for the 
bubbly asset to occur, thereby crowding out part of the productive investments. The rational 
consequence of a dynamically inefficient financial market, as shown in our theoretical model, 
is the occurrence of the rational need for the introduction of bubbly assets, which will bring 
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the financial market to its dynamically optimal “golden steady state”. Such a bubbly asset 
plays its role of solving the problem of dynamic inefficiency of the financial market, by 
crowding out part of the overly accumulated productive investments (Chapter2 - Figure 2.4). 
Looking back at the second co-integrating vector, it is clear that the bubbly asset improving 
the dynamic efficiency of the Croatian financial market is the investment into the Croatian 
and SEE equity oriented open-end mutual funds “PFInvIndirect”. 
 Again it is important to see how the disturbance in the long-term relationship between 
the financial market dynamic efficiency and the two investment variables corrects itself. 
Looking at the loading coefficients in the second column of the “α” loading coefficient 
matrix in Table 4.6.4, we find that the disturbance does not correct itself through the next 
period impact on the dynamic efficiency “DYNEF”. The correction is made through the 
change in the two investment variables, and indirectly through the relative value of the equity 
asset bubble. This is the expected outcome, as dynamic inefficiency is not a consequence, but 
the cause of the occurrence of and investments in the bubbly asset. We notice that there are 
only indirect short-run effects - from the lagged changes in the investment variables - on the 
Dynamic efficiency of the Croatian equity market. We notice also that the loading 
coefficients on the investment variables in the case of the disturbances of the second co-
integrating relationship have a destabilizing effect. In the case of a positive error in the 
second co-integrating relationship (i.e. increased dynamic efficiency), adjustment requires 
either decreasing direct investments “PFInvDirect” or increasing indirect investments 
“PFInvIndirect”. But the loading coefficients are moving the dynamics of the system in the 
opposite direction, increasing direct investments “PFInvDirect” and decreasing indirect 
investments “PFInvIndirect”, which has a destabilizing direct effect on the second error-
correction term. When we look at the absolute values of adjustments initiated by a unit 
disturbance of the second error correction mechanism on the investment variables, we notice 
that the total adjustment of around 3 thousand euro‟s (equal to the sum of the two loading 
coefficients of the second error correction mechanism on the two investment variables) per 
measurement unit of the dynamic efficiency is negligible
12
. Most significant adjustment is 
made through the relative value of the Croatian equity bubble (the effect on the prices of the 
bubbly asset). Namely, a positive unit error in the second error correction mechanism 
                                                 
12
 Given that both coefficients are destabilizing, we add them together to obtain the combined effect. 
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produces around a quarter percentage point decrease of the relative value of the Croatian 
equity bubble in the following period. Such a negative effect of the increase in the dynamic 
efficiency of the Croatian equity market on the relative value of the Croatian equity bubble is 
an expected outcome from our theoretical model. Because “B_Croatia” doesn‟t appear in the 
second co-integrating vector, the stabilisation is then effected though the dynamics of the 
whole system, which will be analysed though IR analysis.  
 We also have a structural shift in the second co-integrating vector occurring with the 
incidence of the Global Financial Crisis in September 2008 (I_shift_m9 = 1). It produces a 
negative error correction term (-7.234) requiring a strong increase of the dynamic efficiency 
of the Croatian financial market in order to bring the second long-term relationship into 
equilibrium. To get a complete image on the interaction of our endogenous variables in the 
model, with the confidence intervals describing their significance, we will look at the Impulse 
Response Analysis. 
 To analyze the holistic picture about the interactions of our endogenous variables in 
the VECM (4) system, we complete our analysis by the use of Impulse Response Function 
analysis. For this purpose, we will introduce a unit impulse on each endogenous variable in 
the model, and analyse its accumulated effect on the value of itself, and on the rest of the 
endogenous variables. The effect is “accumulated”, because it accumulates through time in 
the system based on the holistic interaction of all endogenous variables. We present the 
outcomes in Figure 4.9.1a-d, where four separate graphs for each endogenous variable in the 
model are shown. Each graph represents the accumulated response of the observed variable 
(y- axis) during the period of 36 months (x- axis), caused by an independent unit shock 
introduced to one of the four endogenous variables at the month 0. 90% confidence interval 
bands are constructed around the expected impact using the Efron bootstrapped CI method 
(Diciccio & Efron, 1996). 
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Figure 4.9.1a: Accumulated IR on “B_Croatia” induced by a unit shock 
introduced to (a) “B_Croatia”, (b) “DYNEF”, (c) “PFInvDirect” and (d)  
“PFInvIndirect” (T=36, conf. interval 90%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author, using JMulti 4.24 
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Looking at the IR analysis in Figure 4.9.1a, from the upper left corner panel [a], we 
find that the relative value of the Croatian equity bubble tends to persist in its value. A unit 
shock introduced on the relative value of the Croatian equity bubble “B_Croatia”, tends to 
create a higher cumulative effect on itself in the following 36 months. This captures a 
trending behaviour of the relative value of the Croatian equity bubble where a positive shock 
induces additional growth of the bubble itself. The mechanism also works in the opposite 
direction, when the crash of the bubble begins it intensifies itself in the following 36 months. 
In the upper right corner panel [b] of Figure 4.9.1a, we see that although a unit shock 
introduced on the value of the dynamic efficiency of the Croatian financial market “DYNEF” 
has a negative average effect on the relative value of the Croatian equity bubble, this effect is 
statistically insignificant. Finally, we analyse the impact of the introduction of the DC 
pension fund investment on the relative value of the Croatian equity bubble presented in the 
lower left and right corner panel [c] and panel [d] of Figure 4.9.1a. We find that both 
variables have a positive and significant impact on the relative value of the Croatian equity 
bubble. Especially in the case of a unit positive shock introduced to the indirect DC pension 
fund investments through the Croatian and SEE equity focused open-end mutual funds 
“PFInvIndirect”, the effect on the relative value of the Croatian equity bubble “B_Croatia” is 
positive and highly significant. The same positive unit shock introduced on the direct 
Croatian equity investments “PFInvDirect” becomes statistically insignificant 2 years after 
the shock is introduced (panel [c]). This once again contributes to the argument that the 
indirect DC pension fund investments through the open-end mutual funds investing in the 
Croatian and SEE equity are representing the bubbly asset. As we warned in the previous 
lines, IR analysis is affected by the negative correlation of the residuals of the two investment 
variables, this is why we are not going to comment on the absolute effects of a unit shock 
introduced on each investment variable, because such a unit shock might, at the same time, 
coexist with an opposite shock on the other investment variable. This means that a correct 
absolute effect analysis of a unit currency invested in “PFInvIndirect” should account for the 
over 0.8 units of currency disinvested from other “PFInvDirect” investment variable at the 
same time. What is important at this point, especially related to the hypothesis on the impact 
of the DC pension funds from the theoretical model, is that the total increase of the DC 
pension fund direct and indirect investments in Croatian equity market (“PFInvDirect” and 
“PFInvIndirect”), corresponding to the introduction of the DC pension funds on the Croatian 
equity market, have a positive and significant effect on the relative value of the Croatia equity 
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bubble “B_Croatia”. This is shown in panels [c] and [d] in Figure 4.9.1a, and it confirms our 
main hypothesis defined in Chapter 2. 
Figure 4.9.1b: Accumulated IR on “DYNEF” induced by a unit shock introduced 
to (a) “B_Croatia”, (b) “DYNEF”, (c) “PFInvDirect” and (d) “PFInvIndirect” 
(T=36, conf. interval 90%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author, using JMulti 4.24 
282 | P a g e  
 
Figure 4.9.1b shows the accumulated impact to the value of the Croatian financial 
market dynamic efficiency “DYNEF” caused by a unit shock introduced to each endogenous 
variable in the system. In the upper left panel [a] of Figure 4.9.1b, we find that a unit shock 
introduced to the relative value of the Croatian equity bubble “B_Croatia” has no statistically 
significant effect on the dynamic efficiency of the Croatian equity market “DYNEF”.  
On the other side, the dynamic efficiency “DYNEF” shows a high persistence in its 
value, which can be seen on the upper right panel [b] in Figure 4.9.1b. A unit shock 
introduced to the value of the Croatian financial market dynamic efficiency “DYNEF” 
persists and even accumulates over its initial unit shock in the following 36 months.  This 
also works in the opposite direction when a negative shock is introduced to the value of the 
Croatian financial market dynamic efficiency. 
 We are also interested to analyze the impact of a positive unit shocks introduced to 
the DC pension fund investment variables on the dynamic efficiency of the Croatian financial 
market. Our theoretical model assumes that the over-accumulation of the productive 
investments lowers the dynamic efficiency of the financial market. This hypothesis is 
confirmed by the accumulated impact on the dynamic efficiency “DYNEF” caused by a unit 
shock introduced on the direct investments of the DC pension fund “PFInvDirect”. As shown 
in the panel [c], a positive unit shock introduced on the DC pension fund direct equity 
investment variable, has a negative and significant impact on the dynamic efficiency of the 
Croatian financial market. This implies that the DC pension funds direct equity investments 
“PFInvDirect” are less speculative and more corresponding to the productive investments 
from our theoretical model. On the other side, a unit positive shock introduced to the indirect 
DC pension fund equity investments through the Croatian and SEE equity focused open-end 
mutual funds, “PFInvIndirect”, has no statistically significant effect on the dynamic 
efficiency of the Croatian financial market “DYNEF” as shown in the lower right panel [d] in 
Figure 4.9.1b. This result once again confirms that the indirect equity investments are a better 
bubbly asset candidate. Although the direct equity investment of the DC pension funds 
“PFInvDirect” decreases Croatian financial market dynamic efficiency, the indirect equity 
investments “PFInvIndirect” and the relative value of the bubble itself “B_Croatia” have no 
statistically significant impact on the Croatian financial market dynamic efficiency. Our 
theoretical model implies that the bubbly asset is a rational consequence of the dynamic 
inefficiency of the financial market solving the systemic problem of dynamic efficiency but 
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not affecting dynamic efficiency itself. This corresponds to the non-significant impact of a 
unit shock introduced on the bubbly indirect equity investment and on the relative value of 
the Croatian equity bubble on the Croatian financial market dynamic efficiency. 
Figure 4.9.1c: Accumulated IR on “PFInvDirect” induced by a unit shock 
introduced to (a)“B_Croatia”, (b)“DYNEF”, (c) “PFInvDirect” and (d) 
“PFInvIndirect” (T=36, conf. interval 90%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author, using JMulti 4.24 
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In Figure 4.9.1c above, and in Figure 4.9.1d below, we analyze the accumulated effect 
of a unit shock introduced to each individual endogenous variable in the model on, 
respectively, the DC pension fund investment variables “PFInvDirect” and “PFInvIndirect”. 
Because the accumulated effects are very similar for both direct and indirect DC pension fund 
investment variables, we will comment on them jointly. In the upper left panel [a] of both 
Figure 4.9.1c and Figure 4.9.1d, we find that a positive unit shock in the relative value of the 
Croatian equity bubble “B_Croatia” accumulates to a positive effect on the direct and indirect 
DC pension fund investments. The effect is felt sooner (in 6 months) in the case of the 
indirect investment (Figure 4.9.1d panel [a]) compared to the direct investment variable 
(Figure 4.9.1c [a]).  
We also find in the upper right panel [b] in Figure 4.9.1c and Figure 4.9.1d, that 
although the positive unit shock introduced on the Croatian financial market dynamic 
efficiency “DYNEF” has a statistically insignificant accumulated effect on both direct and 
indirect DC pension fund investment variables, the average accumulated impact on both 
investment variables is negative. Based on the hypothesis drawn from our theoretical model, 
we should expect the dynamic efficiency to have an especially negative and significant effect 
on the bubbly asset in our case best represented by the indirect DC pension fund investments 
through the Croatian and SEE equity focused open-end mutual funds “PFInvIndirect”. This is 
not confirmed by the confidence intervals in panel [b] in both Figure 4.9.1c and in Figure 
4.9.1d. The issue of strong negative cross-correlation of the residuals among our two 
estimated equations for the direct and indirect investment variables (Table 4.6.4), maybe 
affecting our IR analysis results. This problem will be addressed by our second empirical 
model in Chapter 5 where instead of using two, we will be using a single variable for the DC 
pension fund speculative investments. 
 
Finally, looking at the lower panels [c] and [d] in Figure 4.9.1c and in Figure 
4.9.1d, we find that a positive unit shocks introduced on each DC pension fund direct or 
indirect investment variable, tends to self-induce both higher direct and indirect DC pension 
fund investments in the next periods. This shows that DC pension fund investments are self-
inducing in both positive and negative directions; i.e. not only during the rise of the stock 
market but also in a negative direction during the crash of the financial markets and during 
the crash of the speculative bubble.   
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Figure 4.9.1d: Accumulated IR on “PFInvIndirect” induced by a unit shock 
introduced to (a)“B_Croatia”, (b)“DYNEF”, (c) “PFInvDirect” and (d) 
“PFInvIndirect” (T=36, conf. interval 90%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author, using JMulti 4.24 
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Finally, analyzing the impact of the exogenous and dummy variables in our estimated 
model in Table 4.6.4, we find that the US equity market, as the representative of the global 
financial markets, has a one month lagged positive short-term effect on the change in the 
relative value of the Croatian equity bubble. One percentage point increase in the relative 
value of the US equity market bubble causes a 0.629 percentage point rise in the relative 
value of the Croatian equity bubble after one month. This captures the interconnection of the 
Croatian with the global financial markets and suggests that the significant correction of the 
US equity markets during the GFC caused an additional negative impact on the Croatian 
equity bubble, decreasing the valuations on the Croatian equity market.  
The introduction of regulation increasing the transparency of the DC pension fund 
investments, denoted by “Dummy4=1”, had a shocking impact on the relative value of the 
bubble (+16.7 pp) and on the dynamic efficiency of the Croatian equity market (+4.2). This 
event causes disturbing dynamics on the Croatian equity market, increasing the value of the 
bubble, but also increasing the dynamic efficiency of the financial market, which decreases 
the value of the bubble.  
Both dummy variables representing the initiation of the DC pension funds 
“Dummy1=1” and the legislative acts widening the investment horizon of the DC pension 
funds on the Croatian equity market “Dummy3=1” have one-time negative and a one-time 
positive effects on the direct and on the indirect DC pension fund investments respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
287 | P a g e  
 
4.10. Concluding remarks 
 
Estimating our theoretical model using data that describes the actual direct and 
indirect DC pension funds equity investments, and the relative value of the equity bubble in 
Croatian equity market, we find supportive results confirming the factors driving the bubbly 
equity market dynamics hypothesised in our theoretical model in Chapter 2.  
We found that the VECM (4) with the two investment variables describing the 
introduction of the DC pension fund on the Croatian financial market should be derived from 
a VAR (5) levels model, and that a structural shift in the long-term equilibrium caused by the 
Global Financial Crisis has a meaningful role in the VECM with two co-integrating 
relationships. We set the suggested two long-term relationships (co-integrating vectors) based 
on theoretical reasoning and their estimation showed us the following two long-term 
equilibrating relationships:  
 the first, signifying the positive long-run relationship among the relative value of the 
equity bubble and both DC pension fund direct equity investments and indirect equity 
investments through the Croatian and SEE equity focused open-end mutual funds; and   
 the second, signifying the long term relationship between the dynamic efficiency of the 
Croatian equity market and the direct and indirect equity investments of the Croatian DC 
pension funds.  
From the second relationship we found that direct equity investments have a negative 
relation to the Croatian financial market dynamic efficiency, which characterizes them as a 
productive investment vehicle. The negative impact of the DC pension fund direct equity 
investments on the dynamic efficiency of the Croatian financial market was also confirmed 
using IR analysis. The indirect investments have an opposite – positive (corrective) impact on 
dynamic efficiency – characterizing them as a bubbly asset. The loading coefficients confirm 
that the shocks in the first and in the second long-term relationship mostly adjust through the 
relative value of the Croatian equity bubble. This means that a positive shock in the first error 
correction mechanism produced by lower DC pension fund direct and indirect investments, or 
a positive shock in the second error correction term caused by higher dynamic efficiency, will 
adjust mainly through the decrease in the relative value of the Croatian equity bubble. From 
our results we also find that the introduction of the DC pension funds, measured by their 
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direct and indirect investments, produced a deterioration of the dynamic efficiency of the 
Croatian financial market and created a fertile ground for the occurrence of the bubbly assets. 
The indirect investments, through the Croatian and SEE equity focused open-end mutual 
funds, played the role of the bubbly asset increasing the relative value of the Croatian equity 
bubble and solving the problem of dynamic inefficiency of the Croatian financial market.  
The Global Financial Crisis played a critical role for the collapse of the Croatian 
equity bubble. It produced an immediate negative effect on the relative value of the Croatian 
equity bubble by making its value overpriced compared to the amount of DC pension fund 
investments and by making the dynamic efficiency of the Croatian equity market lower than 
its long-term equilibrating value. This interaction together with the direct external market 
impact produced a swift collapse of the equity asset bubble. Having found that the indirect 
DC pension fund investments to the Croatian equity, through the Croatian and SEE equity 
focused open-end mutual funds, are the best candidate representative of the bubbly asset used 
by the DC pension funds, in the following chapter we will develop a simpler model that 
substitutes our lower to higher frequency interpolated direct and indirect investment variables 
with a single variable representing an index of assets under management of the open-end 
mutual funds used by the DC pension funds with a genuine higher frequency. The use of a 
single investment variable will produce a simpler model and will solve the issue of residual 
cross-correlation existent among the two interpolated investment variables used in this 
chapter. 
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5. Model 2: Explaining the Croatian equity bubble with the DC pension 
fund investments represented by a single investment variable 
“OMF_AUMIndex” 
 
Introduction 
 
 In this fifth Chapter we present an empirical model explaining the dynamics of the 
Croatian equity bubble using an endogenous explanatory variable, the index of the assets 
under management of the Croatian and SEE equity focused open-end mutual funds 
“OMF_AUMIndex”, instead of the two lower to higher frequency interpolated investment 
variables “PFInvDirect” and “PFInvIndirect”. We showed the detailed derivation of this I(1) 
variable in Chapter 3, and here we recall its main characteristics.  
The variable “OMF_AUMIndex” is a genuine monthly index variable (Dec. 2004 = 
100), which explains the relative dynamics of the value of Assets under Management (AUM) 
of the Croatian and SEE equity focused open-end mutual funds invested by DC pension 
funds. Its main idea is to present a good estimate of the genuine monthly investments of the 
Croatian DC pension funds, being the dominant investors in the identified bubbly asset, the 
Croatian and SEE equity focused open-end mutual funds. In order to present only net 
investment amounts, net of the equity price changes, the index is discounted by the monthly 
dynamics of the “Crobex”, the Croatian general equity market price index. In order to 
represent the DC pension fund investments, the index is calculated as a weighted average of 
the monthly dynamics of the AUM of all open-end mutual funds investing in Croatian and 
SEE equity, weighted by their yearly weights in the DC pension fund portfolios. This way, 
this index closely represents the monthly index of investments of the DC pension funds into 
the bubbly indirect investment vehicle, the Croatian and SEE equity focused open-end mutual 
funds. By using this index variable instead of the two investment variables “PFInvDirect” and 
“PFInvIndirect”, we gain an explanatory variable with a genuine higher frequency whose 
monthly variance is much richer with information. Because we are not using interpolation, 
we also exclude the residuals cross-correlation issue, which we had in our previous model for 
the residuals of the two interpolated investment variables. 
 But we also lose, because this variable also contains noise from the other investors 
who are also investing money in those open-end mutual funds together with the DC pension 
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funds. In addition, we also have a much shorter data set starting at the end of 2006, almost at 
the peak of the asset bubble when the monthly assets under management of the open-end 
mutual funds started being reported by the regulatory agency on a monthly basis (previously 
only yearly data was reported). 
 Comparing the “OMF_AUMIndex” variable with the dynamics of the DC pension 
fund indirect investments in the SEE and Croatian equity focused open-end mutual funds 
represented by “PFInvIndirect”, we notice very similar dynamics. The only significant 
difference following after the collapse of the bubble in the mid of 2008, when the 
“PFInvIndirect” exhibits higher recovery than “OMF_AUMIndex”, could partly be due to the 
noise contained in the value of “OMF_AUMIndex” coming from the actions of other 
investors –“herd followers” – who were also investing/disinvesting in the Croatian and SEE 
equity focused open-end mutual funds. We present the dynamics of the two variables in 
Figure 5.0.1. 
Figure 5.0.1 Plot of “OMF_AUMIndex”(LH panel) and “PFInvIndirect” (RH 
panel) standardized by their standard deviation 
 
Source: Author, using JMulTi 4.24 
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5.1. Lag order of the underlying VAR model 
 
In order to estimate the model using the “OMF_AUMIndex” variable instead of the 
“PFInvDirect” and “PFInvIndirect” variables, we proceed by first investigating the optimal 
order of the underlying VAR model. We do this by checking the suggested lag using 
information criteria, and then the diagnostics at different lags of the VAR model, where only 
“B_Croatia”, “DYNEF” and “OMF_AUMIndex” are endogenous variables. The results from 
the investigation of the optimal order of the levels VAR model based on the information 
criteria are presented in Table 5.1.1. 
Table 5.1.1 Suggested VAR lag order for a model without a constant, with a constant, 
and with both trend and a constant using information criterion 
 
endogenous variables:     B_Croatia DYNEF OMF_AUMIndex  
exogenous variables:      B_US_d1  
exogenous lags (fixed):   2  
deterministic variables:  dummy4_L1_d1 dummy3_L1_d1  
sample range:             [2007 M6, 2010 M12], T = 43 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 6 lags of levels): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    1             
Final Prediction Error:   1             
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   1             
Schwarz Criterion:        1             
 
 
endogenous variables:     B_Croatia DYNEF OMF_AUMIndex  
exogenous variables:      B_US_d1  
exogenous lags (fixed):   2  
deterministic variables:  dummy4_L1_d1 dummy3_L1_d1 CONST  
sample range:             [2007 M6, 2010 M12], T = 43 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 6 lags of levels): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    6             
Final Prediction Error:   1             
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   1             
Schwarz Criterion:        1             
 
 
endogenous variables:     B_Croatia DYNEF OMF_AUMIndex  
exogenous variables:      B_US_d1  
exogenous lags (fixed):   2  
deterministic variables:  dummy4_L1_d1 dummy3_L1_d1 CONST TREND  
sample range:             [2007 M6, 2010 M12], T = 43 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 6 lags of levels): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    6             
Final Prediction Error:   1             
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   1             
Schwarz Criterion:        1         
*info-criteria estimation made up to the 6th lag because of the short dataset T=43 
Source: Author, using JMulti 4.24 
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Although we find that the lag order of 1 in the underlying levels VAR model is 
dominantly suggested by the information criterion, we continue with the lag order selection 
procedure by comparing the diagnostic tests and checks of the underlying levels VAR model 
at different lag orders. We first present Table 5.1.2 where the LMF residuals autocorrelation 
test p-values are presented for different VAR lag orders of the models without a constant, 
with only a constant, and with a constant and a trend. The LMF test p-values represent the 
probability of rejecting the null hypothesis of no residual autocorrelation and making a Type 
1 error (rejecting the null when actually the null hypothesis is valid). We conclude that the 
VAR model with the lag order of one has the most favourable residual non-autocorrelation 
test statistics.  
Table 5.1.2 LMF tests of residual auto-correlation for different lag order of the VAR 
model 
  no constant or trend constant, no trend constant and trend 
  LMF(2) LMF(3) LMF(2) LMF(3) LMF(2) LMF(3) 
VAR(1) 0.1723 0.2068 0.4738 0.5097 0.5154 0.4681 
VAR(2) 0.0801 0.0143 0.0609 0.0344 0.0383 0.0212 
VAR(3) 0.0145 0.0038 0.0113 0.0059 0.0027 0.0005 
VAR(4) 0.0643 0.0694 0.1739 0.0737 0.1713 0.0605 
VAR(5) 0.2285 0.1906 0.0029 0.0057 0.0267 0.0307 
VAR(6) 0.0015 0.0265 0.037 0.1423 0.1579 0.2677 
Source: Author, using JMulTi 4.24 
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 We continue with the residuals normality tests. In Table 5.1.3 we present the p-values 
of the normality tests (H0: Existence of residuals normality) of the model and of each 
equations‟ residuals. We find that the VAR models with 5 and 6 lags have more favourable 
residual normality results compared to the VAR model with only one lag.  
Table 5.1.3: Test of the normality of residuals of the VAR model at different lag order 
    
no const. or 
trend 
constant, no 
trend 
constant 
and trend 
VAR(1) Jarque-Bera       
  U1 0.1513 0.035 0.0038 
  U2 0.0116 0.0071 0.0274 
  U3 0 0 0 
  Joint test LJB 0 0 0 
VAR(4) Jarque-Bera       
  U1 0.315 0.6644 0.5128 
  U2 0.0066 0.003 0.0029 
  U3 0 0 0 
  Joint test LJB 0 0 0 
VAR(5) Jarque-Bera       
  U1 0.2548 0.8946 0.9994 
  U2 0.4823 0.4391 0.2097 
  U3 0 0 0 
  Joint test 0 0 0.0286 
VAR(6) Jarque-Bera       
  U1 0.2715 0.8618 0.6536 
  U2 0.4459 0.2279 0.1551 
  U3 0 0 0.005 
  Joint test 0 0.0008 0.6106 
Source: Author, using JMulti 4.24 
 
 Although the VAR (1) models show inferior residuals normality test results, because 
of them being preferred by the Information Criterion and, in particular, because of their 
superior LMF test results of no residual autocorrelation, and especially because the small data 
set favours the use of a smaller number of lags, we analyse co-integration based on the 
assumed VAR (1) model. 
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5.2. Estimating the rank of the co-integration matrix 
 
 We present in Table 5.2.1 the Johansen test results for the rank of the co-integration 
matrix using the VAR (1) levels model as our underlying model. We also inspect models with 
and without a structural break occurring with the Global Financial Crisis on September 2008, 
which we suspect might cause a significant structural break in the model. 
Table 5.2.1 Johansen Trace Test for the rank of co-integration of our underlying VAR 
(1) model 
 
a) Not allowing for a structural break: intercept included; trend and intercept included 
Johansen Trace Test for:  B_Croatia DYNEF OMF_AUMIndex  
unrestricted dummies:     dummy3_L1_d1 dummy4_L1_d1 Dummy_DYNEF_L1_d1  
restricted dummies:         
sample range:             [2007 M1, 2010 M12], T = 48 
included lags (levels):   1  
dimension of the process: 3  
intercept included 
response surface computed: 
----------------------------------------------- 
r0  LR       pval     90%      95%      99%      
----------------------------------------------- 
 0   53.24    0.0001   32.25    35.07    40.78   
1   15.90    0.1823   17.98    20.16    24.69   
 2   5.44     0.2468   7.60     9.14     12.53   
 
Johansen Trace Test for:  B_Croatia DYNEF OMF_AUMIndex  
unrestricted dummies:     dummy3_L1_d1 dummy4_L1_d1 Dummy_DYNEF_L1_d1  
restricted dummies:         
sample range:             [2007 M1, 2010 M12], T = 48 
included lags (levels):   1  
dimension of the process: 3  
trend and intercept included 
response surface computed: 
----------------------------------------------- 
r0  LR       pval     90%      95%      99%      
----------------------------------------------- 
 0   49.79    0.0077   39.73    42.77    48.87   
 1   15.11    0.5726   23.32    25.73    30.67   
 2   5.13     0.5860   10.68    12.45    16.22   
 
 
b) Testing in the presence of a structural break: intercept included; trend and intercept 
included 
 
Johansen Trace Test for:  B_Croatia DYNEF OMF_AUMIndex  
unrestricted dummies:     dummy3_L1_d1 dummy4_L1_d1 Dummy_DYNEF_L1_d1 D[2008 M9]  
restricted dummies:       S[2008 M9]  
sample range:             [2007 M1, 2010 M12], T = 48 
included lags (levels):   1  
dimension of the process: 3  
intercept included 
response surface computed: 
----------------------------------------------- 
r0  LR       pval     90%      95%      99%      
----------------------------------------------- 
 0   57.52    0.0000   37.61    39.81    44.17   
 1   20.75    0.1658   22.29    24.18    28.00   
 2   6.35     0.4568   11.02    12.82    16.66   
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Johansen Trace Test for:  B_Croatia DYNEF OMF_AUMIndex  
unrestricted dummies:     dummy3_L1_d1 dummy4_L1_d1 Dummy_DYNEF_L1_d1 D[2008 M9]  
restricted dummies:       S[2008 M9]  
sample range:             [2007 M1, 2010 M12], T = 48 
included lags (levels):   1  
dimension of the process: 3  
trend and intercept included 
response surface computed: 
----------------------------------------------- 
r0  LR       pval     90%      95%      99%      
----------------------------------------------- 
 0   66.13    0.0002   43.19    46.40    52.84   
 1   30.49    0.0262   25.72    28.29    33.54   
 2   5.28     0.6802   12.02    13.89    17.88   
 
Source: Author, using JMulti 4.24 
 
 Looking at the test results from Table 5.2.1, we find that the co-integration matrix of 
the underlying VAR (1) model has a rank of one in a model without a structural break. This 
means that without the structural break, there is only one independent co-integration vector of 
constants transforming our three endogenous variables into a non-stationary process. 
We also note that by adding a trend in the co-integration matrix to the model with a 
structural break, we find evidence that the rank of the co-integration matrix equals two. 
Although the value of the bubble should not demonstrate a trending dynamics in the long 
term, when we are analysing a shorter data series covering only the periods of the rise or the 
collapse of the bubble, such as in our case, and not the full bubbly cycle, then we could 
expect a trend to play a descriptive role in the relationship among our endogenous variables. 
Otherwise, as in our previous model, there is no justification for the inclusion of a long-term 
trend as in our previous empirical model presented in Chapter 4. The dynamics of the system 
governed by the long-term relations among our endogenous variables brings the system to its 
long-term equilibrium and it stays at that point until there are disruptive changes such as the 
GFC that cause a new dynamic path, collapse the bubble and bring the market to its new 
dynamic equilibrium. Only in the case where we include a shorter data series, covering only a 
part of the bubbly cycle, do we find a theoretical justification for including a trend in the co-
integrating relationships among our endogenous variables.  
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5.3. VECM (0) model estimation 
 
 We chose to proceed with the VECM model with a restricted constant and a trend in 
the co-integration matrix, a structural shift occurring with the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) 
and with two co-integration vectors. Our VAR(1) level model reduces to a VECM(0) model, 
with two error correction mechanisms including a constant and a trend in the co-integration 
matrix. As previously explained, we believe that the trend gained significance in the model, 
compared to the previous model with the interpolated investment variables, because of the 
shorter time series, which includes mostly the period of the crash of the bubble. In this 
period, the value of the Croatian equity bubble and investments into the bubbly asset exhibit a 
joint negative trend. Because of the shorter time series not including proportionally the full 
bubbly cycle, we support the inclusion of the trend in the co-integration matrix. We will also 
add one lag of the exogenous variable, the value of the US equity market bubble, because we 
found in our previous modelling that the external markets represented by the US market have 
their most significant impact on the Croatian financial market with a lag of one month. In 
Table 5.3.1, we present the unrestricted VECM (0) estimation results. 
 Table 5.3.1 Unrestricted VECM (0) with the “OMF_AUMIndex” variable 
representing the DC pension fund SEE and Croatian equity investments in the bubbly 
asset (t-statistics in brackets) 
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 Having estimated the unrestricted model, we perform an analysis for selecting the 
optimally restricted model. For this purpose, we check the diagnostics of all suggested subset 
models by the subset selection procedures available in JMulti4.24 based on different 
information criteria. In Table 5.3.2, we present the diagnostic test p-values for the tests of 
residual no-autocorrelation and normality, for all suggested subset models, restricted using 
different selection criteria. Again, similar to the selection process in our first model presented 
in Chapter 4, we found our optimal subset model using the System SER method (HQ) which, 
in this case, gave us the same model restrictions as the System SER(AIC), SER/Testing 
procedure (AIC), SER/Testing procedure (HQ) and the Top down – AIC procedure.   
Table 5.3.2 Subset model selection criteria and the model diagnostic characteristics 
Model 
Number 
of 
variables Testing residuals autocorrelation 
Testing joint residuals 
joint normality (p-
value) LR-test Det(Σ(u)) 
    LM(2) p-value LM(3) p-value       
Unrestricted 33 0.5021 0.3944 0 1 2.35E+05 
System SER (AIC) 21 0.3143 0.35 0 0.9665 2.59E+05 
System SER (HQ) 21 0.3143 0.35 0 0.9665 2.59E+05 
SER/Testing procedure (AIC) 21 0.3143 0.35 0 0.9665 2.59E+05 
SER/Testing procedure (HQ) 21 0.3143 0.35 0 0.9665 2.59E+05 
Top down -AIC 21 0.3143 0.35 0 0.9665 2.59E+05 
Top down -HQ 20 0.433 0.6558 0 0.8648 2.75E+05 
System SER (SC) 19 0.6239 0.7845 0 0.621 3.00E+05 
SER/Testing procedure (SC) 19 0.6239 0.7845 0 0.621 3.00E+05 
Top down -SC 19 0.6239 0.7845 0 0.621 3.00E+05 
System testing proc. (t>2.00) 19 0.6239 0.7845 0 0.621 3.00E+05 
Source: Author, using JMulTi 4.24 
 
 Having chosen the restrictions determined by the System SER (HQ) selection 
criterion as our optimal selection criteria, we place the suggested restrictions on the 
unrestricted model and repeat the estimation. We present the estimated subset model in Table 
5.3.3. This model is characterised by 21 regression coefficients (seven within the co-
integration matrix) and based on the diagnostic tests has no residual auto correlation (LMF 
(2) test p-value of 0.4355). There are four statistically significant “loading” coefficients in the 
model, two for each error correction mechanism.  
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Table 5.3.3 Estimation results of the optimally restricted VECM with the 
“OMF_AUMIndex” variable representing DC pension fund bubbly asset investments 
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5.4. VECM (0) model diagnostics 
 
Before we make any statistical or economic inferences from our estimated model, we 
need to make sure that the model is valid as a statistical generating mechanism. For this 
purpose, we perform diagnostic tests and checks on the estimated model. We first visually 
check the dynamics of the two Error Correction (EC) variables, finding that the two variables 
resemble the dynamics of a stationary process. We present the EC dynamics of the restricted 
model in Figure 5.4.1 
Figure 5.4.1 Error Correction dynamics of the restricted model 
 
Source: Author, using JMulti 4.24 
 
We further present the diagnostic tests for the null hypothesis of no-autocorrelation of 
the residuals and residual normality in Table 5.4.1. We conclude that the estimated restricted 
model does not generate auto-correlated residuals, which suggests that the estimated 
coefficients are non-biased and consistent. Although the model suffers from non-normality of 
the regression residuals, this is considered as an issue of second-order importance not 
affecting the consistency of the regression coefficients (Wooldridge, 2000).  
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Table 5.4.1 LMF test of residual no-autocorrelation and tests of residual normality for 
the restricted model 
 
LM-TYPE TEST FOR AUTOCORRELATION with 2 lags 
 
LM statistic:             20.3348  
p-value:                 0.3143   
df:                      18.0000  
 
LM-TYPE TEST FOR AUTOCORRELATION with 3 lags 
 
LM statistic:             29.2257  
p-value:                 0.3500   
df:                      27.0000  
 
TESTS FOR NONNORMALITY 
 
Reference: Doornik & Hansen (1994) 
joint test statistic:     59.2961  
p-value:                 0.0000   
degrees of freedom:       6.0000   
skewness only:            20.1134  
p-value:                 0.0002   
kurtosis only:            39.1827  
p-value:                 0.0000   
 
Reference: Lütkepohl (1993), Introduction to Multiple Time Series Analysis, 2ed, p. 153 
joint test statistic:     71.2622  
p-value:                 0.0000   
degrees of freedom:       6.0000   
skewness only:            32.0941  
p-value:                 0.0000   
kurtosis only:            39.1682  
p-value:                 0.0000   
 
JARQUE-BERA TEST 
 
variable        teststat   p-Value(Chi^2)  skewness   kurtosis   
u1              21.2502    0.0000          1.1289     5.3511    
u2              7.7045     0.0212          0.8126     4.1005    
u3              45.3110    0.0000         -1.0654     7.2562    
 
Source: Author, using JMulti 4.24 
 
We also performed visual inspection on the residual cross-correlations and auto-
correlation presented in Figure 5.4.2. Looking at the diagonal, where the residual auto-
correlation is presented, we conclude that none of the three equations in the system has a 
significant positive or negative auto-correlation of its residuals at the first 12 lags. We also 
find no significant cross-correlation of the residuals among different equations, with the 
exception of the negative first lag correlation between the residual from the first and the third 
equation in the system. All other residuals show no cross-correlation. 
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Figure 5.4.2 Auto-correlation and cross-correlation of residuals of the restricted 
model with “B_Croatia”, “DYNEF” and “OMF_AUMIndex” as endogenous 
variables 
 
*each graph shows the cross-correlation of residuals of each one of the three endogenous variable 
equations, including the 95% critical value band. Cross-correlation of the residuals from one equation, 
with the residuals of another equation is estimated for different lags up to 12 months. Graphs on the 
diagonal represent the auto correlations of residuals in the three equations of the system. 
 
Source: Author, using JMulti 4.24 
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5.5. VECM (0) coefficient stability 
 
 Examining the stability of the regression coefficients, we find that the regression 
coefficients of our restricted model “loading matrix” are stable as we recursively expand the 
data set on which the coefficients are re-estimated. These recursive estimations and the 
graphical presentations of the coefficients as performed in JMulti 4.24 are presented in Figure 
5.5.1. 
Figure 5.5.1 Recursive estimation of the “loading matrix” coefficients of our 
VEC Model with “B_Croatia”, “DYNEF” and “OMF_AUMIndex” as endogenous 
variables 
 
Source: Author, using JMulti 4.24 
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 We also performed the Chow sample split (SS) and Chow break point (BP) tests for 
coefficient stability in the model. The test p-values of the Chow SS statistic with 95% level of 
confidence show that, in contrast to the initial periods (as expected), in the later periods we 
could not reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the model are stable. This result 
confirms that the overall model stability is better compared to our first model reported in 
Chapter 4. Conversely, the Chow BP test results reject the stability null, because of the 
instability of the coefficients other than the loading coefficient matrix. The Chow test p-
values are presented in Figure 5.5.2. 
Figure 5.5.2Chow SS and Chow BP test results for all viable months between 
June 2008 and January 2010 performed in JMulti 4.24 
 
 
Source: Author, using JMulti 4.24 
 
We conclude that this model shows much more robust results in terms of the stability of its 
coefficients compared to the model presented in Chapter 4. 
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5.6. Economic meaning of the estimation results 
 
Finally, we interpret the regression results of our estimated restricted VECM (0) 
model. We first comment on the long-term equilibrium relationships represented by the two 
co-integration vectors. Then we analyse the interactions of the endogenous variables in the 
model by the use of Impulse Response (IR) analysis and, finally, comment on the role of the 
exogenous and deterministic variables. 
Before discussing the long-term co-integrating relationships, we must note that, 
similar to our modelling in Chapter 4, we determined the structural order of variables in the 
two co-integration vectors based on theoretical reasoning. Our theoretical model in Chapter 2, 
suggested that the first long-term relationship should describe the relation between the 
relative value of the Croatian equity bubble “B_Croatia” and the DC pension fund 
speculative investments “OMF_AUMIndex”, while the second long-term relationship should 
relate the DC pension fund speculative investments “OMF_AUMIndex” and the Dynamic 
efficiency of the Croatian financial market “DYNEF”. This imposed restrictions on the order 
of the variables in the vector of endogenous variables used in the VECM (0) estimation 
process. In order to properly capture those two long-term relationships, we followed the same 
principle as in our estimation of the first empirical model in Chapter 4. We normalized the 
first co-integrating relationship on the unit relative value of the Croatian equity bubble 
“B_Croatia” and we placed a zero restriction on the dynamic efficiency variable “DYNEF”. 
This way, the first co-integrating vector related “B_Croatia” only to the DC pension fund 
investment variable “OMF_AUMIndex”. Then we normalize our second co-integrating 
relationship on the unit value of the dynamic efficiency of the Croatian financial market 
“DYNEF”, and we set a zero restriction on the relative value of the Croatian equity bubble 
“B_Croatia”. This way, in our second co-integrating relationship we focus on the long-term 
relationship between the Dynamic efficiency of the Croatian financial market “DYNEF” and 
the investments of the DC pension funds in the Croatian and SEE equity focused open-end 
mutual funds “OMF_AUMIndex”. These two long-term relationships reflected in our co-
integrating vectors are supported by our theoretical model. On the one hand, the introduction 
of the DC pension funds, measured by the investment variables of the DC pension funds 
“OMF_AUMIndex”, should relate to the relative value the Croatian equity market bubble 
“B_Croatia” as a sufficient condition for the occurrence of the bubble; while, on the other, 
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the dynamic efficiency of the Croatian equity market “DYNEF” should relate to the DC 
pension fund investments “OMF_AUMIndex” as the necessary condition for rational 
investments in the bubbly asset. 
 Based on our estimated VECM (0) using the suggested structure of the co-integrating 
vectors, the OLS estimated long-term co-integrating relationships are presented in equation 
5.1a-b and 5.2a-b (t-statistics in parenthesis).  
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                      (5.2a-b) 
Looking at the first long-term relationship (equation 5.1a-b), we notice that the index 
explaining the DC pension fund investments in the Croatian and SEE open-end mutual funds 
“OMF_AUMIndex” is positively related to the relative value of the Croatian equity bubble 
“B_Croatia”. This means that as the demand for the bubbly asset investment by the DC 
pension funds increases, this is followed by an increase in the value of the bubbly assets. This 
demand is realized through the DC pension fund investment in the indirect investment 
vehicle, the Open End Mutual Funds focused on Croatian equity. The impact of changes in 
“OMF_AUMIndex” can be highlighted by considering the first co-integrating vector set out 
with “B_Croatia” as the left-hand side variable and setting the other terms to zero. If we set 
the value of the “OMF_AUMIndex” to100, which corresponds to zero investments of the DC 
pension fund in the bubbly open-end mutual funds, the corresponding level of bubbly asset 
investments by the DC pension funds is a marginally positive value of the Croatian equity 
bubble of only 8.5 percentage points (0.08549*100=8.549). At the other extreme, when the 
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“OMF_AUMIndex” reaches high speculative investment values of over 1500 index points, 
then the corresponding relative value of the Croatian equity bubble, ceteris paribus, reaches 
nearly 130 percentage points (1500*0.08549=128.235). Given that “B_Croatia” ranges 
between -55.7 and 138.1, we see the prime importance of indirect DC pension fund equity 
investment “OMF_AUMIndex” in the development of the equity bubble. If we now consider 
just the deterministic components, the constant (-16.63) and time trend (0.949), excluding 
“OMF_AUMIndex” and the structural shift term “l_shift_m9m-1“ representing the impact of 
the GFC, we see that the large negative constant enables an upward trend that captures 
otherwise un-modelled growth in the relative value of the Croatian equity bubble. Finally, we 
find that the occurrence of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), ceteris paribus, caused a strong 
negative shock to the value of variable “B_Croatia” (by -45.7 percentage points). The 
following Figure 5.6.1 shows the time path of “B_Croatia” predicted by Co-integrating 
Vector 1 taking into account: (1) only the constant and time trend; (2) all of the deterministic 
components (constant, time trend and shift dummy); and (3) all variables (the deterministic 
components together with the impact of “OMF_AUMIndex”).    
Figure 5.6.1 Predicted time paths of “B_Croatia” from the Co-integrating 
Vector 1 
 
 
Source: Author, using co-integration equation 5.1b 
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We notice from Figure 5.6.1, that the level of the relative value of the Croatian equity 
bubble “B_Croatia” reaches positive values only after we include the DC pension fund 
investments in the equation (solid line). Otherwise, including only the deterministic variables, 
the trend and the constant, the relative value of the Croatian equity bubble shows much lower 
long-term values, which could have been reached had there been no structural break caused 
by the GFC. When we include the structural shift caused by the GFC along with the other 
deterministic variables (constant and trend), without the introduction of the DC pension funds 
speculative investments, the first co-integration relationship predicts that the Croatian equity 
bubble would have not occurred. This result supports the hypothesis drawn from the 
theoretical model in Chapter 2, which stated that the introduction of the DC pension funds 
increase the intensity and the level of the asset bubble in the financial market.  
Having interpreted the long-run equilibrium relationship from the first co-integrating 
vector, we now explore its corresponding adjustment processes. In order to understand the 
way such disequilibrium in the first long-term relationship is removed by adjustments within 
the system, we need to look at the loading coefficients in the first column of the “α” loading 
matrix (Table 5.3.3). Those coefficients correspond to the first co-integrating vector. Looking 
at the loading coefficients, we find that the strongest error correction mechanism works 
through the correction of the relative value of the bubble itself “B_Croatia”. Namely, a unit 
error term from the first co-integrating vector, expressed in units of relative value of the 
Croatian equity bubble, corrects by 41.8% during the following month by changing the 
relative value of the Croatian equity bubble “B_Croatia”.13 This means that over 95% of the 
error is corrected by the change of the relative value of the Croatian equity bubble in only 6 
months [(1-0.418)^6=0.96]. On the other side, the other loading coefficient affecting the next 
period value of the DC pension fund investments in the bubbly asset “OMF_AUMIndex”, 
although with a negative value of -1.884, has a destabilizing effect on the equilibrium in the 
first co-integrating vector.14A unit error term from the first co-integrating vector, expressed in 
                                                 
13
The dependent variable is the absolute change per month of “B_Croatia”. A unit error term from the first co-
integrating vector, expressed in units of relative value of the Croatian equity bubble, corrects by 0.418 units per 
month. Hence, this is a stabilising rate of change of 41.8% per month. 
14
 The adjustment (loading) coefficients on the differenced variable on the left-hand side of the (vector) error-
correction model and the long-run coefficients on the corresponding level within the co-integrating vector need 
to be of opposite signs for the process to be stable (Juselius, 2006, p. 122).   
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units of relative value of the Croatian equity bubble, takes the first co-integrating vector away 
from equilibrium at a monthly rate of 1.884 index points of the “OMF_AUMIndex”. 
However, because “OMF_AUMIndex” varies between around 100 and 1700, this is a rather 
small effect (proportionally small when at the lower end and very small at the higher end of 
its range).Accordingly, although the stabilising coefficient on “B_Croatia” is smaller in 
absolute value than the destabilising coefficient on “OMF_AUMIndex”, once it is taken into 
account that they are acting on different variables within the system, and that the scale of 
measurement of these two variables is different by an order of magnitude, then it becomes 
clear that the former signifies a large effect and the latter a small effect. Hence, the overall 
process is stabilising. The speculative DC pension fund investments tend to destabilize the 
adjustment process, but their effect is much lower compared to the dominating adjustment 
through the value of the Croatian equity bubble “B_Croatia”. 
Next, we analyse the second co-integrating relationship (equation 5.2a-b). This 
explains the long-term equilibrating relationship between the dynamic efficiency of the 
Croatian financial market “DYNEF” and the DC pension fund investments in the bubbly 
asset “OMF_AUMIndex”. The second co-integrating vector shows that there exists a 
negative long-term relationship between the DC pension fund investments in the bubbly 
Croatian and SEE equity focused open-end mutual funds “OMF_AUMIndex” and the 
Dynamic efficiency of the Croatian financial market “DYNEF”. Ceteris paribus, the value of 
100 index points of the DC pension fund investment variable “OMF_AUMIndex” 
corresponds to a 0.3 unit of the dynamic efficiency of the Croatian financial market 
(0.003*100). This means that at the beginning of the sample period, at m=1, and without the 
introduction of the DC pension funds speculative investments, represented by 
“OMF_AUMIndex=100”, the dynamic efficiency of the Croatian equity market “DYNEF” 
would be positive (2.095-0.3=1.795), although this positive intercept (constant) is the point of 
departure for a negative time trend (-0.286*Trend, which given the range of “DYNEF” – 
between about -7.3 and +9.6 – represents a substantial monthly rate of decline). Such a 
relatively fast negative time trend in the dynamic efficiency of the Croatian financial market 
could be a logical consequence of a significant accumulation of productive investments, 
which makes the financial market dynamically inefficient as productive investment 
opportunities become scarce. As the dynamic efficiency of the Croatian equity market 
decreases through the passage of the time, the system requires higher speculative investment 
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of the DC pension funds through the Croatian and SEE equity focused open-end mutual funds 
“OMF_AUMIndex”. Namely, to compensate a unit fall of the dynamic efficiency (a large 
fall) then, ceteris paribus, the DC pension funds need to increase their speculative 
“OMF_AUMIndex” investments by over 324 percentage points (-0.003081*324=-1), 
bringing the dynamic efficiency error correction mechanism into equilibrium. This 
relationship corresponds to the role of the dynamic efficiency of the financial market 
suggested by the theoretical model in Chapter 2, where lower dynamic efficiency creates a 
fertile environment for rational investment into the bubbly asset. In addition, part of the fall 
of the dynamic efficiency would be compensated by the trend variable (0.286 units per 
month), which might signify the rise in other investment opportunities on the Croatian 
financial market, which widen the investment horizon and improve the dynamic efficiency of 
the financial market. The following Figure 5.6.2 shows the time path of “DYNEF” predicted 
by Co-integrating Vector two taking into account: (1) only the constant and time trend; (2) all 
of the deterministic components (constant, time trend and shift dummy) and (3) all variables 
(the deterministic components together with “OMF_AUMIndex”).    
Figure 5.6.2 Predicted time paths of “DYNEF” from the Co-integrating Vector 2 
 
 
Source: Author, using equation 5.2a-b 
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Figure 5.6.2 show that the Croatian financial market has a decreasing trend in its 
dynamic efficiency, which is an expected consequence of a maturing financial market. The 
dynamic efficiency is worsened by the introduction of the DC pension funds, because they 
put additional pressure on the demand for saving/investment vehicles in the market. We also 
see that the GFC created a significant shift in dynamic efficiency, mainly by increasing the 
investment risk premiums. The occurrence of the GFC turned the market into a state of being 
dynamically efficient, a state in which investments in the bubbly asset become irrational. 
Such a change in the dynamic efficiency of the Croatian financial market, based on the 
theoretical model in Chapter 2, is the major factor causing the crash of the Croatian equity 
bubble (Figure 2.5) 
We analyse the second column of the “α” loading coefficient matrix in order to learn 
how a unit shock in the second co-integrating vector feeds back into the system, bringing the 
second long-term relationship back to equilibrium (Table 5.3.3).  We see that a positive unit 
shock in the second co-integrating relationship corrects the next period value of the dynamic 
efficiency by -0.285, decreasing the unit error by 28.5% in the next period. This means that a 
unit disturbance in the second error correction term adjusts itself by over 85% in only six 
months [(1-0.285)^6=0.866], mostly through the change in the value of the dynamic 
efficiency of the Croatian financial market “DYNEF”. A unit of positive disequilibrium in the 
second long-term relationship also corrects through the change in the value of the investment 
variable “OMF_AUMIndex”. This adjustment is also stabilizing (the long-run coefficient is 
0.003 and the adjustment coefficient is -11.525, hence of the opposite signs required for 
negative – i.e. stabilising – feedback). Namely, a positive unit shock in the second long-term 
relationship causes a 11.5 index points decrease in the DC pension fund speculative 
investments “OMF_AUMIndex” in the next period. In effect, this decrease in the DC pension 
fund investments, ceteris paribus, corrects the unit disequilibrium in the second long-term 
relationship by -0.035497 (-11.525*0.00308), or -3,5%, which presents a much slower 
adjustment compared to the direct adjustment through the dynamic efficiency variable 
“DYNEF”. Although with a slower adjustment, this shows that the DC pension fund 
speculative investments also react to the disequilibrium in the second long-term relationship 
normalized on the Croatian financial market dynamic efficiency. 
Finally, looking at the effect of the GFC in the second co-integrating vector (equation 
5.2a-b), we see that it caused – ceteris paribus – a strong positive shock of 8.877 units (the 
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estimated effect of “l_shift_m9”), on the dynamic efficiency of the financial market 
“DYNEF”. Given that the range of values of “DYNEF” is between -8 and +10, this 
represents an enormous rise in dynamic efficiency associated with the GFC (see Figure 
5.6.2). This makes the investment environment suddenly much less favourable for rational 
bubbles and so triggers the collapse of the bubble.  
After we described the two co-integration relationships and their loading mechanisms, 
we analyse the effect of the occurrence of the GFC in the context of the two co-integrating 
vectors together. If we now focus on the equilibrium error formulation of the two co-
integrating vectors (the first equations in, respectively, 5.1,a-b and 5.2, a-b), we find that the 
GFC caused a positive structural shock of +45.7 percentage points in the first long-term 
equilibrium error normalized on the relative value of the Croatian equity bubble (Error1), and 
a negative structural shock of -8.877 units in the second long-term relationship normalized on 
the dynamic efficiency of the Croatian equity market (Error2). Both effects jointly caused a 
sharp correction in the relative value of the Croatian equity bubble “B_Croatia” and a 
disappearance of a speculative financial market environment on the Croatian financial 
market. 
To get a better image of the complete causal relationships between the endogenous 
variables in our estimated VECM (0), respecting all interactions defined by the estimated 
model, we continue with Impulse Response Analysis. IR analysis is presented in the Figure 
5.6.3a-c, where the accumulated effects on each endogenous variable, caused by unit shocks 
on other variables, are investigated for the period of 36 consecutive months. Graphs contain 
the average projected effect, together with the 90% Confidence Intervals determined 
following Diccicio and Efron CI estimation(Diciccio & Efron, 1996). 
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Figure 5.6.3a Impulse Responses of “B_Croatia” to an imposed unit shock on all 
three endogenous variables individually: (a) “B_Croatia”; (b) “DYNEF”; and (c) 
“OMF_AUMIndex” 
 
Source: Author, using JMulti 4.24 
 
From the first IR analysis (panel [a] in Figure 5.6.3a), focused on the impacts on the 
relative value of the Croatian equity bubble “B_Croatia”, we find that similar to the rapid 
adjustment process identified above,  a unit positive shock on the relative value of the bubble 
itself is not self sustaining, meaning that it rapidly declines towards zero. We also find from 
panel [b], that a unit positive shock introduced to the dynamic efficiency “DYNEF” causes a 
negative and significant impact on the relative value of the Croatian equity bubble (namely, a 
unit shock introduced on “DYNEF” causes an average -0.2 *102 = 20 percentage point 
accumulated decrease of “B_Croatia” in 12 months). Consistent with the theoretical model, a 
positive shock to the dynamic efficiency of the Croatian financial market “DYNEF” creates a 
less favourable environment for the occurrence of the speculative equity bubble “B_Croatia”.  
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And finally, looking at panel [c], we find that a unit positive shock imposed on the DC 
pension fund investments in the speculative open-end mutual funds, “OMF_AUMIndex”, 
positively affects the relative value of the Croatian equity bubble “B_Croatia” (causing a unit 
accumulated increase in the relative value of the bubble in the following 12 months). 
Figure 5.6.3b: Impulse Responses of “DYNEF” to an imposed unit shock on all 
three endogenous variables individually: (a) “B_Croatia”; (b) “DYNEF”; and (c) 
“OMF_AUMIndex” 
 
Source: Author, using JMulti 4.24 
 
From the second IR analysis presented in Figure 5.6.3b, in panel [a] on the far left and 
in panel [c] on the far right of the figure respectively, we see that a unit positive shock 
introduced to the relative value of the Croatian equity bubble “B_Croatia” and a unit positive 
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shock introduced on the speculative DC pension fund investments in the open-end mutual 
funds “OMF_AUMIndex” does not significantly affect the dynamic efficiency of the 
Croatian financial market “DYNEF”. This result is consistent with the theory, where the 
dynamic efficiency of the financial market is expected to be affected by the productive 
investments and not by the speculative investments, which are the only type of pension fund 
investments in this model. This distinction was made in the estimated model in Chapter 4, 
where we included both direct and indirect DC pension fund investment variables. We also 
find from panel [b] in the middle, that there exists some persistence in the value of dynamic 
efficiency “DYNEF”. 
Figure 5.6.3c.Impulse Responses of “OMF_AUMIndex” to an imposed unit shock 
on all three endogenous variables individually: (a) “B_Croatia”; (b) “DYNEF”; 
and (c) “OMF_AUMIndex” 
 
Source: Author, using JMulti 4.24 
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Finally, looking at the third IR analysis presented in Figure 5.73c, from panel [a], we 
see that the unit shock introduced on the relative value of the Croatian equity bubble 
“B_Croatia” has a negative and significant effect on the speculative DC pension fund 
investments in the Croatian and SEE open-end mutual funds “OMF_AUMIndex”, our bubbly 
asset. The theoretical model shows that total speculative investments should approach the 
bubbly steady state at a rate diminishing in absolute value (Figure 2.4 in Chapter 2 suggests 
diminishing absolute value of speculative investments as the system approaches its bubbly 
equilibrium). In other words, at the onset of the increase in the relative value of the bubbly 
asset, when its return is the highest, the self enforcing effect of the speculative investments 
should dominate. But this self-enforcing effect on speculative investments would be 
diminished by the opposite effect of the increasing relative value of the bubble itself. If we 
compare the two effects caused by a unit shock of the relative value of the Croatian equity 
bubble “B_Croatia” in panel [a] and a unit shock on the DC pension fund speculative 
investments “OMF_AUMIndex” in panel [c], on the DC pension fund bubbly investments 
“OMF_AUMIndex”, we notice that the self-enforcing effect of the rise in speculative 
investments (panel [c]) dominates over the negative effect caused by the increase in the 
relative value of the equity bubble panel [a]).  The diminishing effect on the additional 
speculative investments caused by a unit increase of the relative value of the bubble could 
also be seen by looking at the non-accumulated impact presented in Figure 5.6.4. 
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Figure 5.6.4Non-accumulated impact of a unit shock introduced on “B_Croatia” 
to the value of “OMF_AUMIndex” in the period of 36 months 
 
 
Source: Author, using JMulti 4.24 
 
Looking at the second panel [b] in 5.6.3c, we find a negative and significant effect of 
a unit shock introduced to the value of the dynamic efficiency of the Croatian equity market 
“DYNEF” on the speculative DC pension fund investments “OMF_AUMIndex”. Namely, a 
unit increase in the value of the dynamic efficiency of the Croatian financial market 
accumulates to more than a 500 index points decline in the DC pension fund investment in 
the bubbly Croatian and SEE equity focused open-end mutual funds “OMF_AUMIndex”. 
This shows that an increase of the dynamic efficiency of the Croatian market observed by the 
GFC could fully discourage and even produce high disinvestment in the bubbly asset 
“OMF_AUMIndex”, making it a major cause of the collapse of the Croatian equity bubble. 
Our theoretical model predicts that a positive change in the dynamic efficiency of the 
financial market will affect the rationality of the bubbly investments and will discourage 
further speculative investments. This is exactly consistent with the result in panel [b]. Finally, 
panel [c] shows that the bubbly DC pension fund investments are self-inducing, which means 
that a unit positive shock in the speculative investments “OMF_AUMIndex” creates 
additional speculative investments in the next period by the DC pension fund; and the 
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opposite happens in the correction process. Looking at the theory, we mentioned that for the 
bubbly asset to occur, it needs initially to be accepted as an investment vehicle; this is 
supported by the self-inducing effect of the speculative investments shown in panel [c]. 
Finally, looking at the estimated model (Table 5.3.3), we also find that the dummy 
variables “Dummy4” representing the introduction of higher transparency standards in the 
DC pension fund industry in Croatia, and the dynamic efficiency dummy variable 
“Dummy_DYNEF” (coefficient with a border line significance), representing the moment 
when the dynamic efficiency of the financial market rises over the value of zero, both 
positively affected the dynamic efficiency of the Croatian financial market. This is a logical 
consequence of the improved transparency of DC pension fund investments and it could 
show that when the dynamic efficiency crossed the zero thresholds (“dummy_DYNEF=1”) it 
improved even more rapidly in the following period.  We also find that the introduction of 
wider investment opportunities to the DC pension funds, by the increase of their investment 
horizon on the domestic equity market, indicated by “Dummy3=1”,decreased their 
investment in the speculative Croatian and SEE equity focused open-end mutual funds.  
We also find that the dynamics of the relative value of the bubble on global financial 
markets, such as the US market “B_US”, affects the relative value of the Croatian equity 
bubble both contemporaneously and with lag. A unit positive change in the relative value of 
the US equity market bubble translates into a 0.65 units positive effect on the relative value 
of the Croatian equity bubble with a lag of two month periods (-0.647+1.296=0.65). Such a 
positive effect of the US market could even increase the negative impact of the GFC on the 
collapse of the Croatian equity bubble. 
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5.7. Concluding remarks 
 
Following the same estimation procedure as we reported in Chapter 4, we estimate a 
model explaining the dynamics of the relative value of the Croatian equity bubble using the 
“OMF_AUMIndex” variable representing the DC pension fund investments in the bubbly 
asset. We found that the VECM (0) of our system of three endogenous variables is the most 
representative model. Using the Johansen test, we determined that there exist two co-
integrating relationships in the model, which we structured based on the theoretical reasoning 
from our model developed in Chapter 2. We estimated the model, and applied subset 
selection techniques to restrict the model to its optimal subset. The subset model was much 
simpler compared to the estimated model in Chapter 4, and suffered no contemporaneous 
cross-correlation, which was an issue in the previous model between the two interpolated 
investment variables. The model also showed much better coefficient stability in the loading 
coefficients as well as overall. Finally, the dynamics suggested by the empirical model 
confirmed the suggestions defined by the theory. First, the sufficient condition for the higher 
levels of the relative value of the Croatian equity bubble was the introduction of the DC 
pension funds and their acceptance of the bubbly Croatian and SEE equity focused open-end 
mutual funds in their portfolio. But the necessary condition for the DC pension fund 
investments in the bubbly asset to be rational and sustainable was the occurrence of dynamic 
inefficiency of the Croatian financial market. DC pension fund investments in the Croatian 
and SEE equity focused open-end mutual funds were self-inducing and sustainable if and 
only if the market was dynamically inefficient. Such a state of the financial market becoming 
dynamically inefficient created the logical development and growth of the speculative equity 
bubble. When the market suddenly became dynamically efficient, as in the aftermath of the 
Global Financial Crisis, the Croatian equity bubble collapsed and speculative investment 
became irrational. Although initially DC pension funds continued moderately investing in the 
speculative asset, soon the crash intensified, opening a strong self-inducing sell-off of the DC 
pension fund investments in the Croatian and SEE equity focused mutual funds.  
This empirical second simpler empirical model gives support to several of the 
hypothesis of our OLG rational asset bubbles model with DC pension funds in Chapter 2. We 
have observed from our first co-integrating relationship and the Figure 5.6.1, as well as from 
the panel [c] in Figure 5.6.3 describing the Impulse response of the relative value of the 
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Croatian equity bubble on the impulse introduced to the DC pension fund investment 
variable, that the DC pension fund presence on the Croatian financial market, increases the 
speed of the development of the equity bubble as well its level. This supports the first as well 
as the second hypothesis suggested by our theoretical model developed in Chapter 2. The 
ability of the regulator to control DC pension fund investments on the local market and the 
pension tax imposed on consumer agents, could translate into control of the speed and the 
level of the speculative market dynamics caused by the DC pension fund. We have seen in 
Figure 5.6.2 describing the second co-integrating relationship that the DC pension fund 
investments coexist with a strictly lower dynamic efficiency of the Croatian financial market 
compared to the environment without the DC pension fund investments in place. On the other 
side we did not found strong support that the DC pension fund investments had a significant 
impact on the dynamic efficiency of the financial market. This might be a consequence of the 
use of only one investment variable, the DC pension funds to the Croatian and the SEE equity 
oriented open-end investment funds labelled as speculative investments. In our previous 
model, where we could have distinguished among the two types of direct and indirect 
investments, direct being identified as productive investments, we found more support that 
such investments by the DC pension funds decrease the dynamic efficiency of the Croatian 
financial market. Dynamic inefficiency imposing support on the DC pension fund investment 
in the bubbly Croatian and SEE equity focused open-end investment funds as observed in 
panel [b] in Figure 5.6.3c, and the self inducing effect of DC pension fund speculative 
investments as observed on panel [c] in Figure 5.6.3c, suggest that the impact of the DC 
pension fund investment in the bubbly asset, would accelerate with the shift of the financial 
market from the state of being dynamically efficient to a state of being dynamically 
inefficient. In such environment, as could be seen from Figure 5.6.1, and the panel [c] of 
Figure 5.6.3a, the presence of the DC pension fund on the financial market with a positive 
investment in the bubbly asset, would increase the level of the relative value of the equity 
bubble. This supports the fourth hypothesis suggested by the theoretical model in Chapter 2. 
Finally, the effects of the structural break identified by the dummy variable representing the 
occurrence of the Global Financial Crisis, clearly supports our fifth theoretical hypothesis 
suggesting that shocking market events such as the global financial crisis could rapidly 
change the financial market environment to a dynamic efficient state, and could 
simultaneously produce a crash of the relative value of the bubbly asset, which no longer 
represents a rational investment vehicle. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
6.1. Summary and contribution to knowledge 
 
Some prominent financial economists, including J.M. Keynes (1936) and the Nobel 
laureate Robert Shiller (2000), appealed to the “animal spirits” of individual market 
participants, and their interactions, as being the main source of financial market failure and 
speculative financial market outcomes. However, our theoretical model and the empirical 
findings developed in this dissertation suggest that the “irrational exuberance” of consumer 
agents is not the only potential source of financial market speculation and the development of 
asset bubbles. Our results suggest that institutional reform, introducing influential market 
participants, could be another such source.  
When we introduce influential institutions such as Defined Contribution pension 
funds to an underdeveloped and illiquid financial market, as in the case of pension reforms in 
developing and transition economies, the institution takes command of a significant portion 
of consumer savings and investment discretion. Such capturing of the saving decision making 
discretion promotes a higher level of financial market investments, which greatly affects the 
balance of supply and demand of investable assets, especially visible in less developed 
financial markets. In our dissertation, we developed an original extension to the Overlapping 
Generations Model economy with rational asset bubbles, by introducing DC pension funds in 
order to simulate theoretically market outcomes in such a financial market environment.  
The importance of such potential impacts caused by the introduction of DC pension 
funds onto underdeveloped financial markets, was largely ignored and misunderstood by 
global reform leaders, such as the World Bank (1994). In contrast to their mainly positive 
expectations of the outcomes of such institutional reform, suggested on the grounds of the 
aging population and inadequacy of the current pension systems, we show in this dissertation 
that the introduction of highly influential financial institutions can induce speculative 
financial market outcomes, especially when defined contribution mandatory pension funds 
are introduced into underdeveloped financial markets with shallow (liquidity constrained) 
equity markets. In a financial market context, where most consumers have no investment 
experience or interest prior to the introduction of the DC pension fund, the introduction of the 
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DC pension funds, vastly changing the overall demand for investment vehicles, stimulates the 
development of bubbly financial market instruments and propels their dynamics to higher 
speculative valuation levels.  
We estimated two Vector Error Correction models based on Croatian market data in 
order to determine the long-term and short-term interactions between DC pension fund 
investments, the dynamic efficiency of the Croatian financial market and the relative value of 
the Croatian equity bubble. Most importantly, we undertook this empirical estimation to test 
our theoretical hypotheses about the impact of influential institutional investor on dynamic 
efficiency and speculative market valuations. Our empirical results support the theoretical 
hypothesis that the introduction of DC pension funds, especially in financial market 
environments with underdeveloped equity market such as the Croatian financial market, 
could lead to asset bubbles. Accordingly, financial market reforms such as introducing 
influential financial institutions should be carefully designed, considering the impact of those 
new influential institutional investors on the dynamic efficiency of the financial market and 
on the overall market-saving attitude in order to avoid causing the investment environment to 
stimulate the development of speculative asset bubbles, which are ultimately fragile. This is 
suggested in order to prevent costly abandoning of financial market reforms, such as the 
pension reform in the transition and developing economies, after the occurrence and the 
collapse of speculative market episodes. 
 
6.2. Findings 
 
In order to develop our argument, we reviewed the foundations of the currently 
dominating Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis (ECMH) and its main critics, stressing the 
arguments for the failure of the efficient market pricing mechanism and the development of 
speculative asset pricing outcomes. We found that the Overlapping Generations Modelling 
framework (OLG), introduced by Paul Samuelson, presents one of the most complete 
modelling frameworks for explaining financial market dynamics by connecting specific 
micro-characteristics of the financial market with different macro-dynamic outcomes. This 
model presented the basic framework for the development of the canonical OLG Rational 
Asset Bubbles model introduced by Jean Tirole in 1985, which is used as the basis of our 
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extension; namely, adding influential institutional investors, such as the DC pension funds, in 
order to theoretically examine their impact on financial market speculative valuation 
outcomes. 
We divide the findings with respect of the market environment stimulating the 
development of asset bubbles into two categories. The first category contains the summarized 
micro characteristics identified by the current literature on asset bubbles as the main drivers 
of market speculation. These characteristics mainly represent certain anomalies within the 
investment decision making of market participants that create market miss-valuations. The 
second category of findings encompasses our original contribution, which is focused on the 
role of influential institutional investors such as the defined contribution pension funds. In 
order to reach those findings, we developed a specific theoretical model based on the OLG 
Rational Bubbles modelling framework. Our theoretical model simulations led us to our 
theoretical hypotheses, which we tested using Croatian financial market data. This second 
category of findings contains the originality in the dissertation, both in its theoretical and its 
empirical approaches, while the first category represents a summary of findings from the 
most important already established work in the field. Nonetheless, this first category is 
needed in order to reach a complete understanding of the main factors that promote 
speculative or bubbly asset market valuation and that might complement our conclusions 
connected to the impact of influential institutional investors. Hence, before we summarize our 
original findings with respect to the impact of influential institutional investors such as the 
DC pension funds, we begin with a summary of the first category of established ideas on 
asset bubbles and micro market characteristics that stimulate the occurrence of asset bubbles: 
a) The asymmetric information problem and its impact on the valuation efficiency in the 
financial market.  The presence of high asymmetry of information about the fundamental 
value of investment instruments among market participants places institutional investors, 
especially when introduced to underdeveloped market environments, into a leading – 
signaling – role, thereby multiplying their market influence by “guiding” the actions of 
the “herd”. As the market participation of the DC pension funds increases on such a 
financial market in relative terms, it is critical to introduce strict standards in investment 
decision making, based on high and sophisticated knowledge in asset valuation, 
investment ethics and transparency, in order to avoid the potentially speculative market 
leading role of the DC pension funds. It is also important to impose high ethical standards 
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when it comes to the public presentation of valuation opinions and investment 
recommendations by the representatives of the DC pension funds. 
b) The agency problem within the institutional investor points to the need for setting strict 
rules in order to overcome issues of “risk shifting” –not only within the investment 
management decision makers of the DC pension fund management companies but also in 
cases when institutional investors stimulate market innovation in the direction of the 
extension of the principal-agent chain in the investment process outside the DC pension 
fund. Such extension of the principal-agent chain is achieved by further delegating 
investment authority from the DC pension fund to other institutional investors. Our 
empirical study, from the case of Croatia, suggests that the extension of such an 
investment decision making chain may create speculative market innovations, such as 
was the case with the introduction of the open-end mutual funds investing in Croatian and 
SEE equity. Those investment vehicles in the case of Croatia served as a suitable 
speculative-bubbly asset for the Croatian DC pension funds when financial market 
conditions for the development of such a market innovation were satisfied, such as the 
dynamic inefficiency of the financial market. 
c) Irrational investors are the third influential micro characteristic, signifying the issue and 
the impact of groups of market participants making decisions based on irrational market 
expectations. Their high presence on the financial market makes departures from the 
fundamental value of financial assets even more persistent and harder to arbitrage-out. 
Their presence and survival could be especially dominant in underdeveloped financial 
market. In this case, policies preventing waves of abrupt market speculation and policies 
introducing financial education and knowledge based investment decision making should 
be applied alongside the introduction of the DC pension funds. Moreover the presence of 
irrational investors may increases the impact and the importance of the institutional 
investor in both productive and speculative asset investments. 
These micro-market characteristics, stressed by the currently dominating asset 
bubbles theories, should be taken into account by policy makers in addition to the suggestions 
arising from our theoretical model, which focus predominantly on the role of the introduction 
of DC pension funds in creating speculative market dynamics. We did not add any additional 
micro-market complication in our theoretical modelling, in order to preserve the simplicity of 
the model, and in order to focus only on the speculative market outcomes arising from the 
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interaction of DC pension funds with financial market dynamic-efficiency. The dynamic 
efficiency of the financial market represents the financial market balance between the growth 
of the wealth that is required to be invested or saved, and the investment opportunities 
available on the financial market. The state of a high imbalance between assets to be invested 
and investment opportunities available on the market, caused by the introduction of the 
influential institutional investor, characterizes the financial market as being a fertile platform 
for the development of rational asset bubbles.  
Based on our theoretical OLG model of rational asset bubbles in illiquid financial 
markets with DC pension funds, developed and examined in Chapter 2, we derive five main 
hypotheses, which we test using data from the Croatian financial market. We introduced an 
original approach to measuring the relative value of the Croatian equity bubble, mainly 
influenced by the ideas presented by authors such as Robert Shiller. Similarly, our 
measurement of the dynamic efficiency of the Croatian financial market is based on 
suggestions in the work of Abel et al. (1989) emphasising financial market imbalance 
between the return on productive assets and the growth rate of investable assets approximated 
by the growth rate of subscribers to the DC pension funds. We also had to make significant 
primary data collection on the regulatory process and the investments of the DC pension 
funds in Croatia in order to investigate their impact on the Croatian financial market. Finally, 
using our Croatian data set we estimated two empirical time series Vector Error Correction 
Models; we then tested our main theoretical hypotheses against the long-term equilibrium 
relationships measured by these models and the Impulse Response analysis performed on the 
platform of these models. 
Our first empirical model presented in Chapter 4 had several issues, such as the cross 
correlation of the equation residuals from direct DC pension fund equity investments labelled 
as “productive” and the indirect equity investments labelled as “bubbly”. The model also 
suffered from being too extensive, consuming many degrees of freedom in our short data set, 
and showing non-stable estimation coefficients. In order to overcome some of those issues, 
mainly arising from the fact that our DC pension fund investment variables were interpolated 
from a yearly to a monthly frequency, we also investigated a second empirical model in 
Chapter 5. This second VEC model contained only one endogenous investment variable, 
representing the DC pension fund investments in the Croatian and SEE equity focused open-
end mutual funds, which we labelled as “bubbly” in the first model. Although the second 
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VEC model is based on a much shorter data set, all of its variables have a genuine monthly 
frequency, which makes the model much richer in information. The second VEC Model is 
estimated with a zero lag of the endogenous variables, which means that the consumed 
degrees of freedom are much smaller and, altogether, the model is much simpler. In addition, 
very important is that the cross correlation issue is not present in the second VEC Model, and 
that the model is much more robust, showing much better results on the coefficient stability 
tests. 
The difference between the two estimated VECM models is made by the use of two 
different data sets representing the investments of the Croatian DC pension funds on the 
Croatian equity market. The first VEC Model made an important distinction between direct 
equity investment in the Croatian equity market and indirect equity investments through the 
Croatian and SEE equity focused Open-end investment funds. The estimation results of the 
first VEC Model presented in Chapter 4, and the simulations made by the Impulse Response 
Analysis, suggest that the direct equity investments had a less speculative character on the 
Croatian financial market, and could be labelled as “productive investments”. On the other 
side, the results from the first empirical VEC model suggest that the indirect equity 
investments through the Croatian and SEE equity focused mutual funds were the financial 
market “bubbly asset” innovation. In the light of the theoretical discussion, this identification 
of the productive and the bubbly asset in the case of the Croatian market is one of the major 
benefits of the first VEC Model. 
The following hypotheses capture the implications of our original theoretical 
modelling for the impact of introducing influential institutional investors, DC pension funds, 
onto underdeveloped financial markets. Following each hypothesis, we present a summary of 
the supporting empirical evidence based on the two VEC Models. 
Hypothesis 1: Faster and more aggressive rise in the value of the bubbly asset could be 
expected with the introduction of the DC pension fund on the financial market. 
Looking at the empirical results representing the bubbly asset pricing dynamics in our 
estimated VEC Models in Chapter 4 and 5, we find supporting for our first theoretical 
hypothesis. Namely, in the first co-integrating relationship of our first empirical model 
presented in Chapter 4, both direct (“productive”) and indirect (“bubbly”) investments of the 
DC pension funds have a strictly positive long-term relationship with the relative value of the 
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Croatian equity bubble. Such a positive impact of the DC pension fund investments on the 
relative value of Croatian equity bubble was also confirmed by the use of Impulse Response 
Analysis applied on our estimated restricted VECM in Chapter 4. Namely, positive impulses 
introduced in both direct and indirect DC pension fund investment variables, translated into 
an increase in the relative value of the Croatian equity bubble. The same long-term and short-
term impact is confirmed also using our second empirical VEC Model presented in Chapter 
5, where we use only one investment variable representing the introduction of the DC 
pension fund. Its long-term relationship with the relative value of the Croatian equity bubble, 
as seen from the first co-integrating relationship is also positive. The same positive direction 
of the impact of the introduction of DC pension funds is likewise confirmed by the Impulse 
Response Analysis applied on the VEC Model in Chapter 5. Results from our both empirical 
models based on Croatian financial market data support our first hypothesis, suggesting faster 
and more aggressive increase in the value of the bubbly asset as a consequence of the 
introduction of DC pension funds. 
Hypothesis 2: Manipulating the pension fund investment rules –represented in the theoretical 
model by the variable τ –which could be in the hands of the law setting body responsible for 
the introduction of the DC pension fund in the system, affects the intensity of the effect of the 
DC pension fund on the financial market and on the dynamics of the productive and bubbly 
investment assets in the economy. 
The evidence supporting our second theoretical hypothesis is connected to the 
previously mentioned supporting evidence for the first theoretical hypothesis. As the DC 
pension fund tax on the gross salary of the young generation and DC pension fund 
investments increase, it exerts strictly positive effect on the relative value of the Croatian 
equity bubble. Consequently, a regulatory institution that has control on the extent of such 
DC pension fund salary tax, and the consequent investments on the domestic financial market 
in both productive and speculative market instruments, can impact the level and the intensity 
of the rise of the bubbly asset on the domestic market. The concomitant role of the regulator 
could be especially important in underdeveloped financial markets. This is an important 
finding that increases the role and the responsibility of the DC pension fund regulatory body 
with respect of the occurrence of speculative market episodes. 
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Hypothesis 3: The introduction of the mandatory DC pension fund to a closed illiquid 
financial market increases significantly the probability that the economy becomes 
dynamically inefficient and that it requires a bubbly asset to be introduced to overcome the 
potential issue of productive capital over-accumulation.   
This hypothesis is treated by the second long-term co-integrating relationship in both 
estimated VEC models in Chapter 4 and in Chapter 5. By looking at the second co-integrating 
relationship of the first VEC Model in Chapter 4, we find that the increase of productive 
investments by the DC pension fund produces decrease in the dynamic efficiency of the 
financial market. This is the expected theoretical consequence of productive capital over-
accumulation, and it confirms our third hypothesis; namely, that the introduction of DC 
pension funds strictly increases the probability that the financial market becomes dynamically 
inefficient. Moreover, in the first VEC Model in Chapter 4, we also find that the “bubbly” 
asset has the opposite impact, crowding out part of the productive investments and thereby 
solving the problem of productive capital over-accumulation. Although this theory-consistent 
distinction between the productive and “bubbly” investments of the DC pension funds is not 
preserved in the second VEC Model in Chapter 5, because we used a single investment 
variable, we again find that the investment variable has a negative interaction with the 
dynamic efficiency of the financial market. We conclude that the long-term equilibrium 
relationships in the two estimated VEC Models, in Chapters 4 and 5, suggest that the 
introduction of DC pension funds intensify productive capital over-accumulation and increase 
the probability that the financial market becomes less dynamically efficient or, ultimately, 
dynamically inefficient. Such dynamic inefficiency of the financial market is simulative for 
the occurrence of rational asset bubbles. 
Hypothesis 4: The increase of the value of the bubbly assets, consequent upon the 
introduction of DC pension funds, would be relatively much more dramatic and 
unsustainable in the case when the starting point is a dynamically efficient economy.  
Here, the idea is that the DC Pension Funds increase saving– changing behaviour by 
capturing a substantial part of the income of the young generation – and, hence, investment. 
The consequent over accumulation of productive assets leads – via diminishing returns – to 
the financial market becoming dynamically inefficient. In turn, this favours investment in the 
bubbly asset, thereby partially crowding out productive investment. Finally, this raises the 
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rate of return on productive assets and – through the non-arbitrage condition – increases the 
rate return on the bubbly asset and thus incentivises increasing investment in the bubbly asset 
and inaugurating an asset price bubble. The corollary is that the greater the intervention of 
DC Pension Funds, the more dramatic and the less sustainable the bubble. In particular, the 
bubble will be vulnerable to any movement back towards dynamic efficiency in the financial 
market. 
This hypothesis finds support with our second VEC Model presented in Chapter 5, where we 
model the impact of the DC pension funds with the Croatian data set using only one 
investment variable, the DC pension fund investments into the Croatian and SEE equity 
focused open-end mutual funds. In this second VEC model, using Impulse Response 
Analysis, we find that the negative shocks introduced on the dynamic efficiency of the 
Croatian financial market translate into positive relative valuation levels of the Croatian 
equity bubble. This means that increased dynamic efficiency (decreased dynamic 
inefficiency) negatively affects the value of the bubbly assets, which also means that if the 
starting point is a dynamically inefficient financial market economy, and if it changes to 
becoming dynamically efficient, or at least more dynamically efficient, this could trigger 
lower values of the bubbly asset.  This can clearly be seen in panel [b] of Figure 5.6.3a, 
which confirms the negative response of the relative value of the Croatian Equity bubble 
caused by a positive unit shock to the dynamic efficiency of the Croatian financial market. By 
implication – given that the empirical model is linear – this also works the other way round; 
i.e., reduced dynamic efficiency (increased dynamic inefficiency) triggers higher values of 
the bubbly asset.   
Moreover, based on Figure 5.6.3c panel [b], a positive shock introduced on the 
dynamic efficiency of the Croatian financial market also triggers lower DC pension fund 
investments in the bubbly asset through the Open End Mutual Funds. As explained above, 
this also works the other way round, such that an increase in dynamic inefficiency stimulates 
the DC pension funds to invest more in the bubbly asset. As seen from the analysis of the first 
co-integrating relationship presented in Figure 5.6.1, this may be one of the main drivers to 
higher valuation levels of the bubbly asset. Such mechanisms initiated by the decreased 
dynamic efficiency of the Croatian financial market stimulate increase of the relative value of 
the Croatian equity bubble.  
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Finally, if we analyse the long-term relationship presented by the second co-
integrating relationship of our VEC Model presented in Chapter 5, describing the long-term 
relationship between the dynamic efficiency of the Croatian financial market and the DC 
pension fund bubbly asset investments, and depicted in Figure 5.6.2, we find that without the 
Croatian DC pension funds, the Croatian financial market could have remained dynamically 
efficient even in the period before the Global Financial Crisis. This evidence of a long-run 
relationship between the introduction of the DC pension funds and the dynamic efficiency of 
the Croatian financial market is consistent with the implication of our theoretical model that 
the introduction of the DC pension funds could have shifted the overall Croatian financial 
market savings attitude, thereby changing the state of the financial market from being 
dynamically efficient into being dynamically inefficient (Figure 5.6.2).If the extent of such a 
change in the state of dynamic efficiency was large enough, as suggested by our empirical 
analysis, ceteris paribus, such a change might have made the Croatian equity market become 
a fertile environment for higher speculative equity valuations, additionally stimulated by the 
higher DC pension fund investments in the bubbly Croatian and SEE equity focused open-
end mutual funds. 
This leads to the conclusion that introducing massive DC pension schemes and so 
significantly changing savings behaviour on underdeveloped and illiquid financial markets, 
which might inherently be dynamically efficient, might create a market environment for 
aggressive adoption and valuation of potentially bubbly assets. 
Hypothesis 5: The crash of the bubbly asset could result from a sudden change of financial 
market dynamic efficiency caused either by a termination of the DC pension scheme or a shift 
in the inter-temporal consumption preferences of individual investors affected by some 
domestic or foreign risk event such as the Global Financial Crisis. 
Finally, in order to test our fifth hypothesis, in both VEC Models we introduced a shift 
dummy variable representing a structural break in the co-integrating relationships. The 
estimated impact of the structural shift at the time of the Global Financial Crisis was the same 
in both VEC Models.  Namely, from the first co-integrating relationship, the occurrence of 
the Global Financial Crisis caused highly negative pressure on the pricing levels of the 
bubbly asset in both our models by making the bubbly asset overpriced. This is especially 
intensive and visible in our simpler VEC Model presented in Chapter 5. From the second co-
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integrating relationship in both VEC Models, the Global Financial Crisis produced also a 
sudden and significant positive shift in the dynamic efficiency of the Croatian financial 
market. This in addition intensified the dynamics of the crash of the bubble, making further 
investment in the bubbly Croatian and SEE equity focused open-end mutual funds irrational. 
 
6.3. Final thoughts and directions for further research 
 
 By augmenting the canonical OLG model of rational asset bubbles of Tirole (1985) 
with influential DC pension fund investors, and simulating their impact on the 
underdeveloped financial markets, we have contributed to theoretical debate on the 
consequences of the pension reform advocated by the WB in the 1990s. Moreover, we report 
significant empirical evidence consistent with the theoretically simulated outcomes of such 
reforms, which introduced influential DC pension funds onto small and underdeveloped 
financial markets. This thesis shows that the financial innovation and market deepening 
caused by the introduction of the DC pension funds, especially when introduced into illiquid 
and underdeveloped financial markets, could cause the rise of financial market asset bubbles 
that, upon their collapse, may have high costs on the real economy and on the pension reform 
process. We believe that further research has to bring this debate to a higher level with 
empirical and theoretical work focused on the impact of fully-funded pension schemes on the 
global financial market. We have seen that the institutional investors and especially pension 
funds are becoming the leading investment participants on global financial markets (Allen, 
2001). Such a position makes them an inevitable feature that must be considered when 
modelling market valuation outcomes not only on the financial markets of the developing and 
transition economies, but also on global financial markets. 
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX II - Derivation of the OLG model economy with rational asset 
bubbles and DC pension funds 
 
In this Appendix, we represent the solution for the augmented OLG model with DC 
pension fund. There are two Equilibrium Law of Motion (ELM‟s) derived from our OLG 
model economy, which govern the dynamics of the financial market.  First, is the ELM for 
the productive capital investment asset, and second is the ELM for the speculative or bubbly 
investment instrument. To begin with, we first need to define those two saving assets: 
I) Saving Assets (Productive Capital Investments and Bubbly Asset) 
a. Productive Capital Investment Kt, and Productive Capital per young agent 
t
t
t
N
K
k  . 
Resources invested today in productive capital become capital investments in 
the next period 1tk , bringing a financial interest as a return. Assuming a 
Constant Returns on Scale (CRS) production function, capital Investments 
yields return R at next period t+1   1)( 11 tt kfR , where )( 1 tkf  is the 
marginal product of capital per young agent, and  is the rate of depreciation 
of Capital ( 1tk ) . 
 
b. Speculative/Bubbly Asset Investment  with no intrinsic value and constant 
supply of units of the bubbly asset .1 constBBB tt    where the per 
young agent value of the bubbly asset tb equals to: 
t
t
t
N
B
b

 . Here, t represents the price of the unit of the bubbly asset at 
time t, and tN represents the number of young agents at t. 
 
 
II) Consumers’ Agents and DC pension Fund  
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Similar to Tirole‟s model (Tirole, 1985)  this model has Consumer Agents, who 
rationally decide on their inter-temporal savings and we also added the second savings 
market participant, The DC Pension Fund.  
a) Consumer agents, they live two periods and two generations overlap each other. 
When young, they consume “c1t “and when old “c2t+1”. They are also endowed 
with a one unit of labor when young, which they transform in to wage “wt”. Part 
of it is consumed when they are young at t, part of it is taxed by the DC pension 
fund at an absolute amount “τ”, and the rest they invest in the two available 
assets in order to provide consumption and utility in the second period. Their 
utility maximization gives the following results (following Tirole, 1985, 
augmented by the pension tax “τ” and the price of the bubbly asset “∏”): 
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First Order Conditions (FOC): 
 
 
Solving consumers utility maximization problem, we arrive to the interior solution 
condition called the NON-ARBITRAGE CONDITION, which would play its role in 
the markets for productive and speculative/bubbly investments 1t
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1  - NON ARBIRTAGE CONDITION 
 
b) DC Pension Funds 
We introduced a DC pension fund in the model, which by law, taxes every young 
agent the amount t at time t. It immediately invests the total collected amount in the 
bubbly asset by the rule, and provides the amount
t
t
t

 1  as pension to today‟s young 
agent in the next period by selling previously purchased amounts of the bubbly asset 
units at the current price. 
 The impact of the existence of the pension fund on the financial market has 
two sides, direct and indirect. The Direct effect is described by the investment 
formula which directly impacts the market of the bubbly asset. By simplicity the DC 
pension fund invests only in the bubbly asset. The Indirect effect has its effect through 
capturing part of individual agent‟s first period gross income and adding to the second 
period income, which affects its saving decision of each individual both for the 
bubbly and productive investment assets.  
Now that we described the agents and the institution in the model, we try to define the 
dynamics of the two in the market, by equalling their supply with the demand: 
 
III) Financial market (dynamics of productive capital and speculative/bubbly asset) 
 
a) Evolution of the value of the Bubble Asset tb  
 
t
t
t
N
B
b

 , here the value of the bubbly asset per young agent bt equals the supplied 
amount of units of bubbly asset B which is constant, multiplied by their current price 
t . The factor which would define the value of the bubble per young agent will be its 
price t . To get to the Equilibrium Law of Motion of the value of the bubbly asset 
per young agent, we first should apply the effect of the DC pension fund investments 
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and disinvestments at each period. The DC Pension fund buys the number of units 
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Now, we plug-in the Consumer agent‟s solution, i.e. the Non-Arbitrage condition, and 
we get: 
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, from here for the two consecutive periods we have: 
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From this system, the dynamics of the price of the Bubbly Asset could be expressed 
as: 
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Finally, dividing the two equations, the price change of the bubbly asset could be 
represented by: 
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Once again, since the consumer agent could invest into both investment assets, the 
Non-Arbitrage condition has to hold 
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, and so we transform this equation 
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Finally, exchanging 
  1)( 11 tt kfR  in this equation, we get the Equilibrium 
Law of Motion (ELM) equation for the dynamics of the bubbly asset in the economy: 
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Now in order to find the locus of steady state points, we erase the time subscripts and 
solve the equation. Erasing subscripts, we get the following: 
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We see that only when the interest rate R is equal to 1+n, we do get steady state 
solutions for b: 
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We conclude that for Rt=Rt+1=R=(1+n) =>bt=bt+1=b, which determines a vertical loci 
of SS point from k=f‟(n) 
 
b) Evolution of the value of the Productive Capital tk  
 
We define the savings market as place where the savings demand of every young agent 
)1)(;;)((*   tttt kfkwSN , meets with the supply of available investment assets 
ttt NbK 1 , and the savings market clears: 
ttttttt NbKkfkwSN  1
* )1)(;;)(( 
 
ttttttt NbKkfkwSN  1
* )1)(;;)(( 
, transforming in per young agent terms we get 
ttttt bnkkfkwS   )1()1)(;;)(( 1
* 
 
And from here the Equilibrium Law of Motion (ELM) for the productive capital asset: 
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APPENDIX III.1 Data set 
 
 
Date dummy1 dummy2 dummy3 dummy4 dummyMonthPFInvTotalMonthlyPFInvDirectEQUITYMonthlyPFInvOIFMonthlyOMF_AUMIndexLTinterestCroSubscriberRateCRODYNEF B_Croatia B_US
Oct-97 0 0 0 0 0 100 8.84 0.3 8.54 14.8838 12.2988
Nov-97 0 0 0 0 0 100 8.63 0.3 8.33 7.80169 13.5536
Dec-97 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 9.1 0.3 8.8 15.1233 14.1937
Jan-98 0 0 0 0 0 7760.91 7569.357 191.5531 100 9.54 0.3 9.24 3.99428 21.6949
Feb-98 0 0 0 0 1 15196.19 14821.12 375.069 100 8.59 0.3 8.29 15.621 27.2072
Mar-98 0 0 0 0 0 21980.2 21437.69 542.5104 100 8.93 0.3 8.63 14.8539 27.7959
Apr-98 0 0 0 0 0 27787.31 27101.47 685.8404 100 9.94 0.3 9.639999 3.30514 24.8397
May-98 0 0 0 0 0 32291.9 31494.88 797.0215 100 9.57 0.3 9.27 -9.56054 29.1961
Jun-98 0 0 0 0 0 35168.32 34300.3 868.0167 100 9.51 0.3 9.21 -9.56164 27.0213
Jul-98 0 0 0 0 0 36090.95 35200.16 890.7888 100 9.55 0.3 9.25 -14.8502 7.93221
Aug-98 0 0 0 0 0 34734.14 33876.84 857.3005 100 9.8 0.3 9.5 -51.4306 14.0677
Sep-98 0 0 0 0 0 30772.28 30012.77 759.5146 100 9.88 0.3 9.58 -42.3587 22.5863
Oct-98 0 0 0 0 0 23879.72 23290.33 589.3941 100 9.16 0.3 8.86 -39.5435 29.163
Nov-98 0 0 0 0 0 13730.84 13391.94 338.9016 100 9.07 0.3 8.77 -30.4122 35.7429
Dec-98 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 7.73 0.3 7.43 -31.2313 40.5865
Jan-99 0 0 0 0 0 -17312.8 -16885.5 -427.311 100 8.66 0.3 8.36 -26.8115 35.3554
Feb-99 0 0 0 0 1 -36905.03 -35994.1 -910.882 100 8.73 0.3 8.429999 -32.0015 39.8942
Mar-99 0 0 0 0 0 -57148.52 -55738 -1410.53 100 8.92 0.3 8.62 -35.3192 44.4705
Apr-99 0 0 0 0 0 -76415.12 -74529.1 -1886.06 100 8.53 0.3 8.23 -36.5757 40.1567
May-99 0 0 0 0 0 -93076.65 -90779.4 -2297.3 100 9.14 0.3 8.84 -34.3785 47.0492
Jun-99 0 0 0 0 0 -105505 -102901 -2604.05 100 8.66 0.3 8.36 -36.2797 41.5826
Jul-99 0 0 0 0 0 -112071.9 -109306 -2766.13 100 8.6 0.3 8.3 -40.3038 39.9554
Aug-99 0 0 0 0 0 -111149.3 -108406 -2743.36 100 8.88 0.3 8.58 -42.4854 35.2465
Sep-99 0 0 0 0 0 -101108.9 -98613.4 -2495.55 100 8.89 0.3 8.59 -55.7304 42.9552
Oct-99 0 0 0 0 0 -80322.7 -78340.2 -1982.51 100 9.03 0.3 8.73 -53.4748 44.9242
Nov-99 0 0 0 0 0 -47162.45 -45998.4 -1164.05 100 8.48 0.3 8.179999 -44.1725 52.5157
Dec-99 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 8.87 0.3 8.57 -38.3791 44.0087
Jan-00 0 0 0 0 0 61490.29 59972.6 1517.69 100 8.88 0.3 8.58 -33.0937 40.3919
Feb-00 0 0 0 0 1 132423.9 129155.5 3268.458 100 8.71 0.3 8.41 -27.3408 53.1878
Mar-00 0 0 0 0 0 206613.9 201514.3 5099.598 100 8.64 0.3 8.34 -18.791 47.7193
Apr-00 0 0 0 0 0 277873.2 271014.8 6858.404 100 8.55 0.3 8.25 -29.075 43.7549
May-00 0 0 0 0 0 340014.7 331622.5 8392.168 100 8.48 0.3 8.179999 -25.7243 46.4584
Jun-00 0 0 0 0 0 386851.5 377303.3 9548.184 100 7.54 0.3 7.24 -29.2947 43.6624
Jul-00 0 0 0 0 0 412196.6 402022.8 10173.75 100 7.47 0.3 7.17 -33.3473 51.9579
Aug-00 0 0 0 0 0 409862.9 399746.8 10116.15 100 7.61 0.3 7.31 -30.7664 43.431
Sep-00 0 0 0 0 0 373663.4 364440.7 9222.678 100 7.37 0.3 7.07 -31.7093 42.3255
Oct-00 0 0 0 0 0 297411.1 290070.5 7340.635 100 7.18 0.3 6.88 -30.0365 30.5678
Nov-00 0 0 0 0 0 174919 170601.7 4317.312 100 7.38 0.3 7.08 -26.0294 30.7357
Dec-00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 7.2 0.3 6.9 -27.7445 34.8921
Jan-01 0 0 0 0 0 -228648.3 -223005 -5643.45 100 7.17 0.3 6.87 -28.4806 22.1071
Feb-01 0 0 0 0 1 -492790.7 -480628 -12163 100 7.36 0.3 7.06 -22.9832 13.9549
Mar-01 0 0 0 0 0 -769307 -750319 -18987.9 100 7.07 0.3 6.77 -25.6735 22.3737
Apr-01 0 0 0 0 0 -1035077 -1009530 -25547.6 100 7.15 0.3 6.85 -22.5087 22.6622
May-01 0 0 0 0 0 -1266982 -1235711 -31271.4 100 6.72 0.3 6.42 -26.3549 19.267
Jun-01 0 0 0 0 0 -1441901 -1406312 -35588.7 100 6.26 0.3 5.96 -22.8671 17.6467
Jul-01 0 0 0 0 0 -1536715 -1498786 -37928.9 100 6.07 0.3 5.77 -21.5249 9.78868
Aug-01 0 0 0 0 0 -1528302 -1490581 -37721.2 100 6.28 0.3 5.98 -22.0468 0.528004
Sep-01 0 0 0 0 0 -1393545 -1359150 -34395.2 100 6.44 0.3 6.14 -28.1531 2.05555
Oct-01 0 0 0 0 0 -1109322 -1081942 -27380 100 6.24 0.3 5.94 -27.9572 9.41559
Nov-01 0 0 0 0 0 -652513.4 -636408 -16105.2 100 5.93 0.3 5.63 -23.1954 9.93163
Dec-01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 5.68 0.3 5.38 -22.442 7.91353
Jan-02 1 0 0 0 0 859587.1 838530.9 21056.1 100 5.79 10 -4.21 -13.1638 5.37457
Feb-02 1 0 0 0 1 1890610 1845227 45383.34 100 5.47 10 -4.53 -11.5875 8.93869
Mar-02 1 0 0 0 0 3045681 2974829 70851.87 100 5.06 10 -4.94 -6.16309 1.96121
Apr-02 1 0 0 0 0 4277410 4182078 95331.81 100 4.58 10 -5.42 -10.3826 0.752717
May-02 1 0 0 0 0 5538408 5421715 116693.3 100 4.6 10 -5.4 -11.3837 -6.80796
Jun-02 1 0 0 0 0 6781287 6648480 132806.6 100 4.51 10 -5.49 -16.3257 -14.5052
Jul-02 1 0 0 0 0 7958657 7817115 141541.6 100 4.25 10 -5.75 -22.1719 -14.4216
Aug-02 1 0 0 0 0 9023129 8882360 140768.7 100 4.05 10 -5.95 -21.1579 -24.132
Sep-02 1 0 0 0 0 9927315 9798957 128358 100 4.18 10 -5.82 -21.8371 -17.891
Oct-02 1 0 0 0 0 1.06E+07 1.05E+07 102179.5 100 3.75 10 -6.25 -23.4688 -13.5383
Nov-02 1 0 0 0 0 1.11E+07 1.10E+07 60103.46 100 3.52 10 -6.48 -19.2352 -19.0655
Dec-02 1 0 0 0 0 1.12E+07 1.12E+07 0 100 3.64 10 -6.36 -19.5015 -21.5842
Jan-03 1 0 0 0 0 1.10E+07 1.11E+07 -78581 100 3.46 9.65313 -6.19313 -25.3708 -23.2101
Feb-03 1 0 0 0 1 1.05E+07 1.07E+07 -169370 100 3.51 9.65313 -6.14313 -28.9675 -22.8611
Mar-03 1 0 0 0 0 9818082 1.01E+07 -264420 100 3.36 9.65313 -6.29313 -29.2527 -16.9236
Apr-03 1 0 0 0 0 8938610 9294390 -355780 100 3.16 9.65313 -6.49313 -25.5729 -13.0228
May-03 1 0 0 0 0 7951245 8386747 -435502 100 3.13 9.65313 -6.52313 -24.3886 -12.3669
Jun-03 1 0 0 0 0 6916474 7412111 -495638 100 3.37 9.65313 -6.28313 -23.4732 -11.4163
Jul-03 1 1 0 0 0 5894783 6423021 -528238 100 3.28 9.65313 -6.37313 -25.5889 -10.3074
Aug-03 1 1 0 0 0 4946661 5472015 -525354 100 3.83 9.65313 -5.82313 -24.064 -11.8426
Sep-03 1 1 0 0 0 4132595 4611632 -479037 100 5.25 9.65313 -4.40313 -29.506 -7.48163
Oct-03 1 1 0 0 0 3513071 3894409 -381338 100 4.71 9.65313 -4.94313 -26.9242 -7.30478
Nov-03 1 1 0 0 0 3148577 3372886 -224309 100 3.57 9.65313 -6.08313 -24.503 -3.10101
Dec-03 1 1 0 0 0 3099600 3099600 0 100 4.46 9.65313 -5.19313 -25.1894 -1.93232
Jan-04 1 1 0 0 0 3402937 3109669 293267.8 100 4.96 10.6578 -5.69782 -24.9296 -1.24134
Feb-04 1 1 0 0 1 4000620 3368521 632098.4 100 4.94 10.6578 -5.71782 -26.7153 -3.34992
Mar-04 1 1 0 0 0 4810991 3824164 986826.5 100 5.36 10.6578 -5.29782 -28.2377 -5.45257
Apr-04 1 1 0 0 0 5752393 4424606 1327787 100 4.31 10.6578 -6.34782 -27.8286 -4.79085
May-04 1 1 0 0 0 6743166 5117852 1625315 100 3.42 10.6578 -7.23782 -30.6985 -3.56262
Jun-04 1 1 0 0 0 7701654 5851911 1849744 100 3.34 10.6578 -7.31782 -30.0856 -7.37076
Jul-04 1 1 0 0 0 8546198 6574789 1971409 100 5 10.6578 -5.65782 -28.0891 -7.65589
Aug-04 1 1 0 0 0 9195141 7234495 1960646 100 6.25 10.6578 -4.40782 -26.2371 -7.28752
Sep-04 1 1 0 0 0 9566824 7779035 1787789 100 5.93 10.6578 -4.72782 -17.1029 -6.48617
Oct-04 1 1 0 0 0 9579589 8156417 1423172 100 4.66 10.6578 -5.99782 -13.9801 -3.38873
Nov-04 1 1 0 0 0 9151778 8314647 837131.1 100 3.36 10.6578 -7.29782 -5.7191 -0.7757
Dec-04 1 1 0 0 0 8201734 8201734 0 100 4.12 10.6578 -6.53782 -8.39965 -3.78938
Jan-05 1 1 0 0 0 6692990 7784482 -1091492 4.13 9.25779 -5.12779 11.7674 -2.47913
Feb-05 1 1 0 0 1 4769852 7104888 -2335037 4.05 9.25779 -5.20779 20.3716 -4.83709
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Date dummy1 dummy2 dummy3 dummy4 dummyMonthPFInvTotalMonthlyPFInvDirectEQUITYMonthlyPFInvOIFMonthlyOMF_AUMIndexLTinterestCroSubscriberRateCRODYNEF B_Croatia B_US
Mar-05 1 1 0 0 0 2621815 6223748 -3601932 3.88 9.25779 -5.37779 5.67191 -7.22938
Apr-05 1 1 0 0 0 438379.1 5201856 -4763477 3.47 9.25779 -5.78779 1.86833 -4.93871
May-05 1 1 0 0 0 -1590960 4100008 -5690968 3.34 9.25779 -5.91779 -1.79147 -5.43524
Jun-05 1 1 0 0 0 -3276706 2978998 -6255704 3.55 9.25779 -5.70779 2.2763 -2.51931
Jul-05 1 1 0 0 0 -4429361 1899621 -6328982 3.92 9.25779 -5.33779 3.24086 -4.08845
Aug-05 1 1 0 0 0 -4859427 922673.2 -5782100 4.79 9.25779 -4.46779 7.63874 -3.89579
Sep-05 1 1 0 0 0 -4377408 108948.8 -4486357 3.93 9.25779 -5.32779 12.6189 -6.06161
Oct-05 1 1 0 0 0 -2793806 -480757 -2313049 3.66 9.25779 -5.59779 10.925 -3.22873
Nov-05 1 1 0 0 0 80875.38 -785650 866524.6 3.6 9.25779 -5.65779 10.022 -3.78833
Dec-05 1 1 0 0 0 4436134 -744933 5181067 231.132 3.37 9.25779 -5.88779 7.65503 -1.81285
Jan-06 1 1 0 0 0 1.04E+07 -302974 1.07E+07 3.2 7.84564 -4.64564 11.8016 -2.23876
Feb-06 1 1 0 0 1 1.80E+07 575225.3 1.75E+07 3.38 7.84564 -4.46564 13.9518 -1.62509
Mar-06 1 1 0 0 0 2.72E+07 1919498 2.53E+07 3.42 7.84564 -4.42564 28.0813 -0.90156
Apr-06 1 1 0 0 0 3.79E+07 3759681 3.41E+07 3.34 7.84564 -4.50564 31.3085 -4.41874
May-06 1 1 0 0 0 5.01E+07 6125609 4.39E+07 3.23 7.84564 -4.61564 29.2982 -4.8596
Jun-06 1 1 0 0 0 6.36E+07 9047117 5.46E+07 3.28 7.84564 -4.56564 40.6705 -4.76224
Jul-06 1 1 0 0 0 7.86E+07 1.26E+07 6.60E+07 3.16 7.84564 -4.68564 47.609 -3.12768
Aug-06 1 1 0 0 0 9.48E+07 1.67E+07 7.81E+07 3.12 7.84564 -4.72564 57.9917 -1.14584
Sep-06 1 1 0 0 0 1.12E+08 2.14E+07 9.09E+07 3.46 7.84564 -4.38564 59.9285 1.56164
Oct-06 1 1 0 0 0 1.31E+08 2.69E+07 1.04E+08 3.53 7.84564 -4.31564 63.3825 2.82338
Nov-06 1 1 0 0 0 1.51E+08 3.30E+07 1.18E+08 3.1 7.84564 -4.74564 61.8843 3.70806
Dec-06 1 1 0 0 0 1.72E+08 3.99E+07 1.32E+08 1375.68 2.98 7.84564 -4.86564 58.2941 4.75109
Jan-07 1 1 0 0 0 1.94E+08 4.75E+07 1.46E+08 1398.17 3.56 8.62193 -5.06194 84.1299 2.05993
Feb-07 1 1 0 0 1 2.16E+08 5.59E+07 1.61E+08 1527.96 3.46 8.17591 -4.71591 84.2877 2.67489
Mar-07 1 1 0 0 0 2.39E+08 6.48E+07 1.74E+08 1630.8 3.49 7.69047 -4.20048 104.045 6.70198
Apr-07 1 1 0 0 0 2.60E+08 7.43E+07 1.86E+08 1670.61 3.58 5.40612 -1.82613 120.38 9.74703
May-07 1 1 0 0 0 2.80E+08 8.43E+07 1.96E+08 1669.75 3.75 6.32435 -2.57435 135.902 7.3746
Jun-07 1 1 0 0 0 2.98E+08 9.46E+07 2.03E+08 1637.62 4.55 6.08563 -1.53563 129.195 3.7785
Jul-07 1 1 0 0 0 3.13E+08 1.05E+08 2.07E+08 1590.75 4.95 6.41371 -1.46372 137.193 4.94984
Aug-07 1 1 0 0 0 3.24E+08 1.16E+08 2.08E+08 1503.72 4.25 6.08681 -1.83681 122.455 8.53745
Sep-07 1 1 0 0 0 3.32E+08 1.27E+08 2.05E+08 1408.28 4.82 7.70663 -2.88663 133.738 9.9753
Oct-07 1 1 0 0 0 3.35E+08 1.39E+08 1.97E+08 1360.71 5.65 7.91186 -2.26186 136.092 4.96872
Nov-07 1 1 0 0 0 3.33E+08 1.50E+08 1.83E+08 1083.22 5.94 9.79835 -3.85835 113.128 3.90201
Dec-07 1 1 0 0 0 3.25E+08 1.61E+08 1.64E+08 1141.59 5.42 8.30486 -2.88486 138.091 -2.60367
Jan-08 1 1 1 0 0 3.11E+08 1.72E+08 1.38E+08 991.404 5.79 7.80047 -2.01047 102.982 -6.13427
Feb-08 1 1 1 0 1 2.91E+08 1.83E+08 1.08E+08 822.379 5.01 8.03177 -3.02177 89.7297 -6.83736
Mar-08 1 1 1 0 0 2.66E+08 1.93E+08 7.32E+07 695.914 4.48 7.76329 -3.28329 71.2118 -2.55783
Apr-08 1 1 1 1 0 2.39E+08 2.02E+08 3.61E+07 600.983 4.12 9.52513 -5.40513 67.7501 -1.66891
May-08 1 1 1 1 0 2.08E+08 2.10E+08 -2356313 541.397 4.2 6.18834 -1.98834 75.2204 -10.2594
Jun-08 1 1 1 1 0 1.76E+08 2.17E+08 -4.08E+07 501.956 4.16 8.23155 -4.07155 57.6229 -10.9792
Jul-08 1 1 1 1 0 1.44E+08 2.22E+08 -7.81E+07 422.205 4.23 6.2418 -2.0118 60.444 -9.72636
Aug-08 1 1 1 1 0 1.12E+08 2.25E+08 -1.13E+08 377.606 4.01 5.6532 -1.6432 54.7635 -17.7694
Sep-08 1 1 1 1 0 8.17E+07 2.26E+08 -1.44E+08 309.248 5.2 7.04557 -1.84557 32.9665 -31.5738
Oct-08 1 1 1 1 0 5.40E+07 2.24E+08 -1.70E+08 270.928 7.52 7.11181 0.408188 -2.17333 -36.577
Nov-08 1 1 1 1 0 2.97E+07 2.19E+08 -1.89E+08 267.904 10.24 8.42164 1.818356 -27.9776 -35.9611
Dec-08 1 1 1 1 0 1.01E+07 2.12E+08 -2.02E+08 226.072 5.65 4.7635 0.886502 -22.5179 -41.3365
Jan-09 1 1 1 1 0 -4345490 2.01E+08 -2.05E+08 210.082 7.81 5.44129 2.368709 -24.0355 -47.6872
Feb-09 1 1 1 1 1 -1.38E+07 1.87E+08 -2.01E+08 197.838 11.83 4.91034 6.919664 -37.247 -43.1124
Mar-09 1 1 1 1 0 -1.88E+07 1.71E+08 -1.90E+08 176.605 9.3 4.5388 4.761203 -33.9146 -37.6517
Apr-09 1 1 1 1 0 -2.01E+07 1.54E+08 -1.74E+08 165.084 6.5 3.00834 3.491663 -27.1427 -34.218
May-09 1 1 1 1 0 -1.81E+07 1.35E+08 -1.54E+08 205.299 6 3.68816 2.311841 -1.57116 -34.0803
Jun-09 1 1 1 1 0 -1.36E+07 1.16E+08 -1.30E+08 204.249 6.05 3.43048 2.619516 -12.9457 -29.4141
Jul-09 1 1 1 1 0 -6948422 9.73E+07 -1.04E+08 191.915 6.83 0.899607 5.930393 -13.6292 -27.2723
Aug-09 1 1 1 1 0 1101062 7.88E+07 -7.77E+07 191.508 6.48 2.09672 4.383281 -7.52505 -24.908
Sep-09 1 1 1 1 0 1.00E+07 6.14E+07 -5.14E+07 177.599 6.32 5.24091 1.079094 1.2809 -26.6197
Oct-09 1 1 1 1 0 1.92E+07 4.56E+07 -2.64E+07 166.209 5.05 5.75995 -0.70995 -1.00931 -22.6496
Nov-09 1 1 1 1 0 2.80E+07 3.21E+07 -4017184 165.406 2.69 5.92206 -3.23206 -4.47363 -21.5171
Dec-09 1 1 1 1 0 3.60E+07 2.13E+07 1.48E+07 165.123 2.52 3.71569 -1.19569 -7.25269 -24.6506
Jan-10 1 1 1 1 0 4.26E+07 1.36E+07 2.90E+07 161.287 2.7 3.18891 -0.48891 2.11125 -22.7389
Feb-10 1 1 1 1 1 4.78E+07 8993704 3.88E+07 162.678 2.64 4.29103 -1.65103 -0.77918 -18.4455
Mar-10 1 1 1 1 0 5.18E+07 7132510 4.47E+07 163.939 2.07 3.47162 -1.40162 -0.42559 -17.4932
Apr-10 1 1 1 1 0 5.47E+07 7750196 4.69E+07 168.83 2.15 3.19053 -1.04054 0.568308 -24.4861
May-10 1 1 1 1 0 5.65E+07 1.06E+07 4.60E+07 169.767 2.19 4.16946 -1.97946 -7.44205 -28.7707
Jun-10 1 1 1 1 0 5.75E+07 1.53E+07 4.22E+07 171.811 1.94 3.80555 -1.86555 -13.5559 -24.1232
Jul-10 1 1 1 1 0 5.78E+07 2.17E+07 3.61E+07 170.582 2.04 2.95349 -0.91349 -13.6468 -27.9615
Aug-10 1 1 1 1 0 5.74E+07 2.95E+07 2.79E+07 170.096 1.79 3.21433 -1.42433 -14.1948 -21.9116
Sep-10 1 1 1 1 0 5.65E+07 3.84E+07 1.82E+07 165.838 1.75 3.79346 -2.04346 -11.2179 -19.2985
Oct-10 1 1 1 1 0 5.53E+07 4.81E+07 7224198 168.793 1.95 3.53292 -1.58292 -13.5138 -19.7459
Nov-10 1 1 1 1 0 5.38E+07 5.83E+07 -4518547 169.837 1.91 5.21024 -3.30024 -17.4637 -14.7831
Dec-10 1 1 1 1 0 5.22E+07 6.89E+07 -1.67E+07 151.033 1.93 3.76844 -1.83844 -2.68289 -13.1357
Jan-11 1 1 1 1 0 1.89 3.21218 -1.32218 5.50491 -10.6493
Feb-11 1 1 1 1 1 1.47 3.57755 -2.10755 2.95133 -11.0301
Mar-11 1 1 1 1 0 1.66 3.88656 -2.22656 5.03613 -8.78852
Apr-11 1 1 1 1 0 1.37 2.78553 -1.41553 2.2662 -10.3077
May-11 1 1 1 1 0 1.32 2.03005 -0.71005 4.13925 -12.226
Jun-11 1 1 1 1 0 1.6 2.37079 -0.77079 1.9444 -14.3991
Jul-11 1 1 1 1 0 1.67 2.53065 -0.86065 -0.66754 -19.5305
Aug-11 1 1 1 1 0 2.07 3.41665 -1.34665 -7.058 -25.5541
Sep-11 1 1 1 1 0 2.2 3.235 -1.035 -15.2623 -17.8085
Oct-11 1 1 1 1 0 2.82 4.27371 -1.45371 -15.8021 -18.4951
Nov-11 1 1 1 1 0 2.5 4.8793 -2.3793 -20.5296 -18.0709
Dec-11 1 1 1 1 0 2.46 3.42229 -0.96229 -20.4848 -14.7814
Jan-12 1 1 1 1 0 3.1 3.4564 -0.3564 -21.077 -11.6131
Feb-12 1 1 1 1 1 3.24 3.59073 -0.35073 -18.3391 -9.14165
Mar-12 1 1 1 1 0 2.56 3.12873 -0.56873 -16.2246 -10.1166
Apr-12 1 1 1 1 0 2.09 5.19786 -3.10786 -17.7237 -16.0214
May-12 1 1 1 1 0 1.8 3.65501 -1.85501 -23.7698 -12.9821
Jun-12 1 1 1 1 0 1.85 3.16108 -1.31108 -22.6097 -12.144
Jul-12 1 1 1 1 0 2.12 2.69935 -0.57936 -22.5416 -10.6694
Aug-12 1 1 1 1 0 2.31 2.39094 -0.08094 -23.5055 -8.77081
Sep-12 1 1 1 1 0 2.27 3.3327 -1.0627 -22.0311 -10.8359
Oct-12 1 1 1 1 0 1.73 3.82788 -2.09788 -20.3669 -10.841
Nov-12 1 1 1 1 0 2.17 3.20918 -1.03918 -20.2596 -10.47
Dec-12 1 1 1 1 0 2.08 2.44938 -0.36938 -21.2883 -6.22591
Jan-13 1 1 1 1 0 1.87 2.33996 -0.46996 -14.7648 -5.46087
Feb-13 1 1 1 1 1 1.81 3.21953 -1.40953 -12.3131 -2.26267
Mar-13 1 1 1 1 0 1.65 2.80068 -1.15068
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APPENDIX III.2 Stata program for Cubic-Spline lower to higher frequency 
interpolation 
 
We here present a modified version of a STATA-program taken from a free online 
sharing database provided by www.columbiaeconomics.com: 
 
mata // This line launches the Mata system inside Stata 
 
X = st_data((1,14),"x") // This pulls in the x quarterly markers data. 
 
Y = st_data((1,14),"y") // This pulls in the quarterly y data we want to interpolate between. 
 
XX = st_data(.,"xx") // This pulls in the xx monthly markers we want to interpolate at. 
 
A = spline3(X,Y) // This generates the cubic spline coefficients matrix, and stores it in A.  
 
B = spline3eval(A,XX) // This performs the interpolation, and store the values in B. 
 
st_store(.,"yy",B) // This pushes the interpolated figures in B back into the yy variable in 
Stata. 
 
End 
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APPENDIX III.3 – Data set unit root tests of our endogenous variables in 
their level and first difference forms using ADF, UR with structural break 
tests and KPSS  
 
1. Unit root tests of the Croatian equity bubble variable “B_Croatia” in 
its level form 
 
1.1. Augmented Dickey Fuller test results for “B_Croatia” (lags=4); no 
constant or trend; constant and no trend and both with trend 
and constant 
 
ADF Test for series:      B_Croatia  
sample range:             [1998 M3, 2013 M2], T = 180 
lagged differences:       4  
no intercept, no time trend 
asymptotic critical values 
reference: Davidson, R. and MacKinnon, J. (1993), 
"Estimation and Inference in Econometrics" p 708, table 20.1, 
Oxford University Press, London 
 1%         5%         10%        
-2.56      -1.94      -1.62      
value of test statistic: -2.1133 
regression results: 
--------------------------------------- 
variable      coefficient   t-statistic   
--------------------------------------- 
 x(-1)        -0.0334       -2.1133       
dx(-1)         0.0699        0.9401       
dx(-2)         0.1572        2.1181       
dx(-3)         0.0970        1.3044       
dx(-4)         0.0675        0.9046       
RSS            13324.8013   
 
OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS LAGS FROM INFORMATION CRITERIA 
 
sample range:             [1998 M11, 2013 M2], T = 172 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 12 lags of 1. differences): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    8             
Final Prediction Error:   8             
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   2             
Schwarz Criterion:        0             
 
PORTMANTEAU TEST with 12 lags 
 
Portmanteau:               15.1923      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.2311 
Ljung & Box:               15.9869      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.1918       
 
JARQUE-BERA TEST: 
 
test statistic:            91.3276      
 p-Value(Chi^2):           0.0000       
skewness:                 -0.2736       
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kurtosis:                  6.4464       
 
 
ADF Test for series:      B_Croatia  
sample range:             [1998 M3, 2013 M2], T = 180 
lagged differences:       4  
intercept, no time trend 
asymptotic critical values 
reference: Davidson, R. and MacKinnon, J. (1993), 
"Estimation and Inference in Econometrics" p 708, table 20.1, 
Oxford University Press, London 
 1%         5%         10%        
-3.43      -2.86      -2.57      
value of test statistic: -2.1077 
regression results: 
--------------------------------------- 
variable      coefficient   t-statistic   
--------------------------------------- 
 x(-1)        -0.0334       -2.1077       
dx(-1)         0.0698        0.9365       
dx(-2)         0.1570        2.1092       
dx(-3)         0.0969        1.2986       
dx(-4)         0.0673        0.8994       
constant      -0.1017       -0.1558       
RSS            13322.9419   
 
OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS LAGS FROM INFORMATION CRITERIA 
 
sample range:             [1998 M11, 2013 M2], T = 172 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 12 lags of 1. differences): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    8             
Final Prediction Error:   8             
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   2             
Schwarz Criterion:        0             
 
PORTMANTEAU TEST with 12 lags 
 
Portmanteau:               15.1892      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.2313       
Ljung & Box:               15.9837      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.1920       
 
JARQUE-BERA TEST: 
 
test statistic:            91.3947      
 p-Value(Chi^2):           0.0000       
skewness:                 -0.2739       
kurtosis:                  6.4476       
 
 
 
ADF Test for series:      B_Croatia  
sample range:             [1998 M3, 2013 M2], T = 180 
lagged differences:       4  
intercept, time trend 
asymptotic critical values 
reference: Davidson, R. and MacKinnon, J. (1993), 
"Estimation and Inference in Econometrics" p 708, table 20.1, 
Oxford University Press, London 
 1%         5%         10%        
-3.96      -3.41      -3.13      
value of test statistic: -2.2588 
regression results: 
--------------------------------------- 
variable      coefficient   t-statistic   
353 | P a g e  
 
--------------------------------------- 
 x(-1)        -0.0378       -2.2588       
dx(-1)         0.0717        0.9603       
dx(-2)         0.1590        2.1330       
dx(-3)         0.1003        1.3420       
dx(-4)         0.0706        0.9421       
constant      -0.0963       -0.1474       
trend          0.0109        0.8236       
RSS            13270.9108   
 
OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS LAGS FROM INFORMATION CRITERIA 
 
sample range:             [1998 M11, 2013 M2], T = 172 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 12 lags of 1. differences): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    8             
Final Prediction Error:   8             
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   2             
Schwarz Criterion:        0             
 
PORTMANTEAU TEST with 12 lags 
 
Portmanteau:               15.3451      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.2231       
Ljung & Box:               16.1499      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.1845       
 
JARQUE-BERA TEST: 
 
test statistic:            84.9416      
 p-Value(Chi^2):           0.0000       
skewness:                 -0.2338       
kurtosis:                  6.3327       
 
1.2. Unit Root tests with structural break for “B_Croatia” (lags=4); 
with an impulse dummy (December 2007) and with a shift 
dummy (August 1998); with constant and no trend and with 
both constant and a trend 
 
 
UR test with Structural Break 
Break date search for series:  B_Croatia  
sample range:                  [1998 M3, 2013 M2], T = 180 
searched range:                [1998 M7, 2012 M12], T = 174 
number of lags (1st diff):     4  
suggested break date:          2007 M12 
 
 
UR Test with structural break for series: B_Croatia  
sample range:                  [1998 M3, 2013 M2], T = 180 
number of lags (1st diff):     4  
value of test statistic:      -2.3645    
used break date:               2007 M12 
shiftfunction:                 impulse dummy  
critical values (Lanne et al. 2002): 
--------------------------------------- 
 T          1%         5%         10%       
--------------------------------------- 
1000       -3.48      -2.88      -2.58      
--------------------------------------- 
regression results: 
--------------------------------------- 
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variable      coefficient   t-statistic   
--------------------------------------- 
d(const)       14.3558       24.1659      
d(shiftfkt)    32.3548       38.5122      
dx(-1)         0.1340        1.8429       
dx(-2)         0.0663        0.9054       
dx(-3)         0.0657        0.8978       
dx(-4)         0.1482        2.0384       
 
OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS LAGS FROM INFORMATION CRITERIA 
 
sample range:             [1998 M11, 2013 M2], T = 172 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 12 lags of 1. differences): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    8             
Final Prediction Error:   8             
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   2             
Schwarz Criterion:        2             
 
PORTMANTEAU TEST with 12 lags 
 
Portmanteau:               4.5839       
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.9705       
Ljung & Box:               4.8507       
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.9628       
 
JARQUE-BERA TEST: 
 
test statistic:            71.7519      
 p-Value(Chi^2):           0.0000       
skewness:                 -0.1698       
kurtosis:                  6.0830       
 
 
sample range:                  [1998 M3, 2013 M2], T = 180 
number of lags (1st diff):     4  
value of test statistic:      -2.1903    
used break date:               2007 M12 
shiftfunction:                 impulse dummy  
time trend included 
critical values (Lanne et al. 2002): 
--------------------------------------- 
 T          1%         5%         10%       
--------------------------------------- 
1000       -3.55      -3.03      -2.76      
--------------------------------------- 
regression results: 
--------------------------------------- 
variable      coefficient   t-statistic   
--------------------------------------- 
d(trend)      -0.1350       -0.0167       
d(const)       14.4370       24.2373      
d(shiftfkt)    32.3535       38.4072      
dx(-1)         0.1339        1.8418       
dx(-2)         0.0661        0.9029       
dx(-3)         0.0657        0.8967       
dx(-4)         0.1480        2.0357       
 
OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS LAGS FROM INFORMATION CRITERIA 
 
sample range:             [1998 M11, 2013 M2], T = 172 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 12 lags of 1. differences): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    8             
Final Prediction Error:   8             
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Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   2             
Schwarz Criterion:        2             
 
PORTMANTEAU TEST with 12 lags 
 
Portmanteau:               4.5376       
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.9717       
Ljung & Box:               4.7980       
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.9644       
 
JARQUE-BERA TEST: 
 
test statistic:            74.2149      
 p-Value(Chi^2):           0.0000       
skewness:                 -0.2125       
kurtosis:                  6.1257       
 
 
Break date search for series:  B_Croatia  
sample range:                  [1998 M3, 2013 M2], T = 180 
searched range:                [1998 M7, 2012 M12], T = 174 
number of lags (1st diff):     4  
suggested break date:          1998 M8 
 
 
 
UR Test with structural break for series: B_Croatia  
sample range:                  [1998 M3, 2013 M2], T = 180 
number of lags (1st diff):     4  
value of test statistic:      -1.9953    
used break date:               1998 M8 
shiftfunction:                 shift dummy  
critical values (Lanne et al. 2002): 
--------------------------------------- 
 T          1%         5%         10%       
--------------------------------------- 
1000       -3.48      -2.88      -2.58      
--------------------------------------- 
regression results: 
--------------------------------------- 
variable      coefficient   t-statistic   
--------------------------------------- 
d(const)       14.5664       23.8488      
d(shiftfkt)   -36.8880      -60.3948      
dx(-1)         0.0566        0.7693       
dx(-2)         0.1842        2.5060       
dx(-3)         0.0633        0.8612       
dx(-4)         0.0064        0.0865       
 
OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS LAGS FROM INFORMATION CRITERIA 
 
sample range:             [1998 M11, 2013 M2], T = 172 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 12 lags of 1. differences): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    8             
Final Prediction Error:   8             
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   2             
Schwarz Criterion:        0             
 
PORTMANTEAU TEST with 12 lags 
 
Portmanteau:               21.6343      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.0418       
Ljung & Box:               22.7723      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.0297       
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JARQUE-BERA TEST: 
 
test statistic:            68.2562      
 p-Value(Chi^2):           0.0000       
skewness:                 -0.0305       
kurtosis:                  6.0246       
 
 
UR Test with structural break for series: B_Croatia  
sample range:                  [1998 M3, 2013 M2], T = 180 
number of lags (1st diff):     4  
value of test statistic:      -2.0289    
used break date:               1998 M8 
shiftfunction:                 shift dummy  
time trend included 
critical values (Lanne et al. 2002): 
--------------------------------------- 
 T          1%         5%         10%       
--------------------------------------- 
1000       -3.55      -3.03      -2.76      
--------------------------------------- 
regression results: 
--------------------------------------- 
variable      coefficient   t-statistic   
--------------------------------------- 
d(trend)       0.0625        0.0075       
d(const)       14.5228       23.7127      
d(shiftfkt)   -36.9170      -60.2778      
dx(-1)         0.0565        0.7688       
dx(-2)         0.1842        2.5062       
dx(-3)         0.0632        0.8606       
dx(-4)         0.0063        0.0861       
 
OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS LAGS FROM INFORMATION CRITERIA 
 
sample range:             [1998 M11, 2013 M2], T = 172 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 12 lags of 1. differences): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    8             
Final Prediction Error:   8             
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   2             
Schwarz Criterion:        0             
 
PORTMANTEAU TEST with 12 lags 
 
Portmanteau:               21.6831      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.0412       
Ljung & Box:               22.8239      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.0293       
 
JARQUE-BERA TEST: 
 
test statistic:            68.1161      
 p-Value(Chi^2):           0.0000       
skewness:                 -0.0190       
kurtosis:                  6.0218       
 
1.3. Unit Root tests with structural break for “B_Croatia” (lags=8); 
with a shift dummy (October 2008); with constant and no trend 
and with both constant and a trend 
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*this additional test was performed because of the rejection of the residual no-
autocorrelation tests in the previous section 
 
Break date search for series:  B_Croatia  
sample range:                  [1998 M7, 2013 M2], T = 176 
searched range:                [1999 M3, 2012 M12], T = 166 
number of lags (1st diff):     8  
suggested break date:          2008 M10 
 
UR Test with structural break for series: B_Croatia  
sample range:                  [1998 M7, 2013 M2], T = 176 
number of lags (1st diff):     8  
value of test statistic:      -2.1565    
used break date:               2008 M10 
shiftfunction:                 shift dummy  
critical values (Lanne et al. 2002): 
--------------------------------------- 
 T          1%         5%         10%       
--------------------------------------- 
1000       -3.48      -2.88      -2.58      
--------------------------------------- 
regression results: 
--------------------------------------- 
variable      coefficient   t-statistic   
--------------------------------------- 
d(const)       14.1070       23.7889      
d(shiftfkt)   -34.3256      -57.8838      
dx(-1)        -0.0258       -0.3523       
dx(-2)         0.1739        2.3854       
dx(-3)         0.1080        1.4814       
dx(-4)         0.0049        0.0677       
dx(-5)         0.0866        1.1862       
dx(-6)        -0.1734       -2.3785       
dx(-7)         0.1143        1.5681       
dx(-8)         0.0697        0.9510       
 
OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS LAGS FROM INFORMATION CRITERIA 
 
sample range:             [1998 M9, 2013 M2], T = 174 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 10 lags of 1. differences): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    8             
Final Prediction Error:   8             
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   2             
Schwarz Criterion:        0             
 
PORTMANTEAU TEST with 12 lags 
 
Portmanteau:               1.2989       
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.9999       
Ljung & Box:               1.3660       
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.9999       
 
ARCH-LM TEST with 2 lags: 
 
test statistic:            24.5737      
 p-Value(Chi^2):           0.0000       
F statistic:               14.3211      
 p-Value(F):               0.0000       
 
UR Test with structural break for series: B_Croatia  
sample range:                  [1998 M7, 2013 M2], T = 176 
number of lags (1st diff):     8  
value of test statistic:      -2.2120    
used break date:               2008 M10 
shiftfunction:                 shift dummy  
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time trend included 
critical values (Lanne et al. 2002): 
--------------------------------------- 
 T          1%         5%         10%       
--------------------------------------- 
1000       -3.55      -3.03      -2.76      
--------------------------------------- 
regression results: 
--------------------------------------- 
variable      coefficient   t-statistic   
--------------------------------------- 
d(trend)       0.0358        0.0044       
d(const)       14.0837       23.6847      
d(shiftfkt)   -34.3435      -57.7558      
dx(-1)        -0.0259       -0.3532       
dx(-2)         0.1738        2.3852       
dx(-3)         0.1080        1.4816       
dx(-4)         0.0049        0.0675       
dx(-5)         0.0867        1.1865       
dx(-6)        -0.1733       -2.3779       
dx(-7)         0.1142        1.5675       
dx(-8)         0.0697        0.9501       
 
OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS LAGS FROM INFORMATION CRITERIA 
 
sample range:             [1998 M9, 2013 M2], T = 174 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 10 lags of 1. differences): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    8             
Final Prediction Error:   8             
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   2             
Schwarz Criterion:        0             
 
PORTMANTEAU TEST with 12 lags 
 
Portmanteau:               1.2677       
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.9999       
Ljung & Box:               1.3328       
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.9999       
 
ARCH-LM TEST with 2 lags: 
 
test statistic:            24.6359      
 p-Value(Chi^2):           0.0000       
F statistic:               14.3633      
 p-Value(F):               0.0000       
 
 
1.4. KPSS test for stationarity of “B_Croatia” (lags=4) testing H0: 
“B_Croatia” is stationary I(0) variable against the alternative of 
the variable being integrated at a level higher than 0 (test for 
both level and trend stationarity) 
 
 
KPSS test for series:  B_Croatia  
sample range:          [1997 M10, 2013 M2], T = 185 
number of lags:        4  
KPSS test based on y(t)=a+e(t) (level stationarity) 
asymptotic critical values: 
 10%        5%         1%         
0.347      0.463      0.739      
value of test statistic: 0.7656 
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reference: reprinted from JOURNAL OF ECONOMETRICS, 
Vol 54, No 1, 1992, pp 159-178, Kwiatkowski et al: 
"Testing the null hypothesis of stationarity ...", 
with permission from Elsevier Science 
 
 
KPSS test for series:  B_Croatia  
sample range:          [1997 M10, 2013 M2], T = 185 
number of lags:        4  
KPSS test based on y(t)=a+bt+e(t) (trend stationarity) 
asymptotic critical values: 
 10%        5%         1%         
0.119      0.146      0.216      
value of test statistic: 0.3778 
reference: reprinted from JOURNAL OF ECONOMETRICS, 
Vol 54, No 1, 1992, pp 159-178, Kwiatkowski et al: 
"Testing the null hypothesis of stationarity ...", 
with permission from Elsevier Science 
 
2. Unit root tests of the first difference of Croatian equity bubble 
variable “B_Croatia_D1”  
2.1. Augmented Dickey Fuller test results for the first difference 
transformation of “B_Croatia” (lags=3); no constant or trend; 
constant and no trend and both with trend and constant 
 
ADF Test for series:      B_Croatia_d1  
sample range:             [1998 M3, 2013 M2], T = 180 
lagged differences:       3  
no intercept, no time trend 
asymptotic critical values 
reference: Davidson, R. and MacKinnon, J. (1993), 
"Estimation and Inference in Econometrics" p 708, table 20.1, 
Oxford University Press, London 
 1%         5%         10%        
-2.56      -1.94      -1.62      
value of test statistic: -5.3135 
regression results: 
--------------------------------------- 
variable      coefficient   t-statistic   
--------------------------------------- 
 x(-1)        -0.6760       -5.3135       
dx(-1)        -0.2642       -2.2515       
dx(-2)        -0.1202       -1.1679       
dx(-3)        -0.0441       -0.5915       
RSS            13664.8608   
 
OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS LAGS FROM INFORMATION CRITERIA 
 
sample range:             [1998 M10, 2013 M2], T = 173 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 10 lags of 1. differences): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    7             
Final Prediction Error:   7             
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   1             
Schwarz Criterion:        1             
 
PORTMANTEAU TEST with 12 lags 
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Portmanteau:               14.5850      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.2649       
Ljung & Box:               15.3465      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.2230       
 
JARQUE-BERA TEST: 
 
test statistic:            116.0873     
 p-Value(Chi^2):           0.0000       
skewness:                 -0.7243       
kurtosis:                  6.6579       
 
ADF Test for series:      B_Croatia_d1  
sample range:             [1998 M3, 2013 M2], T = 180 
lagged differences:       3  
intercept, no time trend 
asymptotic critical values 
reference: Davidson, R. and MacKinnon, J. (1993), 
"Estimation and Inference in Econometrics" p 708, table 20.1, 
Oxford University Press, London 
 1%         5%         10%        
-3.43      -2.86      -2.57      
value of test statistic: -5.3008 
regression results: 
--------------------------------------- 
variable      coefficient   t-statistic   
--------------------------------------- 
 x(-1)        -0.6766       -5.3008       
dx(-1)        -0.2637       -2.2396       
dx(-2)        -0.1199       -1.1611       
dx(-3)        -0.0439       -0.5872       
constant      -0.0994       -0.1509       
RSS            13663.0829   
 
OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS LAGS FROM INFORMATION CRITERIA 
 
sample range:             [1998 M10, 2013 M2], T = 173 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 10 lags of 1. differences): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    7             
Final Prediction Error:   7             
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   1             
Schwarz Criterion:        1             
 
PORTMANTEAU TEST with 12 lags 
 
Portmanteau:               14.5828      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.2650       
Ljung & Box:               15.3441      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.2232       
 
JARQUE-BERA TEST: 
 
test statistic:            116.1746     
 p-Value(Chi^2):           0.0000       
skewness:                 -0.7246       
kurtosis:                  6.6592       
 
ADF Test for series:      B_Croatia_d1  
sample range:             [1998 M3, 2013 M2], T = 180 
lagged differences:       3  
intercept, time trend 
asymptotic critical values 
reference: Davidson, R. and MacKinnon, J. (1993), 
"Estimation and Inference in Econometrics" p 708, table 20.1, 
Oxford University Press, London 
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 1%         5%         10%        
-3.96      -3.41      -3.13      
value of test statistic: -5.2836 
regression results: 
--------------------------------------- 
variable      coefficient   t-statistic   
--------------------------------------- 
 x(-1)        -0.6764       -5.2836       
dx(-1)        -0.2638       -2.2343       
dx(-2)        -0.1200       -1.1588       
dx(-3)        -0.0439       -0.5860       
constant      -0.0988       -0.1495       
trend          0.0013        0.1007       
RSS            13662.2862   
 
OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS LAGS FROM INFORMATION CRITERIA 
 
sample range:             [1998 M10, 2013 M2], T = 173 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 10 lags of 1. differences): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    7             
Final Prediction Error:   7             
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   1             
Schwarz Criterion:        1             
 
PORTMANTEAU TEST with 12 lags 
 
Portmanteau:               14.5824      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.2651       
Ljung & Box:               15.3438      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.2232       
 
JARQUE-BERA TEST: 
 
test statistic:            115.8100     
 p-Value(Chi^2):           0.0000       
skewness:                 -0.7273       
kurtosis:                  6.6504       
 
 
2.2. KPSS test for stationarity of  “B_Croatia_D1” (lags=3) testing H0: 
“B_Croatia_D1” is stationary I(0) variable against the alternative 
of the variable being integrated at a level higher than 0 (test for 
both level and trend stationarity) 
 
 
KPSS test for series:  B_Croatia_d1  
sample range:          [1997 M11, 2013 M2], T = 184 
number of lags:        3  
KPSS test based on y(t)=a+e(t) (level stationarity) 
asymptotic critical values: 
 10%        5%         1%         
0.347      0.463      0.739      
value of test statistic: 0.1053 
reference: reprinted from JOURNAL OF ECONOMETRICS, 
Vol 54, No 1, 1992, pp 159-178, Kwiatkowski et al: 
"Testing the null hypothesis of stationarity ...", 
with permission from Elsevier Science 
 
KPSS test for series:  B_Croatia_d1  
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sample range:          [1997 M11, 2013 M2], T = 184 
number of lags:        3  
KPSS test based on y(t)=a+bt+e(t) (trend stationarity) 
asymptotic critical values: 
 10%        5%         1%         
0.119      0.146      0.216      
value of test statistic: 0.1063 
reference: reprinted from JOURNAL OF ECONOMETRICS, 
Vol 54, No 1, 1992, pp 159-178, Kwiatkowski et al: 
"Testing the null hypothesis of stationarity ...", 
with permission from Elsevier Science 
 
3. Unit root tests of the Croatian financial market dynamic efficiency 
variable “DYNEF” 
 
3.1. Augmented Dickey Fuller test results for “DYNEF” (lags=2); no 
constant or trend; constant and no trend and both with trend 
and constant 
 
ADF Test for series:      DYNEF  
sample range:             [2007 M3, 2010 M12], T = 46 
lagged differences:       2  
no intercept, no time trend 
asymptotic critical values 
reference: Davidson, R. and MacKinnon, J. (1993), 
"Estimation and Inference in Econometrics" p 708, table 20.1, 
Oxford University Press, London 
 1%         5%         10%        
-2.56      -1.94      -1.62      
value of test statistic: -2.0152 
regression results: 
--------------------------------------- 
variable      coefficient   t-statistic   
--------------------------------------- 
 x(-1)        -0.1744       -2.0152       
dx(-1)        -0.0707       -0.4658       
dx(-2)        -0.0397       -0.2633       
RSS            111.5818     
 
OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS LAGS FROM INFORMATION CRITERIA 
 
sample range:             [2008 M1, 2010 M12], T = 36 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 12 lags of 1. differences): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    0             
Final Prediction Error:   0             
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   0             
Schwarz Criterion:        0             
 
PORTMANTEAU TEST with 12 lags 
 
Portmanteau:               9.1759       
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.6878       
Ljung & Box:               11.5594      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.4817       
 
JARQUE-BERA TEST: 
 
test statistic:            9.3443       
 p-Value(Chi^2):           0.0094       
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skewness:                  0.8200       
kurtosis:                  4.4784       
 
 
 
ADF Test for series:      DYNEF  
sample range:             [2007 M3, 2010 M12], T = 46 
lagged differences:       2  
intercept, no time trend 
asymptotic critical values 
reference: Davidson, R. and MacKinnon, J. (1993), 
"Estimation and Inference in Econometrics" p 708, table 20.1, 
Oxford University Press, London 
 1%         5%         10%        
-3.43      -2.86      -2.57      
value of test statistic: -2.0086 
regression results: 
--------------------------------------- 
variable      coefficient   t-statistic   
--------------------------------------- 
 x(-1)        -0.1869       -2.0086       
dx(-1)        -0.0629       -0.4068       
dx(-2)        -0.0324       -0.2114       
constant      -0.1000       -0.3911       
RSS            111.1769     
 
OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS LAGS FROM INFORMATION CRITERIA 
 
sample range:             [2008 M1, 2010 M12], T = 36 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 12 lags of 1. differences): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    0             
Final Prediction Error:   0             
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   0             
Schwarz Criterion:        0             
 
PORTMANTEAU TEST with 12 lags 
 
Portmanteau:               9.2236       
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.6837       
Ljung & Box:               11.6170      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.4769       
 
JARQUE-BERA TEST: 
 
test statistic:            10.2660      
 p-Value(Chi^2):           0.0059       
skewness:                  0.8503       
kurtosis:                  4.5698       
 
 
ADF Test for series:      DYNEF  
sample range:             [2007 M3, 2010 M12], T = 46 
lagged differences:       2  
intercept, time trend 
asymptotic critical values 
reference: Davidson, R. and MacKinnon, J. (1993), 
"Estimation and Inference in Econometrics" p 708, table 20.1, 
Oxford University Press, London 
 1%         5%         10%        
-3.96      -3.41      -3.13      
value of test statistic: -1.7334 
regression results: 
--------------------------------------- 
variable      coefficient   t-statistic   
--------------------------------------- 
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 x(-1)        -0.1772       -1.7334       
dx(-1)        -0.0743       -0.4548       
dx(-2)        -0.0411       -0.2580       
constant      -0.0928       -0.3563       
trend         -0.0049       -0.2414       
RSS            111.0190     
 
OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS LAGS FROM INFORMATION CRITERIA 
 
sample range:             [2008 M1, 2010 M12], T = 36 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 12 lags of 1. differences): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    0             
Final Prediction Error:   0             
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   0             
Schwarz Criterion:        0             
 
PORTMANTEAU TEST with 12 lags 
 
Portmanteau:               9.3513       
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.6727       
Ljung & Box:               11.7841      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.4632       
 
JARQUE-BERA TEST: 
 
test statistic:            9.7481       
 p-Value(Chi^2):           0.0076       
skewness:                  0.8277       
kurtosis:                  4.5316       
 
 
3.2. Unit Root tests with structural break for “DYNEF” (lags=2); with 
an impulse dummy (September 2009) and with a shift dummy 
(February 2009); with constant and no trend and with both 
constant and a trend 
 
 
 
Break date search for series:  DYNEF  
sample range:                  [2007 M3, 2010 M12], T = 46 
searched range:                [2007 M5, 2010 M10], T = 42 
number of lags (1st diff):     2  
suggested break date:          2009 M2 
 
UR Test with structural break for series: DYNEF  
sample range:                  [2007 M3, 2010 M12], T = 46 
number of lags (1st diff):     2  
value of test statistic:      -2.0988    
used break date:               2009 M2 
shiftfunction:                 impulse dummy  
critical values (Lanne et al. 2002): 
--------------------------------------- 
 T          1%         5%         10%       
--------------------------------------- 
1000       -3.48      -2.88      -2.58      
--------------------------------------- 
regression results: 
--------------------------------------- 
variable      coefficient   t-statistic   
--------------------------------------- 
d(const)      -4.8871       -23.3539      
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d(shiftfkt)    3.5784        12.0915      
dx(-1)        -0.1624       -1.1372       
dx(-2)        -0.0302       -0.2116       
 
OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS LAGS FROM INFORMATION CRITERIA 
 
sample range:             [2008 M1, 2010 M12], T = 36 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 12 lags of 1. differences): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    6             
Final Prediction Error:   0             
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   0             
Schwarz Criterion:        0             
 
PORTMANTEAU TEST with 12 lags 
 
Portmanteau:               6.9753       
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.8592       
Ljung & Box:               8.8454       
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.7161       
 
JARQUE-BERA TEST: 
 
test statistic:            0.5246       
 p-Value(Chi^2):           0.7693       
skewness:                  0.2643       
kurtosis:                  2.9793       
 
UR Test with structural break for series: DYNEF  
sample range:                  [2007 M3, 2010 M12], T = 46 
number of lags (1st diff):     2  
value of test statistic:      -1.8894    
used break date:               2009 M2 
shiftfunction:                 impulse dummy  
time trend included 
critical values (Lanne et al. 2002): 
--------------------------------------- 
 T          1%         5%         10%       
--------------------------------------- 
1000       -3.55      -3.03      -2.76      
--------------------------------------- 
regression results: 
--------------------------------------- 
variable      coefficient   t-statistic   
--------------------------------------- 
d(trend)       0.0600        0.0406       
d(const)      -4.9583       -23.4696      
d(shiftfkt)    3.5784        11.9770      
dx(-1)        -0.1640       -1.1486       
dx(-2)        -0.0327       -0.2291       
 
OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS LAGS FROM INFORMATION CRITERIA 
 
sample range:             [2008 M1, 2010 M12], T = 36 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 12 lags of 1. differences): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    6             
Final Prediction Error:   0             
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   0             
Schwarz Criterion:        0             
 
PORTMANTEAU TEST with 12 lags 
 
Portmanteau:               6.4544       
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.8915       
Ljung & Box:               8.1399       
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 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.7741       
 
JARQUE-BERA TEST: 
 
test statistic:            0.5487       
 p-Value(Chi^2):           0.7601       
skewness:                  0.2656       
kurtosis:                  2.8973       
 
Break date search for series:  DYNEF  
sample range:                  [2007 M3, 2010 M12], T = 46 
searched range:                [2007 M5, 2010 M10], T = 42 
number of lags (1st diff):     2  
suggested break date:          2009 M2 
 
UR Test with structural break for series: DYNEF  
sample range:                  [2007 M3, 2010 M12], T = 46 
number of lags (1st diff):     2  
value of test statistic:      -1.7435    
used break date:               2009 M2 
shiftfunction:                 shift dummy  
critical values (Lanne et al. 2002): 
--------------------------------------- 
 T          1%         5%         10%       
--------------------------------------- 
1000       -3.48      -2.88      -2.58      
--------------------------------------- 
regression results: 
--------------------------------------- 
variable      coefficient   t-statistic   
--------------------------------------- 
d(const)      -4.8875       -23.0928      
d(shiftfkt)    4.4177        20.8728      
dx(-1)        -0.1422       -0.9952       
dx(-2)        -0.0174       -0.1215       
 
OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS LAGS FROM INFORMATION CRITERIA 
 
sample range:             [2008 M1, 2010 M12], T = 36 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 12 lags of 1. differences): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    0             
Final Prediction Error:   0             
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   0             
Schwarz Criterion:        0             
 
PORTMANTEAU TEST with 12 lags 
 
Portmanteau:               8.1054       
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.7768       
Ljung & Box:               9.9537       
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.6200       
 
JARQUE-BERA TEST: 
 
test statistic:            0.7626       
 p-Value(Chi^2):           0.6830       
skewness:                  0.3128       
kurtosis:                  2.8765       
 
UR Test with structural break for series: DYNEF  
sample range:                  [2007 M3, 2010 M12], T = 46 
number of lags (1st diff):     2  
value of test statistic:      -2.0812    
used break date:               2009 M2 
shiftfunction:                 shift dummy  
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time trend included 
critical values (Lanne et al. 2002): 
--------------------------------------- 
 T          1%         5%         10%       
--------------------------------------- 
1000       -3.55      -3.03      -2.76      
--------------------------------------- 
regression results: 
--------------------------------------- 
variable      coefficient   t-statistic   
--------------------------------------- 
d(trend)      -0.0333       -0.0223       
d(const)      -4.8492       -22.6741      
d(shiftfkt)    4.4620        20.8638      
dx(-1)        -0.1428       -1.0000       
dx(-2)        -0.0170       -0.1189       
 
OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS LAGS FROM INFORMATION CRITERIA 
 
sample range:             [2008 M1, 2010 M12], T = 36 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 12 lags of 1. differences): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    0             
Final Prediction Error:   0             
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   0             
Schwarz Criterion:        0             
 
PORTMANTEAU TEST with 12 lags 
 
Portmanteau:               8.1850       
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.7705       
Ljung & Box:               10.0624      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.6105       
 
JARQUE-BERA TEST: 
 
test statistic:            1.0485       
 p-Value(Chi^2):           0.5920       
skewness:                  0.3737       
kurtosis:                  2.9760       
 
 
3.3. KPSS test for stationarity of “DYNEF” (lags=2) testing H0: 
“DYNEF” is stationary I(0) variable against the alternative of the 
variable being integrated at a level higher than 0 (test for both 
level and trend stationarity) 
 
KPSS test for series:  DYNEF  
sample range:          [2006 M12, 2010 M12], T = 49 
number of lags:        2  
KPSS test based on y(t)=a+e(t) (level stationarity) 
asymptotic critical values: 
 10%        5%         1%         
0.347      0.463      0.739      
value of test statistic: 0.4778 
reference: reprinted from JOURNAL OF ECONOMETRICS, 
Vol 54, No 1, 1992, pp 159-178, Kwiatkowski et al: 
"Testing the null hypothesis of stationarity ...", 
with permission from Elsevier Science 
 
KPSS test for series:  DYNEF  
sample range:          [2006 M12, 2010 M12], T = 49 
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number of lags:        2  
KPSS test based on y(t)=a+bt+e(t) (trend stationarity) 
asymptotic critical values: 
 10%        5%         1%         
0.119      0.146      0.216      
value of test statistic: 0.2501 
reference: reprinted from JOURNAL OF ECONOMETRICS, 
Vol 54, No 1, 1992, pp 159-178, Kwiatkowski et al: 
"Testing the null hypothesis of stationarity ...", 
with permission from Elsevier Science 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Unit root tests of the first difference transformation of Croatian 
financial market dynamic efficiency variable “DYNEF_D1” 
 
 
4.1. Augmented Dickey Fuller test results for the “DYNEF_D1” 
(lags=1); no constant or trend; constant and no trend and both 
with trend and constant 
 
 
 
 
ADF Test for series:      DYNEF_d1  
sample range:             [1998 M1, 2013 M2], T = 182 
lagged differences:       1  
no intercept, no time trend 
asymptotic critical values 
reference: Davidson, R. and MacKinnon, J. (1993), 
"Estimation and Inference in Econometrics" p 708, table 20.1, 
Oxford University Press, London 
 1%         5%         10%        
-2.56      -1.94      -1.62      
value of test statistic: -10.4827 
regression results: 
--------------------------------------- 
variable      coefficient   t-statistic   
--------------------------------------- 
 x(-1)        -1.1257       -10.4827      
dx(-1)         0.0809        1.0877       
RSS            266.4609     
 
OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS LAGS FROM INFORMATION CRITERIA 
 
sample range:             [1998 M10, 2013 M2], T = 173 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 10 lags of 1. differences): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    0             
Final Prediction Error:   0             
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   0             
Schwarz Criterion:        0             
 
PORTMANTEAU TEST with 12 lags 
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Portmanteau:               10.4688      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.5749       
Ljung & Box:               10.9647      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.5319       
 
JARQUE-BERA TEST: 
 
test statistic:            3678.4803    
 p-Value(Chi^2):           0.0000       
skewness:                 -2.3146       
kurtosis:                  24.5324      
 
ADF Test for series:      DYNEF_d1  
sample range:             [1998 M1, 2013 M2], T = 182 
lagged differences:       1  
intercept, no time trend 
asymptotic critical values 
reference: Davidson, R. and MacKinnon, J. (1993), 
"Estimation and Inference in Econometrics" p 708, table 20.1, 
Oxford University Press, London 
 1%         5%         10%        
-3.43      -2.86      -2.57      
value of test statistic: -10.4898 
regression results: 
--------------------------------------- 
variable      coefficient   t-statistic   
--------------------------------------- 
 x(-1)        -1.1300       -10.4898      
dx(-1)         0.0831        1.1142       
constant      -0.0624       -0.6901       
RSS            265.7539     
 
OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS LAGS FROM INFORMATION CRITERIA 
 
sample range:             [1998 M10, 2013 M2], T = 173 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 10 lags of 1. differences): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    0             
Final Prediction Error:   0             
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   0             
Schwarz Criterion:        0             
 
PORTMANTEAU TEST with 12 lags 
 
Portmanteau:               10.4510      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.5765       
Ljung & Box:               10.9464      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.5335       
 
JARQUE-BERA TEST: 
 
test statistic:            3682.0871    
 p-Value(Chi^2):           0.0000       
skewness:                 -2.3165       
kurtosis:                  24.5426      
 
ADF Test for series:      DYNEF_d1  
sample range:             [1998 M1, 2013 M2], T = 182 
lagged differences:       1  
intercept, time trend 
asymptotic critical values 
reference: Davidson, R. and MacKinnon, J. (1993), 
"Estimation and Inference in Econometrics" p 708, table 20.1, 
Oxford University Press, London 
 1%         5%         10%        
-3.96      -3.41      -3.13      
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value of test statistic: -10.5266 
regression results: 
--------------------------------------- 
variable      coefficient   t-statistic   
--------------------------------------- 
 x(-1)        -1.1393       -10.5266      
dx(-1)         0.0878        1.1742       
constant      -0.0621       -0.6860       
trend          0.0016        0.9278       
RSS            264.4749     
 
OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS LAGS FROM INFORMATION CRITERIA 
 
sample range:             [1998 M10, 2013 M2], T = 173 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 10 lags of 1. differences): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    0             
Final Prediction Error:   0             
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   0             
Schwarz Criterion:        0             
 
PORTMANTEAU TEST with 12 lags 
 
Portmanteau:               10.6491      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.5592       
Ljung & Box:               11.1599      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.5153       
 
JARQUE-BERA TEST: 
 
test statistic:            3557.7863    
 p-Value(Chi^2):           0.0000       
skewness:                 -2.3651       
kurtosis:                  24.1373 
 
4.2. KPSS test for stationarity of the first difference of “DYNEF” 
(lags=1) testing H0: “DYNEF” is stationary I(0) variable against 
the alternative of the variable being integrated at a level higher 
than 0 (test for both level and trend stationarity) 
 
KPSS test for series:  DYNEF_d1  
sample range:          [1997 M11, 2013 M2], T = 184 
number of lags:        1  
KPSS test based on y(t)=a+e(t) (level stationarity) 
asymptotic critical values: 
 10%        5%         1%         
0.347      0.463      0.739      
value of test statistic: 0.1381 
reference: reprinted from JOURNAL OF ECONOMETRICS, 
Vol 54, No 1, 1992, pp 159-178, Kwiatkowski et al: 
"Testing the null hypothesis of stationarity ...", 
with permission from Elsevier Science 
 
 
KPSS test for series:  DYNEF_d1  
sample range:          [1997 M11, 2013 M2], T = 184 
number of lags:        1  
KPSS test based on y(t)=a+bt+e(t) (trend stationarity) 
asymptotic critical values: 
 10%        5%         1%         
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0.119      0.146      0.216      
value of test statistic: 0.0542 
reference: reprinted from JOURNAL OF ECONOMETRICS, 
Vol 54, No 1, 1992, pp 159-178, Kwiatkowski et al: 
"Testing the null hypothesis of stationarity ...", 
with permission from Elsevier Science 
 
 
5. Unit root tests of the Croatian DC pension fund direct equity 
investment variable “PFInvDirect” 
 
5.1. Augmented Dickey Fuller test results for “PFInvDirect” (lags=4); 
no constant or trend; constant and no trend and both with trend 
and constant 
 
ADF Test for series:      PFInvDirect  
sample range:             [1998 M5, 2010 M12], T = 152 
lagged differences:       4  
no intercept, no time trend 
asymptotic critical values 
reference: Davidson, R. and MacKinnon, J. (1993), 
"Estimation and Inference in Econometrics" p 708, table 20.1, 
Oxford University Press, London 
 1%         5%         10%        
-2.56      -1.94      -1.62      
value of test statistic: -0.6932 
regression results: 
--------------------------------------- 
variable      coefficient   t-statistic   
--------------------------------------- 
 x(-1)        -0.0000       -0.6932       
dx(-1)         3.1517        41.1263      
dx(-2)        -3.7065       -16.7978      
dx(-3)         1.9261        8.6908       
dx(-4)        -0.3759       -4.8374       
RSS            420191151618.8523 
 
OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS LAGS FROM INFORMATION CRITERIA 
 
sample range:             [1999 M1, 2010 M12], T = 144 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 12 lags of 1. differences): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    5             
Final Prediction Error:   5             
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   5             
Schwarz Criterion:        4             
 
PORTMANTEAU TEST with 12 lags 
 
Portmanteau:               52.2988      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.0000       
Ljung & Box:               57.1959      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.0000       
 
JARQUE-BERA TEST: 
 
test statistic:            7697.9089    
 p-Value(Chi^2):           0.0000       
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skewness:                 -0.7310       
kurtosis:                  37.8328      
 
ADF Test for series:      PFInvDirect  
sample range:             [1998 M5, 2010 M12], T = 152 
lagged differences:       4  
intercept, no time trend 
asymptotic critical values 
reference: Davidson, R. and MacKinnon, J. (1993), 
"Estimation and Inference in Econometrics" p 708, table 20.1, 
Oxford University Press, London 
 1%         5%         10%        
-3.43      -2.86      -2.57      
value of test statistic: -1.2978 
regression results: 
--------------------------------------- 
variable      coefficient   t-statistic   
--------------------------------------- 
 x(-1)        -0.0001       -1.2978       
dx(-1)         3.1402        40.7538      
dx(-2)        -3.6792       -16.6217      
dx(-3)         1.9031        8.5723       
dx(-4)        -0.3686       -4.7396       
constant       6749.4925     1.2406       
RSS            415807705551.7676 
 
OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS LAGS FROM INFORMATION CRITERIA 
 
sample range:             [1999 M1, 2010 M12], T = 144 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 12 lags of 1. differences): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    5             
Final Prediction Error:   5             
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   5             
Schwarz Criterion:        4             
 
PORTMANTEAU TEST with 12 lags 
 
Portmanteau:               50.9722      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.0000       
Ljung & Box:               55.7248      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.0000       
 
JARQUE-BERA TEST: 
 
test statistic:            7252.7767    
 p-Value(Chi^2):           0.0000       
skewness:                 -0.4967       
kurtosis:                  36.8259      
 
ADF Test for series:      PFInvDirect  
sample range:             [1998 M5, 2010 M12], T = 152 
lagged differences:       4  
intercept, time trend 
asymptotic critical values 
reference: Davidson, R. and MacKinnon, J. (1993), 
"Estimation and Inference in Econometrics" p 708, table 20.1, 
Oxford University Press, London 
 1%         5%         10%        
-3.96      -3.41      -3.13      
value of test statistic: -2.3181 
regression results: 
--------------------------------------- 
variable      coefficient   t-statistic   
--------------------------------------- 
 x(-1)        -0.0003       -2.3181       
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dx(-1)         3.1060        39.6005      
dx(-2)        -3.5847       -15.9424      
dx(-3)         1.8061        7.9994       
dx(-4)        -0.3311       -4.1636       
constant       16117.3494    2.2128       
trend          338.4085      1.9129       
RSS            405572312768.3825 
 
OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS LAGS FROM INFORMATION CRITERIA 
 
sample range:             [1999 M1, 2010 M12], T = 144 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 12 lags of 1. differences): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    5             
Final Prediction Error:   5             
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   5             
Schwarz Criterion:        5             
 
PORTMANTEAU TEST with 12 lags 
 
Portmanteau:               55.5405      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.0000       
Ljung & Box:               60.6720      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.0000       
 
JARQUE-BERA TEST: 
 
test statistic:            6924.5482    
 p-Value(Chi^2):           0.0000       
skewness:                 -0.5010       
kurtosis:                  36.0507      
 
 
5.2. Unit Root tests with structural break for “PFInvDirect” (lags=4); 
with an impulse dummy (November 1998) and with a shift 
dummy (September 1998); with constant and no trend and with 
both constant and a trend 
 
 
Break date search for series:  PFInvDirect  
sample range:                  [1998 M5, 2010 M12], T = 152 
searched range:                [1998 M11, 2010 M10], T = 144 
number of lags (1st diff):     4  
suggested break date:          1998 M11 
 
UR Test with structural break for series: PFInvDirect  
sample range:                  [1998 M5, 2010 M12], T = 152 
number of lags (1st diff):     4  
value of test statistic:      -1.3254    
used break date:               1998 M11 
shiftfunction:                 impulse dummy  
critical values (Lanne et al. 2002): 
--------------------------------------- 
 T          1%         5%         10%       
--------------------------------------- 
1000       -3.48      -2.88      -2.58      
--------------------------------------- 
regression results: 
--------------------------------------- 
variable      coefficient   t-statistic   
--------------------------------------- 
d(const)      -7595.2602    -1.8229       
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d(shiftfkt)   -42.6686      -0.0072       
dx(-1)         3.1389        42.3961      
dx(-2)        -3.6790       -17.3367      
dx(-3)         1.9088        8.9947       
dx(-4)        -0.3733       -5.0426       
 
OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS LAGS FROM INFORMATION CRITERIA 
 
sample range:             [1999 M1, 2010 M12], T = 144 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 12 lags of 1. differences): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    5             
Final Prediction Error:   5             
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   5             
Schwarz Criterion:        4             
 
PORTMANTEAU TEST with 12 lags 
 
Portmanteau:               50.6436      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.0000       
Ljung & Box:               55.3994      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.0000       
 
JARQUE-BERA TEST: 
 
test statistic:            7100.9092    
 p-Value(Chi^2):           0.0000       
skewness:                 -0.4953       
kurtosis:                  36.5804      
 
UR Test with structural break for series: PFInvDirect  
sample range:                  [1998 M5, 2010 M12], T = 152 
number of lags (1st diff):     4  
value of test statistic:      -1.9431    
used break date:               1998 M11 
shiftfunction:                 impulse dummy  
time trend included 
critical values (Lanne et al. 2002): 
--------------------------------------- 
 T          1%         5%         10%       
--------------------------------------- 
1000       -3.55      -3.03      -2.76      
--------------------------------------- 
regression results: 
--------------------------------------- 
variable      coefficient   t-statistic   
--------------------------------------- 
d(trend)       536510.8911   10.2546      
d(const)      -10142.2249   -2.4290       
d(shiftfkt)   -42.6731      -0.0072       
dx(-1)         3.1375        42.3964      
dx(-2)        -3.6774       -17.3446      
dx(-3)         1.9095        9.0063       
dx(-4)        -0.3744       -5.0589       
 
OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS LAGS FROM INFORMATION CRITERIA 
 
sample range:             [1999 M1, 2010 M12], T = 144 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 12 lags of 1. differences): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    5             
Final Prediction Error:   5             
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   5             
Schwarz Criterion:        5             
 
PORTMANTEAU TEST with 12 lags 
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Portmanteau:               51.9750      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.0000       
Ljung & Box:               56.8250      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.0000       
 
JARQUE-BERA TEST: 
 
test statistic:            6946.9965    
 p-Value(Chi^2):           0.0000       
skewness:                 -0.3320       
kurtosis:                  36.2222      
 
Break date search for series:  PFInvDirect  
sample range:                  [1998 M5, 2010 M12], T = 152 
searched range:                [1998 M9, 2010 M10], T = 146 
number of lags (1st diff):     4  
suggested break date:          1998 M9 
 
UR Test with structural break for series: PFInvDirect  
sample range:                  [1998 M5, 2010 M12], T = 152 
number of lags (1st diff):     4  
value of test statistic:      -1.3254    
used break date:               1998 M9 
shiftfunction:                 shift dummy  
critical values (Lanne et al. 2002): 
--------------------------------------- 
 T          1%         5%         10%       
--------------------------------------- 
1000       -3.48      -2.88      -2.58      
--------------------------------------- 
regression results: 
--------------------------------------- 
variable      coefficient   t-statistic   
--------------------------------------- 
d(const)      -7595.2601    -1.8229       
d(shiftfkt)    4.1850        0.0010       
dx(-1)         3.1389        42.3961      
dx(-2)        -3.6790       -17.3367      
dx(-3)         1.9088        8.9947       
dx(-4)        -0.3733       -5.0425       
 
OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS LAGS FROM INFORMATION CRITERIA 
 
sample range:             [1999 M1, 2010 M12], T = 144 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 12 lags of 1. differences): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    5             
Final Prediction Error:   5             
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   5             
Schwarz Criterion:        4             
 
PORTMANTEAU TEST with 12 lags 
 
Portmanteau:               50.6438      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.0000       
Ljung & Box:               55.3996      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.0000       
 
JARQUE-BERA TEST: 
 
test statistic:            7100.8968    
 p-Value(Chi^2):           0.0000       
skewness:                 -0.4953       
kurtosis:                  36.5803      
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UR Test with structural break for series: PFInvDirect  
sample range:                  [1998 M5, 2010 M12], T = 152 
number of lags (1st diff):     4  
value of test statistic:      -1.9431    
used break date:               1998 M9 
shiftfunction:                 shift dummy  
time trend included 
critical values (Lanne et al. 2002): 
--------------------------------------- 
 T          1%         5%         10%       
--------------------------------------- 
1000       -3.55      -3.03      -2.76      
--------------------------------------- 
regression results: 
--------------------------------------- 
variable      coefficient   t-statistic   
--------------------------------------- 
d(trend)       536510.4924   10.2545      
d(const)      -10142.2245   -2.4290       
d(shiftfkt)    3.7690        0.0009       
dx(-1)         3.1375        42.3964      
dx(-2)        -3.6774       -17.3446      
dx(-3)         1.9095        9.0063       
dx(-4)        -0.3744       -5.0589       
 
OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS LAGS FROM INFORMATION CRITERIA 
 
sample range:             [1999 M1, 2010 M12], T = 144 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 12 lags of 1. differences): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    5             
Final Prediction Error:   5             
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   5             
Schwarz Criterion:        5             
 
PORTMANTEAU TEST with 12 lags 
 
Portmanteau:               51.9752      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.0000       
Ljung & Box:               56.8252      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.0000       
 
JARQUE-BERA TEST: 
 
test statistic:            6946.9845    
 p-Value(Chi^2):           0.0000       
skewness:                 -0.3320       
kurtosis:                  36.2222      
 
5.3. KPSS test for stationarity of “PFInvDirect” (lags=4) testing H0: 
“PFInvDirect” is stationary I(0) variable against the alternative 
of the variable being integrated at a level higher than 0 (test for 
both level and trend stationarity) 
 
KPSS test for series:  PFInvDirect  
sample range:          [1997 M12, 2010 M12], T = 157 
number of lags:        4  
KPSS test based on y(t)=a+e(t) (level stationarity) 
asymptotic critical values: 
 10%        5%         1%         
0.347      0.463      0.739      
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value of test statistic: 1.3816 
reference: reprinted from JOURNAL OF ECONOMETRICS, 
Vol 54, No 1, 1992, pp 159-178, Kwiatkowski et al: 
"Testing the null hypothesis of stationarity ...", 
with permission from Elsevier Science 
 
KPSS test for series:  PFInvDirect  
sample range:          [1997 M12, 2010 M12], T = 157 
number of lags:        4  
KPSS test based on y(t)=a+bt+e(t) (trend stationarity) 
asymptotic critical values: 
 10%        5%         1%         
0.119      0.146      0.216      
value of test statistic: 0.2079 
reference: reprinted from JOURNAL OF ECONOMETRICS, 
Vol 54, No 1, 1992, pp 159-178, Kwiatkowski et al: 
"Testing the null hypothesis of stationarity ...", 
with permission from Elsevier Science 
 
 
 
 
6. Unit root tests of the first difference transformation of Croatian DC 
pension fund direct equity investment variable “PFInvDirect_D1” 
 
 
6.1. Augmented Dickey Fuller test results for “PFInvDirect_D1” 
(lags=3); no constant or trend; constant and no trend and both 
with trend and constant 
 
ADF Test for series:      PFInvDirect_d1  
sample range:             [1998 M5, 2010 M12], T = 152 
lagged differences:       3  
no intercept, no time trend 
asymptotic critical values 
reference: Davidson, R. and MacKinnon, J. (1993), 
"Estimation and Inference in Econometrics" p 708, table 20.1, 
Oxford University Press, London 
 1%         5%         10%        
-2.56      -1.94      -1.62      
value of test statistic: -3.8384 
regression results: 
--------------------------------------- 
variable      coefficient   t-statistic   
--------------------------------------- 
 x(-1)        -0.0046       -3.8384       
dx(-1)         2.1618        28.5035      
dx(-2)        -1.5609       -10.7816      
dx(-3)         0.3829        4.9804       
RSS            421564895072.5768 
 
OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS LAGS FROM INFORMATION CRITERIA 
 
sample range:             [1998 M12, 2010 M12], T = 145 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 10 lags of 1. differences): 
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Akaike Info Criterion:    4             
Final Prediction Error:   4             
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   4             
Schwarz Criterion:        3             
 
PORTMANTEAU TEST with 12 lags 
 
Portmanteau:               51.8774      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.0000       
Ljung & Box:               56.7453      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.0000       
 
JARQUE-BERA TEST: 
 
test statistic:            7599.7634    
 p-Value(Chi^2):           0.0000       
skewness:                 -0.9356       
kurtosis:                  37.5899      
 
ADF Test for series:      PFInvDirect_d1  
sample range:             [1998 M5, 2010 M12], T = 152 
lagged differences:       3  
intercept, no time trend 
asymptotic critical values 
reference: Davidson, R. and MacKinnon, J. (1993), 
"Estimation and Inference in Econometrics" p 708, table 20.1, 
Oxford University Press, London 
 1%         5%         10%        
-3.43      -2.86      -2.57      
value of test statistic: -3.8698 
regression results: 
--------------------------------------- 
variable      coefficient   t-statistic   
--------------------------------------- 
 x(-1)        -0.0047       -3.8698       
dx(-1)         2.1603        28.4033      
dx(-2)        -1.5603       -10.7527      
dx(-3)         0.3838        4.9789       
constant       2534.8469     0.5794       
RSS            420604352473.0487 
 
OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS LAGS FROM INFORMATION CRITERIA 
 
sample range:             [1998 M12, 2010 M12], T = 145 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 10 lags of 1. differences): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    4             
Final Prediction Error:   4             
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   4             
Schwarz Criterion:        3             
 
PORTMANTEAU TEST with 12 lags 
 
Portmanteau:               51.5768      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.0000       
Ljung & Box:               56.4170      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.0000       
 
JARQUE-BERA TEST: 
 
test statistic:            7452.5733    
 p-Value(Chi^2):           0.0000       
skewness:                 -0.9518       
kurtosis:                  37.2505      
 
ADF Test for series:      PFInvDirect_d1  
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sample range:             [1998 M5, 2010 M12], T = 152 
lagged differences:       3  
intercept, time trend 
asymptotic critical values 
reference: Davidson, R. and MacKinnon, J. (1993), 
"Estimation and Inference in Econometrics" p 708, table 20.1, 
Oxford University Press, London 
 1%         5%         10%        
-3.96      -3.41      -3.13      
value of test statistic: -3.8509 
regression results: 
--------------------------------------- 
variable      coefficient   t-statistic   
--------------------------------------- 
 x(-1)        -0.0047       -3.8509       
dx(-1)         2.1603        28.3065      
dx(-2)        -1.5603       -10.7160      
dx(-3)         0.3838        4.9616       
constant       2533.6395     0.5771       
trend         -2.0830       -0.0208       
RSS            420603104088.6884 
 
OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS LAGS FROM INFORMATION CRITERIA 
 
sample range:             [1998 M12, 2010 M12], T = 145 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 10 lags of 1. differences): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    4             
Final Prediction Error:   4             
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   4             
Schwarz Criterion:        3             
 
PORTMANTEAU TEST with 12 lags 
 
Portmanteau:               51.5510      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.0000       
Ljung & Box:               56.3888      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.0000       
 
JARQUE-BERA TEST: 
 
test statistic:            7451.1241    
 p-Value(Chi^2):           0.0000       
skewness:                 -0.9456       
kurtosis:                  37.2479      
 
6.2. Unit Root tests with structural break for “PFInvDirect_D1” 
(lags=3); with an impulse dummy (August 1998) and with a shift 
dummy (August 1998); with constant and no trend and with 
both constant and a trend 
 
 
Break date search for series:  PFInvDirect_d1  
sample range:                  [1998 M5, 2010 M12], T = 152 
searched range:                [1998 M8, 2010 M10], T = 147 
number of lags (1st diff):     3  
suggested break date:          1998 M8 
 
*** Fri, 25 Sep 2015 12:41:22 *** 
UR Test with structural break for series: PFInvDirect_d1  
sample range:                  [1998 M5, 2010 M12], T = 152 
number of lags (1st diff):     3  
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value of test statistic:      -3.9224    
used break date:               1998 M8 
shiftfunction:                 impulse dummy  
critical values (Lanne et al. 2002): 
--------------------------------------- 
 T          1%         5%         10%       
--------------------------------------- 
1000       -3.48      -2.88      -2.58      
--------------------------------------- 
regression results: 
--------------------------------------- 
variable      coefficient   t-statistic   
--------------------------------------- 
d(const)       7587.6462     1.7267       
d(shiftfkt)    0.0118        0.0000       
dx(-1)         2.2055        29.0092      
dx(-2)        -1.5443       -10.4896      
dx(-3)         0.3135        4.1242       
 
OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS LAGS FROM INFORMATION CRITERIA 
 
sample range:             [1998 M12, 2010 M12], T = 145 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 10 lags of 1. differences): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    4             
Final Prediction Error:   4             
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   4             
Schwarz Criterion:        3             
 
PORTMANTEAU TEST with 12 lags 
 
Portmanteau:               51.2409      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.0000       
Ljung & Box:               56.0841      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.0000       
 
JARQUE-BERA TEST: 
 
test statistic:            7298.2282    
 p-Value(Chi^2):           0.0000       
skewness:                 -0.9498       
kurtosis:                  37.0055      
 
UR Test with structural break for series: PFInvDirect_d1  
sample range:                  [1998 M5, 2010 M12], T = 152 
number of lags (1st diff):     3  
value of test statistic:      -3.6846    
used break date:               1998 M8 
shiftfunction:                 impulse dummy  
time trend included 
critical values (Lanne et al. 2002): 
--------------------------------------- 
 T          1%         5%         10%       
--------------------------------------- 
1000       -3.55      -3.03      -2.76      
--------------------------------------- 
regression results: 
--------------------------------------- 
variable      coefficient   t-statistic   
--------------------------------------- 
d(trend)       28745.8878    0.5221       
d(const)       6860.4920     1.5563       
d(shiftfkt)    0.0119        0.0000       
dx(-1)         2.2053        29.0063      
dx(-2)        -1.5441       -10.4885      
dx(-3)         0.3135        4.1232       
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OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS LAGS FROM INFORMATION CRITERIA 
 
sample range:             [1998 M12, 2010 M12], T = 145 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 10 lags of 1. differences): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    4             
Final Prediction Error:   4             
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   4             
Schwarz Criterion:        3             
 
PORTMANTEAU TEST with 12 lags 
 
Portmanteau:               52.7405      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.0000       
Ljung & Box:               57.7007      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.0000       
 
JARQUE-BERA TEST: 
 
test statistic:            7386.4441    
 p-Value(Chi^2):           0.0000       
skewness:                 -1.1702       
kurtosis:                  37.1837      
 
Break date search for series:  PFInvDirect_d1  
sample range:                  [1998 M5, 2010 M12], T = 152 
searched range:                [1998 M8, 2010 M10], T = 147 
number of lags (1st diff):     3  
suggested break date:          1998 M8 
 
UR Test with structural break for series: PFInvDirect_d1  
sample range:                  [1998 M5, 2010 M12], T = 152 
number of lags (1st diff):     3  
value of test statistic:      -3.9224    
used break date:               1998 M8 
shiftfunction:                 shift dummy  
critical values (Lanne et al. 2002): 
--------------------------------------- 
 T          1%         5%         10%       
--------------------------------------- 
1000       -3.48      -2.88      -2.58      
--------------------------------------- 
regression results: 
--------------------------------------- 
variable      coefficient   t-statistic   
--------------------------------------- 
d(const)       7587.6462     1.7267       
d(shiftfkt)   -0.1604       -0.0000       
dx(-1)         2.2055        29.0092      
dx(-2)        -1.5443       -10.4896      
dx(-3)         0.3135        4.1242       
 
OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS LAGS FROM INFORMATION CRITERIA 
 
sample range:             [1998 M12, 2010 M12], T = 145 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 10 lags of 1. differences): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    4             
Final Prediction Error:   4             
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   4             
Schwarz Criterion:        3             
 
PORTMANTEAU TEST with 12 lags 
 
Portmanteau:               51.2409      
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 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.0000       
Ljung & Box:               56.0841      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.0000       
 
JARQUE-BERA TEST: 
 
test statistic:            7298.2282    
 p-Value(Chi^2):           0.0000       
skewness:                 -0.9498       
kurtosis:                  37.0055      
 
UR Test with structural break for series: PFInvDirect_d1  
sample range:                  [1998 M5, 2010 M12], T = 152 
number of lags (1st diff):     3  
value of test statistic:      -3.6846    
used break date:               1998 M8 
shiftfunction:                 shift dummy  
time trend included 
critical values (Lanne et al. 2002): 
--------------------------------------- 
 T          1%         5%         10%       
--------------------------------------- 
1000       -3.55      -3.03      -2.76      
--------------------------------------- 
regression results: 
--------------------------------------- 
variable      coefficient   t-statistic   
--------------------------------------- 
d(trend)       28745.9090    0.5221       
d(const)       6860.4917     1.5563       
d(shiftfkt)   -2.3651       -0.0005       
dx(-1)         2.2053        29.0063      
dx(-2)        -1.5441       -10.4885      
dx(-3)         0.3135        4.1232       
 
OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS LAGS FROM INFORMATION CRITERIA 
 
sample range:             [1998 M12, 2010 M12], T = 145 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 10 lags of 1. differences): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    4             
Final Prediction Error:   4             
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   4             
Schwarz Criterion:        3             
 
PORTMANTEAU TEST with 12 lags 
 
Portmanteau:               52.7405      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.0000       
Ljung & Box:               57.7007      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.0000       
 
JARQUE-BERA TEST: 
 
test statistic:            7386.4442    
 p-Value(Chi^2):           0.0000       
skewness:                 -1.1702       
kurtosis:                  37.1837      
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6.3. KPSS test for stationarity of “PFInvDirect_D1” (lags=3) testing 
H0: “PFInvDirect_D1” is stationary I(0) variable against the 
alternative of the variable being integrated at a level higher than 
0 (test for both level and trend stationarity) 
 
KPSS test for series:  PFInvDirect_d1  
sample range:          [1998 M1, 2010 M12], T = 156 
number of lags:        3  
KPSS test based on y(t)=a+e(t) (level stationarity) 
asymptotic critical values: 
 10%        5%         1%         
0.347      0.463      0.739      
value of test statistic: 0.1382 
reference: reprinted from JOURNAL OF ECONOMETRICS, 
Vol 54, No 1, 1992, pp 159-178, Kwiatkowski et al: 
"Testing the null hypothesis of stationarity ...", 
with permission from Elsevier Science 
 
KPSS test for series:  PFInvDirect_d1  
sample range:          [1998 M1, 2010 M12], T = 156 
number of lags:        3  
KPSS test based on y(t)=a+bt+e(t) (trend stationarity) 
asymptotic critical values: 
 10%        5%         1%         
0.119      0.146      0.216      
value of test statistic: 0.1389 
reference: reprinted from JOURNAL OF ECONOMETRICS, 
Vol 54, No 1, 1992, pp 159-178, Kwiatkowski et al: 
"Testing the null hypothesis of stationarity ...", 
with permission from Elsevier Science 
 
7. Unit root tests of the Croatian DC pension fund investment into 
Croatian and SEE equity focused open-end investment funds 
variable “PFInvIndirect” 
 
 
7.1. Augmented Dickey Fuller test results for “PFInvIndirect” 
(lags=4); no constant or trend; constant and no trend and both 
with trend and constant 
 
ADF Test for series:      PFInvIndirect  
sample range:             [1998 M5, 2010 M12], T = 152 
lagged differences:       4  
no intercept, no time trend 
asymptotic critical values 
reference: Davidson, R. and MacKinnon, J. (1993), 
"Estimation and Inference in Econometrics" p 708, table 20.1, 
Oxford University Press, London 
 1%         5%         10%        
-2.56      -1.94      -1.62      
value of test statistic: -2.1738 
regression results: 
--------------------------------------- 
variable      coefficient   t-statistic   
--------------------------------------- 
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 x(-1)        -0.0006       -2.1738       
dx(-1)         3.0286        38.8410      
dx(-2)        -3.4386       -15.6462      
dx(-3)         1.7283        7.8567       
dx(-4)        -0.3261       -4.1620       
RSS            3064950066013.2510 
 
OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS LAGS FROM INFORMATION CRITERIA 
 
sample range:             [1999 M1, 2010 M12], T = 144 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 12 lags of 1. differences): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    5             
Final Prediction Error:   5             
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   5             
Schwarz Criterion:        5             
 
PORTMANTEAU TEST with 12 lags 
 
Portmanteau:               81.0214      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.0000       
Ljung & Box:               88.7198      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.0000       
 
JARQUE-BERA TEST: 
 
test statistic:            4295.3597    
 p-Value(Chi^2):           0.0000       
skewness:                 -1.4755       
kurtosis:                  28.8748      
 
 
ADF Test for series:      PFInvIndirect  
sample range:             [1998 M5, 2010 M12], T = 152 
lagged differences:       4  
intercept, no time trend 
asymptotic critical values 
reference: Davidson, R. and MacKinnon, J. (1993), 
"Estimation and Inference in Econometrics" p 708, table 20.1, 
Oxford University Press, London 
 1%         5%         10%        
-3.43      -2.86      -2.57      
value of test statistic: -2.1727 
regression results: 
--------------------------------------- 
variable      coefficient   t-statistic   
--------------------------------------- 
 x(-1)        -0.0006       -2.1727       
dx(-1)         3.0280        38.6886      
dx(-2)        -3.4371       -15.5805      
dx(-3)         1.7267        7.8190       
dx(-4)        -0.3254       -4.1366       
constant       2562.9243     0.2150       
RSS            3063979544191.3853 
 
OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS LAGS FROM INFORMATION CRITERIA 
 
sample range:             [1999 M1, 2010 M12], T = 144 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 12 lags of 1. differences): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    5             
Final Prediction Error:   5             
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   5             
Schwarz Criterion:        5             
 
PORTMANTEAU TEST with 12 lags 
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Portmanteau:               80.9589      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.0000       
Ljung & Box:               88.6486      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.0000       
 
JARQUE-BERA TEST: 
 
test statistic:            4299.2680    
 p-Value(Chi^2):           0.0000       
skewness:                 -1.4764       
kurtosis:                  28.8865      
 
ADF Test for series:      PFInvIndirect  
sample range:             [1998 M5, 2010 M12], T = 152 
lagged differences:       4  
intercept, time trend 
asymptotic critical values 
reference: Davidson, R. and MacKinnon, J. (1993), 
"Estimation and Inference in Econometrics" p 708, table 20.1, 
Oxford University Press, London 
 1%         5%         10%        
-3.96      -3.41      -3.13      
value of test statistic: -2.1757 
regression results: 
--------------------------------------- 
variable      coefficient   t-statistic   
--------------------------------------- 
 x(-1)        -0.0006       -2.1757       
dx(-1)         3.0271        38.5509      
dx(-2)        -3.4353       -15.5258      
dx(-3)         1.7258        7.7926       
dx(-4)        -0.3253       -4.1240       
constant       2513.2528     0.2103       
trend         -112.4831     -0.4176       
RSS            3060299395528.2163 
 
OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS LAGS FROM INFORMATION CRITERIA 
 
sample range:             [1999 M1, 2010 M12], T = 144 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 12 lags of 1. differences): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    5             
Final Prediction Error:   5             
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   5             
Schwarz Criterion:        5             
 
PORTMANTEAU TEST with 12 lags 
 
Portmanteau:               81.3930      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.0000       
Ljung & Box:               89.1281      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.0000       
 
JARQUE-BERA TEST: 
 
test statistic:            4185.1448    
 p-Value(Chi^2):           0.0000       
skewness:                 -1.3603       
kurtosis:                  28.5619      
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7.2. Unit Root tests with structural break for “PFInvDirect” (lags=4); 
with an impulse dummy (August 1998) and with a shift dummy 
(August 1998); with constant and no trend and with both 
constant and a trend 
 
Break date search for series:  PFInvIndirect  
sample range:                  [1998 M5, 2010 M12], T = 152 
searched range:                [1998 M9, 2010 M10], T = 146 
number of lags (1st diff):     4  
suggested break date:          1998 M9 
 
UR Test with structural break for series: PFInvIndirect  
sample range:                  [1998 M5, 2010 M12], T = 152 
number of lags (1st diff):     4  
value of test statistic:      -2.2097    
used break date:               1998 M9 
shiftfunction:                 impulse dummy  
critical values (Lanne et al. 2002): 
--------------------------------------- 
 T          1%         5%         10%       
--------------------------------------- 
1000       -3.48      -2.88      -2.58      
--------------------------------------- 
regression results: 
--------------------------------------- 
variable      coefficient   t-statistic   
--------------------------------------- 
d(const)      -191.8316     -0.0168       
d(shiftfkt)    0.0640        0.0000       
dx(-1)         3.0531        41.0171      
dx(-2)        -3.5089       -16.7090      
dx(-3)         1.8075        8.6072       
dx(-4)        -0.3608       -4.8466       
 
OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS LAGS FROM INFORMATION CRITERIA 
 
sample range:             [1999 M1, 2010 M12], T = 144 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 12 lags of 1. differences): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    5             
Final Prediction Error:   5             
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   5             
Schwarz Criterion:        5             
 
PORTMANTEAU TEST with 12 lags 
 
Portmanteau:               80.4259      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.0000       
Ljung & Box:               88.1199      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.0000       
 
JARQUE-BERA TEST: 
 
test statistic:            4209.2644    
 p-Value(Chi^2):           0.0000       
skewness:                 -1.4719       
kurtosis:                  28.6974      
 
UR Test with structural break for series: PFInvIndirect  
sample range:                  [1998 M5, 2010 M12], T = 152 
number of lags (1st diff):     4  
value of test statistic:      -2.2530    
used break date:               1998 M9 
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shiftfunction:                 impulse dummy  
time trend included 
critical values (Lanne et al. 2002): 
--------------------------------------- 
 T          1%         5%         10%       
--------------------------------------- 
1000       -3.55      -3.03      -2.76      
--------------------------------------- 
regression results: 
--------------------------------------- 
variable      coefficient   t-statistic   
--------------------------------------- 
d(trend)      -197825.9292  -1.3791       
d(const)       1602.9377     0.1400       
d(shiftfkt)    0.0640        0.0000       
dx(-1)         3.0530        41.0158      
dx(-2)        -3.5088       -16.7085      
dx(-3)         1.8075        8.6070       
dx(-4)        -0.3608       -4.8466       
 
OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS LAGS FROM INFORMATION CRITERIA 
 
sample range:             [1999 M1, 2010 M12], T = 144 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 12 lags of 1. differences): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    5             
Final Prediction Error:   5             
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   5             
Schwarz Criterion:        5             
 
PORTMANTEAU TEST with 12 lags 
 
Portmanteau:               80.8671      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.0000       
Ljung & Box:               88.6074      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.0000       
 
JARQUE-BERA TEST: 
 
test statistic:            4095.7423    
 p-Value(Chi^2):           0.0000       
skewness:                 -1.3546       
kurtosis:                  28.3700      
 
Break date search for series:  PFInvIndirect  
sample range:                  [1998 M5, 2010 M12], T = 152 
searched range:                [1998 M9, 2010 M10], T = 146 
number of lags (1st diff):     4  
suggested break date:          1998 M9 
 
UR Test with structural break for series: PFInvIndirect  
sample range:                  [1998 M5, 2010 M12], T = 152 
number of lags (1st diff):     4  
value of test statistic:      -2.2097    
used break date:               1998 M9 
shiftfunction:                 shift dummy  
critical values (Lanne et al. 2002): 
--------------------------------------- 
 T          1%         5%         10%       
--------------------------------------- 
1000       -3.48      -2.88      -2.58      
--------------------------------------- 
regression results: 
--------------------------------------- 
variable      coefficient   t-statistic   
--------------------------------------- 
388 | P a g e  
 
d(const)      -191.8316     -0.0168       
d(shiftfkt)    0.1097        0.0000       
dx(-1)         3.0531        41.0171      
dx(-2)        -3.5089       -16.7090      
dx(-3)         1.8075        8.6072       
dx(-4)        -0.3608       -4.8466       
 
OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS LAGS FROM INFORMATION CRITERIA 
 
sample range:             [1999 M1, 2010 M12], T = 144 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 12 lags of 1. differences): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    5             
Final Prediction Error:   5             
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   5             
Schwarz Criterion:        5             
 
PORTMANTEAU TEST with 12 lags 
 
Portmanteau:               80.4259      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.0000       
Ljung & Box:               88.1199      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.0000       
 
JARQUE-BERA TEST: 
 
test statistic:            4209.2644    
 p-Value(Chi^2):           0.0000       
skewness:                 -1.4719       
kurtosis:                  28.6974      
 
UR Test with structural break for series: PFInvIndirect  
sample range:                  [1998 M5, 2010 M12], T = 152 
number of lags (1st diff):     4  
value of test statistic:      -2.2530    
used break date:               1998 M9 
shiftfunction:                 shift dummy  
time trend included 
critical values (Lanne et al. 2002): 
--------------------------------------- 
 T          1%         5%         10%       
--------------------------------------- 
1000       -3.55      -3.03      -2.76      
--------------------------------------- 
regression results: 
--------------------------------------- 
variable      coefficient   t-statistic   
--------------------------------------- 
d(trend)      -197826.0580  -1.3791       
d(const)       1602.9386     0.1400       
d(shiftfkt)    0.7353        0.0001       
dx(-1)         3.0530        41.0158      
dx(-2)        -3.5088       -16.7085      
dx(-3)         1.8075        8.6070       
dx(-4)        -0.3608       -4.8466       
 
OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS LAGS FROM INFORMATION CRITERIA 
 
sample range:             [1999 M1, 2010 M12], T = 144 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 12 lags of 1. differences): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    5             
Final Prediction Error:   5             
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   5             
Schwarz Criterion:        5             
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PORTMANTEAU TEST with 12 lags 
 
Portmanteau:               80.8671      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.0000       
Ljung & Box:               88.6074      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.0000       
 
JARQUE-BERA TEST: 
 
test statistic:            4095.7422    
 p-Value(Chi^2):           0.0000       
skewness:                 -1.3546       
kurtosis:                  28.3700     
 
 
7.3. KPSS test for stationarity of “PFInvDirect” (lags=4) testing H0: 
“PFInvDirect” is stationary I(0) variable against the alternative 
of the variable being integrated at a level higher than 0 (test for 
both level and trend stationarity) 
 
 
KPSS test for series:  PFInvIndirect  
sample range:          [1997 M12, 2010 M12], T = 157 
number of lags:        4  
KPSS test based on y(t)=a+e(t) (level stationarity) 
asymptotic critical values: 
 10%        5%         1%         
0.347      0.463      0.739      
value of test statistic: 0.1407 
reference: reprinted from JOURNAL OF ECONOMETRICS, 
Vol 54, No 1, 1992, pp 159-178, Kwiatkowski et al: 
"Testing the null hypothesis of stationarity ...", 
with permission from Elsevier Science 
 
KPSS test for series:  PFInvIndirect  
sample range:          [1997 M12, 2010 M12], T = 157 
number of lags:        4   
KPSS test based on y(t)=a+bt+e(t) (trend stationarity) 
asymptotic critical values: 
 10%        5%         1%         
0.119      0.146      0.216      
value of test statistic: 0.1338 
reference: reprinted from JOURNAL OF ECONOMETRICS, 
Vol 54, No 1, 1992, pp 159-178, Kwiatkowski et al: 
"Testing the null hypothesis of stationarity ...", 
with permission from Elsevier Science 
 
 
8. Unit root tests of the first difference of the Croatian DC pension 
fund investment into Croatian and SEE equity focused open-end 
investment funds variable “PFInvIndirect” 
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8.1. Augmented Dickey Fuller test results for “PFInvIndirect_D1” 
(lags=3); no constant or trend; constant and no trend and both 
with trend and constant 
 
ADF Test for series:      PFInvIndirect_d1  
sample range:             [1998 M5, 2010 M12], T = 152 
lagged differences:       3  
no intercept, no time trend 
asymptotic critical values 
reference: Davidson, R. and MacKinnon, J. (1993), 
"Estimation and Inference in Econometrics" p 708, table 20.1, 
Oxford University Press, London 
 1%         5%         10%        
-2.56      -1.94      -1.62      
value of test statistic: -4.5906 
regression results: 
--------------------------------------- 
variable      coefficient   t-statistic   
--------------------------------------- 
 x(-1)        -0.0090       -4.5906       
dx(-1)         2.0798        27.3762      
dx(-2)        -1.4704       -10.3278      
dx(-3)         0.3693        4.8134       
RSS            3163472127225.8657 
 
OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS LAGS FROM INFORMATION CRITERIA 
 
sample range:             [1998 M12, 2010 M12], T = 145 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 10 lags of 1. differences): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    4             
Final Prediction Error:   4             
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   4             
Schwarz Criterion:        3             
 
PORTMANTEAU TEST with 12 lags 
 
Portmanteau:               80.9775      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.0000       
Ljung & Box:               88.7614      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.0000       
 
JARQUE-BERA TEST: 
 
test statistic:            4308.2959    
 p-Value(Chi^2):           0.0000       
skewness:                 -1.4226       
kurtosis:                  28.9261      
 
ADF Test for series:      PFInvIndirect_d1  
sample range:             [1998 M5, 2010 M12], T = 152 
lagged differences:       3  
intercept, no time trend 
asymptotic critical values 
reference: Davidson, R. and MacKinnon, J. (1993), 
"Estimation and Inference in Econometrics" p 708, table 20.1, 
Oxford University Press, London 
 1%         5%         10%        
-3.43      -2.86      -2.57      
value of test statistic: -4.5763 
regression results: 
--------------------------------------- 
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variable      coefficient   t-statistic   
--------------------------------------- 
 x(-1)        -0.0090       -4.5763       
dx(-1)         2.0797        27.2827      
dx(-2)        -1.4703       -10.2927      
dx(-3)         0.3693        4.7972       
constant      -1664.7229    -0.1398       
RSS            3163051448179.3896 
 
OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS LAGS FROM INFORMATION CRITERIA 
 
sample range:             [1998 M12, 2010 M12], T = 145 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 10 lags of 1. differences): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    4             
Final Prediction Error:   4             
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   4             
Schwarz Criterion:        3             
 
PORTMANTEAU TEST with 12 lags 
 
Portmanteau:               80.9677      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.0000       
Ljung & Box:               88.7506      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.0000       
 
JARQUE-BERA TEST: 
 
test statistic:            4300.5027    
 p-Value(Chi^2):           0.0000       
skewness:                 -1.4220       
kurtosis:                  28.9025      
 
ADF Test for series:      PFInvIndirect_d1  
sample range:             [1998 M5, 2010 M12], T = 152 
lagged differences:       3  
intercept, time trend 
asymptotic critical values 
reference: Davidson, R. and MacKinnon, J. (1993), 
"Estimation and Inference in Econometrics" p 708, table 20.1, 
Oxford University Press, London 
 1%         5%         10%        
-3.96      -3.41      -3.13      
value of test statistic: -4.5739 
regression results: 
--------------------------------------- 
variable      coefficient   t-statistic   
--------------------------------------- 
 x(-1)        -0.0090       -4.5739       
dx(-1)         2.0791        27.1866      
dx(-2)        -1.4699       -10.2588      
dx(-3)         0.3694        4.7844       
constant      -1724.9908    -0.1444       
trend         -98.9229      -0.3627       
RSS            3160203599879.9570 
 
OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS LAGS FROM INFORMATION CRITERIA 
 
sample range:             [1998 M12, 2010 M12], T = 145 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 10 lags of 1. differences): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    4             
Final Prediction Error:   4             
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   4             
Schwarz Criterion:        3             
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PORTMANTEAU TEST with 12 lags 
 
Portmanteau:               81.5037      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.0000       
Ljung & Box:               89.3423      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.0000       
 
JARQUE-BERA TEST: 
 
test statistic:            4210.5334    
 p-Value(Chi^2):           0.0000       
skewness:                 -1.3214       
kurtosis:                  28.6483      
 
8.2. Unit Root tests with structural break for “PFInvDirect_D1” 
(lags=3); with an impulse dummy (August 1998) and with a shift 
dummy (August 1998); with constant and no trend and with 
both constant and a trend 
 
Break date search for series:  PFInvIndirect_d1  
sample range:                  [1998 M5, 2010 M12], T = 152 
searched range:                [1998 M8, 2010 M10], T = 147 
number of lags (1st diff):     3  
suggested break date:          1998 M8 
 
*** Fri, 25 Sep 2015 12:44:04 *** 
UR Test with structural break for series: PFInvIndirect_d1  
sample range:                  [1998 M5, 2010 M12], T = 152 
number of lags (1st diff):     3  
value of test statistic:      -4.6381    
used break date:               1998 M8 
shiftfunction:                 impulse dummy  
critical values (Lanne et al. 2002): 
--------------------------------------- 
 T          1%         5%         10%       
--------------------------------------- 
1000       -3.48      -2.88      -2.58      
--------------------------------------- 
regression results: 
--------------------------------------- 
variable      coefficient   t-statistic   
--------------------------------------- 
d(const)       191.9800      0.0156       
d(shiftfkt)    0.0004        0.0000       
dx(-1)         2.1476        27.8793      
dx(-2)        -1.4561       -9.8382       
dx(-3)         0.2726        3.5390       
 
OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS LAGS FROM INFORMATION CRITERIA 
 
sample range:             [1998 M12, 2010 M12], T = 145 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 10 lags of 1. differences): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    4             
Final Prediction Error:   4             
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   4             
Schwarz Criterion:        3             
 
PORTMANTEAU TEST with 12 lags 
 
Portmanteau:               80.4358      
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 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.0000       
Ljung & Box:               88.2230      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.0000       
 
JARQUE-BERA TEST: 
 
test statistic:            4209.9360    
 p-Value(Chi^2):           0.0000       
skewness:                 -1.4171       
kurtosis:                  28.7118      
 
 
UR Test with structural break for series: PFInvIndirect_d1  
sample range:                  [1998 M5, 2010 M12], T = 152 
number of lags (1st diff):     3  
value of test statistic:      -4.5764    
used break date:               1998 M8 
shiftfunction:                 impulse dummy  
time trend included 
critical values (Lanne et al. 2002): 
--------------------------------------- 
 T          1%         5%         10%       
--------------------------------------- 
1000       -3.55      -3.03      -2.76      
--------------------------------------- 
regression results: 
--------------------------------------- 
variable      coefficient   t-statistic   
--------------------------------------- 
d(trend)      -35704.5912   -0.2322       
d(const)       1476.0240     0.1199       
d(shiftfkt)    0.0004        0.0000       
dx(-1)         2.1475        27.8782      
dx(-2)        -1.4561       -9.8377       
dx(-3)         0.2726        3.5385       
 
OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS LAGS FROM INFORMATION CRITERIA 
 
sample range:             [1998 M12, 2010 M12], T = 145 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 10 lags of 1. differences): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    4             
Final Prediction Error:   4             
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   4             
Schwarz Criterion:        3             
 
PORTMANTEAU TEST with 12 lags 
 
Portmanteau:               81.7970      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.0000       
Ljung & Box:               89.7110      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.0000       
 
JARQUE-BERA TEST: 
 
test statistic:            3938.3013    
 p-Value(Chi^2):           0.0000       
skewness:                 -1.0674       
kurtosis:                  27.9279      
 
Break date search for series:  PFInvIndirect_d1  
sample range:                  [1998 M5, 2010 M12], T = 152 
searched range:                [1998 M8, 2010 M10], T = 147 
number of lags (1st diff):     3  
suggested break date:          1998 M8 
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UR Test with structural break for series: PFInvIndirect_d1  
sample range:                  [1998 M5, 2010 M12], T = 152 
number of lags (1st diff):     3  
value of test statistic:      -4.6381    
used break date:               1998 M8 
shiftfunction:                 shift dummy  
critical values (Lanne et al. 2002): 
--------------------------------------- 
 T          1%         5%         10%       
--------------------------------------- 
1000       -3.48      -2.88      -2.58      
--------------------------------------- 
regression results: 
--------------------------------------- 
variable      coefficient   t-statistic   
--------------------------------------- 
d(const)       191.9800      0.0156       
d(shiftfkt)   -0.0093       -0.0000       
dx(-1)         2.1476        27.8793      
dx(-2)        -1.4561       -9.8382       
dx(-3)         0.2726        3.5390       
 
OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS LAGS FROM INFORMATION CRITERIA 
 
sample range:             [1998 M12, 2010 M12], T = 145 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 10 lags of 1. differences): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    4             
Final Prediction Error:   4             
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   4             
Schwarz Criterion:        3             
 
PORTMANTEAU TEST with 12 lags 
 
Portmanteau:               80.4358      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.0000       
Ljung & Box:               88.2230      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.0000       
 
JARQUE-BERA TEST: 
 
test statistic:            4209.9360    
 p-Value(Chi^2):           0.0000       
skewness:                 -1.4171       
kurtosis:                  28.7118      
 
UR Test with structural break for series: PFInvIndirect_d1  
sample range:                  [1998 M5, 2010 M12], T = 152 
number of lags (1st diff):     3  
value of test statistic:      -4.5764    
used break date:               1998 M8 
shiftfunction:                 shift dummy  
time trend included 
critical values (Lanne et al. 2002): 
--------------------------------------- 
 T          1%         5%         10%       
--------------------------------------- 
1000       -3.55      -3.03      -2.76      
--------------------------------------- 
regression results: 
--------------------------------------- 
variable      coefficient   t-statistic   
--------------------------------------- 
d(trend)      -35704.6309   -0.2322       
d(const)       1476.0254     0.1199       
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d(shiftfkt)    5.9062        0.0005       
dx(-1)         2.1475        27.8782      
dx(-2)        -1.4561       -9.8377       
dx(-3)         0.2726        3.5385       
 
OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS LAGS FROM INFORMATION CRITERIA 
 
sample range:             [1998 M12, 2010 M12], T = 145 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 10 lags of 1. differences): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    4             
Final Prediction Error:   4             
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   4             
Schwarz Criterion:        3             
 
PORTMANTEAU TEST with 12 lags 
 
Portmanteau:               81.7970      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.0000       
Ljung & Box:               89.7110      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.0000       
 
JARQUE-BERA TEST: 
 
test statistic:            3938.3014    
 p-Value(Chi^2):           0.0000       
skewness:                 -1.0674       
kurtosis:                  27.9279      
 
 
8.3. KPSS test for stationarity of “PFInvIndirect_D1” (lags=3) testing 
H0: “PFInvIndirect_D1” is stationary I(0) variable against the 
alternative of the variable being integrated at a level higher than 
0 (test for both level and trend stationarity) 
 
KPSS test for series:  PFInvIndirect_d1  
sample range:          [1998 M1, 2010 M12], T = 156 
number of lags:        3  
KPSS test based on y(t)=a+e(t) (level stationarity) 
asymptotic critical values: 
 10%        5%         1%         
0.347      0.463      0.739      
value of test statistic: 0.0759 
reference: reprinted from JOURNAL OF ECONOMETRICS, 
Vol 54, No 1, 1992, pp 159-178, Kwiatkowski et al: 
"Testing the null hypothesis of stationarity ...", 
with permission from Elsevier Science 
 
KPSS test for series:  PFInvIndirect_d1  
sample range:          [1998 M1, 2010 M12], T = 156 
number of lags:        3  
KPSS test based on y(t)=a+bt+e(t) (trend stationarity) 
asymptotic critical values: 
 10%        5%         1%         
0.119      0.146      0.216      
value of test statistic: 0.0701 
reference: reprinted from JOURNAL OF ECONOMETRICS, 
Vol 54, No 1, 1992, pp 159-178, Kwiatkowski et al: 
"Testing the null hypothesis of stationarity ...", 
with permission from Elsevier Science 
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9. Unit root tests of the index variable representing the assets under 
management of the Croatian and SEE equity focused open-end 
investment funds weighted by their presence in the DC pension 
fund portfolios “OMF_AUMIndex” 
 
9.1. Augmented Dickey Fuller test results for “OMF_AUMIndex” 
(lags=1); no constant or trend; constant and no trend and both 
with trend and constant 
 
ADF Test for series:      OMF_AUMIndex  
sample range:             [2007 M2, 2010 M12], T = 47 
lagged differences:       1  
no intercept, no time trend 
asymptotic critical values 
reference: Davidson, R. and MacKinnon, J. (1993), 
"Estimation and Inference in Econometrics" p 708, table 20.1, 
Oxford University Press, London 
 1%         5%         10%        
-2.56      -1.94      -1.62      
value of test statistic: -2.2087 
regression results: 
--------------------------------------- 
variable      coefficient   t-statistic   
--------------------------------------- 
 x(-1)        -0.0254       -2.2087       
dx(-1)         0.3728        2.8277       
RSS            165096.7638  
 
OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS LAGS FROM INFORMATION CRITERIA 
 
sample range:             [2008 M1, 2010 M12], T = 36 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 12 lags of 1. differences): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    10            
Final Prediction Error:   10            
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   1             
Schwarz Criterion:        0             
 
PORTMANTEAU TEST with 12 lags 
 
Portmanteau:               12.5813      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.4002       
Ljung & Box:               15.0189      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.2404       
 
JARQUE-BERA TEST: 
 
test statistic:            63.6528      
 p-Value(Chi^2):           0.0000       
skewness:                 -0.2822       
kurtosis:                  8.6732       
 
ADF Test for series:      OMF_AUMIndex  
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sample range:             [2007 M2, 2010 M12], T = 47 
lagged differences:       1  
intercept, no time trend 
asymptotic critical values 
reference: Davidson, R. and MacKinnon, J. (1993), 
"Estimation and Inference in Econometrics" p 708, table 20.1, 
Oxford University Press, London 
 1%         5%         10%        
-3.43      -2.86      -2.57      
value of test statistic: -1.3310 
regression results: 
--------------------------------------- 
variable      coefficient   t-statistic   
--------------------------------------- 
 x(-1)        -0.0215       -1.3310       
dx(-1)         0.3627        2.6584       
constant      -4.5359       -0.3393       
RSS            164665.9561  
 
OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS LAGS FROM INFORMATION CRITERIA 
 
sample range:             [2008 M1, 2010 M12], T = 36 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 12 lags of 1. differences): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    11            
Final Prediction Error:   8             
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   2             
Schwarz Criterion:        0             
 
PORTMANTEAU TEST with 12 lags 
 
Portmanteau:               12.4988      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.4065       
Ljung & Box:               14.9253      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.2455       
 
JARQUE-BERA TEST: 
 
test statistic:            64.9714      
 p-Value(Chi^2):           0.0000       
skewness:                 -0.4242       
kurtosis:                  8.6971       
 
ADF Test for series:      OMF_AUMIndex  
sample range:             [2007 M2, 2010 M12], T = 47 
lagged differences:       1  
intercept, time trend 
asymptotic critical values 
reference: Davidson, R. and MacKinnon, J. (1993), 
"Estimation and Inference in Econometrics" p 708, table 20.1, 
Oxford University Press, London 
 1%         5%         10%        
-3.96      -3.41      -3.13      
value of test statistic: -0.6963 
regression results: 
--------------------------------------- 
variable      coefficient   t-statistic   
--------------------------------------- 
 x(-1)        -0.0242       -0.6963       
dx(-1)         0.3663        2.5431       
constant      -2.8511       -0.1215       
trend         -0.1267       -0.0879       
RSS            164636.3729  
 
OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS LAGS FROM INFORMATION CRITERIA 
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sample range:             [2008 M1, 2010 M12], T = 36 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 12 lags of 1. differences): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    11            
Final Prediction Error:   11            
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   2             
Schwarz Criterion:        0             
 
PORTMANTEAU TEST with 12 lags 
 
Portmanteau:               12.5163      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.4052       
Ljung & Box:               14.9171      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.2460       
 
JARQUE-BERA TEST: 
 
test statistic:            64.4759      
 p-Value(Chi^2):           0.0000       
skewness:                 -0.4244       
kurtosis:                  8.6748       
 
 
 
 
9.2. Unit Root tests with structural break for “OMF_AUMIndex” 
(lags=1); with an impulse dummy (November 2007) and with a 
shift dummy (December 2007); with constant and no trend and 
with both constant and a trend 
 
Break date search for series:  OMF_AUMIndex  
sample range:                  [2007 M2, 2010 M12], T = 47 
searched range:                [2007 M3, 2010 M10], T = 44 
number of lags (1st diff):     1  
suggested break date:          2007 M12 
 
UR Test with structural break for series: OMF_AUMIndex  
sample range:                  [2007 M2, 2010 M12], T = 47 
number of lags (1st diff):     1  
value of test statistic:      -2.3340    
used break date:               2007 M12 
shiftfunction:                 impulse dummy  
critical values (Lanne et al. 2002): 
--------------------------------------- 
 T          1%         5%         10%       
--------------------------------------- 
1000       -3.48      -2.88      -2.58      
--------------------------------------- 
regression results: 
--------------------------------------- 
variable      coefficient   t-statistic   
--------------------------------------- 
d(const)       1361.9755     180.9782     
d(shiftfkt)    120.9615      11.3655      
dx(-1)         0.6092        5.3780       
 
OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS LAGS FROM INFORMATION CRITERIA 
 
sample range:             [2007 M11, 2010 M12], T = 38 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 10 lags of 1. differences): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    10            
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Final Prediction Error:   10            
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   2             
Schwarz Criterion:        2             
 
PORTMANTEAU TEST with 12 lags 
 
Portmanteau:               11.7391      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.4669       
Ljung & Box:               13.3822      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.3419       
 
JARQUE-BERA TEST: 
 
test statistic:            230.7054     
 p-Value(Chi^2):           0.0000       
skewness:                 -2.2385       
kurtosis:                  13.0162      
 
UR Test with structural break for series: OMF_AUMIndex  
sample range:                  [2007 M2, 2010 M12], T = 47 
number of lags (1st diff):     1  
value of test statistic:      -1.9250    
used break date:               2007 M12 
shiftfunction:                 impulse dummy  
time trend included 
critical values (Lanne et al. 2002): 
--------------------------------------- 
 T          1%         5%         10%       
--------------------------------------- 
1000       -3.55      -3.03      -2.76      
--------------------------------------- 
regression results: 
--------------------------------------- 
variable      coefficient   t-statistic   
--------------------------------------- 
d(trend)      -24.2128      -0.4635       
d(const)       1374.4356     184.1849     
d(shiftfkt)    120.3239      11.4016      
dx(-1)         0.5450        4.5505       
 
OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS LAGS FROM INFORMATION CRITERIA 
 
sample range:             [2007 M11, 2010 M12], T = 38 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 10 lags of 1. differences): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    10            
Final Prediction Error:   10            
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   4             
Schwarz Criterion:        2             
 
PORTMANTEAU TEST with 12 lags 
 
Portmanteau:               12.3762      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.4160       
Ljung & Box:               14.0142      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.2998       
 
JARQUE-BERA TEST: 
 
test statistic:            234.0094     
 p-Value(Chi^2):           0.0000       
skewness:                 -2.4139       
kurtosis:                  12.9391      
 
UR Test with structural break for series: OMF_AUMIndex  
sample range:                  [2007 M2, 2010 M12], T = 47 
400 | P a g e  
 
number of lags (1st diff):     1  
value of test statistic:      -2.9504    
used break date:               2007 M12 
shiftfunction:                 shift dummy  
critical values (Lanne et al. 2002): 
--------------------------------------- 
 T          1%         5%         10%       
--------------------------------------- 
1000       -3.48      -2.88      -2.58      
--------------------------------------- 
regression results: 
--------------------------------------- 
variable      coefficient   t-statistic   
--------------------------------------- 
d(const)       1357.7212     213.7379     
d(shiftfkt)    266.9013      42.0167      
dx(-1)         0.7984        9.2812       
 
OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS LAGS FROM INFORMATION CRITERIA 
 
sample range:             [2007 M11, 2010 M12], T = 38 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 10 lags of 1. differences): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    6             
Final Prediction Error:   6             
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   6             
Schwarz Criterion:        1             
 
PORTMANTEAU TEST with 12 lags 
 
Portmanteau:               11.2449      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.5081       
Ljung & Box:               12.7671      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.3862       
 
JARQUE-BERA TEST: 
 
test statistic:            738.5904     
 p-Value(Chi^2):           0.0000       
skewness:                 -3.6100       
kurtosis:                  21.2544      
 
UR Test with structural break for series: OMF_AUMIndex  
sample range:                  [2007 M2, 2010 M12], T = 47 
number of lags (1st diff):     1  
value of test statistic:      -2.8057    
used break date:               2007 M12 
shiftfunction:                 shift dummy  
time trend included 
critical values (Lanne et al. 2002): 
--------------------------------------- 
 T          1%         5%         10%       
--------------------------------------- 
1000       -3.55      -3.03      -2.76      
--------------------------------------- 
regression results: 
--------------------------------------- 
variable      coefficient   t-statistic   
--------------------------------------- 
d(trend)      -27.1631      -0.6097       
d(const)       1364.9736     214.4621     
d(shiftfkt)    265.5588      41.7241      
dx(-1)         0.7626        8.2529       
 
OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS LAGS FROM INFORMATION CRITERIA 
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sample range:             [2007 M11, 2010 M12], T = 38 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 10 lags of 1. differences): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    6             
Final Prediction Error:   6             
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   6             
Schwarz Criterion:        1             
 
PORTMANTEAU TEST with 12 lags 
 
Portmanteau:               11.3003      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.5034       
Ljung & Box:               12.8039      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.3835       
 
JARQUE-BERA TEST: 
 
test statistic:            704.5319     
 p-Value(Chi^2):           0.0000       
skewness:                 -3.6485       
kurtosis:                  20.7295      
 
 
9.3. KPSS test for stationarity of “OMF_AUMIndex” (lags=1) testing 
H0: “OMF_AUMIndex” is stationary I(0) variable against the 
alternative of the variable being integrated at a level higher than 
0 (test for both level and trend stationarity) 
 
KPSS test for series:  OMF_AUMIndex  
sample range:          [2006 M12, 2010 M12], T = 49 
number of lags:        1  
KPSS test based on y(t)=a+e(t) (level stationarity) 
asymptotic critical values: 
 10%        5%         1%         
0.347      0.463      0.739      
value of test statistic: 2.0805 
reference: reprinted from JOURNAL OF ECONOMETRICS, 
Vol 54, No 1, 1992, pp 159-178, Kwiatkowski et al: 
"Testing the null hypothesis of stationarity ...", 
with permission from Elsevier Science 
 
KPSS test for series:  OMF_AUMIndex  
sample range:          [2006 M12, 2010 M12], T = 49 
number of lags:        1  
KPSS test based on y(t)=a+bt+e(t) (trend stationarity) 
asymptotic critical values: 
 10%        5%         1%         
0.119      0.146      0.216      
value of test statistic: 0.5440 
reference: reprinted from JOURNAL OF ECONOMETRICS, 
Vol 54, No 1, 1992, pp 159-178, Kwiatkowski et al: 
"Testing the null hypothesis of stationarity ...", 
with permission from Elsevier Science 
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10. Unit root tests of the first difference of the index variable 
representing the assets under management of the Croatian and 
SEE equity focused open-end investment funds weighted by their 
presence in the DC pension fund portfolios “OMF_AUMIndex_D1” 
 
10.1. Augmented Dickey Fuller test results for “OMF_AUMIndex_D1” 
(lags=0); no constant or trend; constant and no trend and both 
with trend and constant 
 
ADF Test for series:      OMF_AUMIndex_d1  
sample range:             [2007 M2, 2010 M12], T = 47 
lagged differences:       0  
no intercept, no time trend 
asymptotic critical values 
reference: Davidson, R. and MacKinnon, J. (1993), 
"Estimation and Inference in Econometrics" p 708, table 20.1, 
Oxford University Press, London 
 1%         5%         10%        
-2.56      -1.94      -1.62      
value of test statistic: -4.1180 
regression results: 
--------------------------------------- 
variable      coefficient   t-statistic   
--------------------------------------- 
 x(-1)        -0.5384       -4.1180       
RSS            182994.8894  
 
OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS LAGS FROM INFORMATION CRITERIA 
 
sample range:             [2007 M12, 2010 M12], T = 37 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 10 lags of 1. differences): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    10            
Final Prediction Error:   10            
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   3             
Schwarz Criterion:        3             
 
PORTMANTEAU TEST with 12 lags 
 
Portmanteau:               13.7511      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.3169       
Ljung & Box:               15.9365      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.1942       
 
JARQUE-BERA TEST: 
 
test statistic:            90.7487      
 p-Value(Chi^2):           0.0000       
skewness:                 -0.7847       
kurtosis:                  9.6239       
 
ADF Test for series:      OMF_AUMIndex_d1  
sample range:             [2007 M2, 2010 M12], T = 47 
lagged differences:       0  
intercept, no time trend 
asymptotic critical values 
reference: Davidson, R. and MacKinnon, J. (1993), 
"Estimation and Inference in Econometrics" p 708, table 20.1, 
Oxford University Press, London 
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 1%         5%         10%        
-3.43      -2.86      -2.57      
value of test statistic: -4.5591 
regression results: 
--------------------------------------- 
variable      coefficient   t-statistic   
--------------------------------------- 
 x(-1)        -0.6262       -4.5591       
constant      -16.9434      -1.7531       
RSS            171295.6975  
 
OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS LAGS FROM INFORMATION CRITERIA 
 
sample range:             [2007 M12, 2010 M12], T = 37 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 10 lags of 1. differences): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    10            
Final Prediction Error:   10            
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   3             
Schwarz Criterion:        3             
 
PORTMANTEAU TEST with 12 lags 
 
Portmanteau:               12.7590      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.3868       
Ljung & Box:               14.9646      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.2434       
 
JARQUE-BERA TEST: 
 
test statistic:            77.5849      
 p-Value(Chi^2):           0.0000       
skewness:                 -1.0021       
kurtosis:                  8.9667       
 
ADF Test for series:      OMF_AUMIndex_d1  
sample range:             [2007 M2, 2010 M12], T = 47 
lagged differences:       0  
intercept, time trend 
asymptotic critical values 
reference: Davidson, R. and MacKinnon, J. (1993), 
"Estimation and Inference in Econometrics" p 708, table 20.1, 
Oxford University Press, London 
 1%         5%         10%        
-3.96      -3.41      -3.13      
value of test statistic: -4.7039 
regression results: 
--------------------------------------- 
variable      coefficient   t-statistic   
--------------------------------------- 
 x(-1)        -0.6563       -4.7039       
constant      -17.7162      -1.8339       
trend          0.7593        1.1267       
RSS            166492.4612  
 
OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS LAGS FROM INFORMATION CRITERIA 
 
sample range:             [2007 M12, 2010 M12], T = 37 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 10 lags of 1. differences): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    10            
Final Prediction Error:   10            
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   3             
Schwarz Criterion:        2             
 
PORTMANTEAU TEST with 12 lags 
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Portmanteau:               12.4927      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.4070       
Ljung & Box:               15.0463      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.2389       
 
JARQUE-BERA TEST: 
 
test statistic:            69.8343      
 p-Value(Chi^2):           0.0000       
skewness:                 -0.5770       
kurtosis:                  8.8591       
 
 
10.2. Unit Root tests with structural break for “OMF_AUMIndex_D1” 
(lags=0); with an impulse dummy (April 2007) and with a shift 
dummy (April 2007); with constant and no trend and with both 
constant and a trend 
 
Break date search for series:  OMF_AUMIndex_d1  
sample range:                  [2007 M2, 2010 M12], T = 47 
searched range:                [2007 M2, 2010 M10], T = 45 
number of lags (1st diff):     0  
suggested break date:          2007 M4 
 
UR Test with structural break for series: OMF_AUMIndex_d1  
sample range:                  [2007 M2, 2010 M12], T = 47 
number of lags (1st diff):     0  
value of test statistic:      -5.1269    
used break date:               2007 M4 
shiftfunction:                 impulse dummy  
critical values (Lanne et al. 2002): 
--------------------------------------- 
 T          1%         5%         10%       
--------------------------------------- 
1000       -3.48      -2.88      -2.58      
--------------------------------------- 
regression results: 
--------------------------------------- 
variable      coefficient   t-statistic   
--------------------------------------- 
d(const)       22.4919       0.3050       
d(shiftfkt)   -11.1674      -0.1071       
 
OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS LAGS FROM INFORMATION CRITERIA 
 
sample range:             [2007 M12, 2010 M12], T = 37 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 10 lags of 1. differences): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    10            
Final Prediction Error:   10            
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   3             
Schwarz Criterion:        3             
 
PORTMANTEAU TEST with 12 lags 
 
Portmanteau:               12.8362      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.3811       
Ljung & Box:               14.3354      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.2798       
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JARQUE-BERA TEST: 
 
test statistic:            106.4076     
 p-Value(Chi^2):           0.0000       
skewness:                 -1.4323       
kurtosis:                  9.8783       
 
UR Test with structural break for series: OMF_AUMIndex_d1  
sample range:                  [2007 M2, 2010 M12], T = 47 
number of lags (1st diff):     0  
value of test statistic:      -4.5567    
used break date:               2007 M4 
shiftfunction:                 impulse dummy  
time trend included 
critical values (Lanne et al. 2002): 
--------------------------------------- 
 T          1%         5%         10%       
--------------------------------------- 
1000       -3.55      -3.03      -2.76      
--------------------------------------- 
regression results: 
--------------------------------------- 
variable      coefficient   t-statistic   
--------------------------------------- 
d(trend)      -0.8787       -0.0017       
d(const)       23.3706       0.3134       
d(shiftfkt)   -11.1674      -0.1059       
 
OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS LAGS FROM INFORMATION CRITERIA 
 
sample range:             [2007 M12, 2010 M12], T = 37 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 10 lags of 1. differences): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    10            
Final Prediction Error:   10            
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   3             
Schwarz Criterion:        2             
 
PORTMANTEAU TEST with 12 lags 
 
Portmanteau:               15.8122      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.2000       
Ljung & Box:               17.7338      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.1240       
 
JARQUE-BERA TEST: 
 
test statistic:            102.8845     
 p-Value(Chi^2):           0.0000       
skewness:                 -1.3559       
kurtosis:                  9.8062       
 
Break date search for series:  OMF_AUMIndex_d1  
sample range:                  [2007 M2, 2010 M12], T = 47 
searched range:                [2007 M2, 2010 M10], T = 45 
number of lags (1st diff):     0  
suggested break date:          2007 M4 
 
UR Test with structural break for series: OMF_AUMIndex_d1  
sample range:                  [2007 M2, 2010 M12], T = 47 
number of lags (1st diff):     0  
value of test statistic:      -5.3419    
used break date:               2007 M4 
shiftfunction:                 shift dummy  
critical values (Lanne et al. 2002): 
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--------------------------------------- 
 T          1%         5%         10%       
--------------------------------------- 
1000       -3.48      -2.88      -2.58      
--------------------------------------- 
regression results: 
--------------------------------------- 
variable      coefficient   t-statistic   
--------------------------------------- 
d(const)       22.4919       0.3073       
d(shiftfkt)   -63.0208      -0.8609       
 
OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS LAGS FROM INFORMATION CRITERIA 
 
sample range:             [2007 M12, 2010 M12], T = 37 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 10 lags of 1. differences): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    10            
Final Prediction Error:   10            
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   3             
Schwarz Criterion:        3             
 
PORTMANTEAU TEST with 12 lags 
 
Portmanteau:               16.6622      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.1628       
Ljung & Box:               18.8036      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.0934       
 
JARQUE-BERA TEST: 
 
test statistic:            112.7525     
 p-Value(Chi^2):           0.0000       
skewness:                 -1.7047       
kurtosis:                  9.8704       
 
UR Test with structural break for series: OMF_AUMIndex_d1  
sample range:                  [2007 M2, 2010 M12], T = 47 
number of lags (1st diff):     0  
value of test statistic:      -5.7508    
used break date:               2007 M4 
shiftfunction:                 shift dummy  
time trend included 
critical values (Lanne et al. 2002): 
--------------------------------------- 
 T          1%         5%         10%       
--------------------------------------- 
1000       -3.55      -3.03      -2.76      
--------------------------------------- 
regression results: 
--------------------------------------- 
variable      coefficient   t-statistic   
--------------------------------------- 
d(trend)       0.4723        0.0009       
d(const)       22.0197       0.2975       
d(shiftfkt)   -63.4930      -0.8579       
 
OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS LAGS FROM INFORMATION CRITERIA 
 
sample range:             [2007 M12, 2010 M12], T = 37 
 
optimal number of lags (searched up to 10 lags of 1. differences): 
Akaike Info Criterion:    10            
Final Prediction Error:   10            
Hannan-Quinn Criterion:   3             
Schwarz Criterion:        2             
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PORTMANTEAU TEST with 12 lags 
 
Portmanteau:               14.6843      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.2592       
Ljung & Box:               16.5445      
 p-Value (Chi^2):          0.1676       
 
JARQUE-BERA TEST: 
 
test statistic:            116.7432     
 p-Value(Chi^2):           0.0000       
skewness:                 -1.7703       
kurtosis:                  9.9551       
 
KPSS test for series:  OMF_AUMIndex_d1  
sample range:          [2007 M1, 2010 M12], T = 48 
number of lags:        0  
KPSS test based on y(t)=a+e(t) (level stationarity) 
asymptotic critical values: 
 10%        5%         1%         
0.347      0.463      0.739      
value of test statistic: 0.0000 
reference: reprinted from JOURNAL OF ECONOMETRICS, 
Vol 54, No 1, 1992, pp 159-178, Kwiatkowski et al: 
"Testing the null hypothesis of stationarity ...", 
with permission from Elsevier Science 
 
KPSS test for series:  OMF_AUMIndex_d1  
sample range:          [2007 M1, 2010 M12], T = 48 
number of lags:        0  
KPSS test based on y(t)=a+bt+e(t) (trend stationarity) 
asymptotic critical values: 
 10%        5%         1%         
0.119      0.146      0.216      
value of test statistic: 0.0000 
reference: reprinted from JOURNAL OF ECONOMETRICS, 
Vol 54, No 1, 1992, pp 159-178, Kwiatkowski et al: 
"Testing the null hypothesis of stationarity ...", 
with permission from Elsevier Science 
 
 
 
